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RECENT TRENDS IN THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INTER-
NATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRAL TRIBUNALS, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO 
TERRITORIAL AND BOUNDARY CASES* 
Miyoshi Masahiro" 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Traditionally a clear distinction is made between judicial settlement and ar-
bitration, with an emphasis on their functional differences. While such a dis-
tinction would have been reasonable as a matter of historical explanation of 
their separate functions, it seems a little too simplistic in view of their practice. 
Against this background, the present contribution will review the relationship 
between the International Court of Justice and international arbitral tribunals in 
the light of the territorial and boundary cases since the 1960s. 
Broadly it may be said that the distinction dates back to the time of the es-
tablishment of the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ).I The Per-
manent Court was set up with the intention of doing away with what were 
thought to be the defects of arbitration, especially its voluntary and ad hoc na-
ture. In that sense it was only natural to distinguish the new system from the 
traditional one. On the other hand, as the Permanent Court of Arbitration 
(PC A) had been in existence since 1899 and thus the institutionalisation of ar-
bitration had made a little progress, there was a need to stress the difference 
between the PCA and the newly organized Permanent Court of International 
Justice. Throughout its existence the PCIJ accomplished a good deal, and it 
was succeeded by the International Court of Justice (ICI) as the judicial arm of 
the United Nations Organisation. These developments would have contributed 
to the clear distinction of the PCIJ and ICJ from the traditional institution of 
• This is a translation with some amendments of a paper presented at the autumn session of the 
Japanese Association of International Law in October, 1996. Grateful acknowledgement is made of 
the usual help of my colleague Professor JOHN HAMILTON in improving the English in my text. 
•• Professor of International Law, Aichi University, Japan. 
I As early as at the Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 attempts were made to set up a 
permanent international court and make resort to arbitration compulsory. For a historic account of 
such attempts, see T AOKA RYOICHI, Kokusaiho III - Shinpan [International Law, Part III-New 
Edition] (1973)11-19. See also H.M. CORY, Compulsory Arbitration of International Disputes 
(1932)3-110; A.P. HIGGINS, The Hague Peace Conferences and Other International Conferences 
Concerning the Laws and Usages of War: Texts of Conventions with Commentaries (1909) 82-84; 
A.S. DE BUSTAMANTE, The World Coun (trans. by ELIZABETH F. READ, 1925) 41-67. 
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arbitration, and consequently to the wide recognition of the newer institution 
being superior to the traditional. 
Such recognition, however, was not shared by all states. The Permanent 
Court of Arbitration issued a circular note in 1960 with a view to urging its 
active use by states2 and the International Law Commission drafted the Model 
Rules on Arbitral Procedure in 1958,3 while the declined use of the ICJ in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s drove the General Assembly of the United Nations 
to a discussion of ways and means to activate it.4 As part of such efforts the 
Rules of Court were amended in 1972 and 1978 to encourage the use of a 
Chamber as provided for in Article 26(2), of the Statute of the Court.s A 
Chamber to be constituted under the amended Rules of Court, however, may 
be characterised as analogous to an arbitral tribunal. 
There were other moves around the commemoration of the 50th anniversary 
of the founding of the ICJ. The British Institute of International and Compar-
ative Law, for example, in March 1996 published the report of a study group 
on the ICJ's procedures and working methods,6 while in the field of arbitration 
the Permanent Court of Arbitration adopted a set of optional rules for arbitra-
tion in 19927 and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(CSCE) adopted a Convention on Conciliation and Arbitration in 1993.8 
The developments concerning review or improvement of judicial settlement 
and arbitration are significant. Reserving these for other studies, this contribu-
tion is limited to a comparison of recent judicial and arbitral decisions on terri-
torial and boundary disputes with a view to showing that the two institutions 
have considerable common or analogous points in substantive aspects, if not in 
procedural aspects. 
2 PCA, Circular Note of the Secretary-General, 3 March 1960, 54 AJIL (1960) 940-941. 
3 UN Doc. A/CN.4/113, 3 March 1958, ILC Yearbook 1958-II p. 12. 
4 See e.g. UNGA Res. 2733 (XXV),15 December 1970: 'Review of the role of the International 
Court of Justice'. For a report on the comments of the member states on this question, see UN 
Doc.A/8382 and Adds. 1-4: 'Report of the Secretary-General: review of the role of the International 
Court of Justice'. 
5 For a brief account of the amendments to the Rules of Court, see MIYOSHI MASAHIRO, 'Recent 
trends in international arbitration' (in Japanese), 113 Aichi Journal of Legal and Political Sciences 
(1987) 142-145. See also E. JIMENEZ DE ARECHAGA, 'The amendment to the rules of procedure of 
the International Court of Justice', 67 AJIL (1973) 1-22; G. GUYOMAR, Commentaire du Regle-
men! de la Cour Internationale de Justice, Interpretation et Pratique (1973); D.W. BOWEIT, 
'Contemporary developments in legal techniques in the settlement of disputes', 180 RdC (1983-11) 
183. 
6 D.W. BOWEIT, J. CRAWFORD, I. SINCLAIR, A.D. WAITS, 'The International Court of Justice: 
efficiency of procedures and working methods', (Report of the study group established by the 
British Institute of International and Comparative Law as a contribution to the UN Decade of 
International Law), 45 ICLQ Supplement SI-35 (1996). 
7 PCA, 'Optional rules for arbitrating disputes between two states', 20 October 1992, 32 ILM 
(1993) 575-86. 
8 Convention on Conciliation and Arbitration within CSCE. Annex 2 to 'Decision on peaceful 
settlement of disputes of 15 December 1992, 32 ILM (1993) 557-68. 
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2. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT AND 
ARBITRATION 
2.1. Classical differentiations 
5 
The basic idea of differentiating judicial settlement from arbitration would 
have been to signify the establishment of the Permanent Court of International 
Justice and emphasize its nature in contradistinction to the traditional method of 
arbitration. There used to be some arbitrations by tribunals without any arbi-
trators from third states as, for example, in the case of the Anglo-American 
arbitrations based on the Jay Treaty of 1794.9 Some arbitrations were even 
considered as another forum of diplomatic transactions. 1O Many arbitral awards 
were not reasoned. II The Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement oflnter-
national Disputes of 1899 for the first time included a clause that an award be 
reasoned,12 perhaps partly because the idea was beginning to prevail that an 
arbitral award should be reasoned. But it might also have shown a new idea of 
arbitration as it ought to be. 
The main characteristics of arbitration, as compared with judicial settle-
ment, would seem to be the parties' control over the composition of the tribu-
nal and the process of its proceedings.13 They would be a reflection of the 
state I s propensity for honour and insistence that it have as much control over its 
international relations as possible. In respect of the composition of the tribunal, 
whether an ad hoc tribunal or one of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, it is 
the states parties to the dispute that choose arbitrators. That such composition is 
problematical has been pointed out repeatedly, and as a way of improvement 
the PCU made its appearance. But this institution, and its successor also, still 
9 The Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation between Great Britain and the United States of 
19 November 1794, Arts. 5, 6 and 7. C. PARRY, 52 Consolidated Treaty Series 249,250,252. See 
also the 1903 Anglo-American Alaska Boundary arbitration in which the tribunal was composed of 
three arbitrators from each of the parties, 15 RIAA 481. 
10 In the Bay of Passamaquoddy Islands case of 1817 between Great Britain and the United States, 
the tribunal composed of one member from each of the parties determined the attribution of the 
islands. LB. MOORE stated that the British commissioner had exhibited much ability and skill in his 
'egotiations'with his American counterpart, while DE LAPRADELLE and POLITIS commented: "[la 
decision] n'est au fond, qu'une transaction ... les deux commissaires n'ont pas toute l'impartialite 
desirable." J .B. MOORE, 6 International Adjudications, Modem Series (1936) 36; A. DE 
LAPRADELLE et N. POLITIS, 1 Recueil des Arbitrages Internationaux (1905) 304. 
11 E.g. the award of the British Guyana/Venezuela Boundary case of 1899 was not reasoned, 11 
Proceedings of the Arbitration between the Government of Her Britannic Majesty and the United 
States of Venezuela: British Guyana-Venezuela Boundary (1899) 3237-3238. After handing down 
the award, the president of the tribunal stated that the rules of procedure used in this arbitration 
were mostly incorporated in the Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International 
Disputes of 1899, ibid. 3238. Ironically, Art. 52 of the Convention provides: "La sentence, votee it 
la majorite des voix, est motivee." J.B. SCOTT (ed.), Texts of the Peace Conferences at The Hague, 
1899 and 1907 (1908) 41. 
12 See supra n. 11. 
13 MIYOSHI, supra n. 5 at 133. 
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has a problem in its 'national' judges or judges of the nationality of each of the 
parties. The control by the parties over the arbitral process is technically multi-
faceted. But, common to all aspects involved is the strong will of the parties to 
have such control. Thus, the parties are free to keep the oral proceedings or 
written pleadings closed, and they may even refrain from publishing the 
award. 14 
This tendency of arbitration shows its low degree of objectivity. But it is 
quite another matter whether improving its objectivity is possible or whether it 
can contribute to states going to court. Indeed experience suggests that states do 
not altogether prefer higher objectivity of arbitration. 15 When, for example, the 
International Law Commission (lLC) requested governments for their com-
ments on its draft Model Rules on Arbitral Procedure, their replies included a 
considerable number of critical comments that an arbitral tribunal should prop-
erly be composed of arbitrators chosen by the parties, and that the draft rules 
make light of the will of the parties in procedural matters. 16 Likewise, the 
March 1960 Circular Note of the Secretary-General of the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration criticised the ILC's Model Rules on Arbitral Procedure for its pro-
visions conflicting with the essential nature of arbitration that arbitrators are 
14 The Arbitration Agreement of 10 July 1975 for the 1977 Anglo-French Continental Shelf case, 
Art. 9(4), provides that "Any question of the subsequent publication of the proceedings shall be 
decided by agreement between the two Governments". 18 RIAA 6. The compromis of 12 March 
1985 for the 1989 Guinea-Bissau/Senegal Maritime Boundary case, Art. 9(4), provides: "Les deux 
Gouvernements decident ou non de publier la sentence et/ou les pieces de procedure ecrites ou 
orales." 20 RIAA 124. 
15 MIYOSHI MASAHIRO, 'The state's propensity for control over the settlement of disputes', 104 
Aichi Journal of International Affairs (1996) 43-55. 
16 See, e.g., the reply of the Belgian government dated 13 March 1953 which stated that the ILC's 
draft articles, based on the idea of compulsory arbitration, would seem hardly acceptable if they 
were to secure the support of the majority of states, and that, according to the traditional concept of 
arbitration, the parties have the right to decide whether to submit a dispute to arbitration, to choose 
the arbitrators and to set the limits of the compromis. UN Doc. A/2456, 'Report of the International 
Law Commission to the General Assembly', ILC Yearbook 1953-11 p.232. The Brazilian delegation 
to the United Nations, in its note verbal of 24 March 1953, pointed out that the draft articles 
apparently ignored the fact that an arbitral tribunal owes its existence to the will of the parties. Ibid. 
233. In its reply dated 6 March 1953, the Indian government expressed its view that the idea of the 
IeJ being conferred compulsory jurisdiction by application of one of the parties without the consent 
of the other, in regard to the arbitrability of an existing dispute or the existence of an alleged 
dispute was unacceptable, and that the ruling principle of international arbitration was that there 
should be agreement of both parties, at least in the initial stages of the procedure. Ibid. 234. The 
Netherlands government, in its reply of 1 April 1953, with comparatively moderate criticism made 
a clear distinction between arbitration and judicial settlement and stressed the mediatory nature of 
arbitration as well as the 'prerogatives' of the parties in regard to both the composition of the 
tribunal and the course of the procedure. Ibid. 235. The British government, in its reply of 27 
February 1953, presented the exceptional view of accepting the idea of compulsory arbitration as 
drafted by the ILC. The US delegation to the United Nations in its note verbal of 11 March 1953 
simply acknowledged that the draft would have positive value as a statement of 'desired goals' in 
the field of arbitration. Ibid. 237, 238. 
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chosen by the parties. The Note suggested that the existing procedures remain 
unchanged. 17 
In respect of the applicable law, the Statute of the PCIJ contained a clear 
provision on the application of international law, giving the impression that its 
applicable law was different from that of traditional arbitrations. The 1928 
General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes provided for 
the three different methods of conciliation, judicial settlement and arbitration 
for different kinds of disputes. Following the General Act, the numerous bilat-
eral treaties for the pacific settlement of disputes which were concluded in the 
next few years created a pattern of submitting legal disputes to judicial settle-
ment and non-legal disputes to arbitration. 18 This classification of disputes 
would seem to have led on to the idea that different applicable laws should be 
applied to different kinds of disputes. Such understanding would have rein-
forced the clear distinction of arbitration and judicial settlement. 
2.2. Comparison in the light of recent developments 
Recent arbitral awards in territorial and boundary cases tend to show that 
they are not very different in reasoning from ICJ Judgments in similar cases. 
Judge M. LACHS admitted the general tendency of "increasing assimilation of 
arbitration to adjudication" on the one hand. On the other hand he approved the 
revision of the ICJ Rules of Court in respect of the formation of Chambers un-
der Article 26(2) of the Statute, by stating "[p ]rovided that the judicial charac-
ter of the proceedings is respected, I see little reason to spurn this injection into 
adjudication of some aspects of arbitral practice which States fmd attractive' .19 
According to CHRISTINE GRAY and B. KINGSBURY, the substantive differences 
between arbitration and judicial settlement have become less precise. 20 This is 
17 Permanent Court of Arbitration, supra n. 2, at 940-1. 
18 See United Nations, Systematic Survey of Treaties for the Pacific Settlement of International 
Disputes 1928-1948, New York, 1949. 
19 M. LACHS, in A.H.A. SOONS (ed.), International Arbitration: Past and Prospects (1991) 41, as 
quoted in E. MCWHINNEY, 'International arbitration and international adjudication: the different 
contemporary lots of the two Hague Tribunals', Canadian Yearbook of International Law (1991) 
406-407. The fact that one or two judges ad hoc were chosen to compose the Chambers in the Gulf 
of Maine, the Burkina Faso/Mali Frontier Dispute and the El Salvador/Honduras Land, Island and 
Maritime Frontier cases implies that the IC] Chambers thus constituted are not different from 
arbitral tribunals. In the Sicula Electronics Company case of 1989 two sitting national judges joined 
the chamber. 
20 C. GRAY and B. KINGSBURY, 'Developments in dispute settlement: inter-state arbitration since 
1945', 63 BYIL(1992) 98. In his dissenting opinion in the 1982 TunisialLibya Continental Shelf 
case, Judge GRaS warned against the 'arbitralisation', as it were, of IC] Chambers by saying that 
the Court must answer the request of states and declare the law, not attempt a conciliation by 
persuasion which does not belong to the Court's judicial role. IC] Reports (1982) 156, para. 24. 
Before an ICJ Chamber, by its original objective, the parties are permitted to submit a single 
written pleading only (Art. 92(1) Rules of Court). But in fact this rule has not been observed in the 
Gulf of Maine, the Burkina Faso/Mali and the El Salvador/Honduras cases. Although in these cases 
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shown, for example, in the fact that post-war compromis overwhelmingly refer 
to international law as the applicable law and that arbitral tribunals in cases 
where there was no express choice of law clause in the compromis have uni-
formly chosen to apply international law . 21 
GRAY and KINGSBURY also stated that there is no sign that states want to 
use arbitration mainly for non-legal disputes. Nor do arbitral tribunals seem 
prepared to avow openly that they will indulge in non-legal decision-making. 22 
There is no absolute contrast, they wrote, between judicial settlement and arbi-
tration in respect of consideration for the parties. Some arbitral tribunals appear 
to have failed to successfully engage with both parties, as in the Japanese 
House Tax and Beagle Channel cases, while some IeJ Judgments, for instance 
in the North Sea Continental Shelf, TunisialLibya Continental Shelf and Burk-
ina Faso/Mali Frontier Dispute cases have been notably successful in this re-
gard. 23 With respect to the question of diplomatic compromise as an alleged 
defect of the traditional arbitral practice,24 the authors stated that some tendency 
towards compromise is inherent in any process of collective decision. They 
observed that "[t]he Anglo-French Continental Shelf and Guinea/Guinea-Bissau 
maritime boundary arbitrations do not appear to involve more compromise or 
law-making than similar decisions of the IeJ" .25 I am entirely in agreement 
with these comments. 
Thus, recent developments do not show marked differences between judicial 
settlement and arbitration. Yet they have not completely assimilated into each 
other: the parties' control over the composition of the tribunal and the various 
procedural aspects of the proceedings remains unchanged as essential to the 
nature of arbitration. It is in the applicable law that assimilation is relatively 
discernible. For example, since the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf cases 
identified equitable principles as the applicable law in cases of maritime bound-
ary delimitation, all subsequent similar cases, whether decided by the IeJ or 
arbitral tribunals, have spoken of equitable principles. They are, however, 
thought to be part of international law, and normally strictly distinguished from 
decisions ex aequo et bono. 
more than one written pleading was filed in accordance with Art. 92(2) Rules of Court, the practice 
could be interpreted to point to the 'arbitralisation' of ICI chambers. 
21 GRAY and KINGSBURY, ibid. at 103-104. 
22 Ibid. 105. 
23 Ibid. 115. 
24 W.e. DENNIS, 'Compromise - the great defect of arbitration', 11 Columbia Law Review (1911) 
493-513. 
25 GRAY and KINGSBURY, loco cit. n. 20 at 116. 
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3. THE WORLD COURT AND ARBITRAL AWARDS 
3.1. Significance of reference to arbitral awards 
In international jurisprudence pcn and ICJ Judgments used to be thought to 
have higher authority, and placed on a higher level, than arbitral awards. 26 
Such grading would seem to hold basically true even today. ICJ Judgments are 
normally cited in subsequent cases and scholarly writings even though they 
were rendered in the absence of one of the parties or remain unfulfilled. 27 In 
arbitrations instituted by agreement between the parties, no preliminary objec-
tion is made to the jurisdiction of the tribunal nor, generally, does one of the 
parties refuse to appear before the tribunal,28 as in some cases before the ICJ. 
But as it is composed ad hoc for each case, an arbitral tribunal cannot be ex-
pected to pay particular attention to consistency or continuity of jurisprudence. 
The lack of such a systematic accumulation of case law as the pcn and ICJ 
have, would be the weakest point of arbitration. 
But the tendency towards undisputed supremacy of ICJ Judgments over ar-
bitral awards in international jurisprudence appears to have faded away now. 29 
Indeed, the recent compromis submitting territorial and boundary disputes to 
arbitration mostly refer to international law as the applicable law, 30 and there is 
little difference between the ICJ and arbitral tribunals in respect of the applica-
ble law. Furthermore, as a matter of fact some arbitral awards are frequently 
referred to in recent ICJ Judgments. This tendency is worthy to note. Such ref-
erence, however, appears not only in Judgments of the Court but also, quite 
often, in individual opinions of judges and the parties' written pleadings and 
oral arguments. References by the latter mean they are intended to strengthen 
the quoting parties' arguments, and thus have less objectivity. 
26 According to HUGH THIRLWAY, fonner Secretary at the ICJ, at the time he entered the service of 
the Court in 1968, there was "an unwritten rule of drafting that the Court only referred specifically 
to its own jurisprudence, never to arbitral awards." See his 'The law and procedure of the 
International Court of Justice 1960-1989: part two", 61 BYIL (1990) 128 n. 471. In a private 
conversation with Sir FRANCIS VALLAT in London on 2 July 1988, I was told that the ICJ never 
refers to arbitral awards. 
27 E.g. the Corfu Channel, Fisheries Jurisdiction, United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in 
Teheran, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua cases. 
28 In the 1970 Turriff Construction (Sudan) Ltd. v. Government of the Republic of the Sudan case, 
the Government refused to appear before the tribunal and the Government-nominated arbitrator 
stayed away from the proceedings, later to be replaced. 17 Nederlaruls Tijdschrift voor 
Intemationaal Recht [Netherlands International Law Review] (1970) 200-222. 
29 THIRLWAY, immediately after the sentence quoted above in n. 26, stated: "[t]his rule appears 
now to have been abandoned." THiRLWAY, supra n. 26 at 128 n. 471. 
30 A glance at ten compromis of arbitrations, from the Palena Boundary case of 1966 to the Mount 
Fitz Ray case of 1994, indicates that, except those for the Rann of Kutch and the Dubai/Sharjah 
Boundary cases, they provide for some fonn of international law as the basis of the decisions. In the 
Dubai/Sharjah case the award shows clearly that international law governed the case. See 91 ILR 
678. 
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What is important is the validity and persuasive power of the reasoning of 
individual arbitral awards. Perhaps the clincher would be what impact they can 
have on subsequent arbitral and ICJ decisions. 
3.2. Reference to arbitral awards by the ICJ 
There are some arbitral awards frequently referred to in ICJ Judgments. It 
is proposed here to identify what part(s) of such awards have been cited by the 
ICJ and how this was done. Some of these items are then taken up in the analy-
sis that follows. 
3.2.1. Peaceful and continuous display of State authority 
The principle of effective occupation was clearly propounded as the basic 
principle of acquisition of territory by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in 
the 1928 Island of Palmas case. The applicable law providing this classical 
precedent of effective occupation was "the principles of internatonaI law and 
any applicable treaty provisions".J' By highly legal reasoning, reputedly ex-
tremely careful and exemplary, the award states that: 
"[t]itles of acquisition of territorial sovereignty in present-day international law 
are either based on an act of effective apprehension, such as occupation or 
conquest, or, like cession, presuppose that the ceding and the cessionary 
Powers or at least one of them, have the faculty of effectively disposing of the 
ceded territory. " 
Thus the award held that: 
"the continuous and peaceful display of territorial sovereignty (peaceful in 
relation to other States) is as good as a title. ,,32 
This principle purports that such an act of the state surpasses natural accretion, 
contiguity or discovery33 to constitute a title to acquisition of territorial sover-
eignty. 
It is well known that the principle has since been quoted or cited in a good 
number of similar territorial cases. In the Legal Status of Eastern Greenland 
case of 1933, the earliest territorial case decided by the PCB after Island of 
Palmas, the Judgment stated: 
"La pretention du Danemark ne s'appuie pas sur un acte d'occupation en 
particuIier, mais invoque - pour se servir des mots qui figurent dans la sentence 
31 See the Preamble of the Special Agreement of 23 January 1925, 2 RIAA 831. 
32 Ibid. 839. 
33 Ibid. 839, 854, 845. 
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rendue Ie 4 avril 1928 par la Cour permanente d'Arbitrage dans l'affaire de l'ile 
de Palmas - un titre resultant «d'un exercice pacifique et continu de l'autorire 
etatique sur l'ile». ,,34 
11 
The PCIJ did not apply the principle at face value, but found that it was satis-
fied with very little in the way of the actual exercise of sovereign rights in the 
case of claims to sovereignty over areas in thinly populated or unsettled coun-
tries, such as Greenland, provided that the other state could not make out a su-
perior claim.35 In one of the most recent cases, the Land, Island and Maritime 
Frontier Dispute case of 1992 between El Salvador and Honduras, the ICJ 
Chamber quoted the crucial passage of the Island of Palmas case to say that 
"the law of acquisition of territory invoked by El Salvador is, in principle, 
clearly established and buttressed by arbitral and judicial decisions. ,,36 
In this connection a word is in order about the 1909 Grisbadama case in 
which the conduct of the state in the sea area in question was appreciated. The 
compromis provided that "Ie Tribunal aura a fixer cette ligne frontiere en tenant 
compte des circonstances de fait et des principes du droit international". 37 In-
deed the arbitral tribunal delimited the territorial sea boundary with due account 
taken of the 'circonstances de fait'. 38 The important circumstance that was 
taken into account was the conduct of the state concerned, and it was signifi-
cant that other states acquiesced in it. This case was referred to by the ICJ 
Chamber in its Judgment in the Gulf of Maine case of 1984, but the Chamber 
did so because the United States had extensively discussed this arbitral award in 
its pleadings. The Chamber found, however, that the issue of territorial sea 
boundary between Norway and Sweden was entirely different from that before 
it, and that even if the differences between the two cases were minimised, it 
was unable to conclude that the conduct of the United States was sufficiently 
clear, sustained and consistent to constitute acquiescence. 39 In contrast to this 
negative evaluation of the Grisbadarna case by the Chamber in 1984, Judge 
AlIBOLA, in his separate opinion in the 1994 case of Territorial Dispute be-
tween Libya and Chad, positively evaluated the conduct of the state as dis-
cussed in the Grisbadarna case in relation to acquiescence. 40 
34 PCIJ Publications, Series AlB No. 53 p. 45. 
35 Ibid. 46. 
36 ICJ Reports (1992) 563 para. 342. In the Libya/Chad Territorial Dispute case of 1994, Judge 
AJiBOLA in his separate opinion quotes this principle in emphasising the acquiescence of Spain and 
other countries. ICJ Reports (1994) 81 para. 109. In the same case Judge SEITE-CAMARA'S 
dissenting opinion also refers to this principle. Ibid. 98. 
37 11 RIAA 153-4. 
38 Ibid. 161-162. 
39 ICJ Reports (1984) 309 para. 146. 
40 See supra n. 36. 
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3.2.2. Critical date 
The notion of the critical date is used to denote the date on which the fact or 
act in question has a critical meaning, the date of the commencement of the 
dispute, or even a certain period of time during which the critical situation is 
thought to have lasted.41 In the sense of a critical meaning the concept is said to 
have been used for the first time by MAX HUBER in his award in the Island of 
Palmas case. 42 According to the award, as the island was ceded from Spain to 
the United States as a result of the peace treaty of 10 December 1898, the es-
sential point was whether at the time of the conclusion of the treaty the island 
formed a part of Spanish or Netherlands territory. The time referred to was 
called the 'critical moment', rather than the critical date, while the origin of the 
dispute was found in the visit by General LEONARD WOOD, then Governor of 
the Province of Moro, to the island on 21 January 1906.43 
In the Legal Status of Eastern Greenland case, Denmark maintained that it 
had long established effective occupation there at the time of the alleged Nor-
wegian occupation on 10 July 1931, whereas Norway argued that it had occu-
pied a terra nullius on that date. 44 Thus it was held that the critical date was 
that particular date, and that it was not necessary that Danish sovereignty over 
Greenland should have existed throughout the period preceding the date. Even 
if the material submitted to the Court were to be found insufficient to establish 
such sovereignty, the Court said, this would not exclude a finding that it was 
sufficient to establish a valid title in the period immediately preceding the Nor-
wegian occupation.45 On this particular point, however, the Judgment failed to 
refer expressly to the Island of Palmas case. 
It is well known that the critical date was extensively discussed in The Min-
quiers and Ecrehos case of 1953. In this case the point at issue was the date 
after which no subsequent acts of the parties had to be taken into account by the 
Court. France argued on the basis of the Anglo-French Convention on Fishery 
of 2 August 1839 that 1839 be the critical date, while the United Kingdom 
submitted that as the dispute had not 'crystallised' before the conclusion of the 
Special Agreement of 29 December 1950, this date should be considered as the 
critical date. 46 The Court found that no dispute had arisen before 1886 and 
41 For a detailed discussion of the concept of the critical date, see G.G. FITZMAURICE, 'The law 
and procedure of the International Court of Justice, 1951-4: points of substantive law. Part II', 32 
BYIL (1955-56) 20-44; D. BARDONNET, 'Les faits posterieurs a la date critique dans les differences 
territoriaux et frontaliers', Le Droit International au Service de la Paix, de la Justice et du 
Developpement: Melanges Michel ViTally (1991) 53-78. The arbitral award in the 1966 Palena 
Frontier case states that the parties agreed that the critical date is not necessarily the same for all 
purposes. 16 RIAA 167. 
42 FITZMAURICE, ibid. at 21; R.Y. JENNINGS, The Acquisition of Territory in Inter-national Law 
(1963) 31. 
43 2 RIAA 843, 836. 
44 PCIJ Publications Series AlB No. 53 p. 44. 
45 Ibid. 45. 
46 ICJ Reports {1953) 59. 
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1888, when France for the first time claimed sovereignty over the Ecrehos and 
the Minquiers respectively. But, in view of the "special circumstances of the 
present case", it held that "subsequent acts should also be considered by the 
Court, unless the measure in question was taken with a view to improving the 
legal position of the Party concerned" .47 The idea that post-critical date acts 
should also be taken into account had been suggested in the Island of Palmas 
case before,48 but the Minquiers Judgment says nothing of this earlier case on 
this point. 49 
Other arbitral awards which discussed the critical date in one way or an-
other include the 1966 Argentine-Chile Palena Frontier case, the 1977 Beagle 
Channel case, the 1981 Dubai-Sharjah Boundary case and the 1988 Location of 
Boundary Markers in Taba case between Egypt and Israel.5o 
3.2.3. Uti possidetis 
The principle of uti possidetis was referred to in the Burkina Faso/Mali 
Frontier Dispute case of 1986 and the El Salvador/Honduras Land, Island and 
Maritime Frontier Dispute case of 1992, both decided by ICJ Chambers. The 
latter Decision quotes the 1933 arbitral award in the Honduras Borders case 
between Guatemala and Honduras in discussing uti possidetis. The ICJ Cham-
ber, assuming that it should apply the principle of uti possidetis juris, according 
to which the new international boundaries follow the colonial administrative 
boundaries in Spanish America, states that the problem was to determine where 
those boundaries actually lay.51 Thus it quotes the arbitration of 1933 in which 
the task of the arbitrator was to determine the 'juridical line' of the 'uti pos-
sidetis of 1821'. But the quoted passage of the award conceded that, due to the 
lack of trustworthy information during colonial times, not only had the bounda-
ries of jurisdiction not been fixed with precision, but also great areas had re-
mained in which no effort had been made to assert any semblance of adminis-
trative authority. 52 Consequently the Chamber referred to this award in a nega-
tive sense. 
The principle of uti possidetis was discussed in more general terms, but 
without reference to any earlier arbitral award dealing with it, in the Burkina 
Faso/Ma/i Frontier Dispute case. The ICJ Chamber was expressly requested to 
47 Ibid. 
48 The arbitrator found that there could not be any question of ruling out the events of the period 
1898-1906. 2 RIAA 866. 
49 In the 1975 Western Sahara case, one of the questions on which the Court was requested to give 
an advisory opinion was whether Western Sahara was terra nullius at the time of its colonisation by 
Spain. ICI Reports (1975) p. 14, para. 1. But the Court held that it was not concerned to establish 
the critical date in the sense given to this term in territorial disputes. Ibid. 38 para. 76. 
50 Palena Frontier case, 16 RIAA 166; Beagle Channel case, 52 ILR 93; DuhaiiSharjah case, 91 
ILR 590-4; Taba case, 20 RIAA 45. In the Taba case the tribunal called the entire period of the 
mandate (29 September 1923 to 14 May 1948) "the critical period". Award, para. 172. 
51 ICI Reports (1992) 380 para. 28. 
52 2 RIAA 1325. 
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resolve the dispute on the basis of the "principe de l'intangibilite des frontieres 
heritees de la colonisation" ,53 and felt unable to disregard the principle of uti 
possidetis juris since its application precisely gives rise to respect for the 
'frontieres heritees'.54 According to the Chamber, the principle is not a special 
rule peculiar to the Spanish-American system of international law under which 
it was borne, but a principle of general scope which prevents the independence 
and stability of new states from being endangered by fratricidal struggles pro-
voked by the challenging of frontiers following the withdrawal of the adminis-
tering power. 55 In other words, the fact of the new African states respecting the 
boundaries established by the colonial powers must be seen, in the opinion of 
the Chamber, as the application of a general rule in Africa. 56 Thus, the Cham-
ber places this principle among the most important legal principles and yet 
makes no express reference to earlier arbitral awards dealing with it, notably 
the Honduras Borders case of 1933 in which the tribunal fully discussed the 
principle of Latin American origin. 
In the 1994 Libya/Chad Territorial Dispute case, Judge AJIBOLA developed 
an extensive discussion of uti possidetis in Section VII of his separate opinion, 
where he quotes a passage at the outset of the arbitral award in the Colom-
bia/Venezuela Frontiers case of 1922 that discusses the 'uti possidetis juris of 
1810' . 57 The Swiss Federal Council, as the arbitrator, shows a very clear pic-
ture of the principle58 in its strictly legal treatment of the case. 
3.2.4. Natural prolongation or appurtenance 
The North Sea Continental Shelf cases of 1969, in defining the concept of 
continental shelf as the basis for its delimitation, determined it to be the seabed 
and its subsoil as a natural prolongation of the land territory of the coastal 
State. 59 In another part of the Judgment the same idea was expressed by the 
principle that 'the land dominates the sea'. 60 The ICJ Judgment did not mention 
a precedent in its development of the concept, but the same Court had this to 
say in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case of 1951: 
53 See Preamble of the compromis of 16 September 1983. ICJ Reports (1986) 557. 
54 Ibid. 565 para. 20. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid. 565 para. 21. 
57 ICJ Reports (1994) 84-85 para. 118. 
58 1 RIAA 228. 
59 ICJ Reports (1969) 22 para. 19. For a comment on this point, see R.Y. JENNINGS, 'The limits of 
continental shelf jurisdiction: some possible implications of the North Sea Case Judgment', 18 
ICLQ (1969) 821-823, which sets store by the relevant clause of President TRUMAN'S Proclamation 
of 28 September 1945 and Art. 2 of the Convention on the Continental Shelf of 1958 which gives 
another expression to it. 
60 ICJ Reports (1969) 51 para. 96. In the 1978 Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Jurisdiction) case, the 
ICJ, on the basis of the North Sea cases, stated that "legally a coastal State's rights over the 
continental shelf are both appurtenant to and directly derived from the State's sovereignty over the 
territory abutting on that continental shelf'. ICJ Reports (1978) 36 para. 86. 
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" . . . il faut signaler de fac;on generale I' etroite dependence de la mer 
territoriale it l'egard du domaine terrestre. C'est la terre qui conrere it l'Etat 
riverain un droit sur les eaux qui baignent ses cotes." 61 
"[La laisse de basse mer] est Ie plus favorable it l'Etat cotier et met en evidence 
Ie caractere des eaux territoriales comme accessoire du territoire terrestre. ,,62 
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Here what was being considered was the territorial sea, and not the continental 
shelf, but the underlying idea would be the same. However, no reference was 
made to a precedent on this point either. 
The concept of appurtenance was clearly expounded long before in the ar-
bitral award in the Grisbadama case of 1909: 
"principes fondamentaux du droit des gens, tant ancien que moderne, d'apres 
lesquels Ie territoire maritime est une dependance necessaire d'un territoire 
terrestre" . 63 
For unknown reasons this precedent has not been referred to in subsequent 
cases. Perhaps the concept had already been established as such a commonality 
at the time of the Fisheries case that it required no citation of a precedent, or 
else it might have been due to the unwritten law of the IeJ that it only refer to 
its own jurisprudence and never to arbitral awards. 64 
Attention may now be turned to the relationship between the doctrine of 
natural prolongation and delimitation of the continental shelf. The North Sea 
cases Judgement stated expressly in its operative part: 
"delimitation is to be effected . . . in such a way as to leave as much as possible 
to each Party all those parts of the continental shelf that constitute a natural 
prolongation of its land territory into and under the sea, without encroachment 
on the natural prolongation of the land territory of the other. 65 
That pronouncement would appear to give the impression that natural prolon-
gation has a direct link to delimitation. If the North Sea cases presented an 
'absolutist' doctrine of natural prolongation, the 1977 arbitral award in the An-
glo-French Continental Shelf case slightly revised the doctrine. Referring to the 
North Sea cases on this point, the arbitral award stated: "[s]o far as delimitation 
is concerned, however, this conclusion states the problem rather than solves 
it" . 66 It pronounced first in general terms: 
"[I]t is clear both from the insertion of the 'special circumstances' provision in 
Article 6 and from the emphasis on 'equitable principles' in customary law that 
61 IC] Reports (1951) 133. 
62 Ibid. 128. 
63 11 RIAA 159. 
64 See supra n. 26. 
65 IC] Reports (1%9) 53 para. 101(c)(I). 
66 18 RIAA 49 para. 79. 
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the cardinal principle of 'natural prolongation of territory' is not absolute, but 
may be subject to qualification in particular situations. ,,67 
It then went on to say that "[t]he application of that principle [i.e. of natural 
prolongation] ... has to be appreciated in the light of all the relevant geo-
graphical and other circumstances" and that "the effect to be given to the prin-
ciple of natural prolongation of the coastal State I s land territory is always de-
pendent not only on the particular geographical and other circumstances but 
also on any relevant considerations of law and equity" .68 
It is with this logic that the award concludes that a physical feature called 
Hurd Deep-Hurd Deep Fault Zone in the English Channel should not be con-
sidered as a gap in the natural prolongation of the land territory. It adds, im-
portantly, that "to attach critical significance to ... the Hurd Deep-Hurd Deep 
Fault Zone in delimiting the continental shelf boundary ... would run counter 
to the whole tendency of State practice on the continental shelf in recent 
years" . 69 Thus the arbitral tribunal took a 'relativist' position on the doctrine of 
natural prolongation. 
The Tunisia/Libya Continental Shelf case of 1982 referred to the Hurd Deep 
as a precedeneo in turning down the argments of natural prolongation and geol-
ogy which the parties developed most elaborately. 71 The Hurd Deep was also 
referred to in the Gulf of Maine case of 1984.72 It would be another instance of 
the impact of the Hurd Deep that the rift zone which Libya claimed to be a 
major feature was rejected as a relevant factor to be taken into account in de-
limitation in the Libya/Malta Continental Shelf case of 1985.73 
3.2.5. Customary law of maritime boundary delimitation 
The North Sea cases of 1969 showed that the customary law of continental 
shelf delimitation is that "delimitation is to be effected by agreement in accor-
dance with equitable principles, and taking account of all the relevant circum-
stances . . .".74 The Anglo-French Continental Shelf case of 1977 contributed to 
the further elaboration of this law. The Court of Arbitration made an effort to 
fuse, as it were, the mentioned customary law and the delimitation rule as pro-
vided for in the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf into one. Its award 
stated on this point: 
67 Ibid. 91 para. 191. 
68 Ibid. 92 para. 194. 
69 Ibid. 60 para. 107. The Court of Arbitration also took into account the fact that the United King-
dom had agreed to the drawing of a median line between it and Norway in disregard of the 
Norwegian trough in the 196Os. 
70 IC] Reports (1982) 57 para. 66. 
71 Ibid. 43-47 paras. 38-44; 50-54 paras. 52-61. 
72 IC] Reports (1984) 274 para. 46. 
73 IC] Reports (1985) 34-7 paras. 35-41. 
74 IC] Reports (1969) 53 para. 101(c)(I). 
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"[T]he role of the 'special circumstances' condition in Article 6 is to ensure an 
equitable delimitation; and the combined 'equidistance-special circumstances 
rule', in effect, gives particular expression to a general norm that, failing 
agreement, the boundary between States abutting on the same continental shelf 
is to be determined on equitable principles. ,,75 
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The 'combined rule' thus enunciated was later quoted in the Gulf of Maine case 
of 1984 as confirming the formula of customary law of the North Sea cases.76 
The quoted passage of the Anglo-French case award was further quoted as a 
'much-quoted passage' in the Greenland/Jan Mayen Maritime Delimitation 
case of 1993.77 
It is interesting to note that the Gulf of Maine case was concerned not only 
with the continental shelf but also the fisheries zone, and that the ICJ Chamber 
was requested to draw a single line of delimitation common to the two regimes. 
It is of great significance that the Chamber thought the 'combined rule' to be 
the guiding principle in determining the single boundary line with primary ac-
count taken of the geographical factors. The Libya/Malta Continental Shelf 
case, in which the ICJ was requested to decide on the continental shelf only, 
found that the principles and rules underlying the concept of the exclusive eco-
nomic zone could not be left out of consideration, that the two institutions were 
linked together in modem law and consequently that greater importance must 
be attributed to elements, such as distance from the coast, which are common 
to both concepts. 78 Subsequently, the Greenland/Jan Mayen case of 1993 
quoted the relevant passage of the Libya/Malta case Judgment in its entirety,79 
thus indirectly appreciating the formula of the Anglo-French award. 
Another point of interest about the formation of customary law of maritime 
boundary delimitation is the fact that reference is made to the contribution of 
unspecified arbitral awards. In its context of reviewing the concept of 'relevant 
circumstances' in comparison with customary law and the provisions of Article 
6 of the Convention on the Continental Shelf, the ICJ Judgment in the Green-
land/Jan Mayen case states: "General international law, as it has developed 
through the case-law of the Court and arbitral jurisprudence, and through the 
work of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, has em-
ployed the concept of 'relevant circumstances'. This concept can be described 
as a fact necessary to be taken into account in the delimitation process". 80 Ar-
bitral jurisprudence is thus duly appreciated along with the ICJ case-law and the 
work of UNCLOS-III. 81 
75 18 RIAA 45 para. 70. 
76 IeJ Reports (1984) 293 para. 92. 
77 IeJ Reports (1993) 58 para. 46. 
78 IeJ Reports (1985) 33 para. 33. 
79 IeJ Reports (1993) 58-9 para. 46. 
80 Ibid. 62, para. 55. 
81 Judge MOSLER made a statement of similar effect in his dissenting opinion in the Libya/Malta 
case. He mentioned 40 years of development of international law regarding delimitation of 
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3.2.6. Legal status of islands 
In the Anglo-French case the size and importance of the Channel Islands was a 
point at issue. They were in the end accorded an enclave of continental shelf 
area on the French side of the continental shelf divided by a median line. 82 In 
the Libya/Malta case this treatment of the Channel Islands was compared with 
the legal status of the island State of Malta. Apart from its very small size as 
compared with that of Libya, Malta was assumed to have a continental shelf 
area on the basis of its legal status as an independent State. 83 
Again in the Anglo-French case the status of the Scilly Isles was discussed 
extensively. In view of the relationship between their distance from the main-
land and that of lle d 'Ouessant off the French mainland, a 'half-effect' was ac-
corded to the Scillies based on considerations of equity. 84 This method of giv-
ing partial effect to islands of a State depending on their location, in the de-
limitation of maritime boundaries was later considered as a precedent for the 
half-effect to be accorded to the Kerkennah Islands in the Tunisia/Libya case of 
1982 and to Seal Island in the Gulf of Maine case of 1984.85 The method was 
further quoted in the Greenland/Jan Mayen case of 1993 as a precedent for 
first drawing a provisional median line and then adjusting it in the light of spe-
cial circumstances. 86 The logic of the ICI was that the existence of the Scilly 
Isles in the Anglo-French case was the special circumstance justifying the ad-
justment or shifting of a median line provisionally adopted. 
3.2.7. Proportionality 
In the North Sea cases it was found that equity requires that in the delimita-
tion of continental shelf boundaries there be a reasonable degree of proportion-
ality between the extent of the continental shelf appertaining to the coastal states 
and the lengths of their respective coastlines. 87 This principle has been applied 
in all subsequent cases of maritime boundary delimitation. But in the Anglo-
French case the principle was constituted in the opposite way: an important 
consideration was how disproportion should be corrected. The award stated: 
maritime areas, and stated that further detailed developments must be left to the case-law, "not 
forgetting the arbitrations between France and Great Britain in 1977 and ... between Guinea-
Bissau and Guinea in 1985". ICJ Reports (1985) 114. 
82 18 RlAA 88,89-90 paras. 184 and 187. 
83 ICJ Reports (1985) 42 paras 52-3. 
84 18 RIAA 116 para. 249. This finding of the Court of Arbitration was based on the practice of 
States which includes some instances of partial effect, and especially one precedent of half effect. 
This, however, is not identified in the award. Ibid. 117 para. 251. For a discussion of this point, 
see MIYOSHI MASAHIRO, 'The arbitration on the delimitation of the continental shelf in the English 
Channel' [in Japanese], 87 Aichi Journal o/Legal and Political Sciences (1978) 146 n. 10. 
85 ICJ Reports (1982) 89 para. 129; ICJ Reports (1984) 337 para. 222. 
86 ICJ Reports (1993) 61 para. 51. 
87 ICJ Reports (1969) 52 para. 98. 
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"In short, it is disproportion rather than any general principle of proportionality 
which is the relevant criterion or factor. ... [Ilt is rather a question of remedy-
ing the disproportionality and inequitable effect produced by particular 
geographical configurations or features in situations where otherwise the 
appurtenance of roughly comparable attributions of continental shelf to each 
State would be indicated by the geographical facts. ,,88 
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This principle of proportionality as expressed conversely was employed in 
the Gulf of Maine case without reference to its being the formula of the Anglo-
French case.89 By contrast, the relevant passage of the arbitral award was 
quoted in its entirety in the Libya/Malta case,9O where the conclusion was that 
"there is certainly no evident disproportion in the areas of shelf attributed to 
each of the Parties respectively such that it could be said that the requirements 
of the test of proportionality as an aspect of equity were not satisfied" .91 Again 
in the Greenland/fan Mayen case the earlier cases of proportionality, including 
this conversely expressed principle, were quoted briefly but exhaustively. 92 
3.2.8. Obligation to negotiate in good faith 
That negotiations between the parties to a dispute must be conducted in 
good faith has been pointed out time and again. The North Sea cases, for ex-
ample, discussed the obligation of the parties to negotiate as far as possible 
with a view to arriving at an agreement, by referring to the PCIJ Advisory 
Opinion in the Railway Traffic between Lithuania and Poland case of 1931.93 
The Advisory Opinion, while discussing the obligation to negotiate, did not 
require the obligation to reach agreement. 94 But some years before in the 
Chile/Peru Tacna-Arica case of 1925, the arbitral award had already held that 
whilst good faith in negotiations was important, it was not illegal if the parties 
failed to agree in the end: 
"The question now presented is not whether the particular views, proposals, 
arguments and objections of either Party during the course of the negotiations 
should be approved, but as to the good faith with which these views, proposals, 
arguments and objections were advanced. The failure to agree upon a special 
protocol fixing the conditions of the plebiscite cannot therefore be regarded as 
being in itself a breach of the treaty. ,,95 
88 18 RIAA 58 para. 101. 
89 IC] Reports (1984) 323 para. 185. 
90 IC] Reports (1985) 44-45 para. 57. 
91 Ibid. 55 para. 75. 
92 IC] Reports (1993) 67-8 para. 66. See also ibid. 68-9 paras. 67-70. 
93 IC] Reports (1969) 47-48 para. 87. 
94 PCIJ Publications, Series AlB No. 42, p. 116, where the Pennanent Court said: "Mais I'engage-
ment de negocier n'impJique pas celui de s'entendre et notamment iI n'en resulte pas pour la 
Lithuanie I'engagement et, en consequence, I'obligation de condure les accords administratifs et 
techniques indispensables pour Ie retablissement du trafic sur la section de Jigne de chemin de fer 
Landwarow-Kaisiadorys" . 
95 2 RIAA 933. 
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The same logic was used in the Lac Lanoux arbitration of 1957. The award 
affirmed the necessity of prior notification, but denied the obligation to secure 
the other party's agreement which would amount to the right of veto. 96 
Thus the obligation to negotiate in good faith, as developed in the Lac 
Lanoux and North Sea cases was referred to by Judge GROS in his dissenting 
opinion in the Tunisia/Libya case of 1982.97 
4. DECISIONS EX AEQUO ET BONO 
Over a long period of time there were very few cases in which the PCIJ or 
ICJ and arbitral tribunals decided expressly ex aequo et bono. However, a 
number of judicial and arbitral cases, especially in the sphere of maritime 
boundary delimitation, have been decided by the application of equity since the 
North Sea cases of 1969. Although in this contribution the examination of eq-
uitable cases is not specifically intended, it is proposed here to include some of 
such cases which might be suspected of having been decided ex aequo et bono. 
4.1. Judicial cases 
Among the cases decided by the PCIJ and ICJ there is none that has been 
clearly decided ex aequo et bono. But a few cases have been criticised for al-
legedly deciding ex aequo et bono. A case in point is the North Sea cases. In 
this first-ever case of continental shelf delimitation, Denmark and the Nether-
lands argued in favour of the application of the equidistance principle as laid 
down in the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf, while the Federal Re-
public of Germany as a non-party to the Convention asserted that 'just and eq-
uitable share' be the guiding principle. The Court rejected both contentions on 
the grounds that the first was not a customary rule of international law and that 
the second relied on the theory of distributive justice, and instead preached in 
favour of the application of equitable principles. In discussing equity, the Court 
maintained that distributive justice, which means attribution, was foreign to 
delimitation which means the identification of the boundary line between the 
overlapping continental shelf areas of coastal States. But it might be doubted 
whether the Court's Judgment did not involve any idea of distribution. For ex-
ample, in its finding that given the comparable lengths of the coastlines of the 
three countries, the area of the continental shelf which accrues to Germany by 
the application of the equidistance principle would be unduly small in the light 
96 The arbitral award states: "De toute faeon, I'obligation de donner I'avis pn!alable ne renfermer 
pas celie, beaucoup plus etendue, d'obtenir I'accord de l'Etat avise; Ie but de I'avis peut etre tout 
autre que celui de consentir Ii [l'Etat] B l'exercise du droit de veto ... ". 12 RIAA 309. 
97 GROS stated: "n n'y a pas de negociation, si chaque Partie, ou l'une d'elles, insiste sur sa propre 
position sans jamais envisager d'attenuation ou de modification." leI Reports (1982) 145 para. 4. 
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of the proportionality principle, there could be an indication that the Court 
might have taken distributive justice into account. Thus criticism could arise 
that such a consideration or finding is one ex aequo et bono or extraneous to 
the framework of law. 98 
It was found in the Tunisa/Libya case of 1982 that equitable principles are 
those which produce equitable results.99 If that is so, it is hard to see how the 
application of equitable principles is distinguished from a decision ex aequo et 
bono which is also intended to provide an equitable solution. loo In the 
Libya/Malta case of 1985, the Court held that in light of the great difference in 
the lengths of the coastlines of the parties, it was equitable to attribute a much 
larger continental shelf area to Libya by transposing the provisionally deter-
mined median line towards Malta through 18' of latitude. 101 Here a suspicion 
may arise that a consideration of proportionality did in fact mean a distribution 
of the continental shelf, a case of deciding ex aequo et bono. Furthermore, the 
Court's Judgement that it was justified to 'attribute' a larger shelf area to Libya 
in view of the great difference in length between the coasts of the two coun-
tries102 conflicts with its own strong denial in the North Sea cases that delimita-
tion included attribution of a shelf area. Still another point that is hard to under-
stand is how the idea of shifting the provisional dividing line through 18', 
rather than say 10', of latitude may be justified. What is the right basis of cal-
culation of 18', rather than 10', for the distance of transposition? How can it be 
claimed to be different from the past arbitral decisions ex aequo et bono in the 
estimation of damages or the calculation of the rate of interest on the damages? 
A somewhat similar suspicion may be raised with regard to the Court's 
finding in the Greenland/Jan Mayen case. It would suffice here to refer to the 
individual opinions of three judges. In his separate opinion Judge 0DA admitted 
that the Court's choice of "the line ... cannot be categorized as mistaken be-
cause it represents one choice from an infinite number of potential lines of de-
limitation in this area", but "venture[d] to suggest that it was drawn in an arbi-
trary manner, unsupported by any sufficiently profound analysis" .103 Judge 
98 See W. FRIEDMANN, 'The North Sea Continental Shelf cases - a critique', 64 AJIL (1970) 236: 
"But what can scarcely be doubted is that, by rejecting the criteria laid down in the convention and 
other documents, the Court, in effect, was giving a decision ex aequo et bono, under the guise of 
interpretation. The Court applied a kind of distributive justice while denying that it was doing so." 
99 The ICJ Judgment stated: "It is, however, the result which is predominant; the principles are 
subordinate to the goal. The equitableness of a principle must be assessed in the light of its 
usefulness for the purpose of arriving at an equitable result. It is not every such principle which is 
in itself equitable; it may acquire this quality by reference to the equitableness of the solution." ICJ 
Reports (1982) 59 para. 70. 
100 See MIYOSHI MASAHIRO, Considerations of Equity in the Settlement of Territorial and Boundary 
Disputes (1993) 192. 
101 ICJ Reports (1985) 52 para. 73. 
102 ICJ Reports (1985) 50 para. 68, where the Court stated: "In the view of the Court, this 
difference is so great as to justify the adjustment of the median line so as to attribute a larger shelf 
area to Libya ... " (emphasis added). 
103 Emphasis in original. ICJ Reports (1993) 117 para. 100. 
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SCHWEBEL in his separate opinion commented that "the Court by this holding 
of distributive justice has departed from the accepted law of the matter, as 
fashioned pre-eminently by it". 104 Judge SHAHABUDDEEN in his separate opin-
ion stated that "the equitable principles which the Court applies lack concrete-
ness to the point where the Court is in fact exercising a range of discretion 
which is practically indistinguishable from a power to decide ex aequo et 
bono". 105 
In this connection an intriguing comment made by a former judge of the 
International Court of Justice may be quoted. In his private letter addressed to 
ELIHU LAUTERPACHT in May 1978, Sir GERALD FITZMAURICE is said to have 
made some observations on LAUTERPACHT'S critical comments on the way eq-
uitable principles were applied in the North Sea and Anglo-French cases, by 
confiding that: 
"where ... the Tribunal is precluded by its Statute or terms of reference from 
deciding ex aequo et bono, but is in fact doing just that, it cannot avow it, and 
has to take refuge in silence. ,,106 
4.2. Arbitral jurisprudence 
4.2.1. Claims cases 
When discussing a decision ex aequo et bono, one cannot afford to ignore a 
considerable number of claims cases which have been decided on that basis. 
But since this contribution is intended to discuss territorial and boundary cases, 
it is proposed here to take up just a few claims cases. There are not so many 
compromis using the formula of ex aequo et bono as such, but arbitrations ap-
plying this basis of decision abound besides those which, while they were to be 
decided on the basis of, say 'absolute equity' or 'law and equity', would in fact 
have been decided ex aequo et bono. 
A decision ex aequo et bono was made in the Death of James Pugh case of 
1933 in accordance with the provisions to that effect in the compromis. On 30 
June 1929 JAMES PUGH, an Irish seaman who had been drinking heavily for 
some hours in Colon in Panama, resisted arrest and was clubbed to death by 
the police. The arbitrator found that the clubbing was not in excess of the law-
ful discharge of police duties under the prevailing circumstances, and dismissed 
the claim of the British Government against the Government of Panama.t07 He 
acted under Article 3 of the compromis, "taking into consideration solely for 
104 Ibid. 120. 
105 Ibid. 193. 
106 Emphasis Sir GERALD FITZMAURICE's. E. LAUTERPACHT, Aspects of the Administration of 
International Justice (1991) 125 n. 19. 
107 3 RIAA 1441-53. 
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the finding of the facts the proofs which with regard thereto are to be found in 
the record, [to] decide ex aequo et bono on the questions" .108 
In the 1931 Campbell case, Major CAMPBELL by a signed document de-
clared on 5 December 1912 that he abandoned his lease of a mining concession 
in Mozambique in favour of its legitimate owners without right to any indem-
nity, and the Government of Portugal consented in 1912 to indemnify 
CAMPBELL for damage suffered. The arbitrator was asked to decide on the ef-
fect of the declared abandonment and on the amount of indemnity if any was 
due. The compromis provided for "a speedy settlement of the question in ac-
cordance with the principles of law and equity". 109 But in the arbitrator's rea-
soning the calculation of the indemnity was shown to be made ex aequo et 
bono.110 
In the Tinoco arbitration of 1923 the basis of decision was "existing Agree-
ments, the principles of Public and International Law", III but the single arbi-
trator thought himself justified in proceeding ex aequo et bono, at least in part, 
and held that: 
"the [Royal Bank] is subrogated to the title of Costa Rica in the mortgage and 
that . . . Costa Rica should transfer and assign the mortgage to the bank for its 
benefit, together with any interest which may have been meantime collected 
thereon. ,,112 
The arbitral tribunal in the Nonvegian Shipowners' Claims case of 1922 was 
to proceed "in accordance with the principles of law and equity". 113 But in a 
section of the award, the tribunal discussed "The Law Governing the Arbitra-
tion" and stated that "[t]he words 'law and equity' ... can not be understood 
in the traditional sense in which they are used in Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence" 
but rather mean "general principles of justice as distinguished from any par-
ticular system of jurisprudence or the municipal law of any State". In the view 
of the tribunal, the majority of international lawyers seem to agree on this un-
derstanding of the formula. 114 Thus the tribunal proceeded to assess the amount 
of compensation and interest ex aequo et bono. 115 
In the series of protocols of agreement of 1903 instituting claims of ten 
Euro-American States against Venezuela, the basis of decision was 'absolute 
equity' ,116 but the arbitrations, at least in part, proceeded on a basis which is 
108 Ibid. 1442. 
109 See Preamble of the 'Compromis d'arbitrage concernant les reclamations du Major Campbell' of 
1 August 1930, para. 4, 2 RIAA 1147. 
110 Ibid. 1157. 
III Art. 1 of the compromis of 12 January 1922, 1 RIAA 372. 
112 Ibid. 395. 
113 Art. 1 of the compromisof30 June 1921,1 RIAA31O. 
114 Ibid. 331. 
115 Ibid. 339, 340, 341. 
116 Art. 1 of the Protocol of Agreement between the United States and Venezuela of 17 February 
1903, the earliest of ten such protocols: "The commissioners, or, in case of their disagreement, the 
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hard to be distinguished from deciding ex aequo et bono. For example, in the 
British-Venezuelan mixed claims commission, the umpire had this to say in his 
award: 
"The phrase 'absolute equity' used in the protocols the umpire understands and 
interprets to mean equity unrestrained by any artificial rules in its application to 
the given case. ,,117 
4.2.2. Territorial and boundary cases 
Among the cases of territorial and boundary disputes the Chaco case of 
1938 is the one of which the compromis expressly referred to ex aequo et bono. 
Article 2 provided that the boundary line should be determined by the Presi-
dents of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, the United States, Peru and Uruguay "en 
leur qualite d'arbitres selon l'equite, lesquels, agissant ex aequo et bono, for-
muleront leur decision arbitrale conformement a la presente clause et aux 
clauses ci-apres.'J18 The arbitrators acted on this basis of decision, and said that 
the decided boundary was equitable. The compromis in this case was, however, 
the Bolivia-Paraguay Peace Treaty, and the arbitration accordingly was an as-
pect of the post-bellum adjustment between the two countries involving consid-
erations of peace and security. 1\9 
Similarly, a cease-fire agreement constituted the compromis for the 1968 
Rann of Kutch case. The tribunal was directed under the agreement to act "in 
the light of [the parties] respective claims and evidence produced before it" .120 
During the meetings of the tribunal in February 1966 the question arose 
whether it had the power to decide ex aequo et bono. After hearing the parties 
on this issue the tribunal decided that, as both parties pointed out, equity forms 
part of international law and therefore the parties were free to present and de-
velop their cases with reliance on principles of equity. As the compromis did 
not authorize the tribunal clearly and beyond doubt to decide ex aequo et bono 
and the parties had not consented by any subsequent agreement to confer it the 
power to do so, the tribunal resolved that it had no such power.l2l Based on 
this understanding of the applicable law, the tribunal carefully proceeded to 
examine the huge volume of evidence presented by the parties. In the last part 
of the decision, or the opinion of the chairman of the tribunal in which the ar-
bitrator nominated by Pakistan concurred, the two deep inlets on either side of 
Nagar Parkar (a peninsula-shaped Pakistani territory jutting into the Indian ter-
umpire, shall decide all claims upon a basis of absolute equity, without regard to objections of a 
technical nature, or of the provisions of local legislation. " 9 RIAA 115. 
117 Ibid. 444. 
118 3 RIAA 1819. 
119 See MIYOSHI, supra n. 100 at 165. 
120 Art. 3 (ii) of the Agreement of 30 June 1965, 17 RIAA 8. 
121 Ibid. 11. 
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ritory) were awarded to Pakistan for considerations of peace and stability. The 
opinion of the chairman states: 
"In my opinion it would be inequitable to recognise these inlets as foreign 
territory. It would be conducive to friction and conflict. The paramount 
consideration of promoting peace and stability in this region compels the 
recognition and confirmation that this territory, which is wholly surrounded by 
Pakistan territory, also be regarded as such. ,,122 
This consideration is highly political, and therefore extra-legal, in nature, and 
would go beyond the bounds of equity as part of law. It could thus be consid-
ered to be a decision ex aequo et bono which the tribunal categorically denied 
in its preliminary fmding. 
There are some other territorial and boundary arbitrations in which a con-
sideration of compromise was given. In the otherwise strictly legalistic award 
of the Beagle Channel case of 1977, for example, an exceptional compromise 
decision was made: 
"If therefore, as the Court thinks, Argentina . . . obtained the whole of 
Patagonia north of the Dungeness-Andes line and east of the Cordillera of the 
Andes, it does not seem unreasonable to regard Chile as receiving in principle. 
. . the much smaller area between that line and Cape Horn . . .. " 123 
The others include: the 1931 Aaroo Mountain case between Saudi Arabia and 
Yemen where the former made a full concession to the latter for a considera-
tion of peace combined with a spirit of chivalry; the 1817 Bay of Pas-
samaquoddy Islands case between Great Britain and the United States in which 
the arbitrators allegedly made diplomatic transactions; the 1914 Dutch-
Portuguese Island of Timor case where consideration was given to avoiding 
undue advantage being obtained by one of the parties; the 1897 Manica Bound-
ary case in which the arbitrator took into account the concession which Great 
Britain had made of granting a large area of territory in the north of the Zam-
bezi to Portugal in compensation for what Portugal would lose in the Manica 
Plateau; and the 1961 Honduras-Nicaragua Boundary Demarcation case where 
the mixed commission devised an artificial line to reconcile the claims of the 
parties which both conformed to the treaty. 124 
On the whole, older arbitrations seem to have more examples of decisions 
ex aequo et bono. While in most of these cases the arvitrators were not directed 
to decide ex aequo et bono, they nevertheless wielded their discretion in de-
ciding in that way. If the Permanent Court of International Justice and the In-
ternational Court of Justice have never made a decision ex aequo et bono, it is 
because the parties have never consented to such a basis for decision. But as we 
122 Ibid. 57!. 
123 Emphasis in original; 52 ILR 144 para. 46. 
124 For a more detailed discussion of each of these cases, see MIYOSHI, supra n. 100 at 166-70. 
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have seen above, some judicial cases could substantially be suspected of having 
been decided by considerations ex aequo et bono. 
Common to arbitration and judicial settlement in this connection seems to be 
the tribunal's consideration for the position of each of the parties, i. e. consid-
eration to make its decision equitable and acceptable to them both. Here again a 
comment by FITZMAURICE may be quoted, on the importance of consideration 
for the litigant parties and especially the losing party: 
"States and parties in the international field - entities which are proud, 
sensitive, and always to some extent at the mercy of their own domestic public 
opinion - disposed also to be distrustful of legal procedures - need to be given 
the feeling that their arguments have been adequately considered and above all, 
understood - so that they have something to show for the risks they have taken 
in going to law. ,,125 
Inasmuch as the primary function of either institution is to settle disputes, the 
satisfactoriness of a decision would be the pre-condition for the parties to ac-
cept and fulfil it. It is needless to say, however, that it does not mean to ar-
range an easy compromise. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
We have seen above that, while there are differences in degree in the par-
ties' control over the composition of the tribunal and the conduct of proceed-
ings, arbitration and judicial settlement in recent territorial and boundary cases 
do not present marked differences in the basis of their decisions nor in their 
reasoning. This is not, of course, to deny that there are some characteristic ar-
bitrations, such as the Rann of Kutch, the Taba Boundary and the 
DubaiiSharjah Boundary cases, in which very careful consideration was given 
to the claims of the parties. In the Rann of Kutch case an exceptional attempt 
was made to show the draft text of the award to the parties for comment before 
its formal adoption. This arrangement is recorded in the 'Introductory Note' of 
the award, \26 and implies that it was made with the consent of the parties. In 
the Taba case a chamber of three arbitrators was set up within the tribunal of 
five, so that they were allowed to have consultations with the agents of the par-
ties for settlement. This was the first-ever attempt of its kind in any arbitration, 
although un-successful. The procedure was in fact expressly provided for in the 
compromis127 on the basis of the consent of the parties. All these cases are ex-
ceptional, however. Most recent arbitrations on territorial and boundary cases 
125 G.G. FITZMAURICE, 'Hersch Lauterpacht and his attitude to the judicial function", 50 BYIL 
(1979) 11. 
126 17 RIAA 3. 
127 Art. 9 of the compromis of 11 September 1986, 20 RlAA 111. 
RECENT TRENDS IN ICJ JURISPRUDENCE 27 
basically do not seem to be different from similar IC] cases as far as the basis 
of their decisions and the reasoning of the decisions are concerned. 
This notwithstanding, arbitration and judicial settlement exist side by side. 
The latter institution is not shunned any more as it once was, and is recently 
even struggling with an overload of pending cases. 128 On the other hand, the 
United Nations General Assembly has moved to adopt a resolution granting the 
status of permanent observer to the Permanent Court of Arbitration. 129 Coupled 
with its own adoption of the Optional Rules for Arbitrating Disputes between 
Two States in October 1992,130 the Permanent Court of Arbitration may hope-
fully be re-activated. Also noteworthy is the establishment of the International 
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, the members of which have recently been 
elected, with specialized functions as specified in the United Nations Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea of 1982. 
There is no doubt that such diversification of international adjudicative or-
gans is a reflection of the will of states. It is a welcome trend for the promotion 
of peaceful settlement of international disputes. But since the basic attitude of 
states remains inclined to have as much control over the process of dispute set-
tlement as possible,131 there is not much ground for optimism that they will ac-
tually respond favourably to this trend of diversification of adjudicative bod-
ies.132 
128 See e.g. the report of the Study Group of the British Institute of International and Comparative 
Law, supra n. 6. 
129 UNGA Resolution 48/3, 13 October 1993. A commentator stated that the move reflects the 
attitude of states to support the existence of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in parallel with the 
International Court of Justice. S. ROSENNE, 'Some thoughts on international arbitration today', 27 
Israel Law Review (1993) 458-459. 
130 PCA, supra n. 7. 
131 See MIYOSHI, supra n. 15. 
132 A notable critical comment on the proliferating adjudicative organs in the field of human rights 
protection is found in: W.M. REISMAN, 'Creating, adapting and designing dispute resolution 
mechanisms for the international protection of human rights", in Implications of the Proliferation of 
International Adjudicatory Bodies for Dispute Resolution (Proceedings of a Forum co-sponsored by 
the American Society of International Law and the Graduate Institute of International Studies, 
Geneva, Switzerland, May 13, 1995, reproduced in 9 ASIL Bulletin 8-14). 

AN ENVIRONMENTAL REGIME FOR THE ARCTIC AND 
THE ANTARCTIC ANALOGY 
Zou Keyuan* 
The Arctic region, like the Antarctic, is one of the remotest areas on earth. 
It is mainly composed of an open sea of about 12.2 million square kilometres, 
and also includes the lands around the Ocean. With the strengthening of global 
efforts of environmental protection, the significance of the Arctic environment 
has become more salient as opposed to the past emphasis on national jurisdic-
tion, human population, natural resources development as well as strategic 
importance. For example, ozone depletion above Antarctica and the Arctic has 
become a universal concern. Any change in the polar environments is of global 
impact, I and the protection of the Arctic environment is an indispensable part 
of global protection strategy. For that reason, in 1993 China began to consider 
a scientific expedition to the Arctic for the purpose of providing a scientific 
basis for the living environment, also the Chinese, in the 21st century. On 6 
May 1995, the first Chinese Arctic expedition reached the North Pole.2 While 
there is little doubt about the need of comprehensive protection of the Arctic, 
differences exist on the means and approaches, both at governmental and 
academic levels. The present paper will explore the possible applicability of the 
existing environmental protection regime for Antarctica to the Arctic region. 
1. ARCTIC ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS AND EXISTING LEGAL 
ARRANGEMENTS 
1.1. Environmental Concerns 
The Arctic region generally comprises the Arctic Ocean, its marginal seas 
and islands, and part of the land of eight sovereign States - Canada, Denmark 
(for Greenland), Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the United 
• Associate Professor of International Law, Beijing; at the time of writing Alexander von Humboldt 
Fellow, Department of Human Geography, Hannover University 
I See MIKHAIL E. NIKOLA YEV, 'The Arctic in a global community', in L. LYCK & V.I. BOYKO 
(eds.), Mantlgement, Technology and Human Resources Policy in the Arctic (The North) 
(Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996) 3-9. 
2 See LI SHUANKE, 'Towards the North Pole: the first Chinese Arctic scientific expedition', 48 
Science no. 2 (1996) 29-32 [in Chinese]. See also WEI MENGHUA, 'Thoughts on the North Pole's 
investigation', Science and Technology Review no. 8 (1993) 39-40 (in Chinese). 
Asian Yearbook of International Law, Volume 6 (Ko Swan Sik et al., eds. 
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States (for Alaska). The Arctic is, however, defmed in many ways and with 
different disciplines using different criteria.3 Some scholars tend to define the 
Arctic and the sub-Arctic together as including, in North America, the northern 
part of the Canadian provinces, including all Labrador, and the whole of the 
Northwest Territories, the Yukon Territory, and the State of Alaska; in Eura-
sia, the territory north of about latitude 650N in Scandinavia, with the boundary 
dropping to 63° in European USSR (now Russia) and 57° in Asia, and includ-
ing all Kamchatka; the whole of Greenland, Svalbard, and Iceland; and at sea, 
the Arctic Ocean, with the Barents Sea, the Norwegian Sea (including the 
Greenland Sea), Denmark Strait and the Labrador Sea on the Atlantic side, and 
the Bering Sea, the Sea of Okhotsk and the Gulf of Alaska on the Pacific side.4 
The Arctic referred to in the present paper is the area centred on the Arctic 
Ocean with a boundary line roughly at 60° north latitude for the convenience of 
comparison with the Antarctic region which has been defined by the Antarctic 
Treaty as at 60° south latitude, with some exceptions for management pur-
poses.s 
The Arctic is essentially a basin, the centre of which is occupied by a large 
mediterranean sea, and which is divided into two main basins by the submarine 
Lomonosov Ridge which runs from the north coast of Greenland across the 
Pole to the New Siberian Islands. Each basin has depths of over 4,000 metres. 6 
The continental shelf which borders the land masses is narrow on the North 
American side (20-50 nautical miles) but on the Eurasian side it extends to 450 
miles and more, and is usually under 100 metres in depth. Peninsulas and 
island groups divide this wide shelf into four marginal seas: the Chukchi, East 
3 As BERNARD STONEHOUSE depicts: "Geographers often use the polar circles, for they provide 
two regions exactly equivalent in size and shape, which are useful for comparisons. Lawyers and 
politicians sometimes prefer other parallels of latitude, closer to or farther from the poles. 
Biologists look for ecological limits, for example the boundary between tundra and forest, to define 
polar ecological zones. Oceanographers use boundaries between water masses, and the northern and 
southern limits of pack ice, to create maritime polar regions. Climatologists use isotherms (lines 
joining points of equal mean temperatures) to define polar climatic regions." See his book North 
Pole South Pole: A Guide to the Ecology and Resources of the Arctic and Antarctic (Toronto & 
Montreal: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1990) at 13. For the purpose of legislation, e.g. the U.S. Arctic 
Research and Policy Act of 1984 defines the Arctic as "all United States and foreign territory north 
of the Arctic Circle and all United States territory north and west of the boundary formed by the 
Porcupine, Yukon, and Kuskokwim Rivers; all contiguous seas, including the Arctic Ocean, and 
the Beaufort, Bering, and Chukchi Seas; and the Aleutian chain". See J.H. ZUMBERGE, 
'Introduction', 29 Oceanus no. 1 (1986) at 4. This definition, if followed rigorously, would exclude 
the southern part of Greenland and a large part of Siberia. 
4 TERENCE ARMSTRONG, GEORGE ROGERS & GRAHAM ROWLEY, The Circumpolar North: A 
Political and Economic Geography of the Arctic and Sub-Arctic (London: Methuen & Co., 1978) 1-
2. 
5 This definition has been already concurred by OSHERENKO and YOUNG as they consider all the 
lands and seas lying to the north of (ijl north latitude to be Arctic. See GAIL OSHERENKO and 
ORAN R. YOUNG, The Age of the Arctic: Hot Conflicts and Cold Realities (Cambridge University 
Press, 1989) at 11. 
6 MOIRA DUNBAR, 'The Arctic setting', in R.ST.J. MACDONALD (ed.), The Arctic Frontier 
(University of Toronto Press, 1966) at 11. 
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Siberian, Laptev, and Kara seas. A fifth sea, the Barents, with rather deeper 
waters, leads out of the Arctic Ocean into the Norwegian Sea.7 The main body 
of the Arctic Sea is covered the year round with pack ice. The greatest number 
of icebergs in the north is found in Baffm Bay. 8 On the land there are glaciers 
in all mountain areas. Ice covers about 2.3 million sq km in the northern 
regions. Over four-fifths of this area of ice is located in Greenland.9 Through-
out most of the Arctic and sub-Arctic all or part of the ground contains a layer 
which is perennially frozen and which is called permafrost. 10 
In contrast to Antarctica, the climate in the Arctic is moderate because it is 
a maritime area. The moderating maritime influence on temperature is quite 
noticeable in spite of the ice that covers the water surface for much or all of the 
yearY The mean annual temperature in the North Pole has been estimated to 
be -23DC and that in Central Greenland is -33DC. Total precipitation in the 
Arctic is low and ranges from about 15 to less than 5 inches per yearY The 
humidity of the air is also low, because the capacity of cold air to hold water 
vapour is low. 
A characteristic feature of the northern flora and fauna is that the number 
of species is relatively small while the number of individuals in a species is 
relatively large. This results in instability in the ecosystem, since the number of 
inter-relationships is limited and the dependence of any single element on the 
others is considerable. 13 As to the flora, there are grasses, sedges, lichens and 
dwarf willows in the tundra; and conifers, birches and aspens in the taiga or 
boreal forest. AIl this is the basis for a considerable animal life. Land animals 
which remain the year round in the high Arctic include polar bear, muskox, 
Arctic fox, lemming, snowy owl, raven and ptarmigan. There are others in the 
forest such as reindeer (called caribou in North America), elk (called moose in 
North America), bear and many small fur-bearers. Of the birds, which are 
numerous in the northIands in summer, most migrate to the south in winter -
the Arctic tern going as far as Antarctica, a round trip of 30,OOOkm. 14 The 
productivity of the Arctic waters is rather low and fish fauna is poor both in 
species and in numbers. Seal and walrus, and polar bear are found throughout 
the area in varying numbers. 15 In regions where the floating ice gives way to 
open water, and warmer Atlantic or Pacific waters mix with those of the Arc-
tic, biological productivity is, however, at a high level. Large populations of 
7 DUNBAR, ibid., at 11. 
8 ARMSTRONG et aI., supra n. 4 at 13. 
9 Ibid. 
10 DUNBAR, supra n. 6 at 10. 
II Ibid., at 13. 
12 Ibid., at 15. 
13 ARMSTRONG et aI., supra n. 4 at 18. 
14 Ibid., at 18. 
15 DUNBAR, supra n. 6 at 11. 
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cod, halibut, salmon, char, shrimp and crab are found. Sea mammals are 
relatively abundant. 16 
In view of the above, the Arctic environment is extremely sensitive to 
environmental stress. Recovery from ecological damage occurs slowly, espe-
cially due to the following four features: low temperatures, fluctuating seasonal 
light (short summer 'growing' periods and long winter 'rest' periods), short 
food chain and variable abundance of Arctic fauna and flora. 17 Arctic ecosys-
tems are vulnerable to disturbance by humans. Permafrost may melt and lead to 
extensive erosion if vegetative cover is disturbed. The effects of air pollution 
are magnified in ecological impact by thermal inversions in the winter and by 
the inherent sensitivity of lichens to sulfur dioxide. Oil pollution is accentuated 
by concentration under and between the ice cover and by slow degradation and 
greater toxicity at low temperature. 
It is argued that there are three real threats to the Arctic environment: poor 
knowledge of ecosystemic effects, technological poverty and political inability 
to regulate adequately the growth of economic activity in the region. 18 The 
main and more direct threat to the Arctic environment should, however, be the 
pollution resulting from human activities within and/or outside the Arctic 
region. The sources and causes of this pollution are complex; much pollution 
originates in lower latitudes and is carried by wind and ocean currents to higher 
latitudes. The pollution effects take the form of Arctic haze, stratospheric 
ozone depletion and the accumulation of toxic substances, including radioactiv-
ity, in Arctic terrestrial, marine, and aquatic environments. The Arctic region 
is also expected to be affected by the atmospheric consequences of global 
warming. 19 The most serious accident of oil spill ever around the Arctic area is 
the Exxon Valdez accident on 24 March 1989.20 
1.2. Existing legal arrangements 
The main characteristic of the Arctic legal regime is the element of bilateral 
or regional arrangements and domestic legislation, with only a few multilateral 
treaties. Strictly speaking, the only international agreement which directly 
16 ARMSTRONG et aI., supra n. 4 at 18. 
17 DAVID VAN DER ZWAAG, KEYUAN Zou and CYNTHIA LAMSON, 'The Polar areas', in EDGAR 
GOLD (ed.), Maritime Affairs: A World Handbook (Longman, 2nd ed. 1991) at 304. 
18 See OLAV SCHRAM STOKKE, 'Environmental threats in the Arctic', in LASSI HEININEN (ed.), 
Arctic Environmental Problems (Finland: Tampere Peace Research Institute, 1990) 23-25. 
19 Canadian Institute of International Affairs (CIlA) , National Capital Branch, The Arctic 
Environment and Canada's International Relations (Ottawa: Canadian Arctic Resources 
Committee, 1991) at 7. 
20 See US Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for 
Antarctica (US Government Printing Office, September 1989) at 140. For reference, see A. 
NELSON-SMITH, 'Biological consequences of oil-spill in Arctic waters', in LOUIS REY (ed.), The 
Arctic Ocean: The Hydrographic Environment and the Fate of Pollutants (London: MacMillam 
Press, 1982) 275-293. 
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addresses Arctic environmental protection and conservation is the 1973 Polar 
Bear Convention between the so-called Arctic states: Canada, Denmark, 
Norway, the United States and the Soviet Union. It restricts harvesting of polar 
bears (with an exception for traditional harvesting) and calls on states to 
"take appropriate action to protect the ecosystems of which polar bears are a 
part, with special attention to habitat components such as denning and feeding 
sites and migration patterns, and shall manage polar bear populations in 
accordance with sound conservation practices based on the best available 
scientific data". 21 
Research is to be coordinated and the results shared, and the parties shall 
consult "on the management of migrating polar bear populations". Further-
more, the Arctic countries acknowledged for the fIrst time that the environment 
of the polar sea constitutes a region and that these and other conservation 
efforts are to be pursued in the circumpolar context. 
Among other treaties which apply to the areas around the Arctic was the 
Convention on the Preservation and Protection of Fur Seals which was con-
cluded by four countries - Great Britain (for Canada), Japan, Russia and the 
United States - on 7 July 1911 and which was the fIrst multilateral fur seal 
treaty.22 It applied to the North PacifIc including the Bering Sea, and was 
signifIcant in terms of environmental protection and conservation in the Arc-
tic. 23 In 1957 the treaty was replaced by a new one among the same parties,24 
which lapsed in October 1984 because the United States did not approve a new 
four-year extension. 25 Another could be the 1973 Convention on Fishing and 
Conservation of Living Resources in the Baltic Sea and the Belts. 
On the other hand, there are quite a number of bilateral agreements be-
tween respective Arctic countries. In 1971, Canada and the former Soviet 
Union signed the General Exchanges Agreement which contains specifIc 
provisions relating to the Arctic. 26 On 16 April 1984 the Agreement was 
augmented by the signing of the Protocol of Canadian-Soviet Consultations on 
the Development of a Programme of ScientifIc and Technical Cooperation in 
the Arctic and the North.27 On 20 April 1988 the Protocol on Problems of 
Monitoring and Environmental Protection was signed. The two countries 
agreed to focus joint efforts on a number of scientifIc and technical areas, 
including comprehensive monitoring of pollution of the environment and its 
21 Polar Bear Convention, Oslo, 15 November 1973, CTS No. 24 (1973). Also reprinted in (US) 
Treaties and Other International Acts Series 8409. 
22 Text reproduced in 5 AJIL (1911) 267-274. 
23 Under the US definition the Arctic includes the Bering Sea. 
24 Interim Convention on Conservation of North Pacific Fur Seals, 9 February 1957, 314 United 
Nations Treaty Series 105. 
25 ERIK FRANCKX, 'Environmental protection: an Arctic-Antarctic comparison', in J. VERHOEVEN, 
P. SANDS and M. BRUCE (eds.), The Antarctic Environment and International Law (Graham & 
Trotman, 1992) at 114. 
26 CllA, supra n. 19 at 5l. 
27 Ibid., at 52. 
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ecological consequences; modelling of environmental processes and of the 
processes and impacts of atmospheric pollutants; and relations between human 
health and atmospheric pollution.28 In November 1989, Canada and the Soviet 
Union signed a General Agreement on Arctic Cooperation29 which spelled out 
the areas of cooperation, the forms such cooperation might take, the modes of 
implementation and the functions of the mixed commission established under 
the Agreement. Also in 1989, an Environmental Cooperation Agreement was 
concluded, a framework agreement providing for cooperation on a wide range 
of environmental issues. The Agreement for the first time raised the commit-
ment to cooperate in environmental matters to the level of an internationally 
binding agreement. 30 
In the US-Canadian relationship, there has been an Agreement since 1974 
on a joint Marine Contingency Plan for Spills of Oil and other Noxious Sub-
stances. 31 In 1977 an annex was added to it, dealing with "waters off the Arctic 
coast of Canada and the United States in the Beaufort Sea". 32 The Agreement 
on Arctic Cooperation, signed on 11 January 1988 relates primarily to naviga-
tion by ice-breakers of the two countries in their respective Arctic waters. 33 In 
addition, Canada and the United States have established joint working groups 
which meet annually to discuss arctic science, ice studies and hydrocarbon 
development in the Beaufort Sea. 34 They also signed the Agreement on the 
Conservation of the Porcupine Caribou Herd on 17 July 1987.35 
As to the cooperation in the Arctic between the United States and the 
Soviet Union/Russia, an Agreement was concluded on 23 May 1972 on Coop-
eration in the Field of Environmental Protection. This is a comprehensive 
Agreement covering some eleven specific areas of cooperation, including 
"Arctic and subarctic ecological systems", and providing for its implementation 
by a joint committee. 
The Scandinavian countries such as Norway and Finland may be leading 
the way with their cooperative effort in assisting former Soviet industry to 
reduce emissions of toxic chemicals into the Arctic atmosphere. In September 
1990, the former Soviet government reached an agreement with the govern-
ments of Finland and Norway to rebuild the smelters with Finnish and Norwe-
gian technology. 36 
28 Ibid. 
29 Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the USSR on Cooperation 
in the Arctic and the North, 20 November 20 1989, CTS No. 21 (1989). 
30 CIIA, supra n. 19 at 52-53. For details on the cooperation in the Arctic by the two countries, see 
Building International Relations in the Arctic: 25 Years of Canada-USSR Cooperation (Ottawa: 
Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, 1991). 
31 Ottawa, 19 June 1974, CTS No. 22 (1974). 
32 Ottawa, 30 August 1977, CTS No. 25 (1977). 
33 Agreement between the Government of the United States and the Government of Canada on 
Arctic Cooperation, Ottawa, 11 January 1988,28 ILM (1987) 14l. 
34 CIIA, supra n. 19 at 54. 
35 Text reproduced in the Third Annual Report of the Porcupine Caribou Management Board. 
36 Ibid., at 54. 
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In addition, environmental cooperation has occurred between other Arctic 
countries. For example, Canada and Denmark signed a Marine Environmental 
Protection Agreement on 16 August 1983 which is aimed to protect common 
waters and the economic and social welfare of their inhabitants from oil pollu-
tion risks. The Agreement covers the waters between West Greenland and 
Canada (Baffin Bay, Davis Strait, Nares Strait) and provides response mecha-
nisms for the control of pollution. 37 
Domestic legislation has a particular influence on the development of the 
legal regime for Arctic environmental protection. Just a few significant ones 
will be mentioned here. In Canada, the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention 
Act, enacted in 1970, concerns the prevention of pollution in "areas of the 
Arctic waters and adjacent to the mainland and islands of the Canadian Arctic 
up to 100 miles (i.e. 160 km)". The dumping of waste into Arctic waters from 
ships is prohibited. Safety control zones are also established to prevent shipping 
accidents and to expedite the clean-up of oil spills should they occur. 38 In the 
former Soviet Union, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR issued 
a decree on 26 December 1984 to improve the protection of nature in the 
regions of the Far North and in the sea areas adjacent to the northern coastline 
of the USSR. 39 In the United States, a major legal document specifically relat-
ing to the Arctic is the Arctic Research and Policy Act of 1984. The main 
purposes of this Act are: 
(1) to establish national policy, priorities, goals and to provide a Federal pro-
gram plan for basic and applied scientific research with respect to the Arc-
tic, including natural resources and materials, physical, biological and 
health sciences, and social and behavioral sciences; 
(2) to establish an Arctic Research Commission to promote Arctic research and 
to recommend Arctic research policy; 
(3) to designate the Natural Science Foundation as the lead agency responsible 
for implementing Arctic research policy; and 
(4) to establish an Inter-agency Arctic Research Policy Committee to develop a 
national Arctic research policy and five year plan to implement that pol-
icy. 40 
37 23 ILM (1984) 269-274. 
38 Revised Statutes Canada (1970), c. 2 (1st Supp.). For comments on and analysis of this Act, see 
R. BILDER, 'The Canadian Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act: new stresses on the law of the 
sea', 69 Michigan Law Review (1970) 1; L. HENKIN, 'Arctic anti-pollution: does Canada make - or 
break - international law?" 65 AJIL (1970) 131; A. UrroN, 'The Arctic Waters Pollution 
Prevention Act, and the right of self-protection', 7 UBC Law Review (1972) 221; J. SHERRIN, 
'International law and Canadian Arctic Pollution Control', 38 Albany Law Review (1974) 921; P. 
NEWBURY, 'The international environmental law of the sea: the Canadian Arctic Waters Pollution 
Prevention Act and its effects, 1970-1980',4 Suffolk Transnational Law Journal (1980) 138-61. 
39 The Decree is reprinted in LAWSON W. BRIGHAM (ed.), The Soviet Maritime Arctic (Annapolis: 
Naval Institute Press, 1991) 311-316. 
40 Public Law 98-373, 31 July 1984. Reproduced in M.A. STENBAEK (ed.), Arctic Policy (Centre 
for Northern Studies and Research, McGill University, 1987) A-12 to A-18. 
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We have to realize that in the Arctic, effective international cooperation in 
regard to environmental protection is seldom easy to achieve. Unlike Antarctica 
where a complex of cooperative arrangements in the realm of science emerged 
during the course of the International Geophysical Year of 1957-58, the Arctic 
has during the 20th century been plagued by a variety of expansive and often 
conflicting jurisdictional claims. This is the main obstacle to the establishment 
of an environmental regime in the Arctic. With the Cold War gone by, the 
military threat in the Arctic has been greatly reduced but the contradiction 
between economic development and environmental protection is salient. The 
inadequacy of a mixed strategy combining economic growth and environmental 
protection is nowhere more evident than in the Arctic. This is another obstacle. 
Finally, unlike the Antarctic Treaty System, the Arctic region lacks an interna-
tional regime and leaves the task of protection to a larger extent to the sur-
rounding national states. Without proper coordination and effective cooperation 
among all the Arctic states, there is little hope for protection of the Arctic. 
2. TOWARDS COMPREHENSIVE PROTECTION 
In the Arctic no single international legal regime has ever existed, and the 
state of the art of national environmental protection differs widely. With the 
worsening of the polar environment and the strengthening of efforts towards 
global protection, a comprehensive regime is necessary. Two severe marine oil 
pollution accidents that took place in the early half of 1989 influenced the 
evolution and development of polar environmental policies and promoted 
environmental measures: one was the Bahia Paraiso, which occurred in the 
Antarctic area, and the other was the Exxon Valdez disaster off Alaska near the 
North Pole. Furthermore, some initiatives took place in the past years. Con-
tinuation of these initiatives could [mally lead to the establishment of a regime 
for environmental protection in the Arctic. 
2.1. The Murmansk initiative 
In the context of the increasing openness of the Soviet Union with respect 
to Arctic research and environmental protection, on 1 October 1987 the then 
Soviet leader MIKHAIL GORBACHEV delivered a remarkable speech in Mur-
mansk, calling for cooperation among all interested States and a zone of peace 
throughout the Arctic. He emphasized the importance of the cooperation of the 
northern countries in environmental protection. He proposed to jointly draw up 
an integrated comprehensive plan for protecting the natural environment of the 
north. He stated that: 
"We attach special importance to the cooperation of the northern countries in 
environmental protection. The urgency of this is obvious. It would be well to 
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extend joint measures for protection of the marine environment of the Baltic, 
now being carried out by a commission of seven maritime States, to the entire 
oceanic and sea surface of the globe's North. 
The Soviet Union proposes drawing up jointly an integrated comprehensive 
plan for protecting the natural environment of the North. The North European 
countries could set an example to others by reaching an agreement on 
establishing a system to monitor the state of the natural environment and 
radiation safety in the region. We must hurry to protect the nature of the tundra, 
forest tundra(taiga), and northern forest areas ... 41 
37 
Substantial progress has been made since GORBACHEV'S address. For 
example, the circumpolar conference on Arctic scientific research proposed in 
the address was held in Leningrad in December 1988. Earlier that year, in 
March, all eight Arctic states had agreed to form an International Arctic Sci-
ence Committee (lASC) , and, in August 1990, they signed the Founding 
Articles establishing the IASC.42 
The IASC is a non-governmental international scientific organization, and a 
counterpart of the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research. It is to encour-
age and facilitate international consultation and cooperation in all fields of 
scientific research concerned with the Arctic. It is governed by a council 
comprising representatives of national scientific organizations in Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Japan, the Netherlands, Nor-
way, Poland, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the 
USSR/Russia. 43 The main substantive work of the IASC will be undertaken by 
international scientific working groups. Although the IASC does not directly 
address international cooperation on environmental protection in the Arctic, its 
establishment and function has no doubt considerable influence over the future 
comprehensive regime. 
41 MIKHAIL GORBACHEV, address in Munnansk, 1 October 1 1987. See Foreign Broadcast 
Information Service (FBIS)-Sov-87-191, 2 October 1987. For comments on the initiative, see 
EVGENIA ISSRALlAN, 'Gorbachev's Murmansk initiative', in F. GRIFFITHS (ed.), Arctic 
Alternatives: Civility or Militarism in the Circumpolar Nonh (Toronto: Samuel Stevens, 1992) 269-
277; and T.E. ARMSTRONG, 'Soviet proposals for the Arctic: a policy declaration by Mr 
Gorbachev', 24 Polar Record no. 148 (1988) 68-69. 
42 The US Arctic Commission, established under the Arctic Research and Policy Act of 1984, in its 
report to the President and the Congress of the United States called for the creation of an 
International Arctic Science Committee in 1988. VLADIMIR GoLlTSYN, 'The Arctic - on the way 
to regional cooperation', 1 Marine Policy Repons (1989) at 97. 
43 The Founding Articles are reprinted in 4 Arctic Research o/the United States (1990) 67-69. For 
details on its establishment, see 'The International Arctic Science Committee: from conception to 
birth' , ibid., 65-66. 
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2.2. The Finnish initiative 
At the end of 1988, the Finnish government contacted the other govern-
ments of the 'Arctic Eight' to gamer support for a framework treaty on the 
Arctic environment which could later have more specific protocols attached to 
it. On 12 January 1989 the Finnish government sent a proposal to the seven 
other Arctic countries. It analyzed some relevant factors and took into account 
the fact that the equally fragile Antarctic environment has been taken care of 
fairly effectively through the Antarctic Treaty System.44 The proposal was 
divided into two parts and the second part was a working paper which dis-
cussed both the substance of the proposal and certain details. 
The working paper started from the fact that the ecosystem of the Arctic is 
very fragile. Due to the extreme climatic and ecological conditions, the flora 
and the micro-organisms in this area can only very slowly be renewed or, after 
disturbances of the Arctic equilibrium, revived. The most important threats to 
the Arctic environment, as the working paper identified, are climate change, 
pollution of the marine environment, and exploitation of the living and nonre-
newable resources. The development of the living resources in the Arctic 
should be based on the principles of the World Conservation Strategy. 45 
It was further stated in the working paper that effective protection of the 
Arctic requires development of three things: intergovernmental cooperation, 
scientific research and monitoring of the ecosystems. Since there exists no 
comprehensive regime concerning the conduct of human activities having an 
adverse impact on the Arctic environment or its resources, the Government of 
Finland deemed it necessary to initiate an intergovernmental process with a 
view to elaborating coordinated and concerted action for the protection of the 
Arctic environment, which could lead to a declaration, convention or other 
multilateral arrangement. It was proposed that such action should be taken by 
the eight countries that possess sea and land areas north of the Arctic Circle. 46 
As a result, governmental representatives of the Eight attended a Consultative 
Meeting on the Protection of the Arctic Environment in Rovaniemi, Finland, in 
September 1989, the first such intergovernmental gathering of the Arctic states. 
2.3. Further developments 
Begun with the Finnish Initiative, the process has moved with several 
consultative meetings among the Arctic states. On 14 June 1991, at the First 
Ministers Conference on the Protection of the Arctic Environment, also held in 
44 ESKO RAJAKOSKI, 'Multilateral cooperation to protect the Arctic environment: The Finnish 
Initiative', in The Arctic: Choices for Peace and Security -- Proceedings of a Public Inquiry (West 
Vancouver: Gordon Soules Book Publishers, 1989) at 56. 
45 Ibid., 56-57. 
46 Ibid., 57-58. 
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Rovaniemi, governmental representatives from Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
Iceland, Norway, Sweden, the Soviet Union and the United States issued a 
Declaration on the Protection of the Arctic Environment. They also adopted an 
Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy to begin to better address six key 
environmental problems - persistent organic contaminants, oil pollution, heavy 
metals, noise, radioactivity and acidification. The Strategy, though a non-
binding political declaration, commits the Parties to implementing a four-point 
action program: 
- an Arctic monitoring and assessment program (AMAP) to monitor the effects 
of anthropogenic pollutants in the region through the establishment of an 
organization task force; 
- protection of the Arctic marine environment, using preventive and other 
measures, applied directly or through international organizations with regard 
to origin; 
- establishment of a regional emergency prevention, preparedness and response 
capability; and 
- coordination of research and facilitation of data exchange on conservation of 
Arctic flora and fauna. 47 
The adoption of the Strategy marks a cornerstone towards comprehensive 
protection of the Arctic environment among the Arctic States. Since then, some 
more daunting proposals have been advocated. A significant one among them is 
the proposal to establish an International Arctic Council initiated by Canada. 48 
According to this proposal, an Arctic Council must ensure the peace and 
security of the Arctic, help save the Arctic environment from the contamination 
that comes with disrespectful industrial development in the Arctic and else-
where, and help secure justice for the region's aboriginal peoples.49 
At the non-governmental level, it is remarkable that the native peoples in 
the Arctic have increasingly been playing an important role in the protection of 
the Arctic environment. This is illustrated by the Inuit Circumpolar Conference 
(ICC) which groups the Inuit population from Alaska, Canada and Greenland. 
This is important because it is the first time that a transnational private organi-
zation, which has no connection with the respective governments of the differ-
ent countries, is trying to formulate rules for the exploitation of Arctic re-
sources. They start from the principles that the Arctic environment is theirs, 
that it has been the base of their lives for centuries, and that there is no reason 
41 The Declaration on the Protection of the Arctic Environment and the Arctic Environmental 
Protection Strategy are reprinted in 5 Arctic Research of the United Siates (1991) 29-35; and 30 
ILM (1991) 1624-1669. 
48 The idea of an Arctic Council is said to have been first proposed by the Canadian Prime Minister 
MULRONEY during a speech in Russia in November 1989. JOHN HANNIGAN, The Proposal for an 
Arctic Council: What Position Should the Gow~mment of the Northwest Territories Take?, 
Circumpolar and Scientific Affairs Publication Series 92-11 (Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, 
February 1992) at iv. 
49 For details, see Arctic Council Panel, To Establish an International Arctic Council: A Framework 
Report (Ottawa: Canadian Arctic Resources Committee, May 1991). 
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for outside foreign powers to interfere with this. 50 The Inuit Circumpolar 
Conference developed a Comprehensive Arctic Policy and an Inuit Regional 
Conservation Strategy. As early as 1985, it was attempting to define policies 
and standards which would provide and promote conservation and sustainable 
development in the Arctic. The Inuit Conservation Strategy takes its inspiration 
from the World Conservation Strategy and ensures that the responsibility for 
the implementation of conservation measures will remain in the hands of those 
who are directly affected by its management.s' In 1991, the ICC, the Nordic 
Sami Council and the Association of Small Peoples of the Soviet Union organ-
ized an Arctic Leaders Summit in Copenhagen, bringing together aboriginal 
and non-aboriginal leaders from circumpolar nations for discussions on inter-
national issues effecting Arctic aboriginal peoples.52 Bilaterally, Canadian 
Inuvialuit and Alaskan Inupiat in 1988 finalized a polar bear management 
agreement providing for the establishment of two groups, a Joint Commission 
and a Technical Advisory Committee. 53 This growing awareness among the 
native peoples in the Arctic has introduced a new dimension into the Arctic 
environmental policies and law. 
In a nutshell, the basic features of legal regimes governing comprehensive 
protection of the Arctic are taking discernible form. At present, however, they 
still lack the definition, consistency and sophistication of a mature system able 
to cope effectively with the complex problems arising out of the interaction of 
politics and the environment in a community of national sovereign states. 
3. THE ANTARCTIC ANALOGY AND THE ARCTIC 
Strict environmental regulations may render polar activities more expen-
sive, but environmental concerns are also stimulating new interest in the poles. 
As to their similarities, both poles contain a valuable record of how the earth 
has responded to past climate changes, and both will provide clues about how it 
can be expected to change in the future. 
50 LOUIS REY, 'Resource development in the Arctic regions: environmental and legal issues', in 
D.G. DALLMEYER & L. DEVORSEY (eds.), Rights to Oceanic Resources (Martinus Nijhoff, 1989) 
at 174. 
51 See PETER JULL, Politics, Development and Conservation in the International North (Ottawa: 
Canadian Arctic Resources Committee, 1986) 67-68. 
52 V AN DER Zw AAG et aI., supra n. 17 at 309. 
53 C.D. HUNT, 'Legal aspects of implementing sustainable development in Canada's northern 
territories', in J .0. SAUNDERS (ed.), The Legal Challenge of Sustainable Development (Calgary: 
Canadian Institute of Resources Law, 1990) 285-286. 
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3.1. Significance of the analogy 
In terms of legal arrangements, the two polar legal regimes would have the 
following characteristics: (a) in both regions, sovereignty is in dispute, al-
though the problem is somewhat different with respect to Antarctica and to the 
Arctic. This makes it mandatory for each regime to provide for internal ac-
commodation of the interests involved; (b) both regimes are based on the desire 
to uphold and foster cooperation concerning demilitarization, scientific re-
search, protection of the environment, and economic uses; (c) in both regimes 
the institutional structures which provide for the channelling of the cooperation 
exhibit certain peculiarities and even similarities; and (d) both regimes rely on 
and presuppose the collaboration of certain states which form the 'inner circle' 
of institutionalized cooperation. 54 
On the other hand, the differences between the north and south poles are 
explicit at least in terms of their respective geographical structures. In the legal 
and political perspective, the following has been pointed out by ORAN YOUNG: 
(a) unlike the circumstances prevailing in the Antarctic, extensive North/South 
interactions between southern metropolis and Arctic hinterlands have long been 
the norm in the Far North; (b) the Antarctic region was not an arena for the 
deployment and operation of major military systems, whereas the Arctic was an 
area of growing strategic significance to both superpowers and an area for the 
regular deployment of critical weapons systems; (c) no industrial or commer-
cial activities were taking place in Antarctica, while the Arctic is the scene of 
world-class industrial operations; (d) despite dramatic evidence concerning the 
occurrence of a seasonal ozone hole over Antarctica, the environmental impacts 
of the activities of advanced industrial societies located in the mid-latitudes are 
even more profound in the north polar region than in the south polar region; (e) 
Antarctica does not constitute an ancestral homeland for sizeable groups of 
indigenous peoples.55 
The above common and different characteristics of the two poles render a 
comparison significantly meaningful. Besides, the peculiar natural environment 
of polar regions is of global significance; any change in it would result in 
unpredictable effects upon the climate or environment in other regions of the 
earth. So, the protection of the polar regions is a mirror for the protection of 
the global environment, and the polar regions are the testing ground for global 
protection. If we could not protect the polar regions well, we would have no 
hope for our common future. The current state of human progress has raised 
high expectations concerning environmental protection in a global context. The 
Rio Declaration, which was adopted in June 1992, provides that states shall 
cooperate in a spirit of global partnership to conserve, protect, and restore the 
54 R. WOLFRUM, 'The Polar regions: legal aspects', in L. CAFLISCH and F. TANNER (eds.), The 
Polar Regions and Their Strategic Significance (Geneva: Graduate Institute of International Studies, 
1989) 3-4. 
55 ORAN R. YOUNG, The Arctic in World Affairs (Seattle: University of Washington, 1989) 12-15. 
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health and integrity of the earth I s ecosystem. With increasing global environ-
mental protection, comprehensive protection of polar regions becomes more 
and more important and a critical link in the chain of global environmental 
protection. 
In the political and legal domain, the success of the Antarctic Treaty in its 
two major purposes - keeping the peace and providing a mechanism for close 
scientific cooperation - has led many to wonder if something of the kind could 
ever be worked out for the ArctiC.56 While it could be very desirable to obtain a 
measure of international agreement to govern the Arctic, the differences be-
tween the Arctic and the Antarctic pose considerable difficulties in the way 
ahead. Some even flatly denied the idea as such by saying that 
"simplistic comparisons between the Arctic and the Antarctic do more to 
confuse the prospects for international cooperation in the Arctic region than to 
shed light on this matter. The mere fact that interested parties have had 
considerable success in establishing cooperative arrangements for one polar 
region does not entitle us to conclude that the other polar region is ripe for 
progress in these terms. ,,57 
Nevertheless, environmental protection in both polar regions is closely related 
with global environmental protection, even though a "brief consideration of the 
Antarctic experience"58 is far from enough to reach a correct and objective 
conclusion. It would, however, be equally simplistic to dismiss the potential 
applicability of the Antarctic experience to the Arctic, especially in the current 
situation where global issues are so interdependent and relevant regimes inter-
act. More and more people with breadth of vision have realized the importance 
of the Antarctic experience for Arctic affairs. Even Canada, which is the most 
conservative country among all Arctic States and has a passive attitude towards 
the Antarctic, has admitted the importance and significance of the Antarctic 
experience.59 The Antarctic Treaty, as regarded by the Canadians, is one of the 
world I s most successful examples of an internationally accepted, flexible 
conflict resolution mechanism, in which a common search for shared scientific 
knowledge, protection of the environment, and the sustained management of 
common resources take precedence over individual national goals. For this 
reason, some Canadians have advocated that there should be an Antarctic-type 
treaty in the Arctic, with reasonable and shared access for everyone in a peace-
56 Various references can be made to STONEHOUSE, supra n. 3, at 205-206; ARMSTRONG et al., 
supra n. 4, at 277; FRED ROOTS, 'Cooperation in Arctic science: background and requirements', in 
GRIFFITHS (ed.), supra n. 41 at 152. 
57 YOUNG, supra n. 55 at 15. 
58 Ibid., at 13. 
59 W.P. ADAMS, P.F. BURNET, M.R. GoRDON & E.F. ROOTS, Canada and Polar Science 
(Ottawa: Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, March 1987) at 17 et seq. 
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ful sort of way. Although the Antarctic model is not perfect, it still provides a 
starting point for something equally important in the North.60 
The Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) includes the Antarctic Treaty of 1959, 
the measures in effect under that Treaty, and its associated separate legal 
documents, including the 1972 Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic 
Seals (CCAS),61 the 1980 Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine 
Living Resources (CCAMLR),62 the 1988 Convention on the Regulation of 
Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities (CRAMRA) which, however, was put 
aside after its adoption by the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties (ATCPs).63 
The latest development within the A TS is the Protocol on Environmental 
Protection to the Antarctic Treaty (PEPAT), adopted in Madrid on 4 October 
1991.64 According to the Protocol, the whole Antarctic area is to be designated 
as a natural reserve, devoted to peace and science. 
The Antarctic Treaty is the core of the whole Antarctic Treaty System. The 
effectiveness of the ATS depends upon the validity of the Treaty. If there were 
a similar legal arrangement for the Arctic, tension and potential conflict would 
be reduced and environmental protection strengthened. The Antarctic Treaty 
contains at least three aspects which may have implications for the Arctic 
region and could also be applied here. 
3.2. International cooperation and scientific research 
Scientific activities in Antarctica began much earlier than the emergence of 
the legal regime and in fact contributed to its establishment. The Antarctic 
Treaty reaffirms the freedom of scientific investigation and cooperation. It 
confers upon any country in the world the right to conduct its scientific re-
search at any spot in Antarctica according to its capability. In order to promote 
international cooperation in this regard, the states parties agreed to exchange 
scientific information and personnel among them and to encourage the estab-
lishment of cooperative working relations with international organizations 
which have scientific and technical interest in Antarctica. With the legal guar-
antee of the Antarctic Treaty, international cooperation of scientific research 
has worked quite satisfactorily at Antarctica. In particular, progress in our 
knowledge of world climate change is largely due to research carried out in 
Antarctica. 65 
As to individual countries, a typical example can be drawn from the Chi-
nese practice. China, as a leading developing country in the world, has bene-
60 GORDON HODGSON, 'Editorial: who owns the land?" 41 Arctic (1988) at iii. 
61 See Handbook of the Antarctic Treaty System (7th ed., 1990), Part IV, 4105. 
62 Text is reprinted in ibid., 4209. 
63 For the whole text, see Antarctic Treaty: Final Report of the Fourth Special Antarctic Treaty 
Consultative Meeting on Antarctic Mineral Resources (Wellington, 1988) 43-109. 
64 ATS Doc. XI ATSCMI2/312, 3 October 1991. 
65 ROLAND DUMAS, 'The Antarctic in world politics', 10 International <.-"'hallenges (1990) at 5. 
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fited a lot from other countries, especially at its first stage of Antarctic activities 
under the provision of the international cooperation in the Antarctic Treaty, 
Japan offered training to Chinese explorers before the first Chinese expedition; 
the Soviet Union gave assistance; Chile and Argentina helped in choosing a 
suitable site for China's first Antarctic station; and the United States and New 
Zealand shared their Antarctic experiences with Chinese scientists.66 Such 
scientific cooperation more or less softened tensions and promoted friendly 
relations among the countries concerned. 
Scientific activities in the Arctic began as early as those in the Antarctic. 
Usually scientists from various countries cooperate and help each other. Un-
fortunately no legal framework exists to stabilize and promote such coopera-
tion. We may recall that, in SCAR's67 meeting in Oslo in August 1970, it was 
decided to request the International Council of Scientific Unions to establish an 
Arctic sister-organization of SCAR, a so-called SCAB, i.e. 'Scientific Com-
mittee for the Arctic Basin', but the plan later died out. 68 Only in recent years 
the possibility was explored to establish an 'Arctic SCAR' to enhance interna-
tional scientific cooperation in the Arctic region. Interestingly, such kind of 
discussion first took place at the SCAR meeting in 1986 when representatives 
of several countries at that meeting felt that the time was propitious, in light of 
both the international political situation and the needs of science. In February 
1987, a formal meeting among the Arctic countries was held in Oslo. The 
meeting was historic in the sense that for the first time senior people from all 
countries with territories north of the Arctic Circle had come together to dis-
cuss cooperation in Arctic science. There was a general consensus on the need 
for an international organization devoted to such cooperation. 69 After several 
consecutive fruitful meetings, the countries concerned signed the Founding 
Articles of the International Arctic Science Committee (IASC) on 28 August 
1990 at Resolute Bay, Canada. 
According to those Founding Articles, IASC is a non-governmental scien-
tific organization established to encourage and facilitate international consulta-
tion on and cooperation in scientific research concerned with the Arctic. The 
Committee covers all fields of Arctic science and provides a forum for discus-
sion, exchange of information and cooperation. It is composed of a Council, a 
66 For details, see ZOU KEYUAN, 'China's Antarctic policy and the Antarctic Treaty System', 24 
Ocean Development and International Law (1993) 237-255. 
67 The Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR) is a coordinating organization 
subordinate to the International Council of Scientific Unions. SCAR is to initiate, promote and 
coordinate scientific activity in Antarctica, with a view to framing and reviewing scientific 
programmes of circumpolar scope and significance. The Constitution of SCAR is reprinted in 
Handbook of the Antarctic Treaty System (7th ed., 1990) Part 4 at 4401. For reference, see J .H. 
ZUMBERGE, 'The scientific committee on Antarctic research and the Antarctic Treaty System', in 
Polar Research Board (ed.), Antarctic Treaty System: An Assessment (Washington: National 
Academy Press, 1986) 153-168. 
68 SKAGESTAD, infra n. 88 at 172-173. 
69 Loc. cit. n. 43 at 65. 
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Regional Board, Working Groups, the Arctic Science Conference and a Secre-
tariat. The establishment of the IASC is quite meaningful in terms of establish-
ing an international legal regime in the Arctic if we recall that SCAR also 
preceded the Antarctic Treaty.?O 
3.3. Legal arrangement for territorial sovereignty 
The sovereignty issue in the Antarctic is very complicated and was a major 
obstacle to international cooperation and scientific research in territory. There 
are seven countries which formally made territorial claims over parts of the 
Antarctic. The first claim was made by Britain in 1908. Since then, six other 
countries, one after another, have also made claims in Antarctica: New Zealand 
in 1923, France in 1924, Australia in 1933, Norway in 1939, Chile in 1940 
and Argentina in 1942. These claims are pie-shaped, extending from 600S 
latitude to the South Pole, except for the undefmed northern limit of the Chil-
ean?! and the northern/southern limits of the Norwegian.72 The bases of the 
claims vary from discovery, historic rights and symbolic act to geographic 
contiguity, sector principle, etc., but they are not sufficient in international law 
to support the claims. Furthermore, the claims made by Argentina, Britain and 
Chile overlap each other. All the claims together cover 85 % of the Antarctic 
continent, leaving about 15 % unclaimed (the Marie Byrd Land) which was 
tacitly reserved for the US. 
The US has never officially made territorial claims, nor has it recognized 
the claims made by other countries. It has, however, reserved for itself the 
right to make territorial claims in the future. A similar position is taken by 
Russia. The rest of the world community of states has never accepted these 
claims or rights to make claims. 
The controversy on Antarctic territorial sovereignty during the 1940s-1950s 
was a serious problem among the relevant countries. The tension and rivalry 
resulting from the territorial claims was, however, softened by the International 
Geophysical Year in 1957-1958. There was a gentleman's agreement among 
the countries conducting scientific investigations in Antarctica that they would 
not engage in legal or political argumentation during that period, in order for 
70 We have to note that the International Geophysical Year was a catalyst for the Antarctic Treaty 
but it failed in the Arctic context. 
71 One of the reasons was articulated as "Chile is a single geographic unit which extends from Arica 
(on the northern border with Peru) to the South Pole". JACK CHILD, 'Latin lebensraum: the 
geopolitics of Ibero-American Antarctica', 10 Applied Geography (1990) at 294. 
72 For the purpose of avoiding disadvantages resulting from the 'sector principle' for her rights or 
interests in the Arctic. In fact, AMUNDSEN individually claimed for Norway a circular area 
comprising the plateau around the South Pole and named it 'King Haakon VII Plateau'. JOHN 
HANESSIAN, Jr., 'National interests in Antarctica', in TREVOR HA THERTON (ed.), Antarctica (New 
York: Praeger, 1965) at 21. 
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the scientific programme to proceed without impediment.73 The International 
Geophysical Year represented a major turning point for scientific research in 
Antarctica, and provided a sound foundation for the development of Antarctic 
scientific research in a wide range of disciplines of natural science. Politically, 
it became a catalyst for the negotiation of the Antarctic Treaty. 
The Antarctic Treaty freezes the different legal positions of the state parties 
regarding territorial claims. Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty provides: 
"1. Nothing contained in the present Treaty shall be interpreted as: 
a) a renunciation by any Contracting Party of previously asserted rights of 
or claims to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica; 
b) a renunciation or diminution by any Contracting Party of any basis of 
claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica which it may have whether 
as a result of its activities or those of its nationals in Antarctica, or 
otherwise; 
c) prejudicing the position of any Contracting Party as regards its 
recognition or non-recognition of any other State's right of or claim or 
basis of claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica. 
2. No acts or activities taking place while the present Treaty is in force shall 
constitute a basis for asserting, supporting, or denying a claim to territorial 
sovereignty in Antarctica. No new claim, or enlargement of an existing claim, 
to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica shall be asserted while the present Treaty 
is in force." 
The provision created an ingenious solution to the delicate issue of territorial 
claims which otherwise would have caused great confrontation, even armed 
conflict, around Antarctica.74 Thus the status quo of Antarctica maintained by 
the Antarctic Treaty has effectively prevented it from becoming the scene or 
object of international discord. The bifocalism in Article IV of the Antarctic 
Treaty is in fact only a modus vivendi, but it successfully put aside the tough 
issue of Antarctic sovereignty after all, and instead established the basis for 
international cooperation in the Antarctic continent. 
In early years, the sovereignty problem posed a serious issue around the 
Arctic, as it did in the Eastern Greenland Case.7S Over time, however, almost 
all territorial disputes have been settled. Some exceptions relate to delimitation 
of some maritime areas among the countries concerned or between Arctic 
countries and the international community. 76 Tracing back into history, sover-
73 P.C. DANIELS, 'The Antarctic Treaty', in R.S. LEWIS and P.M. SMITH (eds.), Frozen Future: A 
Prophetic Report from Antarctica (New York: Quadrangle Books, 1973) at 35. 
74 Irrespective of the Cold War during the 1950s-1960s which culminated in the Berlin and Cuban 
crises, the two superpowers cooperated well in Antarctic affairs. And during the Falkland/Malvinas 
War in 1982, the delegates from respectively Britain and Argentina sat together, with other 
Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, to negotiate the Antarctic minerals regime. 
75 PCIJ Ser. A/B, No. 53 (1933). 
76 It is recalled that Hand Island, less than a mile in length and located between Greenland and 
Ellesmere Island at 80049'N, is still contested between Canada and Denmark. FRANCKX, supra n. 
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eignty issues in the Antarctic and the Arctic interacted. For instance, the sector 
principle was applied in both regions by some of the territorial claimants. The 
sector principle/theory was first invoked by a Canadian Senator , PASCAL 
POIRIER, in 1907 as a basis for claiming sovereignty over all of the islands 
north of Canada. He advocated that "all the lands between the two lines up to 
the North Pole should belong and do belong to the country whose territory 
abuts up there.'>77 It was later supported by some other scholars.78 In practice, 
Canada and the Soviet Union openly or tacitly apply this theory to their respec-
tive Arctic territorial claims, but it was rejected by other Arctic States and the 
rest of the world community. Likewise, six of the claimants of Antarctic 
territories also use this theory as one of the bases of their claims. As one 
authority put it, the sector principle has not developed as a principle of custom-
ary law, neither general nor regional, and cannot serve as a root of title for the 
acquisition of sovereignty, particularly not to sea areas.79 
The only legal arrangement for territorial sovereignty in the Arctic is the 
1920 Svalbard Treaty which granted Norway full and absolute sovereignty 
while setting some conditions on its exercise of sovereignty. The salient princi-
ples of the Treaty are demilitarization and neutralization of the region, and free 
access for and equal treatment of the state parties and their subjects with regard 
to the conduct of certain forms of economic activity on Svalbard. The Svalbard 
arrangement is different from the Antarctic arrangement in that the Antarctic 
model may be characterized as a 'cooperation-apparatus without a solution', 
while the Svalbard model may be termed a 'solution without a cooperation-
apparatus'. With a view to these factors, it is natural to emphasize the dynamic 
character of the Antarctic model as compared to the static character of the 
Svalbard model. 80 
Another question which is closely related to the sovereignty issue over 
polar regions is whether the concept of common heritage of mankind (CHM) 
should apply to them and the resources therein. It is not possible for the polar 
regions to be recognized as CHM at present time nor in the near future, al-
though they are often categorized as the 'global commons'. 81 Nevertheless, 
there is a tendency of these areas advancing towards becoming CHM, but, 
because of their global environmental importance and unlike the legal arrange-
ment for the deep seabed in the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, 
25 at 115. 
77 Canadian Senate Debates, 20 February 1907 at 271; cited in DONAT PHARAND, Canada's Arctic 
Waters in International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988) at 10. 
78 See D.H. MILLER, 'Political rights in the Arctic', 4 Foreign Affairs (1925) 47-60; and W.L. 
LAKHTINE, 'Rights over the Arctic', 24 AJIL (1930) 703-717. 
79 PHARAND, supra n. 77 at 79. 
80 GUNNAR SKAGESTAD, infra n. 88 at 18!. 
81 For details, see ZOU KEYUAN, 'The common heritage of mankind and the Antarctic treaty 
system', 38 Netherlands International Law Review (1991) 173-198; and DONAT PHARAND, 
'L'Arctique et l'Antarctique: patrimoine commun de I'humanite', 7 Annals of Air and Space Law 
(1982) 415-430. 
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the arrangement as such, if applied to the polar regions, should be environment 
and conservation-oriented rather than towards economic development. 
In 'polar literature', the question whether the Arctic is CHM is much less 
discussed than that with regard to the Antarctic. A simplistic perception may 
arise in the fact that all territories in the North have already been attributed and 
there is little debate on sovereignty. Consequently, there are hardly areas 
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction in the Arctic region, and there is no 
room for application of the CHM concept. The possibility of such application 
has been explored and advocated by a number of scholars. As LOUIS REY 
wrote: 
"One of the world's most precious wildlife sanctuaries, the last frontier, the 
delicate remnants of nature's original schemes, the Arctic is a unique feature 
which is part of the common heritage of mankind and as such, deserves 
reverence and protection. ,,82 
A similar argument was made by a Canadian lawyer, THOMAS R. BURGER, 
who noted that "all nation-states who are the joint custodians of the circumpo-
lar basin" should "for all mankind, participate in the stewardship of the re-
sources of that region". 83 According to others, the CHM principle could mate-
rialize in the Arctic context by establishing institutions for that purpose. 84 
Whether the Arctic should be classified as CHM is still a matter of debate, but 
in any case the sea areas in the Arctic beyond the limits of national jurisdiction 
are part of CHM, even under the UNCLOS arrangement. 
3.4. Consultative mechanism 
As provided in Article IX of the Antarctic Treaty, the ATCPs shall meet 
regularly for the purposes of exchanging information, consulting each other on 
matters of common interest pertaining to Antarctica, and formulating measures 
in furtherance of the principles and objectives of the Antarctic Treaty, including 
measures regarding: (a) use of Antarctica for peaceful purposes only; (b) 
facilitation of scientific research in Antarctica; (c) facilitation of international 
scientific cooperation in Antarctica; (d) facilitation of the exercise of the rights 
of inspection provided for in Article VII of the Treaty; (e) questions relating to 
82 LoUiS REY, 'The Arctic: mankind's unique heritage and common responsibility', 19 Arctic and 
Alpine Research no. 4 (1987) 346. 
83 T.R. BURGER, 'The north as frontier and homeland', in The Arctic, supra n. 44 at 41. The Arctic 
Council Panel also recognized the Arctic as common heritage, but of all Arctic peoples. See supra 
n. 49 at 6. 
84 HEIKKI PATOMAKI, 'Legal principles and political visions: territorial sovereignty versus the 
common heritage of mankind in the Arctic environmental protection', in LASSI HEINlEN and JYRKI 
KAKONEN (eds.), Arctic Complexity: Essays on Arctic Interdependencies (Finland: Tampere Peace 
Research Institute, 1991) 115-116. 
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the exercise of jurisdiction in Antarctica; and (f) preservation and conservation 
of living resources in Antarctica. 
In practice, the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting (ATCM) discusses 
all matters concerning Antarctic affairs. In these meetings the parties negotiate 
conventions relating to Antarctica as well as adopt a large number of recom-
mendations. 
With the consultative mechanism provided in Article IX of the Antarctic 
Treaty as a legal guarantee, the ATS maintains its strong vitality and remains 
dynamic. The ATCM can, at any time, negotiate and conclude a legal regime 
for various Antarctic activities, thus enhancing the development of the ATS. 
Furthermore, the provision ensures active cooperation instead of passive co-
existence among the Antarctic Treaty parties in dealing with Antarctic affairs. 
This has been one of the key reasons for the rapid development of the A TS in a 
period of thirty years. 
On the other hand, the mechanism of the decision-making process in the 
ATS consists of a two-tiered system, i.e., those countries who have conducted 
substantial activities in Antarctica can obtain the position of Consultative 
Parties and have the right of decision-making, whereas other Antarctic Treaty 
Parties have no such right. This system in practice obstructs the developing 
countries from participating in the Antarctic decision-making process because 
the financial and technological capabilities of these countries are comparatively 
weak. 85 Nevertheless, since 1983 this situation has greatly improved: non-
ATCPs are invited to attend the ATCM as observers, thus enabling them to 
exert some influence on the development of the A TS. 
While this institutional structure has been criticized as a closed shop or 
'rich man's club', 86 it still has some advantages. Since Antarctica is a peculiar 
environment, newcomers without sufficient knowledge would easily cause 
environmental damage there. Thus the qualification system will ensure safer 
and more meaningful contributions from new countries.87 The same situation 
would occur in the Arctic region. 
Several consultative meetings have been held among the Arctic countries in 
response to the Finnish Initiative to protect the Arctic environment. Although 
they were first steps and lacked established forms and substance, there is little 
doubt that this form of discussion was to some extent influenced by the ATS 
consultation mechanism and will develop in a similar way in the near future. 
As SKAGESTAD pointed out, it is conceivable that such a consultative mecha-
nism may be a useful, practical gateway towards cooperation meeting the need 
of measures of regulation and control in the Arctic where the conflict-potential 
85 ZOU, supra n. 84 at 196. 
86 Remark by J.V. GBEHO, Permanent Representative of Ghana to the UN, 80 Proceedings 
American Society of International Law (1986) at 281. 
87 See Zou, supra n. 84 at 196-197. 
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is so comprehensive that the parties involved cannot be expected to agree upon 
any radical political 'New Deal'. 88 
4. CONSERVATION PURPOSES 
Having discussed some elements contained in the Antarctic Treaty and of 
Arctic relevance, we now turn to some of the conservationist and environ-
mental principles and purposes embodied in the A TS to see whether they could 
be applied in the Arctic context. Finally, PEP AT will be discussed since it is 
now a legal framework of comprehensive environmental protection in the 
Antarctic. 
4.1. Ecosystem principle 
As noted above, the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine 
Living Resources (CCAMLR) endorsed the ecosystem approach to the man-
agement of the entire Southern Ocean. This approach is in contrast to other 
conventions on fisheries such as IWC, NAFO and ICSEAF, where the aim is a 
sustainable yield of the target species and the welfare of the industry dependent 
upon it. 89 CCAMLR is based upon the conviction and understanding that the 
waters surrounding the Antarctic continent form a distinct marine region. Thus 
there was recognition from the outset that the ecosystem management would 
require coverage of an area larger than that of the Antarctic Treaty. As early as 
1977, the ATCPs agreed that the Convention should apply not only to the area 
of the Antarctic Treaty but also "extend north of 60° South latitude where that 
is necessary for the effective conservation of species of the Antarctic ecosys-
tem" .90 The scope of application of the Convention is up to the Antarctic 
Convergence or the Polar Front which is a complex transition zone lying 
between 45° and 60° South latitude within which colder Antarctic waters sink 
beneath the warmer sub-Antarctic waters to the north. 
According to Article II of CCAMLR, the ecosystem approach contains 
three basic elements or conservation principles: maximum net recruitment; 
maintenance of ecological relationships; and the avoidance of non-reversible 
reductions of any species in the Southern Ocean. 
88 GUNNAR SKAGESTAD, 'The frozen frontier: models for international cooperation', 10 
Cooperation and Conflict (1975) at 186. 
89 M. BASSON and J.R. BEDDINGTON, 'CCAMLR: the practical implications of an ecosystem 
approach', in A. JORGENSEN-DAHL and WILLY OSTRENG (eds.), The Antarctic Treaty System in 
World Politics (MacMilIam, 1991) at 54. 
90 See TUCKER SCULLY, WILLIAM BROWN and BRUCE MANHEIM, 'The Convention for the 
Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources: a model for large marine ecosystem 
management', in K. SHERMAN and L.M. ALEXANDER (eds.), Variability and Management of 
Large Marine Ecosystems (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1986) at 282. 
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The flrst conservation principle requires harvesting and associated activities 
to prevent a decrease in the size of any harvested population to levels below 
those which ensure the population's stable recruitment. For this purpose, the 
size of a population should not be allowed to fall below a level close to that 
which ensures greatest net annual increment. The level of greatest net annual 
increment is the ultimate limit on harvest. If a population falls below this level, 
then harvest must be consistent with recovery to the level of greatest net annual 
increment, or must cease. This ultimate limit on harvesting activities not only 
applies to krill, flsh, and whales, which are the principal subjects of harvest, 
but also to populations of other species that directly or indirectly interact with a 
harvested population. 91 
The second principle requires harvesting and associated activities which 
prevent changes, or minimize the risk of changes in marine ecosystems which 
are not potentially reversible over two to three decades. This principle recog-
nizes that adaptive change may result from artiflcial selection as well as eco-
logical change, and thus addresses the resilience of the Antarctic ecosystem to 
harvesting and associated activities. Hence, while the first principle sets limits 
on the degree to which populations may be altered by human exploitation, the 
second conservation principle sets a rate at which such changes must be re-
versible. 
The third principle requires parties to the Convention to maintain the 
ecological relationships that exist between harvested, dependent, and related 
populations of Antarctic marine living resources, and to restore depleted popu-
lations to levels which ensure the greatest net annual increment. This provision 
provides authorization for designating selected protected areas of sea, where 
harvest would be prohibited unless it would restore the ecosystem to such a 
structure and function as it was before harvesting occurred. Establishment of 
such areas in the Southern Ocean would provide a hedge against uncertainty 
and the risk of inadvertent exploitation in harvesting elsewhere.92 
The ecosystem standard provided in the CCAMLR was viewed as an 
important innovation in international arrangements for living resource man-
agement. 93 It is designed to protect the marine ecosystem as a whole while 
conserving the living species. Due to the absence of an effective enforcement 
mechanism and comprehensive scientific data about the whole marine ecosys-
tem, there are, however, many difficulties in its implementation.94 Secondly, 
91 SCULLY et aI., ibid. at 283. 
92 Ibid., at 285. 
93 See T. SCULLY, 'The Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources - a 
case study', in L.M. ALEXANDER, S. ALLEN and L.C. HANSON (eds.), New Developments in 
Marine Science and Technology: Economic, Legal and Political Aspects, 22 Law of the Sea 
Institute Proceedings (1989) at 138. 
94 See M.W. HOLDGATE, 'Antarctica: ice under pressure', 32 Environment no. 6 (1990) at 9. The 
ecosystem standard has been criticised to the extent that Art. II(3)(a), which sets as the criterion for 
the protection of species that they not be harvested below the level which ensures the greatest net 
annual increment, is suitable for those predatory species at the top of the food chain, but not 
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the term "rational use" in the conservation principle of the CCAMLR is yet to 
be defmed unambiguously, i.e. how and to what extent the use is rational. 
Further, since the entry into force of the CCAMLR the ecosystem standard has 
not been effectively enforced - particular conservation measures come into 
being so late that some species and areas have already been over-exploited.95 In 
this context, for the purpose of the effective implementation of the ecosystem 
standard of the CCAMLR, it is necessary, in furtherance of the concept of 
sustainable development, to apply the precautionary principle: the catch of the 
species of which mankind has collected sufficient scientific data is permissible, 
but must be sustainable and subject to the total allowed catch which must 
ensure the greatest net recruitment of the taken species. As to the species for 
which there is lack of sufficient scientific data, the catch should be strictly 
controlled or forbidden, waiting for further scientific justification. In short, 
fishing activities shall be prohibited unless they are conducted in full compli-
ance with the ecosystem standard. 
The Antarctica and Southern Ocean Coalition once stressed the urgent need 
for the creation of a management protocol to CCAMLR to improve the existing 
legal provisions. Accordingly, the protocol should include, inter alia, the 
following elements: (a) prior to the commencement or expansion of a fishery, 
the state party shall submit in advance to the Commission on the Conservation 
of Antarctic Marine Living Resources a proposal for harvesting which includes 
details of the nature and extent to which it wishes the fishery be established or 
expanded, and available biological data pertinent to management; (b) the 
Scientific Committee shall assess the likelihood that the objectives of the eco-
system standard will be achieved by this proposal; (c) the Commission shall 
establish a management plan for the new or developing fishery so that all the 
objectives of the ecosystem standard will be confidently satisfied.96 These 
elements should be gradually embodied in the future Antarctic marine living 
resources regime. 
Despite difficulties in the implementation and elaboration of conservation 
measures and desire to improve the existing regime, the ecosystem principle 
has in fact been a legal principle within the ATS, with ramifications for other 
conservation regimes, especially those regulating marine fisheries. 
suitable for prey species. See I.G. GARDAM, 'Management regimes for Antarctic marine living 
resources - an Australian perspective', 15 Melbourne University Law Review (1985) at 302. 
Someone even argued that Article II, which sets out the ecosystem approach, was impractical: not 
enough was known about the Antarctic marine ecosystem to enable it to work if the pressure to take 
krill increased and it could therefore, become a source of weakness. See I.A. HEAP, 'Has 
CCAMLR worked? Management policies and ecological needs', 10 International Challenges no. 1 
(1990) at 15. 
95 See F. ORREGO VICUNA, 'The implementation of CCAMLR: is the decision-making machinery 
conducive to good management?' 10 International Challenges no. 1 (1990) at 9. 
96 Antarctica and Southern Ocean Coalition, The Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic 
Marine Living Resources - A Management Protocol Is Urgently Needed (23 October 1990) at 7. 
ANTARCTIC ANALOGY 53 
Like the Southern Ocean, the Arctic Ocean has its own uniqueness and 
natural features. To some extent, it is more ecosystematically integrated than 
the Southern Ocean. In terms of marine living resources, the Arctic Ocean 
proper is not productive, but the sea areas in the sub-Arctic are abundant in 
fisheries. Further, Arctic systems are usually simpler than other ones, involv-
ing lower diversity of species, so that the extinction of a given link in the food 
web may have serious consequences.97 Thus the ecosystem principle, which 
has been governing the management and conservation of the Antarctic marine 
living resources as well as the protection of the marine environment, can also 
be used in the Arctic context. As BELSKY put it: 
"The international community has accepted an obligation to protect the marine 
environment so as to protect its use for future generations, and to manage living 
and non-living resources so as to reduce or eliminate overexploitation. The only 
scientific means to accomplish this goal is through a total ecosystem 
approach. ,,98 
On the other hand, the application of this approach, which currently is 
done mainly to ocean management, can be expanded to land ecosystems, 
especially in the polar regions since the ecosystems in these areas are vulner-
able and sensitive to human invasions. In order to effectively implement the 
principle, it is necessary to sub-divide the application area into ecologically 
differentiated management areas. 
4.2. Precautionary principle 
The precautionary principle originated from concepts embodied in national 
laws, notably the German law Vorsorgeprinzip. It first achieved some promi-
nence at the international level over a decade ago, when concern was gathering 
over the state of the shallow Wadden Sea which borders the North Sea coast of 
the Netherlands, Germany and Denmark.99 This principle is designed to ensure 
that a substance or activity posing a threat to the environment is prevented from 
adversely affecting the environment, even if there is no conclusive scientific 
proof linking that particular substance or activity to environmental damage. 100 
97 M.J. DUNBAR, 'Arctic marine ecosystems', 29 Oceanus (1986) at 40. 
98 M.H. BELSKY, 'Developing an ecosystem management regime for large marine ecosystems', in 
KENNETH SHERMAN and LEWIS M. ALEXANDER (eds.), Biomass Yields and Geography of Large 
Marine Ecosystems (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989) at 444. 
99 DAVID FREESTONE, 'The precautionary principle', in ROBIN CHURCHILL and DAVID 
FREESTONE (eds.), International Law and Global Climate Change (Graham & Trotman, 1991) at 
21. 
tOO J. CAMERON and J. ABOUCHAR, 'The precautionary principle: a fundamental principle of law 
and policy for the protection of the global environment', 14 Boston College International & 
Comparative Law Review (1991) at 2. See also A. NOLLKAEMPER, 'The precautionary principle in 
international environmental law: what's new under the sunT, 22 Marine Pollution Bulletin (1991) 
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Some people may argue that the precautionary principle is an elusive concept 
and has a variety of aspects which makes it difficult to develop a common 
understanding. But the precautionary principle, though not yet fIrmly estab-
lished in international law, is a stringent form of preventive environmental 
policy. It is more than repair of damage or prevention of risks. Precautionary 
action requires reduction and prevention of environmental impacts irrespective 
of the existence of risks. Precautionary action must be taken to ensure that the 
loading capacity of the environment is not exhausted, and it also requires action 
even if risks are not yet certain but only probable, or, even less, not ex-
cluded. IOI 
The fIrst explicit reference to the precautionary approach and the principle 
of precautionary action is to be found in the text of the 1987 London Declara-
tion, issued by the North Sea states at the end of the Second International North 
Sea Conference in November 1987: 
". . . in order to protect the North Sea from possibly damaging effects of the 
most dangerous substances, a precautionary approach is necessary which may 
require action to control inputs of such substances even before a causal link has 
been established by absolutely clear scientific evidence." 102 
Afterwards, a number of other political and legal documents also mentioned the 
approach. 
Since the precautionary principle has been more and more recognized by 
the international community, it is necessary to apply or extend the principle to 
activities in Antarctica so as to improve the existing regime. Besides, for 
Antarctic activities, especially resource activities, another criterion should also 
be applied: the physical scale of human activity must be kept below the total 
carrying capacity of the planetary biosphere.103 Accordingly, the Antarctic 
resource activities should be subject to some restraints, at least by limiting them 
to the extent that they will not have grave adverse impact on the Antarctic 
natural environment and that they will not comprotnise the needs and interests 
of future generations. 
In fact, within the ATS, the precautionary principle is to some extent 
reflected in the Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource 
Activities (CRAMRA). For example, whether or not a mineral resource activ-
ity is allowed depends upon the strict procedure of environmental impact 
assessment. 104 Furthermore, as to predictability, the legal arrangements of the 
at 107. 
101 LOTHAR GUNDLlNG, 'The status in international law of the principle of precautionary action', in 
DAVID FREESTONE and TON IJLSTRA (eds.), The North Sea: Perspectives on Regional 
Environmental Cooperation (Graham & Trotman, 1990) at 26. 
102 FREESTONE, supra n. 99 at 23. 
103 1. ROBINSON et al., 'Defining a sustainable society: values, principles and definitions', 17 
Alternatives no. 2 (1990) at 44. 
104 See Arts. 2 and 7 CRAMRA, supra n. 63 at 48-49 and 51-52. 
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A TS are advanced. There is no commercial sealing in the Southern Ocean at 
present, but whenever it occurs it shall be automatically controlled under the 
CCAS. The prohibition of mineral resource activities in Antarctica for fifty 
years in the recently adopted Environmental Protection Protocol (PEP AT) is 
another typical example. As mentioned above, the conservation of Antarctic 
marine living resources and the protection of Antarctic ecosystems requires the 
application of the precautionary principle as well. The most significant devel-
opment which was achieved during the 1991 CCAMLR annual meeting was 
the Commission's adoption of a conservation measure to set a precautionary 
catch limit on krill fishing in a certain area in the Southern Ocean. 105 It is 
submitted that the precautionary principle is also applicable to the Arctic envi-
ronment since it may be considered as a gradually accepted rule of international 
customary law. 
4.3. The Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty 
(pEPAT) 
The adoption of PEP AT represented an essential step towards the com-
prehensive protection of the Antarctic environment and ecosystems. The Pre-
amble to the Protocol established the principle that the instrument developed 
partly out of "the need to enhance the protection of the Antarctic environment 
and dependent and associated ecosystems." To this end, the parties "commit 
themselves to the comprehensive protection of the Antarctic environment and 
dependent and associated ecosystems and hereby designate Antarctica as a 
natural reserve, devoted to peace and science." 
Article 3 of the Protocol established the basic environmental principles. It 
provides in paragraph 1: 
"The protection of the Antarctic environment and dependent and associated 
ecosystems and the intrinsic value of Antarctica, including its wilderness and 
aesthetic values and its value as an area for the conduct of scientific research, 
. . . shall be the fundamental considerations in the planning and conduct of all 
activities in the Antarctic Treaty area. " 
In pursuance to this principle, paragraph 2 of the Article states that: 
"(a) activities in the Antarctic Treaty area shall be planned and conducted so as 
to limit adverse impacts on the Antarctic environment and dependent and 
associated ecosystems; 
(b) activities in the Antarctic Treaty area shall be planned and conducted so as 
to avoid: 
(i) adverse effects on climate or weather patterns; 
105 See Antarctica and Southern Ocean Coalition, Report on the Tenth Meeting of the Commission 
for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (1991) at 3. 
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(ii) significant adverse effects on air or water quality; 
(iii) significant changes in the atmospheric, terrestrial (including aquatic), 
glacial or marine environments; 
(iv) detrimental changes in the distribution, abundance or productivity of 
species or populations of species of fauna and flora; 
(v) further jeopardy to endangered or threatened species or populations of 
such species; or 
(vi) degradation of, or substantial risk to, areas of biological, scientific, 
historic, aesthetic or wilderness significance; 
(c) activities in the Antarctic Treaty area shall be planned and conducted on the 
basis of information sufficient to allow prior assessments of, and informed 
judgements about, their possible impacts on the Antarctic environment and 
dependent and associated ecosystems and on the value of Antarctica for the 
conduct of scientific research. " 
Any assessments and decisions made are to take full account of whether tech-
nology and procedures are available to provide for environmentally safe opera-
tions, and, according to Article 3(c): 
"whether there exists the capacity to monitor key environmental parameters and 
ecosystem components so as to identify and provide early warning of any 
adverse effects of the activity and to provide for such modification of operating 
procedures as may be necessary in the light of results of monitoring or 
increased knowledge of the Antarctic environment and dependent and associated 
ecosystems. " 
The decisions are further to take account of whether the capacity exists "to 
respond promptly and effectively to accidents", particularly those with potential 
environmental effects. 
Article 3 is one of the key provisions of the Protocol. In many respects, its 
substance is borrowed from Article 4 of the CRAMRA. But it is more compre-
hensive in that its provisions introduce a basis for a uniform standard for 
assessment of all human activity on the continent, irrespective of whether the 
activity is related to mining or to scientific research. 106 
Five Annexes have been attached to the Protocol, dealing respectively with 
the environmental impact assessment (EIA) (Annex I), the management of 
specially protected areas (Annex V), waste management (Annex III), preven-
tion of marine pollution (Annex IV), and conservation of fauna and flora 
(Annex II). According to PEPAT, a Committee for Environmental Protection is 
to be established to provide advice and formulate recommendations to the 
Parties in connection with the implementation of the Protocol, including the 
operation of its Annexes, for consideration at the ATCM. 
106 S.K.N. BLAY, 'New trends in the protection of the Antarctic environment: the 1991 Madrid 
Protocol', 86 AJIL (1992) at 389. 
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5. PROSPECTS 
Having discussed the legal framework of the A TS in the field of environ-
mental protection, we now tum back to the Arctic to see if the Antarctic regime 
is meaningful for the Arctic and to what extent we can learn from the Antarctic 
experience in establishing an Arctic regime. 
5.1. Assessment of the Arctic Council proposal 
As mentioned above, the proposal to establish an international Arctic 
Council was first made in Canada, and in January 1990 the Arctic Council 
Project was initiated as a private venture for public service. In May 1991, the 
Panel of the Arctic Council Project published a report which contained a 
detailed proposal to establish the Arctic Council. According to the proposal, the 
goals of an Arctic Council would be both substantive and procedural. It must 
help protect and rehabilitate circumpolar ecosystems from the contamination 
that comes with inconsiderate industrial development in the Arctic and else-
where, find a way to abate and then end the uncivil practice of Arctic states, 
and help secure justice for the region's aboriginal peoples. 107 As to the structure 
of the Council, the Panel forwarded several options, but it preferred a compact 
structure which would consist of ten delegations, acting on the basis of consen-
sus, and including eight Arctic States, the Arctic aboriginal conference and the 
Northern Forum. 108 As suggested, the items with respect to the Arctic envi-
ronment constitute the main load for the Council's potential agenda, such as 
environmental impact assessment procedures, fisheries management, habitat 
protection, oil spill clean-up in the Arctic waters, parks creation, removal of 
hazardous materials, sewage disposal and water management, and wildlife 
management. 109 
The above was largely endorsed by the Canadian government when it 
released a governmental proposal to the public in December 1991. According 
to that proposal, the Arctic Council would be an instrument of the Arctic 
countries and would not become a supra-national authority. Its functions would 
be: 
(a) to provide a forum for the Arctic countries to consider and discuss issues of 
common interest relating to the Arctic; 
(b) to support the development of the Arctic region by promoting cooperation 
among the Arctic countries and within the Arctic region in general; 
107 Arctic Council Panel, supra n. 49 at 6-7. 
108 Ibid., at 19. The Northern Forum was launched in Anchorage, Alaska in September 1990. 
Among the signatories to the Anchorage Statement were governors and ministers from Alaska, 
Alberta, British Columbia, Chukhotka, Greenland, Heilojiang (China), Hokkaido, the Jewish 
Autonomous Region (USSR), Lappland (Finland), Magadan, the Northwest Territories, the Russian 
Republic, Sakhalin, Trondelag (Norway), Vasterbotten (Sweden) and Yukon. 
109 Ibid., at 25. 
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(c) to support, as appropriate, the advancement of Arctic interests within 
appropriate international organizations. 110 
The Council would be composed of the representatives of the governments of 
the eight Arctic countries, as members, and the representatives of international 
Arctic non-governmental organizations as permanent observers. All decisions 
of the Council would be taken by con~ensus. Representatives of other non-
Arctic national and sub-national governments could attend the meetings of the 
Council, as observers, upon request. A small Secretariat would be established 
in Canada. III 
The above proposal is meaningful in terms of environmental protection in 
the Arctic because the polar environment can only be protected through inter-
national cooperation and effective international arrangement. Although we 
recognize the values inherent in the proposal, we shall not overestimate them. 
The proposal still has a number of weaknesses. These are also reflected in 
PHARAND'S Arctic Treaty proposal. While addressing the Declaration and 
Strategy of environmental protection in the Arctic as adopted by the Arctic 
countries, PHARAND emphasized at least two reasons for his preference for a 
treaty. First, the legal status of Ministerial Declarations is uncertain; and 
second, Declarations cannot serve as the founding instrument of an Arctic 
Council. ll2 In comparison with the Canadian government's proposal, 
PHARAND's is more comprehensive and detailed. However, a common weak-
ness lies in the solution of the question of fairness of representation in the 
decision-making process. According to both proposals, substantial power is 
attributed to the so-called Arctic countries who have territories north of the 
Arctic Circle. For example, PHARAND proposed that the Commission - the 
main body of the Council - would consist of twelve members, of which the 
founding Arctic states would be permanent members. The four non-permanent 
members would be elected by the Assembly, on the basis of an equitable 
representation of the admitted members. The non-permanent members would 
be elected for a four-year term, except for the first election when two would be 
elected for two years only. 113 It is obvious that such an arrangement is too 
exclusive and not inducive for worldwide participation and cooperation, and in 
fact preventing effective protection of the Arctic rather than enhancing it. This 
reminds us of criticism raised in the United Nations that the ATS was too 
exclusive. For example, it might be peculiar that Iceland could be a permanent 
member in the Commission while Britain could not. 
In comparison with the above proposal, the decision-making mechanism in 
the ATS is more open and accountable. Thus one may wonder whether the 
110 JOHN HANNIGAN, supra n. 48 at 39. 
IlIlbid. 
112 DONAT PHARAND, 'The case for an Arctic regior ouncil and a reaty proposal', 23 Revue 
general de droit (1992) at 186. 
113 PHARAND, ibid., at 193, admitted that the Commiss,on would be a governing body where the 
founding members have a controlling voice by their number (8 out of 12) and permanency. 
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above proposal could be acceptable on a worldwide scale. If not, the initial 
sense of universality of an emerging Arctic Treaty would disappear and reduce 
the whole exercise to a mere regional arrangement. Such arrangements already 
exist with respect to the Arctic and proved insufficient to protect the Arctic 
environment. That is the main reason why we should have an Arctic Treaty 
similar to the Antarctic Treaty. The decision-making process of the A TS 
appears to be a better arrangement, i.e. a parallel system should be endorsed. 
While the Arctic states should play an essential role, the states which have 
conducted substantial activities in the Arctic should be granted the same power 
in the Arctic Council. Equity and fairness could then be fully realized in the 
formation of such an organization. A second consideration is the fact that a 
large part of the Arctic Ocean is beyond the limits of national jurisdiction and 
should be governed by an international organization. In 1996, the Arctic states 
finally agreed to establish the Arctic Council. 114 
5.2. Elements for the future Arctic regime 
Cooperation in protecting the global environment, including that of the 
polar regions, is an obligation that international law imposes upon all states. As 
indicated above, the Arctic Councilor Arctic Treaty proposals are helpful to 
establish an international regime for the Arctic environment. But there are still 
doubts whether these proposals are feasible and/or whether an Arctic Council 
or an Arctic Treaty will be enough to protect the Arctic environment. It is clear 
that a comprehensive regime is required, i.e. to take the Arctic Treaty as an 
umbrella, and then develop step by step individual regimes for particular 
protection and conservation items. The format of the Annexes to the PEPAT 
could 1 ~ borrowed. At the procedural level, the annex system is useful in that 
whem-,vcr a new environmental issue emerges and needs regulation, a relevant 
annex could be quickly negotiated to solve the issue by legal means. In sub-
stance, llle environmental principles and standards provided for in the PEPAT 
are most advanced in international environmental law. Thus there is no doubt 
that these principles and standards should also apply to the Arctic. Likewise, 
the Annexes to the PEP AT which regulate particular environmental issues are 
also conducive to Arctic environmental protection. For example, the environ-
mental impact assessment procedures have become international standards to be 
used anywhere in the world. Secondly, such matters as marine pollution, waste 
disposal and management, specially protected areas, and conservation of fauna 
and flora are important environmental issues to be resolved in the Arctic too. 
Whether the Antarctic model can apply to the Arctic has long been a matter 
of discussion. The comparisons above show that it may not fully apply to the 
114 See the Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council, reprinted in ILM (1996) 1382-
1390. 
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Arctic. \15 Some of the elements in the ATS, however, especially those con-
cerning environmental protection, are of obvious suitability, not only to the 
Arctic but to the global environment as a whole. As early as World War II, the 
then US Vice President HENRY A. WALLACE proposed that the US should take 
the initiative to develop an international treaty for the Arctic which would 
provide for cooperative efforts in the Arctic and assist Arctic exploration. 
During the late 1960s the concept of a 'Northlands Compact' emerged. This 
idea, which appears to have been influenced by the Antarctic Treaty, looked 
toward the development of an umbrella-type agreement to which Arctic nations 
could accede for particular purposes like economic development, environ-
mental protection, health and medicine. 116 Though unrealized, these early ideas 
and proposals offer insights in and incentives for establishing an environmental 
regime for the Arctic. 
BLOOMFIELD noted in the early 1980s with some dismay that, 
"Arctic political cooperation will not be as easy as it was in 1959 in the 
Antarctic. Whereas rudimentary institutions could be created and legal issues 
bypassed in the Antarctic, the Arctic is already an arena of competition in the 
newly vital realm of resource availability, and potentially in the strategic realm 
as well. Moreover, the political climate today for multilateral institution-
building is nowhere near as propitious as it was two decades ago. ,,117 
Nevertheless, the current situation is favourable for broad international coop-
eration in the Arctic. Environmental protection could be regarded as a first step 
in this respect. If successful, such experience can be extended to cooperation in 
other fields. This is the so-called 'spill-over' effect, i.e. cooperation in one 
subject area might 'infect' other areas and possibly also pave the way for more 
directly conflict-preventive measures.1l8 The opportunities for expanded coop-
eration are much improved with the end of the Cold War. Not only has the 
easing of East-West relations improved the climate for regional cooperation in 
the Arctic and elsewhere; it has also removed, or lessened, obstacles caused by 
military considerations. 119 
115 Such a view is also concurred by DON ROTHWELL as he points out that "despite obvious 
similarities, it is not suggested that the Antarctic model should be adopted in the Arctic. 
Nevertheless, there are sufficient similar characteristics for the Arctic States to learn from the 
southern experience". D. ROTHWELL, 'International law and the protection of the Arctic 
environment', 44 ICLQ (1995) at 305; see also D.R. ROTHWELL, 'Polar lessons for the Arctic 
regime', 29 Cooperation and Conflict (1994) 55-76. 
116 TUCKER SCULLY, 'Arctic policy: opportunities and perspectives', in IRA DYER and 
CHRYSSOSTOMOS CHRYSSOSTOMIDIS (eds.), Arctic Technology and Policy (Washington: 
Hemisphere Publishing Corporation, 1984) at 5. 
1I7 LINCOLN P. BLOOMFIELD, 'The Arctic: last unmanaged frontier', Foreign Affairs (Fall 1981) 
103-104. 
118 SKAGESTAD, supra n. 88 at 173. 
119 JOHN SKOGAN, 'International Arctic co-operation: scope and limitations', 19 North Perspectives 
no. 2 (1991) at 18. 
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To establish an environmental regime for the Arctic is not an easy task. 
The Antarctic experiences only provide some useful elements of reference. The 
real challenge lies on the Arctic nations and the native peoples. Apart from the 
Antarctic analogy, other international experiences are also worth learning from. 
For example, the arrangements for combatting marine pollution in the Mediter-
ranean Sea may provide a useful model for approaching the Arctic. 120 It is 
appropriate to keep in mind that an environmental regime for the Arctic is 
urgently needed. There is no reason to delay its process of formation. 
120 As SCULLY notes, in some cases, the region that most directly resembles the Arctic is not the 
Antarctic but the Mediterranean. See supra n. 116 at 6. 
SYMPOSIUM ON THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL CIVIL 
PROCEDURE IN ASIAN COUNTRIES 
Editorial note 
The topic of the present symposium is the outcome of a deliberate choice, giving 
expression to several considerations that underlay the initiative to start publication of 
the Yearbook. 
Among these considerations is the perceived need to enhance the presentation of 
under-exposed Asian views and practices in the field of international law in a broad 
sense of the term. This includes law emanating from international sources as well as 
municipal law relating to transnational relationships. The latter encompasses both 
'public' and 'private' matters, and includes, most eminently, the conflict of laws. The 
law on civil procedure of the various Asian countries relating to transnational relation-
ships obviously also falls under the same category. 
Another consideration is the need for jurists from the different Asian countries to 
familiarize themselves with each other's legal views and practices and thus to learn 
from the legal successes and failures of their neighbours, after having, for much too 
long indeed, focused their interest and attention almost exclusively on the law, institu-
tions and policies of societies which are (far) more distant to their own in more than a 
merely geographic sense. From this point of view, the law on international civil 
procedure as the set of legal rules governing transnational litigation among private 
parties is an eminently practical, and consequently most suitable, field of the law to be 
taken as the subject matter of a comparative presentation. 
The scope of the topic is, of course, very broad, certainly too broad for an 
exhaustive analysis of all relevant aspects of the subject. The paucity of existing 
expositions of the field as a whole in a commonly accessible form and language, 
however, has led us to the conclusion that the present first effort should offer a 
general survey as a starting point for further research and investigation. 
The Editors have been most fortunate to be able to benefit from the expertise and 
experience of Professor KONO TOSIDYUKI who not only participated as one of the 
authors but who has acted as a Co-Editor for the present Symposium. 
It is a matter of profound regret that it has not been possible to have scholars 
from more countries to participate in the symposium. However, the Yearbook wel-
comes contributions for additional 'national chapters', which may be published in its 
future Volumes, and thus enrich the discussion on the topic. 
The Editors express the hope that the present symposium will serve as a reminder 
to those colleagues who regularly deal with transnational private law and international 
conflict of laws rather than public international law, that the Yearbook is theirs as well 
and should be used as the natural forum of communication and presentation of Asian 
aspects of their fields of expertise. 
PHILIPPINE CIVIL PROCEDURE IN TRANSBOUNDARY 
DISPUTES 
Antonio R. Bautista' 
1. GENERAL CONTEXT 
1.1. The Philippine Judicial System in Brief 
The Philippine judicial system consists of one Supreme Court and such 
lower courts as are established by law. These courts were given judicial power, 
defined as "the authority to settle justiciable controversies or disputes involving 
rights that are enforceable and demandable before the courts of justice or 
redress of wrongs for violation of such rights".1 This includes the power "to 
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting 
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of 
the government". 2 
One gathers, therefore, that the Philippine judiciary is unitary. Unlike the 
American system, after which that of the Philippines was patterned, there are 
no state and federal systems in the Philippines. Instead, there is just one 
Supreme Court. The Philippine judicial system is tiered: below the Supreme 
Court are such lower courts as are established by Congress and which exercise 
such jurisdiction as is conferred upon them by law. 3 
The Supreme Court is a collegial body composed of a Chief Justice and 
fourteen Associate Justices. 4 It sits en banc when hearing cases involvin~ the 
constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement, or law; and 
the constitutionality, application or operation of presidential decrees, 
proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances and other regulations;6 in which 
the required majority was not obtained when heard by division; 7 where the 
Supreme Court modifies or reverses a doctrine or principle of law previously 
laid down either en banc or in division;8 of administrative nature involving 
• Bautista Picazo Buyco Tan & Fider; Professor of Law, University of the Philippines. 
I Lopez v. Roxas, 17 SCRA 756 (1966). 
2 Phil. Const., Art. VIII, Sec. 1. 
3 Ibid., Sec. 2. 
4 Ibid., Sec. 4(1). 
5 Ibid., Sec. 4(2). 
6 Ibid. 
1 Ibid., Sec. 4(3). 
8 Ibid. 
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judges, where the vote is for dismissal or the imposition of disciplinary 
sanction;9 concerning election contests involving the President and/or the Vice-
President. 1O In all other cases, the Supreme Court may, at its discretion, sit en 
banc or in division. 
The powers of the Supreme Court are provided in the Constitution, II as 
follows: 
- To exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other 
public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, 
mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus. 
- To review, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or 
the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts: (a) 
in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or 
executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, 
ordinance, or regulation is in question; (b) involving the legality of any tax, 
impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation thereto; (c) in 
which the jurisdiction of any lower court is at stake; (d) concerning criminal 
cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher; (e) in 
which only an error or question of law is involved. 
- To temporarily assign judges of lower courts to other stations, as public 
interest may require. Such temporary assignment shall not exceed six months 
without the consent of the judge concerned. 
- To order a change of venue or place of a trial to avoid a miscarriage of 
justice. 
- To promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of con-
stitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, the admission 
to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the 
underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive 
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of 
the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. 
Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain 
effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. 
- To appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the 
Civil Service Law. 
The Constitution likewise vests in the Supreme Court the power of 
administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof. 12 
Directly below the Supreme Court is the Court of Appeals, another 
collegial body of sixty-nine Justices sitting in twenty-three divisions. The Court 
of Appeals does not sit en banc except to discharge ceremonial and 
administrative functions. These twenty-three divisions are divided into three 
9 Ibid., Sec. 11. 
10 Ibid., Art. VII, Sec. 4. 
11 Ibid., Art. VII, Sec. 5. 
12 Ibid., Sec. 6. 
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groups and are stationed in three different cities of the country to address cases 
coming from Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao, respectively.13 
The Court of Appeals has, among others, exclusive original jurisdiction 
over actions for annulment of judgments of Regional Trial Courts, and 
exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final orders, decisions, resolutions, 
orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, 
instrumentalities, boards or commissions. In the exercise of its original and 
appellate jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals has the power to try cases and 
conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to 
resolve the factual and legal issues raised in cases before it. 14 
The Sandiganbayan ('Sandigan') is a Court co-equal to the Court of 
Appeals but essentially exercises trial functions and has limited jurisdiction. It 
is a special court of fifteen Justices, and was created especially for the purpose 
of hearing cases involving crimes committed by high-ranking public officers in 
relation to their office. 15 
At the lowest rung are the trial courts. Trial courts are single-judge courts, 
where the presiding judge is both a trier of facts and arbiter of law. Trial courts 
are courts of first instance. Judicial reliefs are initially sought either in a 
Regional Trial Court or a Municipal Trial Court. 
Essentially, the jurisdictions of the Regional Trial Court and the Municipal 
Trial Court are similar. Both have jurisdiction to take cognizance of cases 
involving title to or possession of real property. Likewise, these courts are 
empowered to resolve admiralty and probate cases. The proper court in these 
cases is determined by the amount of the claim. 16 
Certain cases, however, are only cognizable by a particular court. For 
instance, where the subject matter of litigation does not lend itself for pecuniary 
estimation or pertains to a contract of marriage and marital relations or refers to 
juvenile and domestic matters, jurisdiction lies with the Regional Trial Court. 
The Municipal Trial Court, on the other hand, has exclusive jurisdiction over 
forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases. 17 
The procedure on appeal from final orders and judgments of trial courts has 
recently been clarified. From the Regional Trial Court, appeal may be taken 
to the Court of Appeals on issues of fact and law19 or to the Supreme Court on 
pure questions of law. 20 From the Municipal Trial Court, first an ordinary 
appeal must be taken to the Regional Trial Court before the appellant may go to 
13 Rep. Act No. 8246, approved 30 December 1996. 
14 BP BIg. 129, as amended by Rep. Act No. 7902, approved 23 February 1995. 
15 Pres. Dec. No. 1606, as amended by Rep. Act No. 8249, approved 5 February 1997. 
16 BP 129, as amended by Rep. Act No. 7691, approved 25 March 1994. 
17 Ibid. 
18 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, promUlgated on 8 April 1997 and effective as from 1 July 1997. 
19 Ibid., Rule 41, Sec. 2(a) and (b). 
20 Ibid., Sec. 20(c). 
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the Court of Appeals. 21 Appeal from the Court of Appeals to the Supreme 
Court is strictly by petition for review. 22 
Where appeal is not a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, or when there is 
no appeal, a party may invoke the certiorari jurisdiction of the Regional Trial 
Court, Court of Appeals or Supreme Court. Certiorari is to determine whether 
or not a tribunal, a quasi-judicial agency or an officer has acted without or in 
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. 23 
The time consumed by litigation varies from one month to ten years, 
according to the circumstances. The Philippine Constitution provides some 
insight into the reasons why, in many cases, litigation is protracted:24 
"Sec. 15(1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution 
must be decided or resolved within twenty-four months from date of submission 
for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve 
months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months for all other lower 
courts. " 
In other cases, however, the proceedings are significantly abbreviated by 
the successful employment of various modes for amicable settlement. Among 
these modes is the conciliation proceeding before the Lupong Tagapamayapa 
('Lupon') of the Sangguniang Barangay.25 The Lupon has the authority to 
bring together for amicable settlement parties actually residing in the same city 
or municipality. Submission to conciliation proceedings is a pre-requisite for 
the filing of any complaint in court. 26 
The pre-trial27 presents another opportunity for amicable settlement. The 
possibilities to settle the dispute or submitting it to alternative modes of dispute 
resolution are carefully weighed during this stage.28 The pre-trial also serves 
the purpose of simplifying the proceedings during trial. At this stage, the 
parties are allowed to agree on which matters are really in controversy. 
Stipulations and admissions may also be requested and given during pre-trial. 
And, together with the various modes of discovery (e.g. deposition, request for 
admission, production and inspection of documents and things),29 the pre-trial 
may be utilized to show that judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment 
or dismissal of the action, is warranted. 
Arbitration is also recognized3o as a mode of settling disputes. Two or more 
persons may submit to arbitration any controversy existing between them. The 
21 Ibid., Rule 40. 
22 Ibid., Rule 45. 
23 Ibid., Rule 65, Sec. (1). 
24 Phil. Const., Art. VII, Sec. 15(1). 
25 Rep. Act No. 7160, Chap. 7, Sec. 410. 
26 Ibid. Sec. 412(a). 
27 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 18. 
28 Ibid., Sec. 2(a). 
29 Ibid., Rules 23 to 29. 
30 Rep. Act No. 876. 
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parties to a contract may agree to submit to arbitration any controversy that 
may arise from or in relation to the contract. 
No special court is designated to resolve trans-boundary civil disputes. 
Such cases fall within the general jurisdiction of trial courts. In the exercise of 
jurisdiction over cases involving a foreign element, the trial court should apply 
the lexjori. A ruling recently enunciated by the Supreme Court clearly puts this 
as follows: 
"It is settled that matters of remedy and procedure such as those relating to the 
service of process upon a defendant are governed by the lex fori or the internal 
law of the forum. In this case, it is the procedural law of Japan where the 
judgment was rendered that determines the validity of the extraterritorial service 
31 of process or SHARP. " 
This ruling reiterates an earlier Supreme Court decision: 32 
"As a general rule, a foreign procedural law will not be applied in the forum. 
Procedural matters, such as service of process, joinder of actions, period and 
requisites for appeal and so forth, are governed by the laws of the forum. This 
is true even if the action is based upon a foreign substantive law." 
1.2. Sources 
The sources of Philippine laws governing international civil procedure are 
both written and unwritten. Foremost among the written sources is the 
Constitution.33 The Constitution defines who are Filipino citizens and 
prescribes their rights and obligations. It is also noteworthy that this 
fundamental document "adopts the generally accepted principles of inter-
national law as part of the law of the land". 34 Another source of rules that 
govern international civil procedure is the Spanish Civil Code of 1888. This 
Code took effect in the Philippines in 1889 and remained in force even after the 
country was ceded by Spain to the United States. The Americans did not alter 
this Code and it was only on 30 August 1950 that it was superseded by a new 
Civil Code of the Philippines. The relevant provisions on conflict of laws in the 
Spanish Civil Code, however, were retained. 
There are other special statutes which may also be referred to as sources of 
the law on international civil procedure. Among these are the Corporation 
Code,35 the General Banking Act,36 the Retail Trade Law,37 the Anti-Dummy 
31 Northwest Orient Airlines v. CA, 241 SCRA 192 (1995). 
32 Cadalin v. POEA's Administrator, 238 SCRA 721 (1994). 
33 Adopted on 15 October 1986 and ratified on 2 February 1987. 
34 Phil. Const. Art. II, Sec. 2. 
35 Batas Pambansa Big. 68 which took effect on 1 May 1980. 
36 Rep. Act No. 337, approved on 24 July 1948. 
37 Rep. Act. No. 1180, approved on 15 June 1955. 
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Law,38 the Insurance Code,39 the Intellectual Property Code,40 Negotiable 
Instruments Law,4! the Patent Law,42 the Trademark Law,43 the Salvage Act,44 
the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act,45 the Civil Aeronautics Act,46 the Philippine 
Overseas ShiPEing Act, 47 the Investment Incentives Act,48 the Export 
Incentives Act, 9 the Bank Liberalization Act,50 the Philippine Passport Act5! 
and the Omnibus Investments Code. 52 These special laws contain rules which 
determine how cases involving a foreign element should be resolved. 
Treaties and international conventions are also sources of law governing 
private international law. Among them are the Convention on International 
Civil Aviation,53 the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating 
to the Warsaw Convention, 54 the Convention on Offenses Committed on Board 
Aircraft,55 the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the 
Safety of Civil Aviation, 56 the Convention on Carriage of Goods By Sea, 57 the 
Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and 
Registration of Marriages,58 the Convention on Traffic in Persons,59 the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women,60 the Convention on the Political Rights of Women,6! the International 
Convention for the Suppression of Traffic in Women and Children,62 the 
Convention Establishing the W orId Intellectual Property Organization,63 the 
Convention on the International Recognition of Rights in Aircraft,64 the Vienna 
38 Com. Act No. 108, approved on 30 October 1936. 
39 Pres. Decree No. 612, approved on 18 December 1974. 
40 Rep. Act No. 8293, approved on 6 June 1997. 
41 Act 2031, enacted on 3 February 1911. 
42 Rep. Act No. 165, approved on 20 June 1947. 
43 Rep. Act No. 166, approved on 5 June 1951. 
44 Act No. 2616, enacted on 7 February 1916. 
45 Com. Act 65, approved on 22 October 1936. 
46 Rep. Act No. 776, approved on 20 June 1952. 
47 Rep. Act No. 1407, as amended, approved on 9 September 1955. 
48 Rep. Act No. 5186. 
49 Rep. Act No. 6135. 
50 Rep. Act 7722, enacted on 18 May 1994. 
51 Rep. Act No. 8239. 
52 Executive Order No. 226, issued April 1987. 
53 15 UNTS 295. 
54 137 UNTS 11. 
55704 UNTS 219. 
56 IX-1 DFATS 101. 
57 Signed by the Philippines on 14 June 1978. 
58 521 UNTS 231. 
59 96 UNTS 271. 
60 Signed by the Philippines on 15 July 1980. 
61 193 UNTS 135. 
62 53 UNTS 39. 
63 Entered into force for the Philippines on 14 July 1980. 
64 310 UNTS 151. 
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Convention on Diplomatic Relations,65 the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations,66 the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes 
Against Internationally Protected Persons,67 the Berne Convention for the 
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works,68 the Paris Convention for the 
Protection of Industrial Property69 and several Hague Conventions which deal 
with the validity of marriage contracts, the effect of marriage on property and 
status, divorce, ~udicial separation, minors and persons under civil interdiction 
and succession. 
While there is an increasing tendency towards the codification of rules 
governing the conflict of laws, there is always a need for judicial decisions to 
fill the gaps in the existing statutes. Thus, in these times of globalization and 
increasing interface between nations and between individuals of different 
nationalities, judicial decisions play a most important role in the conflict of 
laws. More and more cases have now risen from which guidance may be 
sought in resolving disputes and controversy involving a foreign element. 
2. JURISDICTION 
2.1. The Concept of Jurisdiction 
The concept of jurisdiction should not be confused with a state's right to 
exercise authority over persons and things within its territory. Rather, jurisdic-
tion should be understood in the sense of the competence or authority of a court 
or tribunal to entertain, hear and decide certain controversies, ending in a 
binding judgment which is enforceable upon all parties. 71 In this sense, we 
must consider four things: jurisdiction over the subject matter, jurisdiction over 
the person, jurisdiction over the res, and constraints on the exercise of jurisdic-
tion. 
65 500 UNTS 95. 
66596 UNTS 261. 
67 Signed by the Philippines on 7 June 1974. 
68 331 UNTS 219; entered into force for the Philippines on 16 July 1980. 
69 The Philippine Instrument of Accession was deposited on 14 April 1980 and the Convention 
entered into force for the Philippines on 16 July 1980. 
70 Treatises, commentaries and statutes of learned societies also provide an interesting source of 
rules governing the conflict of laws. Among the foreign writers whose works carry persuasive 
weight in the Philippines are HUBER, MANRESA, SAVIGNY, WEISS, BEALE, CAVERS, CHEATHAM, 
CURRIE, KUHN, GOODRICH, GUSSBAUM, RABEL, STORY, WHARTON, CHESHIRE, WESTLAKE and 
REESE. 
71 People v. Mariano, 71 SCRA 604 (1976). 
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Jurisdiction over the subject matter is the power to hear and determine 
cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong.72 It is 
conferred by law. 73 The power to define, prescribe and abolish the jurisdiction 
of the various courts, except the Supreme Court, is vested in Congress.74 When 
a particular court, therefore, was by law granted jurisdiction to try a particular 
case, the parties may not waive, enlarge or diminish such jurisdiction by their 
agreement. 75 Where no jurisdiction was granted, the parties may likewise not 
agree to vest such jurisdiction upon any particular court. 76 Neither may 
jurisdiction be conferred by the mere acquiescence of the court. Jurisdiction 
over the subject matter exists as a matter of law and may not be denied except 
by another law duly enacted by Congress. 
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is reckoned at the time of the 
commencement of the action and it is determined on the basis of the allegations 
made in the complaint. 77 Where, for instance, the complaint fails to allege 
jurisdictional facts, a court duly conferred with jurisdiction over the subject 
matter may not take cognizance thereof. Should the court persist, its action may 
be questioned either for the first time on appeal or by certiorari for having been 
done without jurisdiction. We note, however, that the Supreme Court, in a case 
noting the delay of twenty-eight years before a party raised the ground of lack 
of jurisdiction in a motion to dismiss, rejected the motion on the ground of 
equitable estoppel. 78 
Jurisdiction over the person is the authority or competence to render 
judgment with binding effect upon the parties.79 In the case of plaintiff, 
jurisdiction is acquired by the filing of the complaint, or the proper initiatory 
pleading. 8o In the case of defendant, it is acquired by his voluntary appearance 
and submission to the authority of the court, or by the service upon him of 
compulsory process served by the court.81 Jurisdiction over the defendant may 
be had by personal or substituted service of summons. Service of summons is 
governed by Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure: 
"Sec. 6. Service in person on defendant. 
Whenever practicable, the summons shall be served by handing a copy thereof 
to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by ten-
dering it to him. " 
"Sec. 7. Substituted service. 
72 Perkins v. Roxas, 72 Phil. 514 (1941). 
73 Lozon v. NLRC, 240 SCRA 1 (1995). 
74 Philippine Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. 2. 
75 Fortune Life and General Insurance Co. v. CA, 224 SCRA 829 (1993). 
76 Department of Health v. NLRC, 251 SCRA 700 (1995). 
77 Alleje v. CA., 240 SCRA 465 (1995); De Luna v. CA, 221 SCRA 703 (1992). 
78 Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29 (1968). 
79 Banco Filipino-Espanol v. Palanca, 37 Phil. 921 (1918). 
80 Manila Railroad Co. v. Attorney General, 20 Phil. 523 (1911). 
81 Munar v. CA, 238 SCRA 372 (1994); People v. Dulos, 37 SCRA 141 (1994). 
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If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable 
time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leav-
ing copies of the summons at the defendant's residence with some person of 
suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at 
defendant's office or regular place of business with some competent person in 
charge thereof. " 
71 
Objections to jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be waived. 
Thus, a party who has not been properly served with summons may appear 
voluntarily and submit to the court's jurisdiction.82 If he does so, he cannot 
later question on appeal the court's jurisdiction over his person. 83 
A defendant's objection to a court's jurisdiction over his person, however, 
is not deemed waived where he appears before the court and submits an answer 
wherein he specifically assails as improper the service of summons upon him 
and, at the same time, sets up special and affirmative defenses: 84 
"Sec. 6. Pleading grounds as affirmative defense. 
If no motion to dismiss has been filed, any of the grounds for dismissal pro-
vided for in this Rule may be pleaded as an affirmative defense in the answer 
and, in the discretion of the court, a preliminary hearing may be had thereon as 
if a motion to dismiss had been filed. 
The dismissal of the complaint under this section shall be without prejudice to 
the prosecution in the same or separate action of a counterclaim pleaded in the 
answer." 
The same is true where the defendant submits a motion to dismiss which pleads 
other grounds together with the objection to jurisdiction. 85 
"Sec. 20. Voluntary appearance. 
The defendant's voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to serv-
ice of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside 
from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed 
a voluntary appearance. " 
Jurisdiction over the res refers to a court's jurisdiction over the property or 
thing in litigation. 86 It is acquired by actual or constructive seizure, by attach-
ment or garnishment or by provisions of law, as in land registration proceed-
ings or those involving the civil status of a non-resident defendant. In the case 
of the former, the property must be placed in custodia legis, actual or con-
structive. If this is not possible, for example when the property is beyond the 
territorial limits of the state, jurisdiction cannot be acquired and a judgment will 
not affect nor bind the property in any way. 
82 Aban v. Enage, 120 SCRA 778 (1983). 
83 Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 14, Sec 20; see also La Naval Drug Corp. v. CA, 236 SCRA 78 
(1994). 
84 Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 16, Sec. 6. 
85 Ibid., Rule 14, Sec. 20; see also La Naval Drug Corp. v. CA 236 SCRA 78 (1994). 
86 Perkins v. Dizon, 66 Phil. 186 (1939). 
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Despite the fact that a court is qualified to entertain a case involving a 
foreign element, it may still refuse to take cognizance thereof in view of the 
existence of constraints. In some instances, a court declines to try a case where 
the controversy may be more conveniently tried in another state. This is the 
doctrine of forum non-conveniens. It is founded on the principle that the end of 
justice would be better served by the elimination of any unfair advantage which 
either party deliberately sought by bringing the trial to a particular forum. This 
is especially true where the plaintiff chose a forum with the intention of har-
assing the defendant by compelling him to incur unnecessary expenses and 
hardship in defending himself. The doctrine is also applied if the choice was 
made by the plaintiff, intending to shop for a forum where he may obtain a 
more favourable judgment. 
But while the doctrine offorum non-conveniens is upheld in the Philippines, 
there is among its courts an inclination to exercise jurisdiction when the re-
quirements for the exercise thereof are clearly present. This is sanctioned by 
Article 9 of the Civil Code which reads as follows: "No judge or court shall 
decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency 
of the laws". In a recent case,87 involving a Japanese and a Philippine corpora-
tion, the Supreme Court did not apply the doctrine of forum non-conveniens, 
"there being still numerous material facts to be established in order to arrive at 
a conclusion" and deemed it best "to allow the trial court to proceed ... and 
consider whatever defense may be raised by private respondent after they have 
filed their answer and evidence to support their conflicting claims has been 
presented" . 
The 'political question doctrine' poses another constraint on the exercise of 
jurisdiction. A 'political question' is defined as "those questions which, under 
the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or 
in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legisla-
tive or executive branch of the government". 88 Where the question is clearly 
political, Philippine courts will refuse to take cognizance thereof. The court's 
duty is not to determine whether or not a particular action of the legislative or 
executive branch is wise and proper under the circumstances, but to adjudicate 
whether or not the mandate of the Constitution is strictly followed. We ob-
serve, however, that the doctrine of 'political question' in many cases has 
succumbed to the expanded jurisdiction of Philippine courts. As stated earlier, 
judicial power now includes the duty to determine whether or not there has 
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on 
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. 
87 Keihin Narasaki Corp. v. Crystal Navigation SA, 193 SCRA 484 (1991). 
88 Tanada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051 (1965). 
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2.2. Exercise of jurisdiction 
2.2.1. Requirements for the Exercise of Jurisdiction 
In conflict of laws cases specific requirements have to be complied with 
before a court may validly exercise jurisdiction. We first consider the require-
ments ratione personae and distinguish between natural and juridical persons. 
We further delimit ourselves by considering cases in personam, in rem and 
quasi in rem. 
An action in personam is directed against a particular person on the basis of 
his/her personal liabili~. Judgment therein is binding only upon them or their 
successors-in-interest. 8 In cases such as these, involving natural persons, 
Filipinos or aliens who are residents of the Philippines, it is indispensable that 
summons be served upon them in accordance with the above-quoted provision. 
In the case of non-resident aliens, jurisdiction over their person may not be 
exercised unless they are first duly served with summons. The same is true in 
the case of a non-resident citizen. 
The rule for juridical persons is entirely different. Where the juridical 
person is a private domestic entity, service of summons may be made on the 
president, managi~ partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer or 
in-house counsel. If service is to be made upon a foreign juridical person 
which is doing business in the Philippines, service may be made upon it 
through its resident agent designated in accordance with laws for that purpose, 
or upon the government officer in charge of regulating such corporation, or on 
any of its officers or agents who may be found within the Philippines.91 Where 
the juridical person involved is a foreign corporation not doing business in the 
Philippines, jurisdiction over its person may not be acquired. 
A case in rem is an action directed against the whole world and its object is 
to bar all who might be minded to make any objection against the rights sought 
to be enforced. 92 Here, when the defendant is not a resident and may not be 
found in the Philippines, service of summons may, by leave of court, be ef-
fected out of the Philippines by personal service or by publication in a newspa-
per of general circulation in which case a copy of the summons and order shall 
be sent by registered mail to the last known address of the defendant. 93 For 
instance, petitions for the registration of land should be furnished to all adjoin-
ing owners and the actual occupant of the land. In addition, they should be 
published in accordance with the rules. Accordingly, the court may acquire 
jurisdiction over the res and its judgment may be held valid and binding not 
only against actual parties but also against the whole world. In cases such as 
89 Sandejas v. Robles, 81 Phil. 421 (1948). 
90 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 14, Sec. II. 
91 Ibid., Sec. 12. 
92 Sandejas v. Robles, 81 Phil. 421 (1948). 
93 Rules of Procedure, Rule 14, Sec. 19. 
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these, where a court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the defendant, it never-
theless acquires competence to hear the case where jurisdiction over the res has 
been acquired. 
A case quasi in rem, on the other hand, is directed against a particular 
person but the judgment therein is binding and valid against all who may 
possess an interest in the property under litigation.94 An example of an action 
quasi in rem is an action to judicially foreclose a mortgage. 
Special jurisdictional rules ratione materiae are likewise prescribed for 
different categories of legal relationships. To illustrate: 
- The principle of territoriality provides that Philippine penal laws and laws of 
public security and safety are obligatory upon all who live or sojourn in Philip-
pine territo~, subject to the principle of public international law and to treaty 
stipulations. 5 
- The nationality theory sanctions the application of Philippine laws relating to 
family rights and duties or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons 
upon all citizens of the Philippines even though living abroad. Implicitly, the 
theory provides that aliens are ?overned by their national law with respect to 
the above-enumerated matters. 9 
- The situs of real property as well as personal property determines the appli-
cable law. 97 
- In intestate and testamentary successions, the national law of the decedent 
prescribes the order of succession, the amount of successional rights, the 
validity of testamentary provisions98 and the capacity to succeed of an heir. 99 
- The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills and other public instruments 
are subject to the lex loci celebrationis. 100 
- Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property and those which 
have as object such things as order, public policy and good customs are not 
rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated or by treaties or con-
ventions agreed upon in a foreign country. 10 
- In marriages involving aliens, to be celebrated in the Philipines, the capacity 
of each party to contract marriage is determined by their national law and the 
parties are required to submit a certificate of legal capacity to contract marriage 
to be issued by their respective diplomatic or consular officials. 102 
- Marriages solemnized outside the Philippines between Filipinos in accor-
dance with the law of the country where they were solemnized are valid and as 
such are also valid in the Philippines, except those which are considered void 
94 Sandejas v. Robles, supra: 
95 Civil Code, Art. 14. 
96 Ibid., Art. 15. 
97 Ibid., Art. 16(1). 
98 Ibid., Art. 16(2). 
99 Ibid., Art. 1039. 
100 Ibid., Art. 17(1). 
101 Ibid., Art. 17(3). 
102 Family Code, Art. 26(1). 
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by reason of public policy, incestuous marriages and those that do not comply 
with the essential and formal requisites of marriage. 103 This rule is modified by 
another conflict rule which gives effect to a divorce validly obtained by an alien 
spouse abroad and which capacitates the Filipino spouse to remarry under 
Philippine laws. 104 
- The property relations of spouses are governed by Philippine law regardless 
of the place of celebration of the marriage. The rule does not apply: where both 
spouses are aliens; with respect to the extrinsic validity of contracts affecting 
property not situated in the Philippines and executed in the country where the 
property is located; and with respect to the extrinsic validity of contracts en-
tered into in the Philippines but affecting property situated in a foreign country 
whose laws require different formalities for their extrinsic validity. 105 
- A Filipino who is in a foreign country may execute a will in accordance with 
the formalities established by the law of the country where he is. Such a will 
may be probated in the Philippines. 106 
- A will executed by an alien who is abroad, produces effect in the Philippines 
if made in accordance with the law of the place of his residence, or the law of 
his country, or in conformity with Philippine laws. 107 
- A will executed in the Philippines by a citizen of another country in accor-
dance with his national law, which might be proved and allowed by the law of 
his country, shall have the same effect as if executed according to Philippine 
laws. 108 
- Joint wills executed by Filipinos in a foreign country are not valid in the 
Philippines. 109 
- The revocation of a will may be effected by a person who is not a domiciliary 
of the Philippines in accordance with the law of the place where the will was 
made or according to the law of the place in which the testator had his domicile 
at the time or in accordance with Philippine laws if the revocation takes place 
in this country. 110 
- The law of the country to which the goods are to be transported shall govern 
the liability of the common carrier for their loss, destruction or deterioration. III 
103 Ibid., Art. 26(2). 
104 Ibid., Art. 80. 
105 Civil Code, Art. 815. 
106 Ibid., Art. 816. 
107 Ibid., Art. 817. 
108 Ibid., Art. 818. 
109 Ibid., Art. 829. 
110 Ibid., Art. 1753. 
III Antam Consolidated, Inc. v. CA, 143 SCRA 288 (1985), reiterated in National Sugar Trading 
Corp. v. CA, 246 SCRA 465 (1995). 
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2.2.2. Exercise in case of non-Julfilment of requirements 
Notwithstanding the non-fulfilment of the general requirements for its 
exercise, jurisdiction may still be exercised in exceptional cases. The voluntary 
appearance of a non-resident citizen or alien to answer a complaint against him 
effectively confers jurisdiction upon the court. It should also be pointed out that 
while a foreign corporation "not doing business in the Philippines" cannot 
ordinarily be sued in this country, because Philippine courts cannot acquire 
jurisdiction over it, jurisdiction may nonetheless be acquired by its voluntary 
submission to Philippine courts. There is no bar against these foreign corpora-
tions' voluntary appearance before Philippine courts and availing of judicial 
remedies for violations of its rights in isolated transactions: 112 
"The doctrine of lack of capacity to sue based on failure to first acquire a local 
license is based on considerations of sound public policy. It was never intended 
to favor domestic corporations who enter into solitary transactions with unwary 
foreign firms and then repudiate their obligations simply because the latter are 
not licensed to do business in this country. " 
This right in favor of foreign corporations not doing business in the 
Philippines is also recognized in statutes subject to the principle of reciprocity. 
For example: foreign corporations "not doing business in the Philippines" may 
maintain actions in the Philippines for infringement of trademark and/or unfair 
competition. II3 
Parenthetically, a definition of the phrase "doing business in the 
Philippines" is in order. A description of the effects of "doing business in the 
Philippines without a license" is also now called for. The phrase "doing 
business in the Philippines" is expressly defined in Article 44 of the Omnibus 
Investments Code, as follows: 
"Definition of Terms. 
As used in this Book, the term 'investment' shall mean equity participation in 
any enterprise formed, organized or existing under the laws of the Philippines, 
and the phrase 'doing business' shall include soliciting orders, purchases, serv-
ice contracts; opening offices, whether called 'liaison' offices or branches; ap-
pointing representatives or distributors who are domiciled in the Philippines or 
who in any calendar year stay in the Philippines for a period or periods totalling 
one hundred eighty (180) days or more; participating in the management, su-
pervision or control of any domestic business firm, entity or corporation in the 
Philippines, and any other act or acts that imply a continuity of commercial 
dealings or arrangements and contemplate to that extent the performance of acts 
or works, or the exercise of some of the functions normally incident to, and in 
progressive prosecution of, commercial gain or of the purpose and object, of 
the business corporation. " 
112 Trademark Law, Rep. Act No. 166, as amended, Sec. 21-A. 
113 Philippine Columbian Enterprises Co. v. Lantin, 39 SCRA 376 (1971). 
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The determination of whether or not a foreign corporation is doing business in 
the Philippines is, therefore, essentially a question of fact. 
The fatal consequence of doing business in the Philippines without a license 
is laid down in Section 133 of the Corporation Code: 
"Doing business without a license. 
No foreign corporation transacting business in the Philippines without a license, 
or its successors or assigns, shall be permitted to maintain or intervene in any 
action, suit or proceeding in any court or administrative agency of the Philip-
pines; but such corporation may be sued or proceeded against before Philippine 
courts or administrative tribunals on any valid cause of action recognized under 
Philippine laws. " 
Therefore, while a foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines 
without a license cannot sue before Philippine courts, it may still be sued and a 
counterclaim filed against a foreign cOl'!?oration is not an admission of its legal 
capacity to sue before Philippine courts. 14 
It is also noteworthy that a party to a contract who is not subject to a Phil-
ippine court's jurisdiction may voluntarily surrender to the jurisdiction of such 
court where the contract itself provides that disputes arising therefrom are 
subject to the Philippines' jurisdiction. 
2.2.3. Jurisdiction to enjoin or to arrest 
Where a Philippine court is properly vested with jurisdiction, it is empow-
ered to issue a writ of injunction to enjoin the performance of an act or to 
compel its performance. This injunction may be an ancillary remedy or the 
main action itself. It will be issued only after strict compliance with the provi-
sions of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court. 
The power to order arrest is also gossessed by Philippine courtsl15 and is 
governed strictly by the Bill of Rights 16 and other pertinent laws. ll7 It should 
be observed, however, that the powers to enjoin and order arrest may be 
exercised only within the territories of the Philippines. An act may be enjoined 
only where it is sought to be performed within the Philippines and the person 
who seeks to commit the same has been subjected to the jurisdiction of the 
court. The same is true with respect to the power to order arrest. In certain 
cases, however, the power to order arrest is constructively extended with the 
execution of bilateral agreements for extradition. 
114 Rules on Civil Procedure, Rule 113. 
115 Phil. Const., Art. III. 
116 Rep. Act. No. 7438, approved on 27 April 1992, 88 OG 3880 No. 25. 
117 Rules on Civil Procedure, Rule 4, Sec. 2. 
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2.3. Forum selection 
Forum selection is sanctioned by written and unwritten rules. The written 
rules which allow forum selection have already been stated earlier in this paper. 
In addition, the Rules of Civil Procedure give the plaintiff, in personal actions, 
the right to choose in which court his action will be tried: 
"Sec. 2. Venue of personal actions. 
All other actions may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the 
principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal de-
fendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be 
found, at the election of the plaintiff. " 
Likewise, the Supreme Court recently enunciated a rule concerning forum 
selection as follows: 118 
"The parties to a contract may select the law by which it is to be governed. 
(CHESHIRE, Private InternatioYUlI Law, 7th ed., 187). In such a case, the foreign 
law is adopted as a 'system' to regulate the relations of the parties, including 
questions of their capacity to enter into the contract, the formalities to be ob-
served by them, matters of performance, and so forth (16 Am Jur 2d, 150-61). 
Instead of adopting the entire mass of the foreign law, the parties may just 
agree that specific provisions of a foreign statute shall be deemed incorporated 
into their contracts as a set of terms. By such reference to the provisions of a 
foreign law, the contract does not become a foreign contract to be governed by 
the foreign law. The said law does not operate as a statute but as a set of con-
tractual terms deemed written in the contract (ANTON, Private InternatioYUlI 
Law, 1967, 197; DICEY and MORRIS, The Conflict Of Laws, 8th ed., 702-703)." 
It is basic, however, that the forum must bear some relationship to the party or 
their transaction. 
Further, the application of Philippine law should be insisted on in the 
following cases: 
1. Where the law itself provides for the application of Philippine law. This is 
illustrated in Article 124, paragraph 1(1) of the Civil Code which provides: 
"If the husband is a citizen of the Philippines and the wife is a foreigner, the 
provisions of this Code shall govern their property relations;" 
2. Where the application of foreign law is specifically proscribed. The rule is 
stated in Article 17, paragraph 3 of the Civil Code which states: 
"Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which 
have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be 
rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or 
conventions agreed upon in a foreign country. " 
118 Northwest Orient Airlines v. CA, supra n. 31. 
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3. Where the applicable foreign law was not properly pleaded and proved. As a 
nonn, Philippine courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws. This must 
be proven as a fact and shown to be applicable under the circumstances of the 
case. If not pleaded and proven, Philippine courts engage in the processual 
presumption that the foreign law is the same as the corresponding Philippine 
law and will proceed to apply the latter. The Supreme Court explains this as 
follows: 
"Alternatively, in the light of the absence of proof regarding Japanese law, the 
presumption of identity or similarity or the so-called processual presumption 
may be invoked. Applying it, the Japanese law on the matter is presumed to be 
similar with the Philippine law on service of summons on a private foreign cor-
poration doing business in the Philippines. Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of 
Court provides that if the defendant is a foreign corporation doing business in 
the Philippines, service may be made: (1) on its resident agent designated in ac-
cordance with law for that purpose, or, (2) if there is no such resident agent, on 
the government official designated by law to that effect, or (3) on any of its of-
ficers and agents within the Philippines." 
On the other hand, the application of foreign law is justified where Philippine 
law mandates the application of such law. Specific examples are Articles 16(1), 
17(1), 124(2) of the Civil Code. These rules are obligatory when properly 
applicable and the parties do not enjoy any discretion to derogate from them. 
Where the application of any of these is clearly warranted, a court which does 
otherwise, acts without or in excess of jurisdiction. 
2.4. Lis Pendens 
Lis Pendens is also referred to in the Philippines as auter action pendant or 
litis pendentia. There is litis pendentia where the parties to the action are the 
same, there is substantial identity in the causes of action and the relief sought, 
and the result of the first action is detenninative of the second in any event. 119 
When there is litis pendentia, the subsistence of one action may be pleaded to 
abate the other. 120 
Litis pendentia is intimately related121 to the concept of forum selection or 
forum shopping, a proscribed practice122 in the Philippines of seeking recourse 
in two or more fora to increase the chances of obtaining a favourable deci-
sion. 123 Forum shopping is penalized as a contumacious act. The counsel is 
held liable for disciplinary action and his client for criminal prosecution. The 
rule was recently incorporated into the new Rules of Civil Procedure. 124 How-
119 Northcott & Co. v. VilIa-Abrille, 41 Phil. 462 (1921). 
120 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 16, Sec. l(e). 
121 First Philippine International Bank v. CA, 252 SCRA 2259 (1996). 
122 Supreme Court Administrative Circular 04-94, 8 February 1994. 
123 International Container Terminal Services, Inc. v. CA, 249 SCRA 389 (1995). 
124 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 7, Sec. 5. 
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ever, litis pendentia as a ground to dismiss an action is limited in application to 
forum shopping in Philippine courts only. It does not comprehend a situation 
where the courts involved belong to different jurisdictions. Moreover, Philip-
pine courts cannot take judicial notice of the pendency of a similar action in 
another state. Thus, this further limits the application of the rule against forum 
shopping in the above situation. Despite the absence of a rule, however, it is 
submitted that filing an identical action in two or more courts of different 
jurisdictions is provable in the proper case as forum shopping and may be 
struck down as unethical and in abuse of the processes of the courts. The 
doctrine of forum non-conveniens likewise exists as a deterrent against this 
pernicious practice. 
2.5. Immunities 
The granting of immunities in favor of a foreign state, international 
organizations and diplomatic officials is contained in several treaties, 
conventions and agreements. Among them is the 1961 Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations 125 which grants criminal as well as civil and 
administrative immunity to diplomatic representatives of a foreign country. 
Similarly, complete immunity is given to s~ecialized agencies of the United 
Nations under the relevant Convention. 1 6 Other, regional international 
organizations created by multilateral and bilateral agreements such as the 
Southeast Asia Fisheries Development Center127 are also given immunity from 
the jurisdiction of the host state in order to allow them to work effectively 
towards the attainment of the purposes for which they are created. These 
treaties and agreements were given express recognition by Congress, which 
enacted Republic Act No. 75, penalizing acts which impair the Philippines' 
proper observance of the immunity rights and privileges of accredited 
diplomatic representatives. 
These immunities notwithstanding, there are instances where our courts 
may still acquire jurisdiction over a foreign state or an international organiza-
tion or over diplomatic representatives. An envoy himself may waive his 
immunity by instituting an action against another person in a Philippine court. 
Or he may voluntarily appear in an action against him, in which case, in the 
absence of an express reservation, he may be deemed to have shed his immu-
nity. A foreign state's immunity is also set aside where it has descended to the 
level of an individual and has entered into business contracts or transactions not 
I d th . f . . fu . 128 re ate to e exercIse 0 Its sovereIgn nctIOns. 
125 Supra 1.2. 
126 327 UNTS 326. 
127 Entered into force for the Philippines on 16 January 1968. 
128 National Development Corp. v. Tobias, 117 Phil. 703 (1963); National Development Corp. v. 
NDC Employees and Workers Union, 66 SCRA 18 (1975). 
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3. SERVICE OF PROCESS 
In a 1939 decision the Philippine Supreme Court, citing American 
authorities, held that: 
"The process of a court has no extraterritorial effect, and no jurisdiction is ac-
quired over the person of the defendant by serving him beyond the boundaries 
of the state. Nor has a judgment of a court of a foreign country against a resi-
dent of this country having no property in such foreign country based on proc-
ess served here, any effect here against either the defendant personally or his 
property situated here. ,,129 
The Boudard ruling was relied upon by the Court of Appeals in a recent case 
where it said: 
"In its decision, the Court of Appeals sustained the trial court. It agreed with 
the latter in its reliance upon Boudard v. Tait (67 Phil., 1939, 170) wherein it 
was held that "the process of the court has no extraterritorial effect and no ju-
risdiction is acquired over the person of the defendant by serving him beyond 
the boundaries of the state". To support its position, the Court of Appeals 
further stated: 
"In an action strictly in personam, such as the instant case, personal service of 
summons within the forum is required for the court to acquire jurisdiction over 
the defendant. To confer jurisdiction on the court, personal or substituted serv-
ice of summons on the defendant not extraterritorial service is necessary. 
It is a general rule that processes of the court cannot lawfully be served outside 
the territorial limits of the jurisdiction of the court from within which it issues 
and this is regardless of the residence or citizenship of the party thus served. 
There must be actual service within the proper territorial limits on defendant or 
someone authorized to accept service for him. Thus, a defendant, whether a 
resident or not in the forum where the action is filed, must be served with 
summons within that forum. ,,\30 
However, in reversing the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held in 
Northwest that our rules on service of process are inapplicable because "matters 
of remedy and procedure are governed by the lex fori. \31 The Northwest case 
deserves closer scrutiny. Northwest, an American airline, entered into an 
International Passenger Sales Agency Agreement with Sharp (a Filipino 
corporation) whereby Northwest authorized Sharp to sell its airline tickets 
through the latter's Japanese branch. Sharp failed to remit the proceeds of the 
ticket sales, so Northwest sued Sharp in Tokyo, Japan for collection of the 
unremitted amounts. The Tokyo District Court issued writs of summons against 
129 Boudard v. Tait, 67 Phil. 170 (1939). 
130 Northwest Orient. v. CA et aI., supra n. 31. 
131 Ibid., p. 199. 
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Sharp in Japan but failed twice. Finally, the Tokyo court had the summons 
served at the head office of Sharp in Manila. It requested the Supreme Court of 
Japan to serve the summons through diplomatic channels. It delivered the 
summons to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs which passed it on to its 
Philippine counterpart. The Ministry (now Department) of Foreign Affairs of 
the Philippines delivered the court processes to the Executive Judge of the 
Court of First Instance of Manila (now Regional Trial Court) and the latter 
forthwith ordered the sheriff to serve the same on Sharp in Manila. Despite 
receiving the summons, Sharp failed to appear at the hearings in Tokyo. The 
Tokyo court proceeded to hear the case and rendered judgment, ordering Sharp 
to pay Northwest the unremitted amounts. 
Northwest was unable to execute the decision in Japan, hence a suit for 
enforcement of the judgment was filed by Northwest before the Regional Trial 
Court of Manila. Unable to settle the case amicably, the case was tried on the 
merits. After the plaintiff rested its case, the defendant on 21 April 1989 filed a 
Motion for Judgment on a Demurrer to Evidence based on two grounds: (1) the 
foreign judgment sought to be enforced is null and void for want of 
jurisdiction, and (2) the said judgment is contrary to Philippine law and public 
policy and rendered without due process of law. The trial court and the Court 
of Appeals found for plaintiff Northwest following the Boudard ruling. On the 
question of jurisdiction, the Supreme Court laid down its main premise that 
procedural rules are governed by lex fori. Then it proceeded to rule that, since 
defendant Sharp failed to plead and prove the relevant Japanese rules, they are 
presumed to be the same as Philippine rules. Under Philippine rules, the 
procedure adopted by the Japanese court in serving court processes was 
sufficient to acquire jurisdiction over defendant. From this case, it would 
appear that the service of foreign court processes will be given effect in the 
Philippines as long as it is in accordance with the law of the forum. 
4. TAKING OF EVIDENCE 
4.1. Taking of evidence abroad for a litigation in the Philippines 
The Philippine Rules of Civil Procedure governing the taking of evidence 
abroad for use in cases pending in the Philippines are fairly well-defined. A 
person, whether a party or not, may be asked to testify in connection with a 
pending action in the Philippines despite the fact that (s)he is outside the 
country. Such testimony may be taken by deposition upon oral examination 
before the person enumerated in Rule 23, Section 11 which reads: 
"Sec. 11. Persons before whom depositions may be taken in foreign countries. 
In a foreign state or country, depositions may be taken (a) on notice before a 
secretary of embassy or legation, consul-general, consul, vice-consul, or con-
sular agent of the Republic of the Philippines; (b) before such person or officer 
PHILIPPINE CNIL PROCEDURE IN TRANSBOUNDARY DISPUTES 
as may be appointed by commission or under letters rogatory; or (c) the person 
referred to in section 14 hereof. " 
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In cases where deposition is not practicable or inconvenient, it may still be 
taken before the proper judicial authority in the foreign country where the 
proposed deponent may be found through the use of a commission or letters 
rogatory. The rule in respect to this, as contained in section 12, is as 
follows: 132 
"Sec. 12. Commission or letters rogatory. 
A commission or letters rogatory shall be issued only when necessary or con-
venient, on application and notice, and on such terms and with such direction as 
are just and appropriate. Officers may be designated in notices or commissions 
either, or name or descriptive title and letters rogatory may be addressed to the 
appropriate judicial authority in the foreign country." 
In brief, the request should state that certain named persons are subject to a 
foreign court's jurisdiction and are material witnesses in a case pending before 
the requesting court. The letter asks that said persons be brought before the 
foreign court or persons appointed by it to answer to interrogatories and cross-
interrogatories annexed to the letter and that the answers be transmitted to the 
requesting court. The taking of evidence in the foreign court is subject to its 
rules. 
The issuance of letters derogatory is generally founded on the principle of 
reciprocity. In the absence of treaties or customary law, the requesting court 
offers reciprocity to that foreign court as a gesture for the latter to grant the 
request. 
4.2. Taking of evidence in the Philippines in connection with litigation 
abroad 
The same principle of reciprocity allows the taking of evidence in the 
Philippines in connection with litigation abroad. There is, however, no 
Philippine rule on this matter and it is submitted that it is governed by the law 
of the forum, being procedural in character. 
5. RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS 
5.1. Philippine rule on recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments 
The rule on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in the 
Philippines is laid down in Rule 39, Section 48 of the Rules of Civil Procedure 
which provides: 
132 Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 23, Sec. 12. 
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"The effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, hav-
ing jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows: 
In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final 
order is conclusive upon the title of the thing. 
In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final or-
der is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their succes-
sors in interest by a subsequent title. 
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a 
want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mis-
take of law or fact. " 
This rule is based on the theory of comity and reciprocity. A forum will 
accord recognition to a final judgment or order of another forum provided its 
own final judgments or order are similarly recognized in the other forum. 133 
The rule also gets support from the vested rights theory134 which provides that 
adjudication by a competent court as to the liability of one person to another 
creates a legal obligation which may be enforced in another country by an 
action for collection of a sum of money. 
Finally, the principle of res judicata bars a second litigation between the 
same parties over matters that have already been tried and decided with finality 
in a first one. Public policy requires that litigation comes to a definite end, so 
that the parties who have litigated the issues therein are bound by the judgment 
rendered and the matters resolved are forever settled between them. 135 
We distinguish between recognition and enforcement. Recognition is the 
passive act of giving legal effect to a foreign judgment, while enforcement 
requires a separate action or proceeding to actually realize a foreign judgment. 
The Philippines, as shown by the above-quoted provision and by jurisprudence, 
favors enforcement over recognition. 136 This means that a foreign judgment 
cannot be given effect by mere execution. Rather, a separate action for 
enforcement must be instituted. This procedure harmonizes the principles of 
territoriality of courts with res judicata. 
5.2. Requisites for recognition and enforcement 
The judgment must have been rendered by a court of competent jurisdic-
tion. Otherwise, the judgment is null and void and it is as if there is nothing to 
be recognized or enforced. The Northwest case illustrates this point. If the 
service of summons upon Sharp were held improper, the Tokyo court had not 
133 CHESHIRE, Private International Law (1947) 628. 
134 Esperanza v. Avila, 20 SCRA 59 (1967). 
135 Paraphrasing COQUIA, 'Enforcement and Recognition of Foreign Judgment', 241 SCRA 40 
(1995). 
136 Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 93 Phil. 1034 (1954). 
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thereby acquired jurisdiction over Sharp and the judgment in favor of North-
west would be unenforceable in the Philippines for being null and void. 
The judgment must be valid under the laws of the court that rendered it. 
The requisite is simple: a judgment which is invalid under the laws of the court 
that rendered it cannot be given effect in a court of another country. This is so 
because the second court merely recognizes or enforces the judgment in the 
manner that it would operate if enforced where the first court is sitting. 
The judgment must be final and executory. In an early case the Supreme 
Court ruled that a decree awarding custody of a child granted by a US court 
could not be implemented in the Philippines because it was merely 
interlocutory. It did not finally settle and ad!udge the rights of the parties and 
thus it was unenforceable in the Philippines. 1 7 
There must be reciprocity between the Philippines and the State where the -
foreign judgment was obtained. This is a reiteration of the principles of comity 
and reciprocity. 
The judgment must be for the delivery of a specific thing or the declaration 
of status or right. This is evident from the above-quoted rule. Unless the 
judgment calls for the delivery of a particular thing or the performance of 
specific acts in the country, there is no reason for that judgment to be enforced 
in the Philippines. 
The foreign judgment must not contravene the law, public policy, morals 
and good customs of the country where it is to be enforced. This is supported 
by Article 17 paragraEh 6 of the Civil Code quoted earlier. The case of 
Gonzales v. Gonzales 1 8 is on all fours. Defendant here obtained a decree of 
divorce in Nevada which he asked the trial court of Manila to confirm. Plaintiff 
joined defendant in his efforts to convince the trial court to recognize and 
enforce the decree of divorce. In disposing of the case, the Supreme Court held 
that such a decree cannot be given effect in the Philippines as it violates 
Philippine law, public policy, morals and good customs. 
Lastly, the judgment must not have been obtained by fraud, collusion, 
mistake of law or fact. During the proceedings on the action for enforcement, a 
party may show that the judgment was attended by any of the above defects. In 
the event he is successful the judgment will not be enforced by Philippine 
courts. 
137 Querubin v. Querubin, 87 Phil. 124 (1950). 
138 58 Phil. 67 (1933). 

INTERNATIONAL CIVIL PROCEDURE IN INDONESIA 
Sudargo Gautama * 
1. GENERAL CONTEXT 
1.1. Introduction 
More than half a century after Independence, civil law and civil procedure 
law in Indonesia are still under the influence of the Dutch legal system. As a 
colony of the Netherlands, the Netherlands Indies in its legal system in civil 
matters closely followed the law and prevailing doctrines of the 'motherland' 
under the so-called concordance principle. I This principle was embodied in 
Article 131(2)(a) of the colonial quasi Constitution.2 It was, of course, aban-
doned after independence. Yet, even in today's legal practice Dutch judicial 
decisions and Dutch scholarly opinions and interpretations are still widely 
followed. 3 
While the concordance principle applied to the part of the law that was of 
European origin, the colonial legal regime was simultaneously based on a 
system of different substantive and procedural civil law for various racially 
defined sub-divisions of the population and for different culturally defmed parts 
of the country. This feature of the system was anchored in the notorious Article 
163 of the above quasi Constitution. Although the legal distinctions along racial 
lines4 were immediately abolished after independence as far as public law was 
concerned, this was not necessarily the case with regard to private law. 5 
• Professor of Conflict of Laws, University of Indonesia, Jakarta. 
I On this principle, see S. GAUTAMA and R.N. HORNICK, An Introduction to Indonesian Law 
(Alumni Pub\., Bandung, 4th printing, 1983), and also S. GAUTAMA, Indonesian Business Law 
(Citra Aditya Bhakti Pub\., Bandung, 1995) 10 et seq. 
2 In Dutch Indische Staatsregeling; also 'Constitution of the Indies'. Netherlands Act of 23 June 
1925, Netherlands Indies State Gazette (NISG) (1925) No. 415. 
3 See the proceedings in Kartika Thahir v. Pertamina, Singapore Law Reports (1993 No.1) 735, 
where the issue of to what extent Indonesian case law and legal practice is still being influenced by 
Dutch case law and legal learning was hotly debated. 
4 The law distinguished between 'Europeans', 'Natives' (Dutch: Inlanders) and 'Foreign Orientals'. 
Europeans comprised Dutch citizens, other persons of European stock, Japanese nationals, and all 
others who in their native country were subjected to family laws essentially similar to Dutch law, 
such as the Thais and the Turks, and the children of Europeans born in Indonesia and their 
descendants. Indigenous people or Natives included the main Indonesian population except those 
who were legally 'equated' with Europeans or women who had moved to the category of Europeans 
by marriage. The Foreign Orientals comprised all those not belonging to either of the two previous 
Asian Yearbook of International Law, Volume 6 (Ko Swan Sik et al., eds. 
«:> Kluwer Law International; printed in the Netherlands), pp. 87-103 
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In order to avoid a legal vacuum after independence, the Constitution 
contains a provision on the validity and applicability of the law, including the 
Netherlands Indies codes of law, as it existed at the time independence was 
attained, i.e. on 17 August 1945. Article II of the Transitory Provisions of the 
Constitution stipulated, inter alia, that all existing regulations were to remain in 
force as far as they were not replaced in accordance with the Constitution. The 
application of this provision later underwent the impact of another instrument 
that was promulgated shortly afterwards. On 10 October 1945, barely two 
months after the declaration of independence, Government Regulation 1945 
No.2 was proclaimed.6 It essentially repeated the above transitory rule but 
added the proviso that existing regulations would only remain in force "insofar 
as they are not contrary to the Constitution itself'. Because of this last sub-sen-
tence the transitory regulation was later interpreted as prescribing the abolition 
of the existing law unless it was not contrary to the 1945 Constitution. If found 
to be contrary to that Constitution, it should be considered invalid even though 
no new legislation had yet been enacted to replace it. 7 
In practice it has not always been entirely clear which rules were abolished 
or altered since independence. This applies also to the ('European') Civil CodeS 
and Code of Civil Procedure9 and is, among other things, caused by the ambi-
guous interpretation and application of the transitory provisions relating to the 
law at the time of the attainment of independence. Another reason for this 
ambiguity is that, in introducing new law, the Indonesian legislature frequently 
does not clearly identify which parts of the existing law shall be deemed to be 
categories. 
5 The distinction \vas upheld in court practice as late as the 1970s: in its Decision of 25 August 
1971 (case No. 268K1Sip/1971) the Supreme Court held "that the relationship between plaintiff and 
defendant is one governed by the law on internal inter-legal relationships [hubungan hukwn antar 
tata-hukwn intern], to which Western law [emphasis added] is applicable, as the defendant [an 
indigenous Indonesian] should be deemed, in accordance with relevant precedent, to have 
voluntarily entered into the legal sphere of the other party [an Indonesian of Chinese descent, and 
thus subject to the 'European' civil law]. See SUDARGO GAUTAMA, Himpunan yurisprudensi 
Indonesia yang penting untuk praktek sehari-hari - Landmark decisions [Collection of Important 
Indonesian Court Decisions for Daily Legal Practice - Landmark decisions], Vol. 9 (1994) case No. 
2. 
6 KOESNODIPRODJO (ed.), 1 Himpunan UruJang2, Peraturan2, Penetapan2 Pemerintah Republik 
Indonesia [Collection of Acts, Regulations and Decisions of the Government of the Republic of 
Indonesia] p. 34. 
7 In 1962, Minister of Justice SAHARDJO, in line with the 'revolutionary approach', suggested at a 
session of the National Law Development Institute that the (European) civil and commercial codes 
should no longer be regarded as proper codes of law but merely as 'law books' or 'commentaries', 
comparable to the 'restatements' in the US. See GAUTAMA and HORNICK, op. cit n. 1 p. 185 et 
seq. 
8 NISG 1847 No. 23. 
9 The so-called (Dutch) Reglement op de Rechtsvordering (hereinafter RV), NISG 1847 No. 52. 
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abolished, but rather confmes itself to the phrase "earlier regulations contrary 
to the new law are no longer in force" .10 
1.2. The judicial system 
Under the 1945 Constitution judicial power is vested in the Supreme Court 
and other judicial organs as determined by law. II The Basic Law on Judicial 
Powerl2 mentions four branches of the judiciary: general courts, religious 
courts, military courts and administrative courts. For practical purposes only 
the first branch mentioned will be dealt with in the present paper. 
The 'Pengadilan Negeri' (hereinafter: PN) or 'Country Court' or District 
Court is the court of first instance. There is a PN in every 'second degree 
autonomous region'. 13 PNs are created by the Minister of Justice with the 
consent of the Supreme Court. Although according to the text of the law the 
PN is a panel court requiring at least three judges for taking valid decisions, it 
often acts as a single-judge court due to lack of qualified personnel. 14 
Before the Japanese occupation during World War II the prevailing racially 
based legal pluralism did not only refer to the substantive law but to the com-
petence of the courts and the law of procedure as well. According to the so-
called 'dualist' system there were separate categories of state courts for those 
who were classified legally as Europeans and so-called Foreign Orientals on the 
one hand, and for the indigenous Indonesians on the other. 15 The PN essentially 
replaced the pre-war first-instance state courts for the indigenous population (in 
Dutch: Landraad). 
The 'Pengadilan Tinggi' or High Court is the court of appeal. In civil cases 
appeal to the High Court is open provided the claim is more than 100 Rupiah, 
which is a nominal amount. 16 
The 'Mahkamah Agung' or Supreme Court is the highest court of the 
country. Decisions of the High Court may be brought before the Supreme 
Court for appeal in cassation. Examination at this stage is confined to the legal 
aspects of the case. Besides, the Supreme Court is entitled to start a special 
10 By way of example reference may be made to the discussions on this issue in connection with the 
introduction of the Basic Agrarian Act in 1960. See S. GAUTAMA, Tafsiran Undani Pokok 
Agraria [Interpretation of the Basic Agrarian Act] (Citra Aditya Bakti pub\. , Bandung, 9th ed., 
1993); S. GAUTAMA, Indonesian Business Law, ch. IV 'Land Law'. Art. 58 of the Act provided 
that all earlier law, whether written or unwritten, that was not explicitly revoked, would continue to 
be in force to the extent that it was not contrary to the spirit and content of the Act. 
II Constitution, Art. 24. 
12 Lembaran Negara [(Indonesian) State Gazette; hereafter LN] 1970 No. 19. 
13 In Indonesian: Daerah Swatantra Tingkat Kedua or Kabupaten. Constitution, Art. 18; Law No. 
111957, LN 1957 No.6. 
14 This is especially the case in smaller cities. 
15 There were also indigenous courts (in Dutch: inheemse rechtbanken) with limited jurisdiction. 
16 The present (end of 1996) rate is Rp 2,300 to 1 US dollar. 
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kind of revision procedure by which it, by way of court of last instance, scruti-
nizes cases of blatant error, fraud, corruption or collusion of judges in a certain 
case, and the emergence of new facts or evidence which were not known at the 
time of the original decision and which are of such a nature that, had the court 
rendering the decision known them, it would certainly not have rendered such a 
decision. Further, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over disputes on compe-
tence between different branches of courts. Lastly, whenever parties have not 
agreed about the fmality of an arbitral award, an appeal is open directly to the 
Supreme Court. 17 
1.3. The sources 
Reference has already been made to the pre-war 'dualist' court system. 
Accordingly, there was a rather complete though outdated Code of Civil Pro-
cedure (RV). It dated from 1847 and essentially was a copy of the correspon-
ding Code in the Netherlands. It applied to proceedings before the 'European' 
state courts, next to a set of much more compact 'Native Regulations', dating 
from 1848 though later revisedl8 , for use in the state 'Native' courts as far as 
Java was concerned. 19 
With the abolition of the pre-war legal pluralism, as far as its public law 
aspects were concerned, and the resulting uniformation of the courts, the 
revised 'Native Regulations' were taken to become the directly applicable and 
principal rules of (penal and civil) procedure in the unified state court system, 
under the name of 'Revised Indonesian Regulations' (hereinafter RIB, after its 
Indonesian designation). It is, however, established Indonesian legal practice 
that RV provisions are being used by the courts supplementary to the RIB 
whenever the latter does not provide adequately for the matter at hand and 
when application of the RV would serve the realization of the substantive law. 
2. JURISDICTION 
2.1. The notion of jurisdiction 
The notion of jurisdiction, within the meaning of the internationally recog-
nized adjudicatory power of Indonesian courts as organs of the Indonesian 
state, plays no effective role in the Indonesian law or doctrine of international 
civil procedure. The issue is avoided or, rather, denied by focusing on domes-
tic jurisdictional rules. 
11 RV Art. 641. 
18 NISG 1848 No. 16, subsequently revised: NISG 1926 No. 559 and NISG 1941 No. 44. 
19 A separate but similar set of rules was applicable for the 'Native' state courts in the 'Outer 
Possessions' . 
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2.2. The exercise of jurisdiction 
2.2.1. General 
2.2.1.1. Forum 
According to the RIB as applied by the Indonesian courts, a civil law suit is 
to be filed with the court of the defendant's habitual residence (in Dutch: 
woonplaats; in Indonesian: tempat tinggal): 'actor sequitur forum rei' .20 In case 
the defendant is a legal entity, the place of habitual residence is to be substi-
tuted by the place of the entity's legal seat (which is the place of incorporation 
or principal place of business). 21 In case of more than one defendant, the plain-
tiff has the right to choose among the courts competent in respect of each of the 
defendants. 22 These requirements show that the 'basis of presence' is essential. 
If, however, the defendant's habitual residence is unknown or if the defendant 
himself is unknown, the petition may by way of exception be filed with the 
Court of the plaintiff's residenceY 
In determining the rules relating to 'international jurisdiction', Indonesian 
judicial practice follows the Dutch model according to which the defendant's 
domicile basically determines jurisdiction in international (transboundary) mat-
ters. The Indonesian court is deemed to have international jurisdiction if the 
defendant's residence is in Indonesia and may consequently be sued under the 
(domestic) forum rei rule. 24 
2.2.1.2. Forum actoris 
As already mentioned earlier, if the defendant's habitual residence is un-
known, or if the defendant himself is unknown, then the court of the plaintiff's 
habitual residence is competent. This rule is also applied in transboundary cases 
following the RV, according to which, in case the defendant has no legal 
residence nor an actual residence in the country, the Indonesian court is 
deemed to be competent provided the plaintiff has his habitual residence in 
Indonesia. 25 
20 RIB, Art. 118. The tenn 'habitual residence' has been used in the Hague Conventions on private 
international law. See the 1961 Child Protection Convention and the 1965 Adoption Convention. 
The tenn is regarded to be more factual than the English tenn 'domicile'. The requirement of/orum 
rei is in line with the 1971 Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters. 
21 Depending on the doctrine adhered to. See S. GAUTAMA, 7 Hukum perdata internasional 
Indonesia [Indonesian Private International Law] (3d ed., 1995) Ch. 22. 
22 RIB, Art. 118(2). 
23 Ibid., Art. 118(3). Forum actoris, see infra. 
24 Cf. R. VAN ROOD and M.V. POLAK, Private International Law in the Netherlands (1987) 45. 
The same approach is taken in the European Convention on Jurisdiction and Execution, Art. 2. 
25 RV, Art. 99(3). 
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Another exception to the forum rei rule is the possibility to sue before an 
Indonesian court non-resident aliens without a known address in Indonesia, for 
obligations arising from transactions concluded with Indonesian nationals.26 
This mode, unknown in the RIB and applied by analogy to the RV, was in fact 
derived from the French Code. It is a less known exception to the forum rei 
rule and has been much criticized by various authors27 It enables an Indonesian 
plaintiff to bring a foreign party without a known address in Indonesia before 
an Indonesian court. 28 Of course the ultimate decision of the Indonesian court 
would not be enforceable in the foreign country where the defendant company 
has its legal seat, but it may be of value to bring foreign opponents to the 
negotiating table. 29 
2.2.2. Jurisdiction to enjoin and to arrest 
The R V contains specific provisions Vlith regard to the filing of a suit by an 
alien before the Indonesian courts. Under one of these provisions the foreign 
plaintiff is obliged to provide 'security for costs', the so-called cautio judicatum 
solvi.30 The RIB does not contain rules on the matter and, according to Indone-
sian judicial practice as well as legal writings, the court is not obliged to order 
the provision of such security for costs, not in relation to foreign plaintiffs nor 
to foreign defendants who file a counterclaim. The rationale is that at present 
any plaintiff has to pay an advance for the court fees when filing a civil law suit 
with the state courts. Besides, the fmal costs which the defeated party may 
ultimately be ordered to pay are confined to the official court fees which are 
26 This possibility is also derived from the RV, Art. 100: [translated from the Dutch text] "An alien 
who has no permanent residence in Indonesia, or who is not even living in Indonesia, may be sued 
before the Indonesian court in respect of transactions with an Indonesian national, concluded in 
Indonesia or elsewhere". The corresponding provision in Dutch law (Art. 127 Code of Civil 
Procedure) has been referred to as a 'dead letter' as far as Dutch judiciary practice is concerned. 
See VAN ROOIJ and POLAK, op. cit. n. 24 p. 53. 
27 See, inter alia, L.I. DE WINTER, 'Excessive jurisdiction in private international law', 17 ICLQ 
(1968) 706, who classified it as having a 'chauvinistic character'. L. STRIKWERDA, in Nederlands 
Internationaal Privaatrecht, special issue, 1996, p. 96, observed that, internationally, forum actoris 
is in fact no more accepted as a proper forum. DELAUME, in American-French Private 
International Law (1953) 57, called it "a legal trap into which foreigners, unaware of the existence 
of the privilege, may fall" . 
28 In my personal experience as a litigation lawyer this has proven to be useful. Reference may be 
made to the case filed against a Liberian shipping company by the Indonesian state-owned oil 
company Pertamina before the Central Jakarta Court in the 1970s for the annulment of overpriced 
tanker lease contracts between Pertamina and the Rappaport Group. The case was settled out of 
court. 
29 This was in fact what happened in the case referred to in the preceding note. 
30 RV, Art. 128: [translated from the Dutch text] "Non-resident aliens who act as plaintiff or ... 
intervening party are obliged, upon request of the opposing party, ... to provide security for costs, 
damages and interests for which he might be declared liable. " 
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nominal. 31 Under Indonesian law the defeated party is not liable for the victori-
ous party's lawyer's fees. 
Another special aspect of proceedings involving non-residents is that the 
other party may always apply and obtain permission for attachment of the non-
resident's assets in Indonesia. 32 
Depending on the subject matter of the case, provisional measures may be 
requested from, and ordered by the court, enjoining a party to refrain from 
acting in a certain way or from altering the status quo pending a decision in the 
case. These measures may also be ordered in transboundary cases. 
2.2.3. Jurisdiction in rem 
Claims with respect to rights to immovables fall under the jurisdiction of the 
court having jurisdiction at the place where the immovable is situated (in 
Indonesia). The RIB itself does not contain a provision to this effect, but 
Indonesian judicial practice follows the relevant RV rule. 33 
2.2.4. Constraints on exercise ofjurisdiction (forum non conveniens) 
According to the forum non conveniens doctrine, the court may refrain from 
exercising jurisdiction by declaring itself incompetent in the matter, despite 
having jurisdiction according to the criteria for international jurisdiction. This 
possibility for refusal to exercise jurisdiction is based on the consideration that 
in some cases insufficient connections with the legal sphere to which the court 
belongs might exist. 
The doctrine may thus practically serve as a general exception to the in-
ternational jurisdiction of the court. It is well-known in Anglo-American private 
international law but much less in the continental European systems. Conse-
quently the doctrine seems to flourish in countries like Singapore and Malay-
sia,34 while there is no comparable rule nor praxis in Indonesia. 
2.3. Forum selection 
The Indonesian law of civil procedure recognizes the freedom of choice of 
forum. This implies the recognition of the jurisdiction of the court chosen by 
31 RIB, Art. 182. 
32 RV, Art. 757. 
33 RV, Art. 99(8). 
34 See e.g., Justice JUDITH PRAKASH's paper, 'Forum rwn conveniens and lis alibi pendens', 
presented at the 8th Singapore Conference on International Business Law on Current Legal Issues in 
International Commercial Litigation, 1996. Justice PRAKASH quoted the House of Lords in Spiliada 
v. Cansulex Ltd, (1986) 3 All ER 843, and outlined that Commonwealth jurisdictions such as 
Singapore, Malaysia, New Zealand and Canada have fully adopted and applied the doctrine, while 
Australia has some reservations. 
94 ASIAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
the parties. Such choice of forum can, for example, be found in many standard 
maritime transport contracts (bills of lading) of Indonesian shipping companies 
where it sometimes appears next to a clause on choice of applicable law. 
Indonesian judicial practice shows that Indonesian courts have no problem in 
exercising jurisdiction that has been conferred on them by the parties by way of 
choice of forum. 
A choice of forum without a choice of applicable law implies a choice for 
the lex fori. In Indonesian legal practice transnational loan agreements often 
contain a clause opting for the forum of the foreign lender, thus extricating the 
Indonesia-based borrower from the Indonesian courts and Indonesian law. The 
present author considers a choice of this kind completely valid, although no 
court decisions are available on the question yet. On the other hand, the Jakarta 
District Court decided that it had no jurisdiction in a case in which the parties 
had made an express choice of Singapore law but no choice of forum.35 This 
was, in my opinion, a wrong decision. A choice of law should be regarded as 
something separate and different from a choice of forum. 36 
Just like it often occurs that transnational loan agreements contain a choice 
of forum clause, they sometimes contain a choice of law clause without a 
choice of forum. In a loan agreement between the Jakarta branch of a foreign 
bank and a local Indonesian company Japanese law was chosen by the parties 
as the applicable law. The Jakarta District Court in 1982 correctly took cogni-
zance of the case while ruling that the choice of law should be respected37 in 
spite of an exception raised by the foreign defendant that the court should 
declare itself incompetent since the parties had opted for foreign law. In an-
other case involving Singapore citizens as the plaintiffs and a Jakarta branch of 
a foreign bank as the defendant, the Central Jakarta District Court also cor-
rectly refused the defendant's contention that, since Singapore law was chosen 
by the parties, the Singapore court should have jurisdiction in the matter. The 
Court held itself competent. 38 
35 Case No. 560/1982G. In appeal, however, the Jakarta High Court has not upheld the lower 
court's decision. 
36 See GAUTAMA, op. cit. n. 2l. 
37 P.T. Indokaya Nissan Motors v. Marubeni Corporation, Central Jakarta District Court, Case 
560/1982/Pdt. G of 11 October 1983; (in appeal) Jakarta High Court, No. 18/1984/Pdt. of 22 May 
1984; (in cassation) Supreme Court No. 2820KlPdt. 1984 of 27 February 1986. Commented on in 
S. Gautama, op. cit. n. 5, Vol. 6, case No.4. The recognition of the choice of law as the expres-
sion of the intention of the parties is established case law in the field of inter -personal law in 
Indonesia. 
3& Case No. 325/1982G. Since there was, according to the Court, no difference between Singapore 
and Indonesian law in respect of the matter, it chose to apply the Indonesian Civil Code. 
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2.4. Lis alibi pendens 
This stay of action on grounds of pending proceedings between the same 
parties on the same subject matter before another court is known in the Indone-
sian law of civil procedure, though only in the RV39 and not in the RIB. In my 
opinion the RV provision should be applied in transboundary cases too, but 
there is neither directly applicable legislation nor a court decision available on 
the matter. 
2.5. Immunities 
Following Article 13A of the Dutch 'General Provisions of Legislation' 
(abbreviated AB after its Dutch name Algemene BepaUngen van Wetgeving) , 
Article 22A of the Indonesian version of the General Provisions stipulates that 
"[t]he jurisdiction of the Indonesian courts, as well as the enforcement of court 
decisions [. . .] are limited by the exceptions contained in the law of nations" . 40 
Under this provision it is suggested that foreign states and state organs, 
when acting iure imperii, are to be regarded as having immunity precluding the 
Indonesian courts to sit in judgment over them. But if they act iure gestionis in 
daily civil undertakings, such as renting a house, it should be possible to sue 
them before Indonesian civil courts. 
Yet, in its attitude towards the outside world Indonesia used to adhere to the 
doctrine of absolute immunity. 41 This has become apparent in the attitude of 
state organs in judicial practice in Indonesia towards foreign states. In cases 
concerning non-payment of rent by foreign embassies or consulates, or of com-
pensation due for returning leased houses in a bad state etc. (i.e. acts jure gesti-
onis) , where a foreign state refuses to appear before the court, the court chan-
nels its summons through the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In prac-
tice this Ministry appears reluctant to service the summons under the impact of 
the doctrine of absolute immunity. 42 In case the foreign embassy, even though 
39 RV, Art. 134. 
40 The provision was inserted into the 19th century AB in the Netherlands in response to a Dutch 
court decision during the First World War convicting the German state for tort. In accordance with 
the concordance principle, the article was inserted in the Indonesian AB in 1918. 
41 See e.g., Yuan Ismael & Company Inc. v. Government of the Republic of Indonesia, [1955] AC 
72, before the Hongkong courts in 1954; the series of cases before various foreign courts 
concerning the nationalization of Dutch tobacco plantations in Indonesia during the struggle for the 
return of Western New Guinea (now: Irian Jaya); and several other cases. 
42 For these practices, see S. GAUTAMA, Aneka masalah hukum perdnta intemasional 
[Miscellaneous Problems of Private International Law], 1985. See also, for the doctrine of immuni-
ty and the 'act of state' doctrine, YUDHA BHAKTI ARDINISASTRA, Perkembangan penerapan 
imunitas kedaulatan negara dnlam penyelesaian perkara diforum pengadilan - Studi perbandingan 
atas praktek Indonesia diforum pengadilan asing [The Development of the Application of State 
Immunity in the Settlement of Disputes before the Court - a Comparative Study of the Indonesian 
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it was properly served, still refuses to appear, the Jakarta court used to declare 
itself incompetent for lack of jurisdiction. 43 
3. SERVICE OF PROCESS 
According to the RIB, a law suit starts with the fIling of a request or petition 
by the plaintiff at the court of the defendant's habitual residence.44 In case of a 
defendant abroad, the service is channelled through the Foreign Ministry which 
delivers the summons through the embassy or consulate in the country of 
residence or seat of the defendant. The foreign party is as a rule represented by 
an Indonesian attorney who is given a legalized power of attorney. The power 
of attorney must not be worded in general terms, but should specify the name 
of the other party in the case, a short description of the case and, whenever 
possible, the registration number of the case at the Indonesian court. 
4. TAKING OF EVIDENCE ABROAD 
There are no special provisions in the RIB, nor in the RV, with regard to 
the taking of evidence abroad. Indonesia, however, has concluded a treaty with 
Thailand on the subject. 45 Although the treaty bears the broader title of judicial 
cooperation, it deals primarily with cooperation between the courts of the two 
countries concerning the taking of evidence by way of 'letters of request'. 
Indonesian courts may request the hearing of witnesses domiciled in Thailand 
by a Thai court by way of 'rogatory commission' . 
So far no such a request has yet been made by the Thai judiciary to its 
Indonesian counterpart, nor the other way around. Nonetheless, ultimately this 
bilateral treaty will serve as a starting point and model for closer multilateral 
judicial cooperation between the states in the ASEAN region. 
5. RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS 
In dealing with this subject it may be useful to note the distinction between 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. Enforcement is something 
more profound than recognition and is broader in scope. It requires some 
Practice before Foreign Courts], doctoral dissertation, Pajajaran University, Bandung, 1995. 
43 In some cases the defendant foreign state subjected itself voluntarily to the jurisdiction of the 
Indonesian court. See e.g. Supreme Court 16 July 1974 in case No. 6351Sipl1973 , in S. GAUTA-
MA, op. cit. n. 5 Vol. 7 (1993), case No.4, with comments by the author. 
44 RIB, Art. 118. 
45 For this Convention see S. GAUTAMA, Indonesia dan Konvensi-konvensi hukum perdata 
internasional [Indonesia and Conventions on Private International Law], rev. ed. 1996. 
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positive action by the court and organs of the executive branch of government. 
Recognition, on the other hand, is more passive and does not require action by 
the court. Therefore, states may be more liberal in recognizing foreign judg-
ments than enforcing them. 46 
Contrary to its adherence to the 1958 New York Convention on the Recog-
nition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, Indonesia has so far not 
concluded any treaty for the recognition and enforcement of foreign court 
judgments. 
In principle the situation in Indonesia with regard to the status of foreign 
judgments is quite clear: they are as a rule not recognized and cannot be en-
forced in Indonesia. There are no directly applicable written rules, as the RIB 
does not contain provisions on the matter, but the non-enforceability of foreign 
judgments is explicitly stated in Article 436 of the RV which reads: 
"Except in cases referred to in Article 724 of the Commercial Code no judg-
ments handed down by foreign . . . courts can be enforced in Indonesia. The 
cases may be tried afresh and finalized by the court in Indonesia. 
In case of the above exception, the judgment of the foreign court shall not be en-
forced before a leave for enforcement (exequatur) has been obtained ... [from 
the Indonesian court]." 
This article, or at least its substance, is still being applied. 
Although a foreign judgment is not directly enforceable, it is by no means 
totally worthless: it serves as primajacie evidence in the new case to be filed in 
Indonesia.47 Moreover, the classical view of non-enforceability has undergone 
a tempering/moderating development. As a result the court is practically free to 
determine, in each specific case, whether and to what extent the foreign judg-
ment is accepted. Judgments containing condemnatory money payments are not 
enforceable, but declaratory decisions are usually recognized. 
Meanwhile there are proposals in the context of national law development 
by the National Law Development Institute48 towards giving positive effect to, 
and allowing enforcement of, foreign judgments.49 On another aspect, the 
present author has argued for a treaty for the harmonization of enforcement and 
recognition of foreign judgments in the ASEAN countries. 50 To standardize the 
46 Especially in Anglo-Saxon literature due attention is paid to the difference between the two 
concepts. 
47 See B.A. CAFFREY, Enforcement of Foreign Judgments (a study for Lawasia, 1985) 67 et seq., 
for the different systems in the ASEAN region: the 'common law method' and the 'legislative 
method' based on the 'obligation theory' (inter alia, Singapore); the 'Indian method'; the 'Japanese 
method' based on the German system; the 'evidentiary method' (Indonesia, Thailand); the 'appeal 
method' (Philippines, modeled on the US system). 
48 An autonomous Directorate-General of the Ministry of Justice. 
49 Reference is made here to Art. 76 of the draft for a new Civil Procedure Code which reads as 
follows: "Judgments of a court belonging to a different legal sphere and decisions of foreign courts, 
of which enforcement is requested, may be enforced under the present Part of the code in 
accordance with the applicable law and on order of the Supreme Court. " 
50 'Recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments and arbitral awards in the ASEAN region', 
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existing different rules and procedures it was suggested to have an ASEAN 
Convention along the lines of the European Convention of 196851 and the 1971 
Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments 
in Civil and Commercial Matters. 52 
The tendency not to enforce foreign judgments is in line with the principle 
of territorial sovereignty. Under this principle judgments cannot be automati-
cally enforced in the territory of another state, and the principle of 'judicial 
sovereignty' is closely connected with it. 53 Moreover, the non-enforceability of 
foreign judgments in Indonesia may also be considered as being in accordance 
with Article 22a of the 'General Provisions of Legislation'. 54 For foreign judg-
ments to qualify for enforcement in other states, there must, as a rule, be a 
treaty between the state of enforcement and the state where the judgment has 
been pronounced rendering each other's judgments reciprocally enforceable in 
the same way as judgments emanating from national courts. So far Indonesia 
has concluded no such execution treaty. 
The above-mentioned exception to non-enforceability in Article 436 of the 
RV refers to foreign judgments dealing with 'general average' compensation in 
the law on maritime transport and will not be elaborated here because of its 
specific nature. 
Does the doctrine on the non-enforceability of foreign judgments apply to 
all kinds of judicial decisions or is a differentiation to be made between types of 
judgments, such as condemnatory and declaratory ones, and decisions con-
cerning the personal or family law status of a person? There is no consensus of 
opinion on this matter. 
Foreign judgments of a declaratory nature, such as those dealing with the 
validity of a marriage or a divorce, or the validity of proprietary rights 
(ownership) to goods expropriated from the original owner, will as a rule be 
recognized by the Indonesian courts. 55 The same is the case with constitutive 
paper presented at the 5th ASEAN Law Association Conference at Denpasar, Bali, 1989. The idea 
obtained the support of other scholars. See PEARLIE M.C. KOH, 'Foreign judgments in ASEAN - a 
proposal', 45 ICLQ (1996) 844. See also S. GAUTAMA, 8 Hukum perdata intemasional Indonesia 
[Indonesian Private International Law] (2nd ed. 1987) 807 et seq. 
51 This Convention directly distributes jurisdiction amongst the courts of the EEC (now European 
Union) member states. The success of this Convention is primarily due to the fact that jurisdictional 
issues of the different courts are clearly outlined. See B.A. CAFFREY, op. cit. n. 47 p. 24. 
52 The text of this Convention is included in Recueil des Conventions de La Haye de Droit 
International Prive (1951-1988), edited and published by the Permanent Bureau of the Hague 
Conference on Private International Law, The Hague. 
53 The Supreme Court of the Netherlands said in an early decision of 31 January 1902: "Since a 
judge acts as a state organ, the scope of his decisions is limited to the territory over which the state 
authority extends; outside that territory, they are only binding in such a manner and under such 
prerequisites as the competent authority in each state involved determines." Weekblad van het Recht 
[Law Weekly] No. 7717. 
54 See supra, section 2.5. 
55 This is in line with the 'Act of state' doctrine. Cf. SUDARGO GAUTAMA (Gouw GIOK SIONG), 
Segi-segi hukum intemasional pada nasionalisasi di Indonesia [International Law Aspects of 
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decisions which create a certain legal situation or relationship, e.g. decisions 
concerning the annulment of a contract, the termination of a marriage, the 
appointment of a guardian, adoption, etc. Declaratory decisions do not need 
any enforcement by Indonesian courts as they merely affirm rights and duties 
between the parties. It is natural that these, so-called 'status decisions', are 
recognized rather easily because they only require the adjustment of the regis-
ters of the Civil Registry by administrative authorities. When status decisions of 
foreign courts deal with persons of Indonesian nationality, they must not only 
be rendered by a competent court but must also comply with Indonesian private 
international law rules applicable to the facts of the case concerned, in order to 
be eligible for recognition and enforcement. Foreign divorce judgments in-
volving Indonesian nationals, for example, will only be recognized if Indo-
nesian law was applied and Indonesian grounds of divorce were duly observed. 
Similarly, it may be assumed that foreign guardianship decisions concerning 
Indonesian minors and foreign adoption decisions involving Indonesian nation-
als would only be recognized if Indonesian law was applied. The reason of all 
this is that under Indonesian private international law the nationality principle is 
adhered to in matters of personal status. 56 
Finally, the general limit set to the discretion of the Indonesian court to 
recognize or enforce a foreign judgment is, of course, that this judgment must 
not be contrary to Indonesian 'international public policy' . 
The fact that foreign judgments cannot be automatically enforced in Indone-
sian territory is a matter that has not been sufficiently taken into consideration 
by foreign parties to contracts with Indonesian counterparts . We often see that 
in such contracts a choice of jurisdiction is made in favour of a foreign court, 
usually that of the country of the foreign party's domicile. The foreign party 
and his counselling lawyer are usually of the opinion that it is to their advan-
tage to be entitled to sue the Indonesian counterpart before the courts of the 
chosen jurisdiction. They appear, however, to be less aware that a favourable 
decision obtained from the foreign court cannot be enforced in Indonesia where 
the assets of the Indonesian party, as a rule, are located. Thus the value of a 
foreign decision is different from a decision obtained through an Indonesian 
court, and it may well be that the foreign party is only losing time and money 
by instituting the case before a foreign court. 
Nationalization in Indonesia] (1960). 
56 Art. 16 of the General Provisions of Legislation cf. supra section 2.5. 
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6. ARBITRATION 
6.1. The law on arbitration 
The regulation of arbitration in Indonesia is to be found in Title One of 
Book III of the RV. The Articles 615-651 are similar to those of the Dutch 
Code of Civil Procedure before the latter's revision, which were in turn based 
on the [fonner] French Code. Under the colonial regime the articles were 
meant to apply only to those persons who were subject to 'European' or 
'Western' civil law. The RIB does not contain provisions on the matter. Con-
sequently, in present practice the RV provisions are applied to relationships 
among persons belonging to any group of the population. As far as the applica-
tion to members of the majority group of indigenous Indonesians is concerned, 
recourse is sometimes taken to the presumption that, whenever such a person 
claims a right to submit to arbitration, he is deemed to have subjected himself 
voluntarily to the 'Western, European' law. 
Since the applicability of the· RV and its articles is based on the Transitory 
Provisions of the Constitution, and in view of the proviso that the existing law 
may not be contrary to the Constitution, Indonesian courts are in fact free to set 
aside or to reshape any of the arbitration rules of the R V whenever they are 
regarded no longer suitable in an independent Indonesia. Article 617(2), for 
example, prohibits the appointment of women as arbitrators. In independent 
Indonesia, however, women are treated on an equal footing with men and, 
consequently, the relevant provision is considered to be no more valid. 57 
At present the Indonesian Ministry of Justice has completed a draft of a new 
arbitration law58 which is now scheduled for submission to Parliament. 
Finally, some specific laws provide for arbitration as a means of dispute 
settlement. For instance, the Foreign Capital Investment Law of 1967 and the 
1974 Foreign Investment Law inter alia provide for arbitration in case of dis-
agreement on the amount of compensation in case of nationalization. 59 
57 Supreme Court Circular Letter 1963 No.3. 
58 An academic draft was submitted by the present author upon request. It formed the basis for the 
official draft which has now been accepted by various government departments. For the successive 
drafts see S. GAUTAMA, Aneka hukum arbitrase [Miscellaneous Aspects of Arbitration Law] 
(1996). In 1994 another academic draft was submitted by a committee of economic law experts 
sponsored by US AID under the so-called 'Elips project' . 
59 International instruments may also provide for arbitration. As far as Indonesia adheres to such 
instruments, the possibility of arbitration offered may be relevant for Indonesia. See e.g. the 
Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, 
1965 (ICSID Convention); and the following case decided by ICSID arbitration: Amco Asia Corp. 
and others v. The Republic of Indonesia, 89 International Law Reports 366 et seq. and, as to the 
latest decision in this case (of 3 December 1992): S. GAUTAMA, Arbitrase Bank Dunia terhadap 
penanaman modal asing di Indonesia dan yurisprudensi Indonesia dalam perkara hukum perdata 
internasional [World Bank Arbitration on Foreign Investment in Indonesia and Indonesian Case 
Law in the Field of Private International Law] (1994). 
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6.2. The practice of arbitration 
While arbitration was frequently resorted to in the pre-independence period, 
later the number diminished significantly. At present, however, the importance 
of arbitration as a way of settlement of disputes is gradually increasing again in 
the field of economic transactions, particularly in respect of international 
commercial contracts. The foreign party often still feels uneasy before the 
national courts of his Indonesian contract partner and prefers to avoid the (in 
his eyes) biased national court of his opponent. In this situation arbitration is 
the most suitable form of dispute settlement. Nowadays it is in fact standard 
procedure in most contracts between Indonesian and foreign parties. 
The Indonesian Chamber of Commerce has set up its own National Indone-
sian Arbitration Institute (BANI after its Indonesian name 'Badan Arbitrase 
Nasional Indonesia'. Arbitration clauses in favour of arbitration outside Indo-
nesia refer to various arbitration tribunals and rules, such as the International 
Chamber of Commerce in Paris, the London Arbitration Court, and Tokyo. 
Increasingly reference is made to the UNCITRAL arbitration rules and the 
Regional Arbitration Centre in Kuala Lumpur under the auspices of the Asian-
African Legal Consultative Committee. 
The Supreme Court has emphasized the obligation of courts to give effect to 
arbitration clauses by rendering courts incompetent in such cases. In Ahju 
Forestry Compo Ltd. V. P.T. Balikpapan Raya a dispute had arisen between a 
Korean company and its Indonesian partner concerning their joint venture 
company. Upon the request of the Indonesian party the North Jakarta District 
Court regarded itself competent by pronouncing on the validity of the transfer 
of the company's management, notwithstanding an arbitration clause. On 
appeal, the Jakarta Appeal Court affirmed the lower court's decision. The 
Supreme Court, however, gave effect to the arbitration clause and declared that 
the Indonesian court had no jurisdiction. 6O The same happened in P. T. Metro-
politan Timbers V. P.T. Gapki Trading Comp.61 where the dispute was between 
a foreign contractor engaged in the exploitation of a timber forestry concession 
and its Indonesian counterpart. 
6.3. The enforcement of foreign arbitral awards 
For the question of enforcement a distinction is to be made between whether 
or not a treaty on the matter applies to the case. Two multilateral treaties are 
relevant for the Indonesian situation: the 1927 Geneva Convention for the 
Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards (in conjunction with the 1923 Geneva 
60 Supreme Court 8 February 1982, No. 2924K1Sip/1981, in Himpunan putusan Mahkamah Agung 
tentang arbitrase intemasional [Collection of Supreme Court Decisions concerning International 
Arbitration] (1988). 
61 Supreme Court 30 September 1983, case No. 2225K1Sip/1976, ibid. 
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Protocol on Arbitration Clauses) and the 1958 New York Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. 
As to the 1927 Geneva Convention and the 1923 Protocol, the Netherlands 
were a party to the Convention and Protocol and extended their application to 
Indonesia on 28 April 1933.62 The Supreme Court, in a decision of 1984, 
considered the question whether Indonesia was bound by the Convention after 
its attainment of independence.63 It held that, in spite of the application of the 
Convention to Indonesia in 1933 and in spite of a devolution provision in the 
Indonesian-Dutch Agreements on the occasion of the Dutch recognition of 
Indonesian independence in 1949, new principles of international law regarding 
state succession had emerged since World War II according to which Indonesia 
was not bound by pre-independence treaties. 
In the same decision of 1984, the Supreme Court scrutinized whether the 
1958 Convention was to be applied by the Court. Acknowledging that Indone-
sia had acceded to the Convention which came into effect for it on 7 October 
1981, the Supreme Court held that: 
" . . . in accordance with Indonesian practice it is necessary for the government 
to introduce implementing legislation. Such legislation must be observed both in 
case of a request to the District Court for the enforcement of a foreign award and 
in case of a direct request to the Supreme Court for the determination as to 
whether the award is contrary to Indonesian public policy". 
The court concluded that pending such implementing legislation the Indonesian 
courts cannot order the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards on the basis of 
the Convention. 
This was a disappointing decision since a formal implementing regulation is 
not normally required in respect to treaties. It is suggested that the enforcement 
of foreign awards should be effected in the same manner as domestic arbitral 
awards, and in fact along the lines of the enforcement of a normal court deci-
sion, through the District Court of the defendant's place of habitual residence. 
This is essentially the way prescribed by Article 639 of the RV. My conclusion 
is, therefore, that a foreign award, enforcement of which is sought under the 
New York Convention, can be executed even without implementing legislation. 
This does not imply an automatic enforcement, as recognition and enforcement 
may be refused by the Indonesian court on one of the five grounds listed in 
62 NISG 1933 Nos. 131 and 132. 
63 Cf. S. GAUTAMA, Capita selecta hukum perdata intemasiofllll (1974) 97; R. HORNICK and SIDIK 
SURAPUTRA, 'Beberapa masalah hambatan terhadap pelaksanaan perwasitan internasional di 
Indonesia' [Some problems obstructing the enforcement of international arbitration in Indonesia], 
Hukum dan Pembangunan [Law and Development; Journal of the Faculty of Law of the University 
of Indonesia] (1986) 283 and 289; H. Gunanto, "Implementing regulations for the 1958 New York 
Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in Indonesia", 1 AsYIL 
151-155. The decision was of 29 November 1984, case No. 2944 KlPdt/1983 in Navigation 
Maritime Bulgare v. P.T. Nizwar. 
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Article V(I) of the Convention or one of the two grounds stated in Article 
V(2). 
The Supreme Court's decision of 1984 is being criticized especially because 
of its attitude towards the applicability of the New York Convention. The 
question about the Geneva Convention has become rather theoretical since the 
Convention's replacement by the New York Convention and the almost world-
wide adherence to the latter. Later the Supreme Court took measures to fIll the 
suspected gap in legislation, by issuing Supreme Court Regulation No. 1 of 1 
March 1990. 
The courts will always refuse enforcement of the foreign award if it is found 
to be contrary to Indonesian public policy. However, no clear criteria exist for 
this notion in regard to arbitral awards. In the case of E.D. and F. Mann 
(Sugar) Ltd. v. Yani Harjanto64 the Supreme Court had issued a fiat exequatur 
to the foreign sugar firm Mann, for the enforcement of a London arbitration 
award, in accordance with the applicable rules as embodied in a Supreme Court 
Regulation of 1990. Yet, in a subsequent decision the Supreme Court denied 
further enforcement of the award in Indonesia for being contrary to Indonesian 
public policy (ketertiban umum). The decision was based on grounds that the 
sugar sale contract which contained the arbitration clause was null and void for 
being in violation of an Indonesian government regulation under which a 
certain government body was designated as the sole body entitled to import 
sugar into Indonesia, thereby excluding private individuals like Y ANI HARJAN-
TO. 
64 Supreme Court case No. 1203/Pdtll990 of 14 December 1991, in conjunction with Central 
Jakarta District Court case No. 736/Pdt/G/1988/PN Jakarta Pusat, and Jakarta High Court case No. 
4851Pdtl1989/PT DKI. Commented on in S. GAUTAMA, op. cit n. 5 Vol. 6 case No.2. 
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Kono Toshiyukt 
1. GENERAL CONTEXT l 
1.1. The judicial system2 
1.1.1. Introduction 
All judicial power is vested in the Supreme Court and in such other inferior 
courts as are established by law. Accordingly, a single judicial hierarchy 
decides administrative as well as civil and criminal actions. Since Japan is a 
unitary (non-federal) state, all courts are national courts. Thus the organization 
and power of the courts are determined by the Japanese Constitution and the 
national Court Law. 
The hierarchy of the courts is as follows: the summary courts are at the 
bottom, the district courts and the family courts at the second level, the high 
courts at the third level and the Supreme Court at the top. There is no limita-
tion to the right of appeal from sllmmary courts to district courts, or from 
district courts, as the courts of first instance, to a high court. A re-appeal may 
be made to a high court against appellate judgments of the district court, and to 
the Supreme Court against judgments of either first or second instance rendered 
by a high court. The grounds for re-appeal in civil cases are restricted to 
violation or misconstruction of the law or the Constitution. 
1.1.2. Summary Court 
The summary courts are the base of the whole court structure and have 
power to try civil cases involving small claims. They are the courts of first 
instance for civil cases involving claims not exceeding 900,000 Yen. In sum-
mary courts a single judge decides the case. The court may use judicial com-
• Professor of Law, Kyushu University. 
I Important articles in this field are included in ANDREAS HELDRICH and KONO TOSHIYUKI (eds.), 
Herausforderung des Internationalen Verfahrensrecht [The Challenge of the Law on International 
Procedure] 1994. For an overview, see AOYAMA YOSHIMITSU, 'Problems in international 
litigation', in Collected Reports of the International Symposium on Civil Justice in the Era of 
Globalization (1993) 44-63; TANIGUCHI YASUHEI, in BAUM and DROBNIG (eds.), Japanisches 
Handels- und Wirtschaftsrecht [Japanese Commercial and Economic Law] (1994) ch. 6 sec. 13 pp. 
683-689. 
2 HATTORITAKAAKI and DAN HANNO HENDERSON, Civil Procedure in Japan (1985) Ch. 1 and 3. 
Asian Yearbook of International Law, Volume 6 (Ko Swan Sik et al., eds. 
Ii) Kluwer Law International; printed in the Netherlands), pp.105-134 
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missioners3 in effecting a settlement or conducting a hearing. There are special 
provisions in the Japanese Code of Civil Procedure (CCP)4 for the simpler 
character of summary court proceedings.5 In 1995, 243,569 civil cases were 
handled by the summary courts, out of which 112,446 were finished by judg-
ment, 68,267 by settlement and 51,702 by withdrawal. Circa 80% of the 
243,569 cases were finished within three months after the commencement of 
the litigation. 6 
1.1.3. District Court/Family Court 
The district courts have general adjudicatory authority over civil cases 
(including transboundary) and criminal cases as courts of first instance. There 
is one district court in each of the 47 prefectures, except for Hokkaido which 
has four such courts. The Supreme Court may establish branches of a district 
court within its district. Each branch has its own territory and usually hears 
cases arising therein. The main office remains competent, however, to hear all 
cases within its territory. The district court bench consists of judges and assis-
tant judges. Usually one judge presides over the court and decides the cases. In 
exceptional cases a three-judge collegiate court is required. Two kinds of cases 
require such a collegiate court: appeal cases from summary court judgments, 
and cases where a collegiate court has ruled that they are to be decided by a 
collegiate court, upon request of a single judge in a complicated case. In 1995, 
146,772 cases were handled by the district court in first instance, out of which 
69,951 were finished by judgment, 48,144 by settlement and 22,532 by with-
drawal. Around 60% of the 146,772 cases were finished within 6 months, 
around 15 % within one year, and around 15 % within two years after the 
commencement of the procedure. 7 
The family courts rank with the district courts in the judicial system. Family 
courts specialize in domestic relations and juvenile delinquency. Except for 
their different competence, family courts are quite similar to district courts. 
Almost all cases in family courts are heard by a single judge. Laymen often 
take part in domestic relations cases. When the family court hears domestic 
cases affecting personal relations or status within a family, family court coun-
cillors assist the judge by making recommendations, but they have no vote in 
deciding the case. 
3 Judicial commissioners are all laymen of experience who are appointed in advance every year by 
the supervising district court. The purpose of this system is to project the common sense of the 
community into the resolution of disputes and to make justice more accessible to the citizens. See 
HAlTORI and HENDERSON, ibid., ch. 3 p. 9. 
4 A new Code of Civil Procedure (Law No. 109 of 1996) will replace the old CCP (Law No. 29 of 
1890) as of 26 June 1998. 
5 E.g. oral complaint (Art. 271 new CCP), no submission of preparatory writings (Art. 276) or a 
simpler judgment (Art. 280). 
6 Supreme Court, Shiho Tokei [Judicial Statistics] (1996) 96. 
7 Ibid., p. 118. 
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Conciliation procedures in certain domestic relations cases are mandatory 
and must be conducted by a conciliation committee. This committee is usually 
composed of one family court judge and two lay conciliation commissioners 
appointed by the court. 
1.1.4. High Court 
The high courts are the highest of the lower courts and serve as intermedi-
ate appellate courts. They are located in eight large cities. 8 Some of the high 
courts with the larger territorial districts have one or two branches. High courts 
have authority over appeals from district or family court judgments rendered 
within their respective territories. 9 From summary court judgments in civil 
cases, appeals may be brought to the district court and then re-appeal to the 
high court. All cases in the high court are heard by a three-judge bench. Only 
the judicial review of the decisions of the Fair Trade Commission and crimes 
concerning insurrection must be heard by a five-judge bench. In 1995, 15,369 
civil cases were handled by the high court as the court of second instance, out 
of which 8,207 were finished by judgment, 5,455 by settlement and 1,415 by 
withdrawal. Around 70% of 15,369 cases were disposed of within one year 
after the commencement of the procedure. [0 
1.1.5. Supreme Court 
The Supreme Court is the highest court of Japan, the court of last resort, 
and the so-called 'Constitutional Court' required by the Japanese Constitution. 
The Supreme Court exercises appellate competence only. Its main case load 
consists of appeals from judgments of the high court. The Supreme Court 
usually sits in three divisions composed of five justices (petty benches). The 
Grand Bench consists of alliS justices. All cases filed with the Supreme Court 
are first assigned by rotation to one of the petty benches. A case is transferred 
to the Grand Bench, if, in the course of review, it turns out to fall into one of 
the following categories: (1) when, as a result of the contention of the party 
concerned, the Court is required to determine whether a law, ordinance, 
regulation or official disposition is constitutional; (2) when the Court finds, on 
its own initiative, that a law, ordinance, regulation or official disposition is 
unconstitutional; (3) when the opinion of the Court (petty bench) in the instant 
case is contrary to precedent of the Supreme Court on the interpretation or 
application of the Constitution or any other law; (4) when the opinion of the 
justices of a petty bench are evenly divided; or (5) when a petty bench deems it 
appropriate that the case be heard by the Grand Bench. In principle, judgments 
8 Tokyo, Osaka, Nagoya, Hiroshima, Fulruoka, Sendai, Sapporo and Takamatsu. 
9 The high courts have original jurisdiction over certain subject matters designated by special laws 
such as violations of the election law or the crime of insurrection. The Tokyo High Court has 
jurisdiction to review decisions made by such quasi-judicial agencies as the Fair Trade 
Commission, the Patent Office, and the Marine Accident Adjustment Agency. 
10 Loc.cit. n. 6 p. 164. 
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are made by majority. To declare a law or ordinance unconstitutional, a major-
ity of eight in the Grand Bench is required. In 1995, 2,429 civil cases were 
handled by the Supreme Court, out of which 2,371 cases were finished by 
judgment, 10 by settlementl l and 48 by withdrawal. Around 80% of the 2,429 
cases were finished within one year after the commencement of the proce-
dure. 12 
Mainly because of the heavy case loads of Supreme Court justicesl3 and 
delays in the lower courts, several ways to reform the court system were 
proposed. 14 As a result of the reform of the CCP in 1996, the re-appeal system 
has been amended. Under the old CCP, there were three main grounds for 
re-appeal: violation of the Japanese Constitution, violation of laws or ordi-
nances which clearly affects the judgment (old CCP Art. 394) and violation of 
important procedural rules (as absolute grounds of re-appeal,15 old CCP Art. 
395). Re-appeal had to be accepted, unless certain formal procedural require-
ments were not met (old CCP Arts. 399 and 399(3)). Therefore, when a party 
contended that the judgment of the inferior court suffered from one of the 
above three deficiencies, and when the re-appeal fulfilled all formal procedural 
requirements, the Supreme Court must accept the re-appeal and start oral 
proceedings. In practice, however, the second ground (violation of laws or 
ordinances which clearly affects the judgment) was often misused. It caused 
heavy case loads for the Supreme Court and hampered the latter's role in 
unifying the interpretation of laws and ordinances. 
Besides modification of the grounds for re-appeal, the new CCP introduced 
a new system for re-appeal: "acceptance of the case for re-appeal". Under the 
new law, there are only two grounds for re-appeal: violation of the Japanese 
Constitution and violation of important procedural rules. 16 The often misused 
ground of violation of laws or ordinances which clearly affects the judgment is 
no ground for re-appeal to the Supreme Court any moreY When, however, "a 
judgment of an inferior court might contain important issues concerning the 
interpretation of laws or ordinances, such as contradiction with the precedents 
of the Supreme Court", the parties can apply for re-appeal to the Supreme 
II This shows that re-appeal cases are highly complicated. 
12 Loc.cit. n. 6 p. 188. 
13 The number of newly accepted civil and administrative re-appeal cases was 2406 in 1992, 2500 
in 1993 and 2726 in 1994. 
14 HATIORI and HENDERSON, op.cit. n. 2 ch. 3 p. 21. 
15 Such absolute grounds for re-appeal were: (1) the court was not lawfully constituted, (2) a judge 
who should not take part in the procedure did participate, (3) violation of rules on exclusive 
jurisdiction, (4) incompetence of the representative of the parties to act in the procedure, (5) 
violation of rules on public trial, and (6) lack of, or contradictions in, reasons given in the 
judgment. 
16 New CCP, Art. 312. There is no difference between the old and the new CCP list of 'important 
procedural rules'. 
17 The purpose is to reduce the case load of the Supreme Court. It is still a re-appeal ground to the 
High Court (Art. 312(2». 
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Court. The Supreme Court may accept or refuse the case. By the decision to 
accept the case, the application is considered a re-appeal (Art. 318). 
1.2. The sources of international civil procedure 
Japanese law has only a few provisions on international procedural matters 
in the CCP. The Horei (Law No. 10 of 1898, as amended), regulating private 
international law, contains no provision on the matter. The number of interna-
tional treaties that Japan has ratified is quite limited. 18 Therefore academic 
theories and case law play an important role. Judicial precedents are relied on 
by lawyers and courts in applying statutes and court rules to particular cases. 
The courts are, however, not bound by stare decisis, except that lower courts 
must follow the Supreme Court precedents and generally they follow their own 
precedents until overruled by higher courts. 
The lex fori, including the CCP and the Rules of Civil Procedure19 as 
primary sources, is in principle also applicable to procedural matters in cases of 
transboundary litigation. This does not mean that the CCP should be applied to 
transboundary litigation without any modification. It is argued that in certain 
matters of transboundary litigation, like those closely connected with substan-
tive law, 20 foreign law should be taken into consideration in determining proce-
dural matters?l 
1.3. The historical background of the CCP and its amendment in 199622 
The old CCP referred mainly to the German Code of Civil Procedure of 
1877 but also to Prussian and Austrian lawsY It was promulgated in 1890 and 
came into force in 1891. In 1927 it was substantially amended. Partial amend-
ments were made several times afterwards. Due to drastic changes in the 
Japanese economy and society and the complications in litigation since then, 
gradually the old CCP became less adequate for the current situation in Japan. 
Therefore a reform was carried out, and on 26 June 1996 a new CCP was 
promulgated. It will replace the old CCP within two years after promulgation. 
Not only have several new systems been introduced in the new CCP, but 
unchanged provisions have been rewritten into modern Japanese so as to make 
the Code more accessible. This was the reason why the reform was put in the 
form of a new law. 
18 International treaties can be directly applied by the Japanese court, as far as they are 
self-executing. They are generally considered superior to national laws. 
19 Technical rules made by the Supreme Court for the implementation of the CCP. 
20 E.g. in which circumstances the standing of the party should be recognized. 
21 See YAMAMOTO KAZUHIKO, 'Kokusai Minji Sosho Ho' [Law of International Civil Procedure], 
in SAITO HIDEO (ed.), Chukai Minji Sosho Ho [Commentary on Civil Procedure Law] Vol.5 (2nd. 
ed., 1991) 402-422. 
22 MIYAKE HIROTO, 'Comparative legal analysis of the reform of the Code of Civil Procedure', in 
Collected Reports, op.cit. n. 1 p. 179. 
23 About the history preceding the old CCP, see HATTORI and HENDERSON, op.cit.n.2, ch. 1 p. 28. 
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The main features of the new CCP are: 
( 1) Three new procedures to clarify issues and evidence: preparatory oral 
proceeding, proceeding -preparing procedure24 and proceeding -preparing 
procedure by documents.25 
(2) Improvement of procedures for the taking of evidence. 26 
(3) Creation of a special procedure for claims not exceeding 300,000 YenY 
(4) Modification of the system of re-appeal to the Supreme Court. 
2. JURISDICTIOW8 
2.1. The notion of jurisdiction 
2.1.1. Jurisdiction in the sense of 'Kankatsu-ken' 
In this context, 'Saiban-ken' and 'Kankatsu-ken' should be distinguished. 
Saiban-ken denotes comprehensively the power to adjudicate legal disputes and 
to enforce decisions. 29 It constitutes the main portion of the judicial power 
(Shiho-ken) prescribed by the Japanese Constitution and can be limited only by 
that Constitution and by international law. 
Kankatsu-ken, on the other hand, presupposes the existence of Saiban-ken. 
It is the Japanese equivalent of Zustiindigkeit, as used in German law to refer to 
a specific portion of the judicial competence. In transboundary civil litigation it 
defines if and how Japanese courts are authorized to exercise Saiban-ken,30 
while in regular domestic civil litigation it is assigned to a particular court as a 
24 The difference between the preparatory oral proceeding and the proceeding-preparing procedure 
is as follows: the preparatory oral proceeding is an oral proceeding for the purpose of sorting out 
and clarifying the issues and the evidence (Arts. 164-167). It takes place in the court room and is 
open to the public. The court which handles the case also presides over the procedure during which 
any kind of acts regarding the sorting out and clarifying of issues and evidence may be conducted. 
The proceeding-preparing procedure, on the other hand, takes place at another place, such as the 
room for settlement or even the judge's chambers. The procedure is not necessarily open to the 
public, although the parties may require the attendance of certain people. Due to its nature, the 
kinds of acts allowed under this procedure are limited, for example regarding the examination of 
testimony. The procedure can be conducted by a judge exclusively appointed for this purpose, or by 
a telephone conference system (Arts. 168-174). 
25 This is the proceeding-preparing procedure without attendance of the parties. It is mainly 
available for those who live far from the seat of the court (Arts. 175-178). 
26 E.g. the court may order the parties to produce more kinds of documents (Art. 220). 
27 This is a summary court procedure. The claim can be brought orally to the court. The oral 
proceeding takes place only once and judgment is rendered right after it. The procedure is 
dependent of the plaintiffs option. Otherwise the case will be treated according to the ordinary 
summary court procedure (Arts. 270-280). 
28 Besides HELDRICH and KONO, op.cit. n. 1, see also NOMURA YOSHIAKI, 'Japanese court 
jurisdiction in transnational litigation' , 21 Osaka University Law Review (1984) 31. 
29 HATTORI and HENDERSON, op.cit. n. 2, ch. 4 p. 4. 
30 Ibid. 
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limited portion of Saiban-kenY Therefore, Kankatsu-ken is regulated in princi-
ple by national laws. In this paper 'jurisdiction' will be used in the sense of 
Kankatsu-ken. Kankatsu-ken and Saiban-ken should be theoretically distin-
guished, but court decisions often use the word Saiban-ken in the sense of 
Kankatsu-ken or do not clearly distinguish between the twO. 32 
2.1.2. How to determine international jurisdiction? 
According to unanimous opinion in case law and academic doctrine, there is 
no provision on international jurisdiction in Japanese law, and, to flIl this 
lacuna, the notion of 'Jori' should be used. 33 Jori is a notion similar to justice, 
meaning "fairness between parties and speedy and appropriate judgment". 34 
Although this is the unanimous understanding of Jori in its abstract content, it 
is not clear how to determine whether jurisdiction can be exercised in concrete 
cases. The following theories have been proposed as to possible criteria: 
(1) Jurisdiction acquired under a provision of the CCP implies jurisdiction 
for transboundary cases. 35 In other words, according to this theory the contents 
of Jori is contained in the CCP. The theory does not allow any jurisdiction 
which is not based on the CCP. This theory seems contradictory to me: it says 
that there is no provision on international jurisdiction in the Japanese law, but 
at the same time it says that Jori as contained in the CCP should be applied. In 
my opinion, this is practically the same as saying that the CCP regulates not 
only domestic, but also transboundary jurisdiction. The theoretical advantage of 
this theory is not clear to me. The judgment of the Supreme Court in the 
so-called Malaysian Airline case36 seems to adhere to this theory. 
(2) The leading opinion is that, since there is no provision on international 
jurisdiction in the CCP, special jurisdiction rules for specific types of trans-
boundary cases should be created based on international considerations. 37 
Although this theory looks different from the first one, it refers so often to 
provisions of the CCP that it leads to similar results. 
3 J Kankatsu-ken for domestic civil litigation is further sub-divided into three categories: 
Shokubun-kankatsu (functional competence: e.g. some cases must be brought in the family court 
because of their nature), libutsu-kankatsu (subject matter competence: claims not exceeding 
900,000 Yen go to the summary court), and Tochi-kankatsu (territorial competence: this indicates 
the geographical district where an action must be commenced). Cf. ibid., ch. 4 p. 6. 
32 E.g. Supreme Court 16 October 1981, 35 Minshu No.7 p. 1224 (English translation in 26 JAIL 
(1983) 122). 
33 Ibid. See also, IKEHARA SUEO, 'Kokusaiteki Saiban Kankatsu-ken' [International Jurisdiction], in 
7 Shin litsumu Minji Sosho Ho Koza [New Series of Practice of Civil Procedure] (1982) 14. 
34 Supreme Court, loc.cit. n. 32. 
35 EGAWA HIDEFUMI, 'Kokusai Shiho ni okeru Saiban Kankatsu-ken' [Jurisdiction in private 
international law], Hogaku Kyokai Zasshi [Journal of the Jurisprudence Association, University of 
Tokyo] Vol.60 No.3 (1942) 374. 
36 Loc.cit.n. 32. 
37 IKEHARA, loc.cit.n. 33 p.22. See also Tokyo District Court 15 February 1984, Hanrei Taimuzu 
No. 525 p. 132 (English translation in 28 JAIL (1985) 243) and cf. Tokyo District Court 20 March 
1979, Hanreijiho No. 925 p. 78 (English translation in 24 JAIL (1981) 127). 
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(3) Specific rules should be created on a case by case basis, whereby con-
crete circumstances in each individual case, such as close connection between 
the case and the forum or protection of the weaker party, should be taken into 
consideration. 38 This third theory is criticized as the results are unpredictable. 
(4) The rule on international jurisdiction is in principle determined under the 
provisions of the CCP. Exceptions can be made by taking into consideration 
'special circumstances' in each individual case. Lower courts started to use this 
test39 after the judgment of the Supreme Court in the Malaysian Airline case 
and some scholars elaborated it as a theory. 40 This theory offers the possibility 
to modify the jurisdiction rules of the CCP. A broad interpretation of 'special 
circumstances', the taking into consideration of the many elements of an indi-
vidual case and the creation of exceptional rules for each individual case, may, 
however, lead to unpredictable results. 
As the comment on each theory shows, a choice in favour of one theory 
does not automatically lead to clear-cut results. The important thing is not to 
select one theory, but to examine individual jurisdiction rules and their theo-
retical backgrounds. 
2.2. The exercise of jurisdiction 
2.2.1. Requirements 
In this section we shall deal with jurisdiction rules for specific types of 
cases. 
(1) The court at the place of the defendant's domicile is entitled to exercise 
jurisdiction. This rule applies to all types of transboundary cases. If the defen-
dant has his domicile in a foreign country and only his residence in Japan, a 
Japanese court may not exercise jurisdiction. 41 
Recently, however, the Supreme Court confirmed jurisdiction of the Japa-
nese court in a case where the defendant had her domicile exclusively in Ger-
many.42 The German wife of a Japanese husband had filed a claim for divorce 
with a German court, which admitted the claim. Then the Japanese husband 
filed a claim for divorce in a Japanese court, where the German wife raised the 
exception of lack of jurisdiction. According to the Supreme Court, the case 
should be distinguished from the ones in which the jurisdiction of the Japanese 
court was recognized on the basis of special circumstances,43 such as the fact 
38 ISHIGURO KAZUNORI, Gendai Kokusai Shiho [Contemporary Private International Law] VoU 
(1986) 291. 
39 E.g. Tokyo District Court 27 September 1982, Hanrei Taimuzu No. 487 p. 167 (English transla-
tion in 27 JAIL (1984) 174); Tokyo District Court 27 March 1989, Hanreijiho No. 1318 p. 82 
(English translation in 33 JAIL (1990) 199). 
40 E.g. KOBAYASHI HIDEYUKI, Kokusai Torihiki Funso [International Trade Disputes] (1987) 116. 
41 YAMAMOTO, loc.cit. n. 21 p. 443. 
42 Supreme Court 24 June 1996, Hanreijiho No. 1578 p.56. 
43 Supreme Court 25 March 1962, 18 Minshu No.3 p.486; Nagoya High Court 30 May 1995, 891 
Hanrei Taimuzu p. 248. 
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that the plaintiff was abandoned or that the defendant's domicile is unknown or 
even abroad. In order to recognize jurisdiction of the Japanese court in the 
above recent case, not only the defendant's interest, i.e. not being forced to 
appear before a foreign court, but also the plaintiffs interest, i.e. being entitled 
to sue, should be taken into consideration, as well as the legal or practical 
obstacles involved in a foreign forum. The German divorce judgment would 
not be eligible for recognition in Japan, since service was conducted by way of 
public notice, while a claim of the Japanese husband would be dismissed in 
Germany due to res judicata of the earlier German divorce judgment. In order 
to protect the plaintiffs interest, i.e. his right to sue, the Japanese court should 
exercise jurisdiction. 
The judgment should be criticized, however, since, following this judg-
ment, the Japanese court may take cognizance of lawsuits without referring to 
any jurisdiction rule, merely based on the fact that the foreign judgment cannot 
be recognized in Japan. The last domicile in Japan of a person who has no 
domicile nor residence in any country cannot be a ground of jurisdiction ei-
ther. 44 
The principal place of business of a corporation determines jurisdiction in 
all types of cases. 45 An office which has nothing to do with the case does not 
suffice for the Japanese court to exercise jurisdiction, although in some cases 
the courts have nevertheless asserted jurisdiction.46 The general rule cedes to 
special rules in case of applicability of the Convention on Civil Liability for Oil 
Pollution Damage (1969) or the Convention for Unification of Certain Rules 
relating to International Transportation by Air (1953) and the additional Proto-
col (1967). 
(2) The place of perjonnance47 may determine jurisdiction only in case of 
contract-related48 disputes and only when the place of performance can be 
clearly identified from the contract. 49 The rule should not be applied to mone-
tary obligations. Since the place of performance of a monetary obligation is 
often not closely connected to the contract itself, such as when chosen for tax 
or other reasons, the evidence available at the place of performance is usually 
less decisive. 50 However, case law tends to take a more generous attitudeY 
44 DOGAUCHI MASATO, 'Kokusaiteki Saiban Kankatsu-ken' [International Jurisdiction], in SHINDO 
KOJI and KOJIMA TAKESHI (eds.), Chushaku Minji Soshoho [Commentary on International Civil 
Procedure] (1991) 111. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Supreme Court, supra n. 32. Also, Tokyo District Court 27 September 1982, Hanreijiho No. 
1113 p. 137 (English translation in 27 JAIL (1984) 174). 
47 According to Tokyo District Court 30 August 1995, Hanrei Taimuzu No. 909 p. 270, the place 
of performance should in principle be determined by applying Art. 484 of the Japanese Civil Code 
and, consequently, the place of obligee's domicile is the place of performance. To determine his 
domicile, his house number should be specified. 
48 This means that the rule does not apply to tort cases. 
49 YAMAMOTO, loe.cit. n. 21. 
50 DOGAUCHI, loe.cit. n. 44. 
51 Interloeutory judgment Tokyo District Court 27 November 1981, Hanrei Taimuzu No. 460 p. 
118. 
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(3) The place of tort determines jurisdiction in tort casesY It can be the 
place of the tortuous act or the place of occurrence of the damage. 53 In the 
latter case, indirect damage such as economic loss caused by physical damage 
should be excluded, since it would lead to jurisdiction based on the place of 
domicile of the injured (plaintiffl). The rule should also apply to product 
liability cases. 
(4) The action for negative declaratory judgment, in which it is declared 
with res judicata effect that party A (plaintiff) is not liable, is often used as a 
counter- or preventive measure against lawsuits in a foreign forum where party 
A is the defendant. Although the parties and the type of case (e.g. product 
liability case) are the same, the parties change their roles in the lawsuit (i.e. the 
defendant in the foreign case becomes the plaintiff with an action for negative 
declaratory judgment case in Japan). The inferior courts tend to apply the same 
jurisdiction rule to normal product liability cases and to actions for negative 
declaratory judgment, exercising jurisdiction as the court of the place of tort. 54 
As a result, the plaintiff in the action for negative declaratory judgment in 
Japan can obtain such a judgment with res judicata effect to protect himself 
against a lawsuit by the opposing party in a foreign forum. This tendency has 
been criticized: although the rule of jurisdiction by reference to the place of the 
tort is originally intended to serve the interest of the injured person, it has come 
to serve rather the interests of the manufacturer through the action for negative 
declaratory judgment. 
Under Article 8 of the old CCP (Art.5(4) of the new CCP),55 when the 
obligation relating to a "property right" forms "the object of the claim", the 
place of the obligor's domicile is understood to be the place where the obliga-
tion is "situated". If this rule would apply also to an action for negative de-
claratory judgment, the plaintiff (obligor) would be able to bring the action 
against his obligee before the court at the place of his domicile. This would be 
unfair,56 as the Tokyo District Court pointed out in its judgment. 57 
52 E.g. interlocutory judgment of the Tokyo District Court 27 October 1995, Hanrei Taimuzu No. 
891 p. 71 (plaintiff: the US Government, defendant: a US company, place of tort: Japan). 
53 Tokyo District Court 15 February 1984, Hanrei Taimuzu No. 525 p. 132 (English translation in 
28 JAIL (1985) 243). 
54 Tokyo District Court 27 March 1984, Hanreijiho No. 1113 p.26 (English translation in 28 JAIL 
(1985) 248); Tokyo District Court 30 May 1989, Hanrei Taimuzu No. 703 p. 240; Tokyo District 
Court 19 June 1989, ibid.p.246 (English translation in 33 JAIL (1990) 202). See also the 
interlocutory judgment of the Tokyo District Court of 28 August 1989, Hanreijiho No. 1338 p.121 
(English translation in 33 JAIL (1990) 206). 
55 An action concerning a property right against a person who does not live in Japan or whose 
abode is unknown may be brought in the judicial district where the object of the claim, or a security 
thereof, or any seizable property of the defendant, is situated. 
56 See, for a different opinion, YAMAMOTO, loc.cit. n. 21 p. 444. 
57 Tokyo District Court 28 July 1987, Hanreijiho No.1275 p.77 (English translation in 32 JAIL 
(1989) 161). 
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2.2.2. Exercise ofjurisdiction in case of non-fulfilment of requirements 
This section deals with rules on the exercise of jurisdiction, even if the 
above-mentioned requirements are not fulfilled. 
( I) Joinder of claims 
This notion can be sub-divided into joinder of claims as a multiplicity of 
objects in a suit, and joinder of parties as a multiplicity of subjects in a suit. 
According to the majority opinion, in order to exercise jurisdiction based on 
joinder of claims, a mutual relevance between the claims is required.58 Set-off 
claims can also be treated as joinder of claims. As for joinder of parties, opin-
ions differ: according to a negative opinion,59 if jurisdiction is based on the 
joinder of parties, a co-defendant would be forced to participate in a procedure 
before an unexpected forum. On the other hand, a positive opinion says that 
jurisdiction based on the joinder of parties should be exercised when the rights 
or liabilities which are the key issues of the claims are common to the various 
parties, or when the rights or liabilities of both claims are based on common 
facts and laws.60 Case law tends to follow the positive opinion. 61 
(2) Appearance 
As far as it does not violate the exclusive jurisdiction of another forum, 
jurisdiction may be exercised on the basis of appearance. This rule shares its 
theoretical basis with the rule of forum selection. 
2.2.3. Jurisdiction to enjoin and to arrest 
In Japanese law, injunction or arrest does not create a ground for jurisdic-
tion. The issue here is rather what requirements should be fulfilled in order to 
enable the court to order injunction or arrest. The forum which has jurisdiction 
over the merits should be able to exercise jurisdiction over the question of 
injunction/arrest. 62 In fact in a number of cases the court exercised jurisdiction 
over injunction or arrest after they asserted jurisdiction over the merits. 63 In 
58 DOGAUCHI, loe.cit. n. 44 p. 117; YAMAMOTO, loe.cit. n. 21 p. 445; TAKAHASHI HIROSHI, 
'Kokusai Saiban Kanktsu' [International Jurisdiction], in AOYAMA YOSHIMITSU and SAWAKI 
TAKAO (eds.), Kokusai Minji Sosho no Riron [Theories on International Civil Proeedure] (1987) 
64. See also Tokyo District Court 23 October 1987, Hanreijiho No.1261 p.48; Tokyo District 
Court 27 March 1989, Hanrei Taimuzu No. 703 p. 240; Tokyo District Court 19 June 1989, ibid. 
p.246. 
59 DOGAUCHI, loe.cit.n. 44 p. 118. 
60 YAMAMOTO, loe.cit.n. 21 p. 445. For a similar opinion, see KIDANA SHOICHI, MATSUOKA 
HIROSHI and WATANABE SA TOSHI, Kokusaishiho Gairon [Compendium of Private International 
Law] (2nd ed., 1991) 256. 
61 Tokyo District Court 8 May 1986, Hanreijiho No.1196 p.87 (English translation in 31 JAIL 
(1988) 220); Tokyo District Court 1 June 1987, Hanreijiho No. 1261 p.105. 
62 DOGAUCHI, loe.cit. n. 44 p. 120. 
63 Tokyo District Court 26 April 1965, 16 Rominshu No.2 p.308; Yokohama District Court 
116 ASIAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
addition, when assets of the defendant are (even temporarily) located in Japan, 
the Japanese court should be able to exercise jurisdiction over the question of 
injunction/arrest on the basis of the mere fact of their 10cation.64 Otherwise the 
enforcement of the ultimate decision may not be secured. 
2.2.4. Jurisdiction in rem and quasi in rem 
Japanese law in general does not know these notions. The function of 
Article 8 of the old CCP (Art.5(4) new CCP) is, however, similar to that of 
jurisdiction quasi in rem, although, in contradistinction to the common law 
rule, the jurisdiction is not limited to the assets. But in transboundary cases, the 
Japanese court may exercise jurisdiction only if the object of the claim consists 
of the assets, on the basis of their location. Otherwise such jurisdiction would 
be excessive. 
In relation to real property the court of the place of location has exclusive 
jurisdiction. 
2.2.5. Constraints on exercise: special circumstance test 
Apart from a rigid standpoint as represented by the above-mentioned first 
theory (2.1.2.), it is generally admitted that the jurisdiction rule may be modi-
fied based on the circumstances of each case. A 'special circumstance test' has 
been developed by the lower courts and is adhered to by some scholars. 65 This 
test has both a negative and an affirmative function. The latter is that when the 
Japanese court finds itself without jurisdiction but if this would lead to a situa-
tion where the plaintiff would have no forum at all, the Japanese court should 
exercise jurisdiction based on the special circumstances of the case. An exam-
ple of the negative function is that when no judicial assistance is available due 
to lack of diplomatic relations between Japan and the country where important 
evidence is available, the court may consider Japan an inappropriate forum and 
refuse to exercise jurisdiction. 66 
Although the test offers the possibility of a flexible solution, there is a risk 
that 'special circumstances' is too extensively interpreted and thus practically 
plays the principal role in determining jurisdiction. In fact, the generally used 
criteria of this test, i.e. fairness between the parties and speedy and appropriate 
29 September 1966, 17 Kaminshu No.9-1O p. 874. 
64 WATANABE SATOSHI on international jurisdiction over arrest, in IKEHARA SUEO and HAY AT A 
YOSHIRO (eds.), Shogai Hanrei Hyakusen [100 Selected Judgments in the Field of Private 
International Law] (3rd ed., 1996) 209. 
65 See supra 2.1.2, theory 4. 
66 As to the negative function, the test has a function similar to that of the forwn non conveniens test 
in US law. Different from theforwn non conveniens test, however, the existence of another forum 
which has jurisdiction over the case is not required. Moreover, the criteria of the special 
circumstance test (fair, speedy and appropriate jUdgement) are not as flexible as the criterion of the 
American test. In addition, using the Japanese test, the court in fact cannot react in a really flexible 
manner (cf. stay); it must either affirm or refuse to exercise jurisdiction. DOGAUCHI, loc.cit. n. 44 
p.109. 
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proceeding67, are identical to the abstract contents of Jori. 68 This would mean 
that the criteria of the most fundamental guideline for the determination of 
international jurisdiction and the criteria for exceptional and individual solu-
tions are the same. The 'special circumstance' test would then practically obtain 
the character of a general rule and most existing jurisdiction rules might be 
replaced by it. This would lead to an uncertain and unpredictable situation. 
2.3. Forum Selection 
Forum selection is generally recognized as a basis of jurisdiction. Such a 
selection may raise various questions, such as those on the existence and the 
validity of the forum selection agreement. In order to find an answer to these 
questions, the applicable law must be determined. According to the leading 
opinion, the applicable law is the lex fori. In case of selection in favour of a 
Japanese forum, the lex fori would thus be the Japanese law on international 
civil procedure.69 Since there is no provision in the CCP on this matter, Article 
25 of the old (Art. 11 new) CCP should apply mutatis mutandis. This provision 
requires that the agreement on forum selection should be made in the form of a 
document. If this were taken literally, both offer and acceptance should be 
contained in one document. However, the Supreme Court modified the re-
quirement by ruling that it is not necessary to have both offer and acceptance in 
one document. 70 The requirement is deemed to be fulfilled when one party 
makes a manifest designation of a court in a specific country. This view of the 
Supreme Court is generally accepted by the literature. 71 Some scholars try to 
make the requirement much less strict by taking the position that the designa-
tion of a country (without mentioning a court) should suffice.72 
In the above-mentioned case, the Supreme Court recognized exclusive 
jurisdiction of a foreign court based on agreement of the parties, provided that 
the Japanese court does not have exclusive jurisdiction over the case and that 
the country of the agreed forum exercises its jurisdiction based on its own law. 
Reciprocity is not required. Nor is it necessary that a judgment rendered in the 
agreed forum can be recognized and enforced in Japan. 
If the forum selection would violate Japanese public policy, jurisdiction 
should be denied. In addition, the 'special circumstance' test may be used to 
modify a forum selection. 
67 E.g. Tokyo District Court 20 June 1986, Hanreijiho No.1196 p.87 (English translation in 31 
JAIL (1988) 216); Tokyo District Court, Hachioji Branch 22 May 1991, Hanrei Taimuzu No.755 
p.213. 
68 See the Supreme Court in the Malaysian Airlines case, supra n. 32. 
69 DOGAUCHI, loc.cit. n. 44 p. 112. 
70 Supreme Court 28 November 1975, 29 Minshu No. 10 p. 1554. 
71 MITSUKI MASATSUGU, 'Goi Kankatsu' [Jurisdiction Agreement], in SAWAKI TAKAO and AKIBA 
JUNICHI (eds.), Kokusaishiho no Solen [Issues of Private International Law] (new ed., 1996) 231. 
72 E.g. DOGAUCHI, loc.cit. n. 44 p. 113. 
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2.4. Lis (alibi) pendens73 
There are two typical cases of lis alibi pendens. In the first, the same 
plaintiff files a suit against the same defendant in another forum. In this case 
the plaintiff's purpose is to secure his claim by instituting more than one litiga-
tion. In the second, the defendant in the original litigation (original defendant) 
files a suit against the original plaintiff. In this case the original defendant's 
purpose is to shift the forum to the place where he can proceed with the litiga-
tion more conveniently, or protect his assets by obtaining a negative declara-
tory judgment. 
While for domestic cases, Article 142 of the new CCP (Art. 231 of the old 
CCP) allows only one litigation, there is neither a municipal nor a treaty provi-
sion covering the matter for transboundary litigation. If, however, several 
litigations in several fora were allowed, the burden on parties could become too 
heavy, and, moreover, the litigations could lead to contradictory results. It is 
not possible to await the developments in the other forum, since Japanese law 
does not provide for the possibility of a procedural 'stay' whereby the proce-
dure is temporarily suspended. Consequently, there has been a discussion on if 
and how to regulate lis alibi pendens. 
Earlier court decisions have ignored the pending litigation abroad and have 
allowed litigation in Japan, even where the foreign litigation had commenced 
earlier. 74 More recent judgments tend to have better understood the issue or, at 
least, to have taken the issue into consideration.75 As for doctrine, there are two 
opinions. The first one says that if a judgment to be rendered in a foreign 
litigation would be eligible for recognition in Japan, that litigation should be 
considered as a Japanese one and, consequently, no new claim before the 
Japanese court should be allowed.76 According to this view, the time element is 
important for the determination which (i.e. the Japanese or the foreign) litiga-
tion should be granted priority. The second view says that lis alibi pendens is 
inevitable under the current system of civil procedure in the world, and that it 
can be taken into consideration only as a factor to determine which forum has 
the closest relationship with the case. For this purpose, the court must have 
broad discretion.77 
73 See SAWAKITAKAO, 'Battle of Lawsuits', 23 JAIL (1980) 17. 
74 Tokyo District Court 23 December 1955, 6 Kaminshu No.12 p.2679; Tokyo High Court 18 July 
1957, 8 Kaminshu No.7 p.1282; interlocutory judgment of Tokyo District Court 23 June 1987, 
Hanreijiho No. 1240 p.27; Tokyo District Court 27 May 1965, 16 Kaminshu No.5 p.923; 
interlocutory judgment of Osaka District Court 9 October 1973, Hanreijiho No.728 p.76; 
interlocutory judgment of Tokyo District Court, Hanrei Taimuzu No. 703 p. 246. 
75 Interlocutory judgment of the Tokyo District Court 30 May 1989, Hanrei Taimuzu No.703 
p.240; Tokyo District Court 15 February 1984, Hanrei Taimuzu No.525 p.132; Tokyo District 
Court 29 January 1991, Hanreijiho No. 1390 p. 98 (English translation in 35 JAIL (1992) 171). 
76 DAGAUCHI MASATO, 'Kokusaiteki Sosho Kyogo' [International concurrent litigation], 100 
Hogaku Kyokai Zasshi [Journal of the Jurisprudence Association, University of Tokyo] 771. 
77 ISHIGURO KAZUNORI, 'Gaikoku ni okeru Sosho Keizoku no Kokunaiteki Koka' [Effects of lis 
alibi pendens in Japan], in AOYAMA and SAWAKI (eds.), op.cit. n.58 p.361. 
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2.5. Immunities78 
The judicial power of Japan in principle reaches all legal subjects within the 
territory of Japan. By way of exception foreign states are exempt from litiga-
tion, based on the principle of sovereign or state immunity. Against the back-
ground of par in parem non habet imperium, immunity was understood to be 
absolute. Par in parem non habet imperium has, however, been losing its 
validity since states often commit themselves in the field of trade or economics. 
As a result, the traditional principle of absolute immunity has been replaced in 
many countries by restrictive immunity.79 In Japan, an early decision of the 
Great Court of Cassation adhered to the principle of absolute immunity, 80 and 
this position has never officially been changed. A number of judgments of 
lower courts after World War II followed this lead.8l The Japanese executive 
branch has never made its official position clear, but from the fact that Japan 
has concluded a number of bilateral treaties which contain provisions based on 
the principle of restrictive immunity, 82 the Japanese government may be said 
not to be rigid in its attitude. 83 
The majority of authors support the principle of restrictive immunity84 and 
according to one author this principle has even become part of international 
customary law. 85 Following this opinion, acta jure imperii and acta jure gestio-
nis should be distinguished, and the foreign state should enjoy immunity only 
for the first type of acts. As to the criteria for the distinction, the leading view 
looks at the nature of the state act, i.e. whether the act can be carried out only 
by the state or also by private persons. 86 Since this criterion is very abstract, 
some typical cases are examined here: 
( 1) Immunity is not granted in cases concerning real property (except embassies 
and military bases), succession, tax or intellectual property, since the forum 
state's interests in these matters should be protected. 
(2) The foreign state does not enjoy immunity in cases relating to labour or 
sales contracts. 87 
78 TSUTSUI WAKAMIZU, 'Subjects of international law in the Japanese courts', 37 ICLQ (1988) 
325. 
79 The USA and major European countries including France, Germany and the UK adhere to the 
principle of restrictive immunity. 
80 Great Court of Cassation 28 December 1928, 7 Minshu 1128. 
81 Fukuoka High Court 15 March 1956, 7 Kaminshu No.3 p.629; Tokyo District Court 19 
September 1960, 11 Kaminshu No. 9 p.1931. 
82 E.g. the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between Japan and the USA (1953), 
Art. 18(2). 
83 TAIJUDO KANAE, Minji Saibanken fW Menjo [Sovereign Immunity], in op.cit. n. 33 p. 50. 
84 TAKAKUWA AKIRA, Minji Saibanken fW Menjo [Sovereign immunity], in AOYAMA and SAWAKI, 
op.cit. n.58 p.170. 
85 DOGAUCHI, loc.cit. n.44 p.96. 
86 YAMAMOTO, loc.cit. n. 21 p.436. 
87 Some judgments have accepted immunity of international organizations in cases concerning 
labour contracts: Tokyo District Court 21 September 1977, Hanreijiho No.884 p.77 (relating to the 
United Nations University, English translation in 23 JAIL (1980) 196); Tokyo High Court 12 
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(3) The foreign state does not enjoy immunity for commercial activities. Ac-
cording to one interpretation, a state activity should be qualified as 
'commercial', if the activity brings "profit" to the state.88 
(4) In tort cases, the foreign state enjoys immunity only if the tort is caused by 
the foreign state as a result of its sovereign act. 
These rules are applicable only to foreign states that Japan has recognized, 
and should also apply to international organizations, foreign municipalities and 
public corporations. 
Foreign diplomats also enjoy immunity, 89 since their functions require them 
to be able to perform their duties as a diplomat smoothly. Japan is a party to 
several treaties concerning diplomatic immunity. 90 According to the Great 
Court of Cassation,91 the service of procedural documents is a function of the 
sovereign power of the forum state, and to serve such documents on the repre-
sentative of a foreign state would violate the sovereignty of that foreign state.92 
The Japanese court must examine ex officio if it may exercise judicial power 
over the foreign state. The plaintiff must prove that the act of the foreign state 
is not a sovereign act. Under normal procedure, the defendant would have to 
prove the sovereign nature of his act. 93 
The foreign state can waive the privilege of immunity. Although the Great 
Court of Cassation94 held the view that the waiver should take place by agree-
ment between the two states after the commencement of the litigation, it can in 
fact be made by a statement of the foreign state to the private party before the 
litigation. 
2.6. How to examine jurisdiction? 
The examination by the court whether it may exercise jurisdiction usually 
starts with an objection raised by the defendant. 95 The hearing on the issue of 
December 1983, 34 Rominshu No.5-6 p.922 and Tokyo District Court 31 May 1982, 33 Rominshu 
No.3 p.472 (Representative of the European Community). 
88 YAMAMOTO, loe.cit. n. 21 p. 437. 
89 See, as precedents on this issue, Yokohama District Court 16 July 1924, Horitsu Shinbun 
No.2294 p.7; Tokyo District Court 29 September 1965, Hanrei Taimuzu No. 184 p.170; Yokohama 
District Court 4 March 1987, Hanreijiho No. 1225 p. 45. 
90 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961) Art.31; Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations (1963) Art.43; Japan-US Consular Convention (1964) Art. 11; Japan-UK Consular 
Convention (1965) Art.14; Japan-USSR Consular Convention (1967) Arts.18 and 27; Agreement 
under Article VI of the Japan-US Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security regarding Facilities 
and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan (1960) Art.18. Concerning the 
1961 Vienna Convention, see Tokyo High Court, 8 April 1970, 21 Kaminshu No.3-4 p. 557. 
91 Supra n. 80. 
92 For a critical opinion on this judgement, see GDA SHIGERU and IWASAWA YUH, 'Saibanken 
Menjo (1)' [State Immunity], in op.cit. n.64 p.193. 
93 YAMAMOTO, loe.cit. n.21 p.438. 
94 Supra, n. 80. 
95 In cases where the 1953 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules relating to International 
Transportation by Air, its 1967 Additional Protoeol or the 1969 Convention on Civil Liability for 
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jurisdiction takes place prior to that on the merits. This sequence (objection -
hearing on jurisdiction - hearing on merits) also applies where the relevant facts 
serving as the basis for the exercise of jurisdiction and the facts on the merits 
are closely connected. The exercise of jurisdiction in a tort case, for example, 
requires the determination of the place of the tort. At this stage, however, it 
suffices to prove that the alleged tortious act has been committed, or the dam-
age resulting from the act was caused, in the forum state. It is not necessary to 
prove negligence or, for that matter, legal capacity of the defendant. Therefore, 
as to the degree of proof, it is sufficient for the court to believe that exercise of 
jurisdiction and hearing on the merits would bring no irrational burden to the 
defendant. 
The burden of proof of the facts which serve as the basis of jurisdiction 
should be borne by the plaintiff. Once jurisdiction is confirmed on the basis of 
the facts at the time of fIling, it can no more be influenced by later changes of 
the facts. 
The unsatisfied party may appeal against a fmal judgment which denies or 
confirms jurisdiction but there is no provision in the CCP on appeal against an 
interlocutory judgment confirming jurisdiction. 96 
3. SERVICE OF PROCESS97 
3.1. Service abroad of process in Japan 
If service of process is seen as a function of the sovereign power of the 
state,98 it cannot be performed on persons outside Japanese territory. There-
fore, according to Article 108 of the new CCP (Art. 175 of the old CCP), the 
chief judge of the court commissions the responsible foreign official or the 
Japanese diplomatic representative in the foreign state to perform service of 
process. Japan has concluded bilateral99 or multilateral agreements for this 
purpose. 100 • 
Service by public notice may be made, when none of the means of interna-
tional judicial assistance is available, or when the commissioned foreign official 
does not send a document as proof of performance of service within six months 
Oil Pollution Damage applies, or in cases where a foreign forum has exclusive jurisdiction over the 
case, the claim can be dismissed even without the defendant's objection to jurisdiction. 
96 One opinion supports the possibility of appeal against an interlocutory judgment, while according 
to another opinion appeal would cause terrible delay of the proceeding. See TAKAHASHI HIROSHI, 
loc.cit. n.58 p.57; YAMAMOTO, loc.cit. n.21 p.449. 
97 OHARA YOSHIO, 'Judicial assistance to be afforded by Japan for proceedings in the United 
States', The Intematio1Ul1 Lawyer (1989) 10. 
98 Great Court of Cassation, supra n. 80. 
99 As on 1 January 1992 Japan had concluded bilateral agreements on service abroad with the 
following countries: UK, Italy, Austria, Switzerland, Denmark, Germany, Norway, Iraq, Iran, 
Australia, Kuwait, Syria, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Brazil. 
100 The Hague Convention on Civil Procedure (1954) and the Hague Convention on the Service 
Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil and Commercial Matters (1965). 
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since the commissioning by the Japanese court (Art. 110(1) sub-paras. (3) and 
(4) new CCP). Article 15 of the 1965 Hague Service Convention allows service 
by public notice while Article 16 provides for appeal within two months by the 
party who was not aware of the litigation in Japan (Art. 97 new CCP).101 
In domestic litigation, service may be performed by registered mail (Art. 
107 new CCP). Under this system, the service is deemed to be made at the 
time of mailing. According to one opinion, this form of service should be 
available also for service on a party in a foreign state. 102 But, making it so 
available would ignore the character of this type of service as a last resort. 
Furthermore, if service abroad may be easily performed in this way, the com-
mencement of litigation will often not be notified to the other party. 103 There-
fore, it should not be allowed for service on a party abroad. 
3.2. Service in Japan of process abroad 
This issue will be discussed together with the requirements of recognition of 
foreign judgments, irifra 5.1. 
4. TAKING OF EVIDENCE ABROAD 
4.1. Taking of evidence in foreign states 
Since the taking of evidence is also a sovereign function, it must be com-
missioned to a responsible foreign official or the Japanese diplomatic represen-
tative (Art. 184 new CCP). Evidence may be taken by Japanese consular offi-
cers in the foreign state in the context of judicial assistance and on the basis of 
consular conventions. Under the system of the 1970 Hague Convention on the 
Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters an organ desig-
nated by each contracting state takes the evidence upon request from another 
state. Since Japan has not ratified the Hague Convention, the taking of evidence 
is only possible on the basis of bilateral treaties. 104 According to Article 184 of 
the new CCP, a Japanese consul may take any voluntary testimony from any 
person in a foreign state in accordance with Japanese law, but without violating 
the law of the foreign state. Nobody can be forced to appear as a witness, and 
IOJ In Supreme Court 26 May 1961, 15 Minshu No.5 p.1425, service was performed by public 
notice instead of service abroad. The defendant did not know of the filing of a lawsuit nor of the 
judgment. After he became aware through the enforcement against his car, he appealed within two 
months. The Supreme Court considered the appeal lawful. 
102 ISHIGURO KAZUNORI, op.cit. n.38 p.224. 
103 YAMAMOTO, loe.cit. n. 21 p.454. 
J04 As on 1 January 1992 Japan had concluded bilateral agreements on taking of evidence with the 
following countries: USA, UK, Israel, Italy, Switzerland, Sweden, Spain, Denmark, Germany, 
Pakistan, Iraq, Iran, India, Kuwait, Syria, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Brazil. 
INTERNATIONAL CIVIL PROCEDURE IN JAPAN 123 
if a person does appear, he may refuse to take an oath. And even if he makes a 
false statement on oath, the Japanese criminal law would not apply. !Os 
Article 184(2) of the new CCP declares the evidence to be valid, even if 
taken in a manner which violates the foreign law, as long as it is in accord1!nce 
with the Japanese law. The opposite case, i.e. the taking of evidence in viola-
tion of Japanese law, is not much discussed. When the fundamental principles 
of Japanese civil procedure are violated, the evidence should be considered 
unlawful. 106 
4.2. Taking of evidence in Japan 
Foreign countries can, in reverse direction, use the same judicial assistance 
mechanisms. The often debated issue in other civil law countries concerns the 
unilateral taking of evidence outside the framework of a treaty on judicial 
assistance, such as discovery in US law. When a foreign court orders a party or 
a third party to produce evidence in their possession in Japan, the question 
arises whether the order must be followed. Although in practice Japanese 
companies may have followed discovery orders, there is no court decision on 
this issue nor any official statement about the attitude of the Japanese govern-
ment. It is suggested that the order be classified as a violation of Japanese 
sovereignty . 
4.3. Application of foreign law 
When the applicable law designated by the Horei, the Japanese private 
international law, is a foreign law, the Japanese court must apply it ex officio 
even if the party concerned fails to prove its content. Therefore, even if both 
parties agree on the contents of the foreign applicable law, the court can yet 
determine otherwise. In order to fulfIl its obligation, the court may conduct its 
own reE ~arch, consult various organizations or call expert witnesses to clarify 
the content of the foreign law, and it may ask for the parties' assistance. The 
parties do not have a burden of proof, and failure of proof does not lead to any 
disadvantage for them. On the other hand, the court is not bound by any 
'proof .107 
The Japanese court must interpret the foreign applicable law as if it were a 
court of the foreign state. This means that the foreign applicable law is not 
transformed into Japanese law, but applied as foreign law per se. 
105 Perjury is not included in the list of crimes to which the Japanese criminal law applies 
extraterritorially. See Arts. 2 and 3 of the Japanese Criminal Code. 
106 E.g. the case where the opposite party could not attend the examination of witness. 
YAMAMOTO, loe.cit. n.21 p.470. 
107 KAWAMATA YOSHIYA, 'Gaikoku Ho no Naiyou no Shomei' [The proof of the contents of 
foreign law], in SAWAKI and AKIBA, op.cit. n. 71 p. 71. 
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Despite the efforts of the court, the foreign law may remain unknown or 
unclear. Yet, since the principle jus novit curia applies also to foreign law, the 
court must render judgment. According to the prevailing view, the law most 
probably resembling the foreign law should be applied. 108 This resemblance 
should be judged on the basis of the historical, ethnical and cultural back-
grounds of the foreign state. For example, where the law of North Korea is to 
be applied the laws of South Korea and socialist countries such as China should 
be taken into consideration. 109 The practical outcome of this method is not 
always clear. In fact, there is a judgment in which Japanese law was applied 
instead of North Korean law although the court adhered to the prevailing view 
referred to above. I1O Obviously, the prevailing view is not always practical for 
the courts. As a consequence, another view, emphasizing practicability for the 
courts, is becoming popular. III According to this view, Japanese law as the lex 
fori should be applied. 112 Unfortunately, this approach may lead to the auto-
matic application of the lex fori and may spoil the fundamental principle of 
contlict of laws, i.e. the equal status of the foreign and national laws. 
According to the prevailing view, when the court misinterprets the foreign 
law, a re-appeal to the Supreme Court may be made. 113 The same is the case 
when the court has failed to take appropriate measures to find the contents of 
the foreign law and has rendered a judgment by applying the lex fori. 114 The 
Japanese Supreme Court has not taken a clear stand, but the possibility of re-
appeal is assumed through interpretation of its jurisprudence. liS As a result of 
its reform, the CCP now grants the Supreme Court more discretion in accept-
ing re-appeals. It remains to be seen how generously the Supreme Court will 
allow re-appeal in cases concerning the application of foreign law. 
108 Ibid. See also Tokyo Family Court 13 June 1963, 15 Kasaigeppo No.2 p.163; Tokyo District 
Court 25 October 1962, Hanreijiho No. 321 p. 23. 
109 KIDANA in KIDANA et. aI., op.cit. n. 60 p. 71. 
110 Nagoya Family Court 12 March 1982, 35 Kasaigeppo No.1 p.105. 
III MIKAZUKI AKIRA, 'Gaikoku Ho no Tekiyou to Saibansho' [The application of foreign law and 
the Japanese court], in SAWAKI and AOYAMA, op.cit. n.58, p.269; YAMAMOTO, loe.cit. n.21 
p.459. The same view is expressed in some judgments: Nagoya District Court 7 October 1975, 
Hanreijiho No. 817 p.98; Kyoto District Court 30 September 1987, Hanreijiho No. 1275 p.114. 
112 As a result Japanese law was applied in the judgment of the Nagano Family Court 12 March 
1982, 35 Kasaigeppo No.1 p.105. 
113 KAWAMATA, loc.cit. n.107. 
114 Ibid. 
115 Supreme Court 2 July 1981, 35 Minshu No.5 p.81. 
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5. RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS I 16 
Like the topic of international jurisdiction, the recognition of foreign judg-
ments raises many important theoretical and practical matters. The 1996 reform 
of the CCP on this issue (Arts. 200 of the old CCP and 118 new CCP) was 
minimal and consequently the theories developed so far and existing court 
decisions will continue to play an important role. 
The victorious party in a foreign lawsuit against a person with assets in 
Japan is interested in having his rights under the foreign court's judgment 
realized through execution on the assets in Japan. For that purpose he needs an 
exequatur judgment required by Article 24(2) of the Law of Civil Execution. 117 
Under this provision the foreign judgment must fulfil the requirements of 
Article 118 of the new CCP (Art. 200 of the old CCP). The discussion of these 
requirements will be the core of the present section. Another feature of the 
provision is the prohibition of revision au fond: any substantive examination of 
the foreign judgment as to the propriety of its solution in the specific case is 
excluded. 118 
5.1. Requirements for the recognition of foreign judgments 
5.1.1. Jurisdiction of the foreign court 
The principal requirement is that the foreign forum was entitled to exercise 
international jurisdiction. This jurisdiction is described as 'indirect' interna-
tional jurisdiction in contrast to the jurisdiction dealt with earlier. Article 200(1) 
of the old CCP, which stated that "the jurisdiction of a foreign court is not 
denied by law or by treaty", was amended and according to Article 118(1) of 
the new CCP "the jurisdiction of a foreign court is admitted by law or by 
treaty". Under the old CCP, a minor view held that it is not necessary for the 
existence of jurisdiction of the foreign court to be confirmed,119 but under the 
new CCP such a view cannot be maintained. 
116 KONO TOSHIYUKI and ALEXANDER TRUNK, 'Anerkennung und Vollstreckung ausHindischer 
Urteile in Japan' [Recognition and enforcement of foreign judgements in Japan], 102 Zeitschrift flir 
Zivilprozessrecht (1989) 319. TAKESHITA MORIO, 'Neuere Tendenzen der Anerkennung und 
Vollstreckung ausHindischer Entscheidungen in Japan, 109 Zeitschrift flir Zivilprozessrecht (1996) 
305 et seq.; SAWAKI TAKAO, 'Recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in Japan', The 
International Lawyer (1989) 29. 
117 For an overview, see ISEKI MASAHIRO and HIGASHI TAKAYUKI, 'Civil Execution', in 
KITAGAWA ZENTARO (ed.), 16 Doing Business in Japan Ch. 6. 
118 This is sometimes referred to as 'automatic recognition'. See WATANABE, in KIDANA et al., 
op.cit. n. 60 p. 280. It may, however, be misleading. Although it raises the impression that all 
effects of the foreign judgment under the foreign law are automatically recognized, this is not 
always the case. E.g. the range of res judicata may be vastly different in Japan and in other states. 
119 See KOSUGI TAKEO, in SAWAKI and AKIBA, op.cit. n. 71 p. 234. 
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A key issue concerns the criteria by which to confirm indirect jurisdiction. 
According to the prevailing view, 120 the rule governing the question of juris-
diction of the Japanese court should also apply to the recognition of foreign 
judgments. 121 This means that the jurisdiction of a foreign court must be deter-
mined from the Japanese perspective, since rendering and recognizing a judg-
ment are essentially the same functions. There is, however, another opinion 
which allows the application of different rules to the question of indirect juris-
diction, especially in case of divorce judgments. Situations in which a marriage 
is valid in country A but not in Japan could be avoided through a generous 
attitude towards recognition of foreign judgments. 122 Finally, a third view 
suggests the establishment of specific rules on indirect jurisdiction. 123 
Following the leading opinion, the rules which are explained in section 1 of 
this paper apply to indirect jurisdiction. 
5.1.2. Service and appearance 
These requirements serve the protection of the defendant who has not been 
notified about the commencement of the foreign litigation and who has, there-
fore, not been able to prepare his defence. Although they have remained the 
same under the new CCP, there are two minor differences between Article 
200(2) of the old CCP and Article 118(2) of the new CCP. First, Article 200(2) 
only covered the service on defendants who are Japanese nationals. This 
nationalistic bias has been abolished. Secondly, while the old CCP regarded 
only service by public notice as an inappropriate means of service, under the 
new CCP other equivalent means of service may also be classified as inappro-
priate. Consequently, Article 118(2) of the new CCP may be broadly inter-
preted as regulating not only the service, but also other procedural issues 
relating to due process. 
With regard to the requirements, service by mail from the USA has raised 
an important theoretical and practical issue. 124 Under Article 10 item (a) of the 
1965 Hague Service Convention, each contracting state could declare its objec-
tion to, and consequently refuse service from abroad, by mail. Japan has not 
made such objection, giving rise to a number of questions. When a company or 
a person in Japan receives judicial documents by mail directly from an Ameri-
can attorney of the plaintiff, should it be deemed "service" within the meaning 
120 WATANABE, in KIDANA et aI., op.cit. n. 60 p. 286. 
121 Some judgments have followed this approach. See Tokyo District Court 19 September 1980, 
Hanrei Taimuzu No.435 p.155; Osaka High Court 25 February 1992, 45 Kaminshu 29 (English 
translation in 39 JAIL (1993) 217). 
122 See YAZAWA SHOJI, in IKEHARA and HAYATA, op.cit. n. 64 p. 227. 
123 Ibid. 
124 Besides HELDRICH and KONO, op.cit. n.1, see also WILLIAM TEMPLE JORDAN, 'Beyond 
jingoism: service by mail to Japan and the Hague Convention on Extrajudicial Documents in Civil 
or Commercial Matters', 16 Law in Japan (1983) 69; FUJITA YASUHIRO, 'Service of American 
process upon Japanese nationals by registered airmail and enforceability of resulting American 
judgments in Japan', 12 Law in Japan (1979). 
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of Article 200(2) of the old CCP (Art. 118(2) new CCP)? If so, is it always 
considered valid or only under certain circumstances? 
There are two views on the matter: according to one it is "service" within 
the meaning of the CCP, since Japan has not raised an objection under Article 
10 of the Hague Convention. The validity of the service by mail should be 
determined by whether or not a translation has been attached 125 and by various 
elements of the case, such as the language ability of the defendant, or by the 
type of case. 126 
According to the other opinion, taking the concrete circumstances of each 
case into consideration in order to determine the validity of service would lead 
to uncertainty of procedure. The service should rather be considered invalid or 
simple de facto notice. 127 
According to the official position of the Japanese government, the fact that 
Japan has not made the declaration only means that Japan will not consider 
service by mail to be violative of Japanese sovereignty, but does not mean that 
Japan recognizes it as a measure of service. 128 Some court decisions have held 
that service by mail without translation does not meet the requirements of 
Article 200(2) of the old CCP.129 It is, therefore, recommended to use the 
judicial assistance procedures or, at least, attach a Japanese translation to 
service by mail. 
5.1.3. Public policy 
Article 200(2) of the old CCP as well as Article 118(2) of the new CCP lays 
down that foreign judgments shall not violate Japanese public policy. Not only 
the CCP, but also the Horei (Art. 33) and the Japanese Civil Code (Art. 90) 
use public policy as an instrument to protect the fundamental values of Japanese 
law. However, public policy in the CCP (and in the Horei) protects more 
fundamental values than public policy in Article 90 of the Japanese Civil 
Code. 130 The Japanese court is to examine ex officio whether a foreign judg-
125 TAKAKUWA AKIRA, 'Shogaiteki Minji Sosho Jiken ni okeru Sotatsu to Shokoshirabe' [Service 
and taking of evidence in transboundary civil litigation], 37 Hosojiho [Lawyers Association Journal] 
(No.4) 54. 
126 KONO TOSHIYUKI, commentary on the judgment of the Tokyo District Court, 11 November 
1988, lurisuto No. 957 p.282. 
127 FUJITA YASUHIRO, 'Nihon no Hikoku ni taisuru Amerika Sojo no Chokusetsu Yuso to sono 
Koryoku' [Service by mail from USA to Japanese defendants and its effect], Hanrei Taimuzu 
No.354 p.84; MIKAZUKI AKIRA, in Yuasa law firm (ed.) Kokusaitorihiki to Keiso no 
Horitsujitsumu [International Trade and Legal Practice of Conflicts] p. 480. 
128 HARA MASARU, 'Shiho no Kokusaiteki Toitsu Undo' [International unification of private law], 
17 Kokusai Shoji Homu [Journal of the Japanese Institute of International Business Law] (No.12) 
1287. 
129 Tokyo District Court 21 December 1976, 27 Kaminshu No. 9-12 p. 801; Tokyo District Court 
11 November 1988, Hanreijiho No. 1315 p. 96 (English translation in 33 JAIL (1990) 208); Tokyo 
District Court 26 March 1990, Kinyu Shoji Hanrei No. 1857 p.39 (English translation in 34 JAIL 
(1991) 174). 
130 TAKAKUWA AKIRA, 'Gaikoku Hanketsu Shouinyoken toshiteno Kojoryozoku' [Public policy as a 
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ment violates Japanese public policy. In this examination, not only the formal 
aspects of adjudication, but also the facts underlying the ratio decidendi may be 
taken into consideration. It must, however, not be a revision au fond, although 
as a matter of fact the public policy test may lead to revision au fond. 131 
After the amendment of Article 200(3) of the old CCP, Article 118(3) of the 
new CCP now prescribes that the content and the procedure of judgments (of 
foreign courts) shall not violate the public policy of Japan. Accordingly, the 
public policy test will also be made from the procedural point of view. Not 
only judgments with unacceptable contents, but also judgments rendered on the 
basis of a very unfair procedure, cannot be recognized. The prevailing view 
under the old CCP adhered to this standpoint too and the Supreme Court 
endorsed it in an obiter dictum. 132 It is now the official position of the Japanese 
law. Lack of judicial independence, lack of equal opportunity for both parties 
to examine the evidence, or lack of opportunity for those supervising against 
the forging of evidence are often mentioned as examples of procedures violat-
ing Japanese public policy.133 The qualification 'violating public policy' can 
only be made on a case-by-case basis, since the ultimate criterion of fairness of 
the procedure cannot be defined in an abstract manner. 134 
One of the most debated issues concerning public policy is the recognition 
of American so-called 'punitive damages judgments'. These judgments tend to 
order the defendant to pay enormous amounts of money. The purpose of these 
judgments, i.e. deterrence of unlawful acts or punishing the defendant, is 
foreign to Japanese civil procedure. The matter can be sub-divided into two 
issues: 
(I) Since recognition of foreign judgments deals exclusively with 'civil' judg-
ments,135 it should be asked whether a judgment awarding punitive damages 
can be classified as a 'civil' judgment? If the answer to this question is in the 
negative, the recognition of punitive damages judgments is generally ex-
cluded. 136 
requirement for the recognition of foreign judgments], in AOYAMA and SAWAKI, op.cit. n. 84 p. 
237. 
131 For a problematic case in this sense, see the judgment referred to in n. 139. 
132 Supreme Court 7 June 1983, 37 Minshu No.5 p. 611. 
133 Yokohama District Court 24 March 1989, Hanrei Taimuzu No. 703 p.268. In its decision of 22 
December 1977, the Osaka District Court, Hanrei Taimuzu, No. 361 p. 127, refused to recognize a 
judgment rendered in the State of Washington, USA. The reasoning was that an existing judgment 
in Japan had led to a different result and that recognition would violate Art. 200(2) of the old CCP. 
The majority of scholars endorse this position. See TAKAKUWA, loe.cit. n.130. 
134 T AKAKUW A, ibid. Notice of litigation or guarantee of defence possibilities is covered by Art. 
118(2). 
135 Neither Art. 200 old CCP nor Art. 118 new CCP explicitly mentions the 'civil' nature of foreign 
judgements as a requirement for their recognition. This is, however, the general understanding. 
136 DOGAUCHI MASATO, Hanreijiho No.1388 p.202; HAYAKAWA YOSHIHISA, 'Chobatsuteki 
Songaibaisho Hanketsu no Shonin Shikko' [The recognition and execution of punitive damage 
judgments], Hongo Hosei Kiyo [Journal of Law and Politics of Tokyo University Graduate 
Students] No.l(1993) 257; ISHIGURO KAZUNORI, 'America no Chobatsuteki Songaibaisho to 
'Kokkyo' [US punitive damages and the border], Boeki to Kanzei [Trade and Tax] (October 1994) 
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(2) Should the judgment be classified as 'civil', would recognition violate 
Japanese public policy? If it does, should the recognition of the whole judgment 
be refused137 or could part of the judgment be recognized?138 In the latter case, 
the question is how to determine the part of the judgment (especially the puni-
tive damages awarding part) which could be recognized, since re-examination 
of the case is impossible due to the prohibition of revision au fond. The Tokyo 
District Court refused recognition of the punitive damages award part of a 
Californian judgment (compensatory damages were fixed at US$ 420,000 and 
punitive damages at US$ 120,000).139 The judgment has been criticized for 
actually performing revision au fond. 140 It is certainly not easy to draw a clear 
border line between the public policy test and revision au fond, if partial recog-
nition is to be granted. Therefore, the opinion is held that beyond a certain 
level acceptable in Japan, the award should be assumed to be foreign to Japa-
nese law. Consequently, the victorious party should bear the burden of proof 
that this latter part is also acceptable in Japan. 141 During appeal from the judg-
ment of the Tokyo District Court, the High Court said that it was doubtful that 
the judgment could be the object of recognition due to the criminal law nature 
of the punitive damages award. Even if it could, the recognition and execution 
would violate public policy. 142 
5.1.4. Reciprocity 
According to an old judgment,143 reciprocity exists between Japan and a 
foreign state when the foreign state recognizes Japanese judgments under the 
same requirements as those of the Japanese (old) CCP or under more generous 
requirements. This interpretation was criticized for the following reasons. First, 
a strict application would disturb mutual recognition rather than achieve a more 
generous attitude of both states to each other. Second, it is sometimes difficult 
to determine which state is more generous in recognizing foreign judgments, 
since requirements for recognition differ in each country. Thirdly, if a foreign 
judgment cannot be recognized due to the requirement of reciprocity, the price 
40. 
137 FUJITA YASUHIRO, 'Shogai Minjijiken no Jitsumu to Mondaiten' [Practice and issues in 
international civil cases], 31 Jiyu to Seigi [Liberty and Justice] No.ll (1980) 18. 
138 KONO TOSHIYUKI, 'Amerika no Chobatsuteki Baisho Hanketsu to Kokusai Minjisoshoho jo no 
jakkan no Mondai nitsuite' [US punitive damages judgment and several issues of international civil 
procedure], 58 Hosei Kenkyu [Journal of Law and Politics, Kyushu University] NO.4 (1991) 867; 
KOBAYASHI HIDEYUKI, 'Chobatsuteki Songaibaisho to Gaikoku Hanketsu Shonin' [Punitive 
damages and the recognition of foreign judgments], NBL No. 473 (1991) 6; see also No. 477 p. 20. 
139 Decision of 18 February 1991, Hanreijiho No. 1376 p.79. (English translation in 35 JAIL (1992) 
177). 
140 ISHIGURO KAZUNORI, in Shiho Hanrei Rimokusu [Remarks on Civil Law Judgments] No.4 
(1992) 167. 
141 KONO, loc.cit. n.138. 
142 Tokyo High Court 28 June 1993, Hanreijiho No.1471 p.89 (English translation in 37 JAIL 
(1994) 155). 
143 Great Court of Cassation 5 December 1933, Horitsushinbun No.3670 p.15. 
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must be paid by the persons who try to materialize their rights, and this would 
be quite unfair. As a result, the Supreme Court modified its old opinion and 
now holds that, if a foreign state recognizes a similar type of Japanese judg-
ment under conditions not essentially different from the requirements of Article 
200 (of the old) CCP, reciprocity is deemed to exist between the two coun-
tries. l44 Under these criteria, the judgment of a foreign state which takes a 
more rigorous attitude than Japan, can be recognized. In fact, reciprocity has 
been generously recognized by lower courts145 and is generally endorsed by 
scholars. 146 According to some, even this liberal interpretation of reciprocity is 
not generous enough to enhance the recognition of foreign judgments and, 
consequently, the requirement should be abolished. 147 However, Article 118 of 
the new CCP has retained the requirement. Therefore the existing discussion 
and case law remains relevant. 
5.1.5. Other requirements 
5. 1.5. 1. Recognition of constitutive judgments 
Foreign judgments must be recognized to the extent that under the Civil 
Execution Law recognition is required for the purpose of execution. Some 
kinds of judgments do not need execution, however, for example divorce 
judgments. According to one opinion, Article 200 of the old CCP (Art. 118 
new CCP) should apply mutatis mutandis and the requirement of reciprocity 
should be ignored in these cases. Instead, there should be a requirement that 
the foreign court has applied the same law as that referred to as the applicable 
law by Japanese private international law. 148 This opinion has the following 
background: a judgment acquires its constitutive effect from substantive law. In 
case of judgments of Japanese courts in transboundary cases, this constitutive 
effect is derived from the foreign applicable law referred to by Japanese private 
intemationallaw. If the judgment is rendered by a foreign court and intended to 
144 Supreme Court 7 June 1983, 37 Minshu No.5 p.611 (English translation in 27 JAIL (1984) 119). 
Before this judgment, reciprocity was denied in two cases: Tokyo District Court 20 July 1960, 11 
Kaminshu No.7 p.522 (Belgium), and Fukuoka District Court 25 March 1982, 31 JeA Journal No. 
12 p.2 (Hong Kong). 
145 Nagoya District Court 6 February 1987, Hanreijiho No. 1236 p. 113 (Germany) (English 
translation: 33 JAIL (1990) 189); Tokyo District Court 16 December 1991, Hanrei Taimuzu No. 
794 p. 246 (State of Nevada); Tokyo District Court 30 January 1992, Hanrei Taimuzu No. 789 p. 
259 (State of Texas); Kobe District Court 22 September 1993, Hanrei Taimuzu No. 826 p. 206 
(Hong Kong); Tokyo District Court 31 January 1994, Hanrei Taimuzu No. 837 p. 300 (United 
Kingdom). 
146 KONO TOSHIYUKI, 'Shoninyoken toshiteno Sogo no Hosho' [Reciprocity as a requirement of the 
recognition of foreign judgments], in SAWAKI and AKIBA op.cit. n. 71 p. 239. 
147 SAKURADA YOSHIAKI, in Hanrei/ryoron No. 288 p. 32. Against this opinion: TAKAKUWA 
AKIRA, in 90 Minshoho Zasshi [Journal of Civil and Commercial Law] (no. 1) lOI. 
148 EGAWA HIDEFUMI, 'Gaikoku Hanketsu no Shonin', 50 Hogaku Kyokai Zasshi [Journal of the 
Jurisprudence Association, University of Tokyo] (no. 11) 2054. See also: Tokyo District Court 15 
March 1961, 12 Kaminshu No.3 p. 486. 
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be recognized in Japan, it should fulfil the same condition, i.e. having applied 
the same law as the Japanese court would apply (the so-called applicable law 
requirement) . 
Another school of thought applies Article 200 of the old CCP (Art. 118 new 
CCP) mutatis mutandis without the applicable law require-ment,149 i.e. items 1, 
2 and 3 of the Article. 
The prevailing opinion applies Article 200 of the old CCP (Art. 118 new 
CCP) in its entirety, including the reciprocity requirement but without the 
applicable law requirement. 150 As far as the requirement of reciprocity is 
interpreted generously, as stated above, it does not make sense to ignore this 
requirement. Therefore, under the new CCP the prevailing opinion should also 
be followed. 
5.1.5.2. Final judgments 
Article 200 of the old CCP (Art. 118 new CCP) refers to 'final' judgments. 
'Final' means the state of judgment where neither annulment nor alteration is 
allowed any more. Therefore, among other things, recognition of arrest, being 
a provisional measure, is not allowed under the current system. 
5.1.5.3. Foreign courts 
The foreign judgment must have been rendered by a court or institution of 
the foreign state vested with judicial power. It may be an administrative organ, 
as long as it possesses judicial power. Settlement made in court does not fulfil 
this requirement, since it is based on agreement between the parties and not the 
result of the exercise of judicial power. 
5.2. Effects of the recognition of foreign judgments 
The recognition of a foreign judgment, according to prevailing opllllon, 
extends the effects conferred to the judgment by the law of the foreign state. 151 
This view is closely connected with the notion of automatic recognition. IS2 
When the foreign judgment fulfils the requirements of Article 200 (old, now 
118 new) of the CCP, it is deemed to be "automatically" recognized and 
accordingly its effects extend to the Japanese legal order. There is a possibility, 
however, of limiting these effects as far as they are very different from those 
under Japanese law. For example, the range of res judicata may be vastly 
different in the two legal systems. Therefore another opinion, according to 
149 TAMAlKE YOSHIO, Kokusaishiho Kogi [Lectures of Private International Law] (1995) 454. See 
also Yokohama District Court 7 September 1971, Hanreijiho No. 665 p. 75. 
150 YAMADA RVOICHI, Kokusaishiho [Private International Law] (1992) 406. See also Tokyo 
District Court 17 December 1971, Hanreijiho No. 665 p. 72. 
151 See WATANABE, in KIDANA et aI., op.cit. n. 60 p. 281. 
152 See the introductory part on recognition of foreign judgments in this paper. 
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which recognition implies the conferment of effects to the judgment by Japa-
nese law, is also persuasive. This has not yet been sufficiently discussed so far 
and will be an important future issue. 
5.3. Procedure of exequatur 
The examination of whether a foreign judgment fulfils the requirements of 
Article 200 (old, now 118 new) of the CCP, is part of the exequatur procedure. 
From a theoretical point of view the exequatur procedure originates in a claim 
for a constitutive judgment granting executive effects to the foreign judgment. 
A normal hearing and the regular evidence examination procedure take place. 
No examination is, however, undertaken as to the question of whether the 
foreign judgment was an appropriate solution of the concrete case (prohibition 
of revision au fond). When the situation of the case has changed after the 
judgment,153 the defendant can assert such changes by way of an objection 
against the execution. 154 
6. ARBITRATION 
6.1. Law applicable to international arbitration 
According to the majority of Japanese court decisions on the subject, an 
arbitral agreement is a kind of contract in the field of civil law.I55 Therefore, 
the applicable law is to be determined by the Horei,156 unless international 
conventions apply. 157 
When the validity of an arbitral agreement is in question in the context of 
the recognition of a foreign arbitral award, the law applicable to the question of 
validity is determined by Article 5(1)(a) of the 1958 New York Convention on 
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. If the question 
arises in different contexts, Article 7 of the Horei determines the applicable law 
by leaving the choice to the parties. In the absence of a choice, the intention of 
the parties should be determined. A recent judgment held that, when the parties 
chose the place of arbitration, they must have had the intention to apply the law 
of that place. 158 This view fmds support in the literature. 159 The law applicable 
153 E.g. when partial payment has been made. 
154 Tokyo District Court 13 October 1965, 16 Kaminshu No. 10 p. 1560. 
155 Supreme Court 15 July 1975, 29 Minshu No. 6 p. 106; Tokyo High Court 30 May 1994, 
Hanreijiho No. 1499 p. 68. 
156 For an overview of the Japanese conflict of laws, see FUJITA YASUHIRO, 'Transnational 
litigation - conflict of laws', in KITAGAWA (ed.), op.cit. n. 117 Ch. 5. 
157 International conventions are usually applicable when issues of applicable law are raised in the 
context of recognition of foreign arbitral awards. 
158 Tokyo High Court 30 May 1994, Hanreijiho No. 1499 p. 68. 
159 See e.g. KOJIMA TAKESHI and TAKAKUWA AKlRA (eds.), Chukai Chusaiho [Commentary of the 
Arbitration Law] (1988) 219. 
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to the question of the validity of an arbitral agreement is also applicable to the 
question of the effects of the agreement. 160 
The applicable law in procedural matters in the field of arbitration is, 
according to the leading opinion, the law chosen by the parties, and, in the 
absence of a choice, the law of the place of arbitration. 161 The majority of the 
available court decisions, however, apply the lex fori to the procedural effects, 
such as the litigation-excluding effect. 162 This is also the prevailing view among 
scholars. 163 
6.2. Recognition of foreign arbitration 
Japan is a party to multilateral and bilateral treaties on the recognition of 
foreign arbitral awards,164 but it has not enacted any municipal law on the 
implementation of these treaties. The treaties usually specify the kinds of 
arbitration awards covered by them and the recognition and enforcement of 
most international arbitration awards are dealt with on the basis of these trea-
ties. 165 When both the New York Convention and a bilateral treaty are applica-
ble to the same case, the bilateral treaty applies if it is more generous than the 
New York Convention. 166 In fact, many of the Japanese bilateral treaties are 
considered to be more generous than the New York Convention. 167 
When there is no treaty applicable, the Japanese lex fori should be applied. 
However, Articles 801 and 802 of the old CCP168 are generally considered to 
be applicable only to domestic arbitration. 169 There are two opinions on this 
issue. According to the first one, there are some lacunae in the Japanese law 
160 See Supreme Court, supra n. 155. 
161 KOJIMA and Takakuwa, op.cit. n.159, p. 226; KOYAMA NOBORU, Chusaiho [Arbitration Law] 
(new ed., 1983) 182 and 248. See also Art. 5(1)(d) of the New York Convention. 
162 Tokyo District Court 10 April 1953, 4 Kaminshu No. 4 p. 502; Tokyo District Court 25 
December 1973, Hanrei Taimuzu No. 308 p. 230. Cf. Tokyo High Court supra n. 158. 
163 Op.cit. n. 159 p. 223. 
164 The most important treaty is the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. Japan has concluded 14 bilateral treaties concerning the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards (with the USA, the Soviet Union, Poland, 
Yugoslavia, the Czech Republic, Pakistan, Peru, Argentina, the UK, El Salvador, Rumania, 
Bulgaria, China and Hungary). 
165 KOBAYASHI, loc.cit. n. 138 p. 256. 
166 New York Convention Art.7(1). 
167 KOBAYASHI, loc.cit. n. 138 p. 244. 
168 Art.801 deals with the reasons for annulment of arbitral awards. Art.802 lays down the 
requirement of an exequatur judgment for the execution of arbitral awards, and proscribes 
exequatur in case of existence of one of the reasons for annulment. As a result of the amendment of 
the CCP, these provisions will be transferred to the sections on public protest procedure (German: 
Aufgebotverfahren) and arbitration procedure, without substantial change. 
169 NAKATA JUNICHI, Sosho oyabi Chusai no Hari [Legal Theory of Litigation and Arbitration] 
(1937) 413; KOBAYASHI, op.cit. n.40 p.2IO. Cf. Tokyo District Court 19 June 1995, Hanrei 
Taimuzu No. 919 p. 252. 
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which should be filled by Jori. 170 The other view says that Articles 801 and 802 
of the old CCP should be applied also to international arbitral awards171 or 
should be applied mutatis mutandis. 172 In the present situation, where most 
countries are party to treaties governing the matter, this debate has, however, 
very little practical meaning. Also the judgments which by way of formal 
reasoning applied Articles 801 and 802 of the old CCP mutatis mutandis took 
the requirements of the relevant treaties into consideration. 173 
Since there is no special procedure for the recognition of foreign arbitral 
awards, the procedure for domestic arbitration should be used: an application 
should be submitted seeking an enforcement judgment for the foreign arbitral 
award. When the enforcement judgment is rendered and becomes final, en-
forcement can take place. Dismissal of the claim for reasons of existing 
grounds for annulment (cf. Arts. 801 and 802 of the old CCP) does not imply 
the annulment of the award, since annulment requires a separate procedure. 
The Legal System Council, an advisory organ for the Minister of Justice, is 
at present preparing a draft in the field of arbitration. It is hoped that provisions 
on international arbitration will be included in the draft. 
170 NAKATA, ibid., p. 423. As to the requirements for fori: the arbitration award must (1) be valid 
according to the law applicable to the arbitration contract and (2) not violate Japanese public policy; 
(3) ex parte hearing must have been held and the parties must have been appropriately represented 
in the procedure. 
171 AGAWA KIYOMICHI, 'Gaikoku Chusai Randan no Shonin oyobi Shikko nitsuite' [The re-
cognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards], lurisuto No.232 p.42; YAMAMOTO, loc.cit. 
n. 21 p. 473. 
172 KOBAYASHI, in op.cit. n. 159 p. 243. 
173 Tokyo District Court 20 August 1959, 10 Kaminshu No.8 p. 1711 (1927 Geneva Convention); 
Tokyo District Court 23 October 1959, 10 Kaminshu No. 10 p. 2232 (Japan-US Treaty of Friend-
ship, Commerce and Navigation); Osaka District Court 27 November 1961, 6 Kaijihanrei No.5 p. 
118 (idem); Nagoya District Court, \Chinomiya Branch 26 February 1987, Hanreijiho No. 1232 p. 
138 (idem); Osaka District Court 22 April 1983, Hanreijiho No. 1090 p. 146 (New York Conven-
tion). 
THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL CIVIL PROCEDURE IN 
CHINA 
Li Shuangyuan' and Lii Guoming" 
INTRODUCTION 
Although differing in regard to the relationship between private international 
law and the law of international civil procedure,l almost all Chinese legal 
scholars defme the latter as a body of rules binding the courts and the litigating 
and other parties involved when dealing with civil and commercial cases 
involving foreign elements. They hold that it is made up of three principal 
components: (a) the rules regulating the status of the litigating foreign nation-
als, foreign countries and international organizations in civil proceedings; (b) 
the rules concerning the jurisdiction of courts over international civil and 
commercial cases; (c) the rules governing the taking of evidence abroad, the 
• Professor of Law, Hunan Nonnal University and Wuhan University . 
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piece. 
1 Some Chinese scholars regard the law on international civil procedure as a separate branch of law, 
while others are of the opinion that it is just a sub-division of private international law. The 
following definitions are from two scholars who take contrasting attitudes: 
(1) "International civil procedure law and private international law are closely connected, but they 
are two branches of law of different nature. Private international law, which is substantive law, 
governs the substantive rights and obligations of the parties in international civil and commercial 
legal relationships, whereas the law on international civil procedure is procedural law which 
detennines the procedural rights and obligations of parties in international civil litigation. The 
subjects of private international law relationships in most cases are two parties, while in an 
international civil procedure there is always a third party involved, i.e. the court or another judicial 
organ with jurisdiction to adjudicate." XIE SHISONG, 'Guoji Minshi Susongfa Shi Yige Duli de 
Falii Bumen' [The science of the law on international civil procedure as an independent legal 
discipline], lAw Review (1996, no. 5) 38-42. 
(2) "Traditional private international law also covers international civil procedure. In view of the 
close connection between private international law and international civil procedure law - i.e. the 
rules of civil procedure applicable to cases with foreign elements - it is suitable to include the latter 
into, and regard it as a component of, private international law . . . until it constitutes an 
independent branch of law." Yu XIANYU, Jianmin Guoji Sifaxue [A concise treatise on the science 
of private international law] (Beijing; 1986) 362. 
Discussions on the relationship between international civil procedure law and private 
international law can also be found in other books and articles, such as LI SHUANGYUAN, Guoji 
Sifa [Private International Law] (Wuhan; 1987) 29-30; LIU ZHENJIANG, ZHANG ZHONGBO and 
YUAN CHENDI (eds), Guoji Sifa Jioochen [A Course of Private International Law] (Lanzou; 1988) 
8; QIAN HUA (ed.), Guoji Sifa [Private International Law] (Beijing, 1992) 441-442. 
Asian Yearbook of IntemationallAw, Volume 6 (Ko Swan Sik et al., eds. 
@ Kluwer Law International; printed inthe Netherlands), pp. 135-167 
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proof of foreign laws, the preservation of property rights, the service abroad of 
judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil and commercial matters, and the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judicial decisions and arbitral awards. 2 
Since the adoption of the policy of opening to the outside world in 1978, the 
Chinese legislature, the people's courts (especially the Supreme People's 
Court), the Chinese legal profession and legal scholars have paid increasing 
attention to the law of international civil procedure. In less than ten years, two 
statutes on the law of civil procedure have been promulgated, both of which 
include a part entitled "Special Provisions on Civil Procedure in Cases Involv-
ing Foreign Elements". 3 Since the 1980s, and especially in recent years, Chi-
nese scholars have published numerous articles and several monographs on 
international civil procedure law. 4 This has pushed scholarship in the field of 
the Chinese law on international civil procedure to a new stage and has been of 
great help to the Chinese legislature and Chinese legal practice. A brief intro-
duction to the principles and new developments of international civil procedure 
law in China will be provided below. 
2 See HAN DEPEI (ed.), Guoji Sifa [Private International Law] (Wuhan; 1983) 418; XIE SHISONG, 
loc.cit. n. 1 p. 38. A newly published law textbook written by LI HAOPEI lists the following six 
topics within the law on international civil procedure: immunities from civil and commercial 
adjudication; adjudication jurisdiction over international civil and commercial cases; the legal status 
of foreigners in the law of international civil procedure; recognition and execution of foreign civil 
and commercial judgements; international civil and commercial judicial assistance; international 
civil and commercial arbitration. LI HAOPEI, Guoji Minshi Chengxufa Gailun [An Introduction to 
the Law of International Civil Procedure] (Beijing, 1996) 5. 
3 The two statutes are the Provisional Law of Civil Procedure of the PRC, adopted by the 22nd 
session of the Standing Committee of the Fifth National Congress on 8 March 1982 and abrogated 
on 9 April 1991, and the Law of Civil Procedure of the PRC (hereinafter CPL) which was both 
adopted and entered into force on 9 April 1991. 
4 Almost all books on private international law published in China contain a part on international 
civil procedure. See e.g., Y AO ZHUANG and REN JISHEN, Guoji Sifa Jiehu [Basic knowledge of 
private international law] (Beijing, 1981) 209; HAN DEPEI, op.cit. n. 2, p. 373; LI SHUANGYUAN 
(ed.), Guoji Sifa [Private International Law] (Beijing, 1991) 437. At the end of 1996 there were six 
monographs on the law on international civil procedure: LIU ZHENJIANG, Guoji Minshi Susongfa 
Yuanli [The Basic Principles of International Civil Procedure Law] (Beijing, 1985); LI 
SHUANGYUAn and XIE SHISONG, Guoji Minshi Susongfa Gailun [An Introduction to International 
Civil Procedure Law] (Wuhan, 1990); LI YUQUAN (ed.), Guoji Minshi Susong He Guoji Sangshi 
7}zongeai [International Civil Procedure and International Commercial Arbitration] (Wuhan, 1994); 
lIN PENGNIAN, Guoji Minshi Chengxufa [International Civil Procedure Law] (Hangzhou, 1995); 
XIE SHISONG, Guoji Shangshi 7Jzongeai He Guoji Minshi Susongfa [International Commercial 
Arbitration and International Civil Procedure Law] (Guangzhou, 1995); LI HAOPEI, op.cit. n. 2. 
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1. GENERAL CONTEXT 
1.1. The judicial system 
1.1.1. Structure 
As a unitary state, China has one general judicial system. All judicial organs 
apply uniform substantive and procedural laws throughout the country, unless 
the law provides otherwise.5 The organization of the judicial system of the 
People's Republic of China (PRC) is laid down in the Law on the Organization 
of the People's Courts of the PRC, which was adopted at the second session of 
the Fifth National People's Congress (NPC) on 1 July 1979, and amended at 
the second session of the Sixth NPC on 2 September 1983.6 Article 2(1) of the 
law provides that "the judicial authority of the PRC is exercised by the follow-
ing people's courts: (a) local people's courts at various levels; (b) military 
courts and other special people's courts; (c) the Supreme People's Court". 
Paragraph 2 of the same sub-divides the local people's courts according to 
level, into 'basic people's courts', 'intermediate people's courts', and 'higher 
people's courts' . 
Basic people's courts are county people's courts and municipal people's 
courts, people's courts of autonomous counties, and people's courts of munici-
pal districts. 7 Intermediate people's courts are those established in prefectures 
of a province or an autonomous region and in municipalities which fall directly 
under the central government, namely Beijing, Shanghai and Tianjin. There are 
also intermediate people's courts of municipalities which come directly under 
the jurisdiction of a province or an autonomous region and of autonomous 
prefectures. 8 Higher people's courts include those of provinces, autonomous 
regions, and municipalities which fall directly under the central government. 9 
The Supreme People's Court, located in Beijing, is the highest judicial organ of 
the PRC. lO It supervises the administration of justice by local people's courts at 
various levels and by special people's courtsY It also renders interpretations in 
case of questions concerning specific applications of laws and decrees in judi-
cial proceedings. 12 
5 Hongkong and Macao will be two exceptions to China's general judicial system. According to the 
Sino-British Joint Declaration on the question of Hongkong and the Sino-Portuguese Joint 
Declaration on the question of Macao, the two regions will keep their judicial systems unchanged 
for at least fifty years after 1997 and 1999 respectively. 
6 Chinese text in Fagui Huibian [Collection of Laws] 47-51; English translation in Statutes and 
Regulations, code No. 790705.1.1. 
7 Law on the Organization of the People's Courts of the PRC, Art. 18. 
B Ibid., Art. 23. 
9 Ibid., Art. 26. 
10 Ibid., Art. 30(1). 
II Ibid., Art. 30(2). 
12 Ibid., Art. 33. 
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In addition to military courts, which are provided for in Article 2(2) of the 
Law on the Organization of the People's Courts, there are some other special 
people's courts which have jurisdiction in particular fields. These include, for 
instance, railway courts and maritime courts. The position of the special peo-
ple's courts runs parallel with that of intermediate people's courts. 
Under the Law of Civil Procedure (CPL), a collegiate court is the general 
rule and single-judge courts are the exception. Article 40 of the CPL provides 
that the people's court of first instance shall try civil cases by a collegiate panel 
composed of judges with or without judicial assessors. The collegiate panel 
must have an odd number of members. 13 Single-judge courts operate only in 
civil cases under a summary procedure. 14 
In civil cases, adjudication by the people's courts takes place in two in-
stances. IS A party has the right to file an appeal against a judgment of first 
instance with the people's court at the next higher level. The judgment of the 
latter people's court shall then be fmal. The CPL, however, also lists some 
special cases where no appeal to a higher court is allowed and where the 
judgment of first instance is fmal. 16 These comprise the following four catego-
ries: cases concerning the qualification of voters; cases concerning a declara-
tion of a person as missing or dead; cases on the ad judgment of the legal 
incapacity or the restricted legal capacity of persons; and cases on the determi-
nation of property as being without an owner. 
1.1.2. Competent courts dealing with civil litigation involving foreign elements 
As there are no special courts for transboundary civil matters in China, 
every people's court is competent to hear cases in international civil litigation. 
Besides, the CPL does not distinguish between cases involving foreign ele-
ments and those without such elements as far as jurisdiction is concerned. 
Therefore, civil cases involving foreign elements may, in first instance, fall 
under the jurisdiction of the people's courts of different levels, including the 
basic people's courts. 
1.1.3. The scheme of civil procedure 
In China, parties may choose among three methods to resolve their dis-
putes, namely, mediation, arbitration and litigation. 17 The third method is the 
most effective one. Where the parties are unwilling to submit their dispute to 
mediation, or have not included an arbitration clause in their contract, or have 
not made an arbitration agreement upon the emergence of the dispute, they can 
13 CPL, Art. 40(1). 
14 Ibid., Art. 40(2). 
15 Ibid., Art. 10. 
16 Ibid., Ch. 15 (Arts. 160-176). 
17 See CAl FABANG, Minshi Susongfa [Civil Procedure Law] (Beijing, 1992) 1-2. 
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bring a lawsuit to a people's court. Provided the lawsuit fulfils the requirements 
stipulated by law, the court entertains the case and renders a judgment based on 
the facts and the law. This stage is called the procedure of first instance, which 
is roughly divided into the following stages: bringing a lawsuit and entertaining 
a case, preparations for trial, trial in court, suspension and termination of 
litigation, judgment and orders. 18 In case of an appeal with the people's court at 
the next higher level, the people's court of second instance may, in the form of 
a judgment, reject the appeal or render its own decision (thereby replacing the 
judgment of first instance with one of its own), or remand the case to the 
original people's court for retrial. The judgment of a people's court that has 
become final is to be enforced either by the parties themselves or by an execu-
tion authority. 
In addition to the procedures of first and second instance, the CPL provides 
for the procedure of 'trial supervision' which offers the possibility of a retrial 
in case of a judgment which is legally effective but in which definite errors 
have been found. 
In trying civil cases the courts are under strict time limits which are clearly 
stipulated in the CPL. In procedures of first instance the courts are prescribed 
to conclude the proceedings of ordinary cases (as distinguished from simple 
cases) within six months after the entry of the case in the court's docket. Where 
lengthening of the period is necessary because of special circumstances, a 
six-month extension may be allowed subject to the approval of the president of 
the COurt. 19 For simple cases, the time period is fixed at three months.20 In the 
procedure of second instance, the people's court shall conclude the proceedings 
within three months, with a possible extension of the period whenever necessi-
tated by special circumstances subject to approval by the president of the 
court.21 The time period for special cases22 is similar to that of simple cases of 
first instance. 
1.1.4. Lexfori 
Article 4 of the CPL states that "whoever engages in civil litigation within 
the territory of the People's Republic of China must abide by this law". Conse-
quently, the Chinese people's courts will exclusively follow the procedure as 
laid down by Chinese procedure law when dealing with both domestic civil 
actions and those involving foreign elements. The conclusion can thus be 
drawn that China, like many other countries, adheres to the principle of lex fori 
in matters of procedural law. Many Chinese scholars view the application of 
the lex fori as based on the principle of sovereignty. 
18 CPL, Ch. 12. 
19 CPL, Art. 135. 
20 CPL, Art. 146. 
21 CPL, Art. 159. 
22 See supra 1.1.1. 
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1.2. The sources 
Unlike the practice in most common law countries, decisions of Chinese 
courts are not regarded as a source of Chinese law. 23 The sources of the Chi-
nese law on international civil procedure can be conveniently sub-divided into 
two categories: national sources containing domestic legislation and interpreta-
tion of laws, and international sources, mainly consisting of multilateral con-
ventions and bilateral agreements. 24 
1.2.1. National legislation 
There is no special statutory law on international civil procedure in China. 
The provisions on the subject are to be found scattered among the following 
various laws and regulations: 
A. The Civil Procedure Law 
This law was adopted at the fourth session of the Seventh NPC on 9 April 
1991 and became effective on the same day.25 It is composed of four Parts, 29 
Chapters and 270 Articles. Part Four ("Special Provisions on Civil Procedure 
in Actions Involving Foreign Elements", Arts. 237-269) lays down the funda-
mental provisions of the law on international civil procedure. Its main contents 
include: General Principles (Chapter 24); Jurisdiction (Chapter 25); Service 
and Time Periods (Chapter 26); Property Preservation (Chapter 27); Arbitra-
tion (Chapter 28) and Judicial Assistance (Chapter 29). 
B. Regulations on Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities 
The "Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Diplomatic Privi-
leges and Immunities" were adopted at the seventeenth session of the Standing 
Committee of the Sixth National People's Congress (NPCSC) and became 
effective as of the date of its promulgation, 5 September 1986. This law, 
consisting of 29 Articles, defmes the diplomatic privileges and immunities of 
diplomatic missions in the PRC and their members. Indeed, in essence it serves 
public international law purposes. However, it also plays an important role in 
international civil procedure as it contains rules on issues of civil procedure 
involving persons enjoying diplomatic privileges and immunities. 26 
23 Nevertheless most Chinese scholars acknowledge that the decisions of the Supreme People's 
Court play an important role in the development and improvement of the Chinese legal system. 
24 Some Chinese scholars also regard international custom to be a source of international civil 
procedure law. See Jin Pengnian, op.cit. n. 4, p. 13. 
25 CPL, Art. 270. This article simultaneously abrogated the 1982 Provisional Civil Procedure Law. 
Cf. supra, n. 3. 
26 The provisions on civil procedural issues of persons enjoying diplomatic privileges and 
immunities include Arts. 14 and 15. Art. 14(2, 3 and 4) reads: "[A diplomatic agent] shall [ ... ] 
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C. Regulations on Consular Privileges and Immunities 
This act came into force on 30 October 1990. It also contains some provi-
sions on international civil procedureY 
enjoy immunity from civil and administrative jurisdiction, except in case of: (1) an action relating 
to succession in which he is involved as a private person; (2) an action relating to any professional 
or commercial activity conducted by him in the PRC outside his official functions in violation of 
sentence three of Article 25 of this law. 
Execution shall not be enforced against a diplomatic agent with the exception of a forcible 
execution resulting from the circumstances referred to in the previous paragraphs of this Article, 
and provided that the measures of execution do not constitute any violation of his person and 
residence. 
A diplomatic agent is not obliged to give evidence as a witness. " 
Art. 15(1 and 3) provides: "The immunity from jurisdiction of diplomatic agents and of 
persons who enjoy immunity under Art. 20 may be waived through expliexpression [of such 
waiver] by the government of the sending state. 
The initiation of proceedings by a diplomatic agent or by a person who enjoys immunity from 
jurisdiction under Art. 20 shall preclude him from invoking immunity from jurisdiction with 
respect to any counter-claim which is directly connected with the claim. 
Waiver of immunity from civil or administrative jurisdiction shall not imply waiver of 
immunity with respect to execution of a judgment, for which a separate and explicit waiver shall be 
required." 
27 These provisions include: 
Art. 14: "Consular officers and members of the consular administrative and technical staff shall 
enjoy immunity from judicial and administrative jurisdiction with respect to acts performed in the 
exercise of their functions. The immunity from jurisdiction of consular officers with respect to acts 
other than those performed in the exercise of their functions, shall be handled according to bilateral 
treaties and agreements between China and the foreign state or on the basis of reciprocity. 
The immunity from judicial jurisdiction enjoyed by consular officers and members of the 
consular administrative and technical staff does not apply to civil actions involving: 
1. a contract which was not concluded expressly as an agent of the sending state; 
2. private immovable property within the territory of China other than immovable property which 
is owned in the person's capacity as an agent of the sending state and is used for the consular post; 
3. the inheritance of an estate, brought in a private capacity; or 
4. damage arising from an accident caused by a vehicle, vessel, or aircraft within the territory of 
China." 
Art. 15: "Members of a consular post may be required to act as a witness in the course of 
judicial or administrative proceedings, but are under no obligation to give evidence concerning 
matters connected with the exercise of their functions. They are entitled to decline to give evidence 
as expert witnesses with regard to the law of the sending state. 
If a consular officer declines to give evidence, no coercive measure or penalty may be applied 
to him. 
Members of the consular administrative and technical staff or of the consular service staff may 
not decline to give evidence except for matters connected with the exercise of their functions." 
Art. 16: "The sending state may expressly waive the immunity from jurisdiction enjoyed by the 
staff as provided for in these Regulations. 
The initiation of proceedings by a person who enjoys immunity from jurisdiction under these 
Regulations shall preclude him from invoking immunity with respect to any counterclaim directly 
connected with the principal claim. 
The waiver of immunity from civil or administrative jurisdiction shall not entail a waiver of 
immunity from execution of a judgment. With respect to such an execution, a separate express 
waiver by the sending state will be necessary." 
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1.2.2. Treaties 
Treaties to which China is a party are regarded as a component of Chinese 
domestic law. In case of conflict the provisions of the treaty shall prevail. 28 
Since the 1980s, China has become a party to an increasing number of treaties, 
both multilateral and bilateral ones. Some of them relate to international civil 
procedure. The multilateral treaties among them comprise the New York 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 
10 June 1958 and the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and 
Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters of 15 November 
1965. On 2 December 1986, the Standing Committee of the Sixth NPC ratified 
the New York Convention. Ratification took place with the following two 
reservations: 
(1) "The People's Republic of China will apply the Convention, only on the ba-
sis of reciprocity, to the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards made in 
the territory of another Contracting State"; and 
(2) "The People's Republic of China will apply the Convention only to differ-
ences arising out of legal relationships, whether contractual or not, which are 
considered as commercial under the national law of the People's Republic of 
China." 
The principle of reciprocity, better known in China as the principle of 'mutual 
benefit', is much emphasized by Chinese authors as being one of the funda-
mental principles of private international law. 29 It is regarded as a prerequisite 
for Chinese judicial assistance. As to the meaning of the concept 'contractual 
and non-contractual legal relationships of a commercial nature', the Supreme 
People's Court rendered a ruling specifying its scope.30 
28 Although there is no pertinent provision in the Chinese Constitution on the relation between 
Chinese domestic law and the treaties to which China is a party, provisions of this kind can be 
found in some separate laws. E.g. Art. 142(2) of the General Provisions of Civil Law (see n. 58) 
stipulates: "If any international treaty concluded or acceded to by the People's Republic of China 
contains provisions differing from those in the civil laws of the PRC, the provisions of the 
international treaty shall apply, unless the provisions are ones on which the PRC has made a 
reservation." Article 238 of the CPL reads: "If an international treaty concluded or acceded to by 
the PRC contains provisions that differ from provisions of this Law, the provisions of the 
international treaty shall apply, except those in respect to which China has made a reservation" . 
29 See HAN DEPEI, op.cit. n. 2, p. 32; Yu XIANYU, op.cit. n. 1, pp. 23-24; YAO ZHUANG and 
REN JISHENG, op.cit. n. 4 p. 19; JiN PENGNIAN, op.cit. n. 4 p. 16. 
30 In its "Circular on the Implementation of the International Convention on the Recognition and 
Implementation of Foreign Arbitration Awards" of 10 April 1987 the Supreme People's Court 
stated that the so-called contractual and non-contractual commercial legal relationships are generally 
understood to be relationships of economic rights and duties arising from contract, tort or other 
relevant legal provisions, on topics such as the purchase and sale of goods, lease of property, 
contracts on projects or processing, transfer of technology, joint-ventures, equity joint ventures, 
prospecting and extraction of natural resources, insurance, loans, labour services, agencies, 
consultation services, the carriage of passengers and goods by sea, air, rail and road, product 
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On 2 March 1991 the Standing Committee of the Seventh NPC ratified the 
Hague Service Convention of 1965. This was the first Convention concluded 
under the auspices of the Hague Conference on Private International Law that 
was ratified by the PRC after it had become a member of the Conference on 3 
July 1987. Participation in this Convention was regarded conducive to interna-
tional cooperation in the field of judicial assistance on a wider scope and, also, 
as furthering the role of China in the Hague Conference on Private Interna-
tional LaW. 31 In order to better implement the Convention in China, the Su-
preme People's Court, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of 
Justice jointly issued two circulars, entitled "Certain Procedures in the Imple-
mentation" [of the Convention] (4 March 1992) and "Enforcement Measures on 
the Implementation" [of the Hague Service Convention] (19 September 1992). 
Besides the above two conventions, China is a party to some other treaties 
containing provisions relating to international civil procedure.32 As far as 
bilateral agreements are concerned, China, up to March 1996, had signed 
nineteen agreements on judicial assistance in civil, commercial and/or criminal 
matters. 33 The majority of these agreements contain provisions on the following 
matters: fundamental principles, the scope of civil, commercial and/or criminal 
matters,34 the designation of authorities who are to carry out the assistance, the 
law applicable to the assistance, the procedures to be followed in case of 
judicial assistance and provisions governing specific issues, such as the exemp-
tion of documents from authentication, the exchange of information, the entry 
into force and the termination of the agreement. 
1.2.3. Judicial interpretations and rulings by the Supreme People's Court 
The "Resolution Providing for an Improved Interpretation of the Law", 
adopted by the NPCSC on 10 June 1981, vested the competence of judicial 
interpretation in the judicial organs, enabling the courts to elaborate on laws 
liability, environmental pollution, maritime incidents and disputes regarding ownership. However, 
they do not include disputes between foreign investors and local governments. 
31 People's Daily (Overseas Edition), 26 February 1991 p. 4. 
32 Such as the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 18 April 1961, the Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations of 24 April 1963, the International Convention on Civil Liability 
for Oil Pollution Damage of 29 November 1969, the Convention on International Civil Aviation of 
7 December 1944, etc. 
33 These countries are: France (signed 4 May 1987 and entered into force 2 Aug 1988); Poland (5 
Jun 1987 and 13 Feb 1988); Mongolia (31 Aug 1989 and 29 Oct 1990); Romania (16 Jan 1991 and 
22 Jan 1993); Russian Federation (19 Jun 1992 and 14 Nov 1993); Belarus (11 Jan 1993 and 29 
Nov 1993); Spain (2 May 1992 and 1 Jan 1994); Ukraine (31 Oct 1992 and 19 Jan 1994); Cuba (24 
Nov 1992 and 26 Mar 1994); Italy (20 May 1991 and 1 Jan 1995); Egypt (29 Jul1994 and 31 Mar 
1995); Bulgaria (2 Jun 1993 and 30 Jun 1995); Kazhakstan (14 Jan 1993 and 11 Jul 1995); Belgium 
(signed 20 Nov 1987); Thailand (signed 16 Mar 1994); Turkey (28 Sep 1992 and 26 Oct 1995); 
Greece (signed 17 Oct 1994); Cyprus (25 Apr 1995 and 11 Jan 1996); Hungary (signed 9 Oct 
1995). 
34 Most of the agreements cover civil and commercial matters. Only a few of them relate to civil, 
commercial as well as criminal matters. 
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while applying the law in specific cases. The Supreme People's Court has 
issued many interpretations and rulings concerning laws and treaties on various 
issues of international civil procedure. These interpretations and rulings are 
also a source of the Chinese law on international civil procedure. 
A striking example of judicial interpretation by the Supreme People's Court 
are the "Opinions on Certain Matters Relating to the Implementation of the 
Civil Procedure Law", issued on 14 July 1992 and including 18 Parts and 320 
Articles. Part 18 (Arts. 304-320) deals with questions concerning civil cases 
involving foreign elements. Most of the articles specify the contents of related 
articles of the CPL, with only a few of them touching on new issues not cov-
ered by the CPL. 35 
In connection with the establishment of maritime courts,36 the Supreme 
People's Court in 1989 issued the "Stipulations of the Supreme People's Court 
Regarding the Acceptance of Cases by Maritime Courts". These Stipulations 
entered into force on 13 May 1989 and listed forty-two categories of maritime 
cases that were determined to fall under the jurisdiction of the maritime courts. 
They concerned maritime torts, maritime contracts, maritime commercial 
matters including general average, execution and preservation in regard to 
ships. 
On 31 January 1986, the Supreme People's Court issued "Specific provi-
sions on jurisdiction of maritime litigation involving foreign elements", which 
are regarded as the most comprehensive regulation specifically dealing with the 
jurisdiction of Chinese courts over cases involving foreign elements. These 
provisions consist of seventeen Articles and establish two or more connecting 
factors for each of the sixteen kinds of maritime legal actions in regard to 
which the maritime courts have jurisdiction. Article 17 further explicitly pre-
scribes that the maritime courts may exercise jurisdiction over maritime law-
suits involving the following foreign elements: 
(a) the defendant has his domicile, habitual residence, main business office, or 
permanent agency within Chinese territory; 
(b) a Chinese maritime court has - for the purpose of preserving rights of a 
maritime nature - seized a foreign vessel at the request of the alleged holder of 
the right, or a party has provided a guarantee in China; 
(c) the foreign defendant has property in China which could be seized; 
(d) the parties have agreed to submit the dispute before a Chinese court. 
Since the 1980s, the Supreme People's Court has also issued numerous 
replies, notices and letters, some of which are concerned with questions of 
35 E.g., Art. 310 states that the People's Court may make a written judgment upon the parties' 
request after having reached a settlement by conciliation (i.e. settlement on the basis of mediation). 
36 In accordance with the "Decision concerning the establishment of maritime courts in China's 
coastal harbour cities" (adopted by the Sixth NPC on 14 November 1984) and the "Decision 
concerning the establishment of maritime courts" (issued by the Supreme People's Court on 28 
Nov. 1984), China has set up nine maritime courts in the following harbour cities: Guangzhou, 
Shanghai, Wuhan, Qingdao, Tianjin, DaHan, Haikou, Xiamen and Ningbo. 
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international civil procedure.37 Chinese scholars differ in their views regarding 
the nature of these replies, notices and letters. Some treat them as sources of 
law, others hold the opposite view. Finally, the Supreme People's Court has 
ruled on the implementation of certain conventions on international civil proce-
dure to which the PRC is a party. 38 
37 The replies, notices and letters made or issued by the Supreme People's Court (SPC) comprise: 
(1) Circular of the SPC on the use of answer-back instruments for mutually entrusting the service of 
legal documents between China and Japan; (2) Official reply of the SPC according to which in case 
of a defendant resident abroad who was served a petition by public notice and who failed to enter an 
appearance, the judgment must be communicated by public notice; (3) Letter of the SPC on the 
question as to whether a request from a Chinese-American to file an appeal with Chinese courts can 
be granted; (4) Official reply of the SPC concerning litigation documents involving foreigners and 
the service of these documents after the case has been put on record; (5) Official reply of the SPC 
as to whether a reconciliation agreement can be formulated and issued to Japanese who had stayed 
in China as war orphans, later returned to their homeland, subsequently were sued for divorce by 
their spouses in China and whose case was settled through mediation by Chinese courts; (6) Letter 
of the SPC on the question whether, pursuant to Chinese law, the validity of a divorce between 
Chinese citizens who live abroad and who concluded a separation agreement in accordance with the 
laws of the country where they reside, can be recognized; (7) Official reply of the SPC as to 
whether staff members of a foreign embassy in China may act in their official capacity in briefing 
Chinese lawYers to act on behalf of their countrymen in civil lawsuits; (8) Official reply of the SPC 
as to whether foreign parties to a case before a Chinese court can be permitted to entrust foreigners 
residing in China or staff members of their country's embassy in China to act as their agents; (9) 
Official reply of the SPC on how to determine the statute of limitations for appeal in civil cases 
involving foreign interests in which one party lives in China and the other lives abroad; (10) 
Official reply of the SPC concerning the divorce case involving YIE LILI and LIANG WENRUI, a 
Chinese couple with Venezuelan citizenship; (11) Official reply of the SPC as to whether Chinese 
courts are entitled to take cognizance of cases involving a Chinese citizen who lives abroad and who 
has lodged appeals both with Chinese and foreign courts; (12) Official reply of the SPC on the 
handling of cases involving divorce decrees sent to Chinese people's courts directly by American 
courts and not through diplomatic channels; (13) Specific provisions of the SPC on the jurisdiction 
over maritime cases involving foreign interests; (14) Circular of the SPC, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, and the Ministry of Justice on certain matters concerning Chinese and foreign courts 
entrusting each other with service of legal documents through diplomatic channels; (15) Regulations 
of the SPC on procedures for Chinese citizens in applying for recognition of divorce judgments 
rendered by foreign courts. The instruments issued by the SPC are published in Zlwnghua Renmin 
Gongheguo Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Gongbao [Gazette of the SPC of the PRC]. 
38 When a treaty in which China participates as a party has come into force, the Chinese 
government or the SPC in most cases would issue a notice or some other instrument on the 
implementation of the treaty in China. With regard to international civil procedure, the following 
notices should be heeded: (1) Notice of the SPC on the implementation of Sino-foreign judicial 
assistance agreements; (2) Notice of the SPC, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of 
Justice on certain procedures in the implementation of the Convention on the Service Abroad of 
Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil and Commercial Matters; (3) Notice of the SPC on 
the implementation of the Convention on the Recognition of Foreign Arbitral Awards. 
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2. JURISDICTION 
2.1. The notion of jurisdiction 
Jurisdiction in international civil procedure refers to the scope of judicial 
power to which a country is entitled under international law. Jurisdiction over 
international civil cases is more complex than that over domestic civil cases. It 
involves two questions. 39 One concerns the distribution of jurisdictional com-
petence over international civil cases among related countries. The other refers 
to the distribution of jurisdiction over international civil cases among the courts 
of different levels and among those of the same level at different places in the 
same state. The second question is fully dependent on the settlement of the first 
one. 
Most Chinese scholars insist that a country enjoys the power to decide on 
the jurisdictional competence of its courts over civil cases involving foreign 
elements unless otherwise prescribed by multilateral conventions or bilateral 
treaties to which the country is a party. 40 In China, where a separate law of 
international civil procedure does not exist, the provisions on jurisdiction over 
domestic civil cases are as a rule also applied to civil cases involving foreign 
elements. 41 In addition, China is a party to three Conventions which contain 
some provisions on jurisdiction over certain special kinds of international civil 
cases. 42 
2.1.1. Jurisdiction of courts of a certain level 
According to the CPL, the basic people's courts exercise jurisdiction in first 
instance over civil cases involving foreign elements unless they are assigned by 
the law to the jurisdiction of higher level courts. Thus Article 19(1) of the CPL 
states that the intermediate people's courts exercise jurisdiction in first instance 
over 'important cases' involving foreign elements. Further, civil cases involv-
ing foreign elements, which exert an 'important influence' in the territory 
falling under the competence of higher Chinese people's courts or throughout 
the country, fall under the jurisdiction of the higher people's court concerned 
or, in the latter case, under the jurisdiction of the Supreme People's Court in 
first instance. 43 In the 1992 'Opinions' of the Supreme People's Court the 
notion of 'important cases' refers to "foreign-related cases with a large-sum 
litigation object, or with complex case details, or with a great number of the 
parties residing abroad". 
39 See CAl FABANG, Zhongguo Minshi Susongfa [Chinese civil procedure law] (Beijing, 1992) 589. 
40 Ibid., p. 590. 
41 LI HAOPEI, op.cit. n. 4 p. 48. 
42 These are: !he Convention on !he Unification of Certain Rules on International Air 
Transportation, !he International Agreement on Transport of Goods by Train, and !he Convention 
on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution. 
43 CPL, Arts. 20 and 21. 
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2.1.2. Territorial jurisdiction 
Territorial jurisdiction or jurisdiction by region refers to the power of courts 
of the same level to entertain cases in first instance. Under the CPL, territorial 
jurisdiction can be further sub-divided into two categories: general territorial 
jurisdiction and special territorial jurisdiction.44 
2.1.2.1. General territorial jurisdiction 
In respect of general territorial jurisdiction, the maxim 'the plaintiff goes to 
the defendant' is regarded to be the basic principle. Article 22 of the CPL 
adheres to that principle and states: 
"A civil lawsuit brought against a citizen shall be under the jurisdiction of the 
people's court of the place where the defendant has his domicile; if the place of 
the defendant's domicile is different from that of his habitual residence, the 
lawsuit shall be under the jurisdiction of the people's court of the place of his 
habitual residence. 
A civil lawsuit brought against a legal person or any other organization shall be 
under the jurisdiction of the people's court of the place where the defendant has 
his domicile. " 
Consequently, the people's courts may exercise jurisdiction in civil cases 
involving foreign elements if the defendants' domicile or habitual residence is 
within Chinese territory. 
Article 23 lays down 4 exceptions to the above principle. These exceptional 
cases fall under the jurisdiction of the people's court of the place of the plain-
tiff's domicile or habitual residence. One of these four exceptions is specifically 
related to international civil jurisdiction, i.e. lawsuits concerning personal status 
brought against persons not residing within the territory of the PRC.45 
2.1.2.2. Special Territorial Jurisdiction 
Special territorial jurisdiction is based on the object of the claim or the legal 
facts involved. According to Articles 23-33 of the CPL, the people's court can 
exercise jurisdiction over civil cases involving foreign elements if the defen-
dant's domicile or habitual residence is not in Chinese territory whenever one 
of the following connecting factors refers to a place under the territorial juris-
diction of the court: (a) the place where the contract is to be performed;46 (b) 
44 See CAl FABANG, Minshi Susong Faxue [Science of civil procedure law] (Beijing, 1991) 90. 
45 The other three exceptions are: lawsuits concerning the personal status of persons whose 
whereabouts are unknown or who have been declared as missing; lawsuits brought against persons 
who are undergoing rehabilitation through labour; and lawsuits brought against imprisoned persons. 
46 CPL, Art. 24. 
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the place where the insured object is located;47 (c) the place where the bill (of 
exchange) is to be paid;48 (d) the place of dispatch or destination (in disputes 
over transport contracts);49 (e) the place where the tort is committed;50 (f) the 
place where the accident has occurred or where the ship at fault is detained;51 
(g) the place where the salvage took place or where the salvaged ship first 
docked after the ship accident (in disputes concerning expenses of maritime 
salvage);52 (h) the place where the salvaged ship first docked or where the 
adjustment of general average was conducted or where the voyage ended. 53 
Moreover, Article 243 of the CPL, also dealing with the jurisdiction of the 
court of the place of the performance of the contract, provides another six 
connecting factors by which the people's court can exercise jurisdiction over 
contractual or other disputes over property rights and interests in case of the 
defendant's domicile being outside China. These connecting factors are the 
place in China where the contract is signed or is to be performed, where the 
object of the action is located, where the defendant's distrainable property is 
located, where the tort is committed, and where the defendant's representative 
office is located. 54 
2.1.3. Exclusive Jurisdiction 
In international civil procedure, exclusive jurisdiction refers to the fact that 
under the law of a state certain civil cases involving foreign elements are 
exclusively assigned to the jurisdiction of the courts of that country. Exclusive 
jurisdiction does not accept parallel jurisdiction, and cannot be avoided by 
agreement between the parties. 55 Article 246 of the CPL specifically stipulates 
that the following three types of Sino-foreign contracts fall under the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the people's courts of the PRC: contracts on Sino-foreign con-
tractual joint ventures, on Sino-foreign equity joint ventures and on 
Sino-foreign cooperative exploration and development of natural resources in 
the PRC which are performed in China. Article 34 of the CPL confers exclu-
sive jurisdiction on people's courts at a certain place in case of certain types of 
actions in domestic civil procedure. It is suggested here that this provision may 
be equally applied in cases involving foreign elements.56 The actions and the 
respective courts are then as follows: 
47 Ibid., Art. 26. 
48 Ibid., Art. 27. 
49 Ibid., Art. 28. 
50 Ibid., Art. 29. 
51 Ibid., Arts. 30-31. 
52 Ibid., Art. 32. 
53 Ibid., Art. 33. 
54 Ibid., Art. 243. 
55 See CAl FABANG, op.cit. n. 44 p. 101. 
56 See JIN PENGNIAN, op.cit. n. 4 p. 77. 
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(a) An action arising from a dispute over real estate falls under the jurisdiction 
of the people's court at the place where the real estate is located;57 
(b) An action lodged in connection with a dispute over the operations of a 
harbour falls exclusively under the jurisdiction of the people's court at the place 
of the harbour;58 
(c) An action relating to a dispute concerning succession falls exclusively under 
the jurisdiction of the people's court at the place where the deceased had his 
domicile at the time of his death, or the place where the principal part of the 
estate is located. 59 
2.2. The Exercise of Jurisdiction 
As mentioned above, the principle of 'the plaintiff goes to the defendant' 
also applies to jurisdiction in international civil cases. So if the defendant (a 
natural person or a legal person) has his domicile in China, the people's court 
has jurisdiction, with some exceptions. According to the General Provisions of 
Civil Law, 60 the domicile of a natural person is the place where his residence is 
registered. If his habitual residence does not coincide with his domicile, his 
habitual residence is regarded as his domicile. 61 The domicile of a legal person 
is the place where its main administrative office is located. 62 
If the defendant's domicile is not within the territory of the PRC, the CPL 
stipulates other connecting factors by which a people's court can exercise 
jurisdiction. Such a connecting factor, for example, is the fact that the place 
where the contract is performed, or where the tort is committed, or where the 
accident occurred, is in China. 63 
There are some special circumstances in which the people's court can 
exercise jurisdiction even if no effective connecting factors exist in China. Art. 
126 of the CPL provides: "Additional claims by the plaintiff, counterclaims by 
the defendant and third-party claims related to the [original] case can be tried in 
combination". According to this article, the people's court is entitled to enter-
tain these claims even if the general requirements for jurisdiction over each of 
the claims are not fulfilled. Some Chinese scholars, however, suggest that this 
article allows for some exceptions. For example, when the additional claims 
51 CPL, Art. 34(1). 
58 Ibid., Art. 34(2). 
59 Ibid., Art. 34(3). 
60 The General Provisions of Civil Law (GPCL), which were adopted at the fourth session of the 
6th NPC on 12 April 1986 and became effective as of l1anuary 1987, consist of 156 Articles in 9 
Chapters. Chapter 8 (Arts. 142-150) deals with the law applicable to civil relationships involving 
foreign elements. 
61 GPCL, Art. 15. 
62 Ibid., Art. 39. 
63 CPL, Arts. 24-34. 
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concern real estate located abroad, it is obvious that the people's court may not 
try them in combination with the original one. 64 
The principle of perpetuatio fori is adhered to by both Chinese scholars and 
judicial practice.65 Although the CPL doesn't contain provisions to this extent, 
the Supreme People's Court has pointed out in its 1992 'Opinions' that once a 
people's court has started to entertain a case, its jurisdictional competency 
cannot be influenced by a change of a party's domicile or habitual residence. 66 
Finally, Article 245 of the CPL is particularly designed to confer jurisdic-
tion over international civil cases to the people's court in case of non-fulfilment 
of the general requirements for such jurisdiction. 67 It stipulates that a people's 
court may hear a suit over which it originally has no jurisdiction if the defen-
dant raises no objection to its jurisdiction and responds to the action by making 
his defence. If these requirements are fulfilled, the defendant shall be deemed 
to have accepted the people's court's jurisdiction and is no longer able to raise 
objections. 68 
2.3. Forum selection 
According to the CPL, the parties are entitled to opt for a court of their own 
choice.69 They may agree to submit their dispute to either a Chinese people's 
court or a foreign court. This freedom of choice is, however, limited by the 
64 LIU WEIXIANG, Yu SULIN, ZENG ZIWEN and HUANG GUOHUA, Zlwngguo Guoji Sifa Lifa Lilun 
Yu Shijian [Theory and Practice of the Legislation of Chinese Private International Law] (Wuhan, 
1995) 225. 
65 LI SHUANGYUAN and XIE SHISONG, op.cit. n. 4 p. 191. 
66 See Art. 34 of the Opinions. 
61 Some scholars consider this article as a form of forum selection. In their opinion, forum selection 
consists of two types, i.e. in express form and in implied form, and Article 245 belongs to the latter 
type. See JiN PENGNIAN, op.cit. n. 4 p. 77. 
68 CAl FABANG, op.cit. n. 39 p. 598. 
69 The CPL contains two articles which regulate the question of forum selection. Art. 25 reads: 
"The parties to a contract may agree in their written contract on the choice of the people's court of 
the place where the defendant has his domicile, where the contract is performed, where the contract 
is signed, where the plaintiff has his domicile or where the object of the action is located, to 
exercise jurisdiction over the case, provided that the provisions of this Law regarding jurisdiction 
by forum level and exclusive jurisdiction are not violated". Art. 244 reads: "Parties to a dispute 
over a contract with a foreign element or over property rights and interests involving foreign 
elements may, through written agreement, choose the court of the place which has practical 
connections with the dispute to exercise jurisdiction. If a people's court of the PRC is so chosen to 
exercise jurisdiction, the provisions of this Law on jurisdiction by forum level and on exclusive 
jurisdiction shall not be violated" . 
These two articles have both similarities and differences. Art. 25 is limits to a situation of 
contract, while Art. 244 covers disputes arising frum contract as well as from property rights and 
interests. Chinese scholars differ as to the relationship between these two Articles. Some hold that 
Art. 25 applies only to domestic civil cases while Art. 244 applies to civil cases involving foreign 
elements. Others insist that Art. 25 can also be applied to foreign-related cases. 
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following requirements: 70 (a) only parties to a dispute over a contract with a 
foreign element or over property rights and interests involving a foreign ele-
ment have the right to choose; (b) the parties' choice should be made in written 
form; (c) the court chosen by the parties must have practical connections with 
the dispute; (d) if the choice is made in favour of a people's court of the PRC, 
the provisions of the CPL on forum level and on exclusive jurisdiction shall in 
any case be applicable. The CPL sets a further limit to the parties' freedom to 
choose a forum by conferring exclusive jurisdiction on the people's courts of 
the PRC over actions concerning the performance of contracts on Sino-foreign 
equity joint ventures, Sino-foreign contractual joint ventures, and Sino-foreign 
cooperative exploration and development of the natural resources in the PRC.71 
As to other issues relating to forum selection, such as the law applicable to 
the determination of the validity of the selection and the question whether and 
to what extent the parties may derogate from the selection made, we can hardly 
find answers in present Chinese law. Many Chinese scholars favour the appli-
cation of the lex fori for the determination of the validity of the selection. 
2.4. Lis pendens 
Lis pendens has not received adequate attention among Chinese scholars, 
nor in Chinese legislation.72 The CPL devotes only one Article to the question 
of lis pendens which applies exclusively to domestic cases. 73 According to this 
Article, parallel proceedings are not allowed. With regard to international civil 
and commercial cases, however, the attitude of the people's courts towards 
parallel proceedings is quite different. This conclusion can be drawn from 
Articles 15 and 306 of the 1992 'Opinions' of the Supreme People's Court 
which read, respectively: 
"In a divorce case where one party files a lawsuit in a foreign court and the 
other party resorts to a Chinese court, the Chinese people's court will entertain 
the case." 
and: 
"The people's court may exercise jurisdiction over a case which falls under the 
jurisdiction of both the people's court of the PRC and a foreign court if one 
70 See CAl FABANG, op.cit. n. 44 p. 101. 
71 CPL, An. 246. 
72 There is only one article published in China on this issue: ZHANG MAO, 'Guoji Minshi Susong 
Zhongde Susong Jinhe' [Parallel proceedings in international civil litigation], Faxue Yanjiu [Journal 
of Law] no. 18 (Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 1996). 
73 An. 35 of the CPL: "When two or more people's courts have jurisdiction over a lawsuit, the 
plaintiff may bring his lawsuit in one of these; if the plaintiff brings the lawsuit in two or more 
people's courts that have jurisdiction over the lawsuit, the people's court in which the case was first 
entertained shall exercise jurisdiction". This article is silent on the situation arising if one party 
brings the lawsuit in one competent people's coun, while the other party brings the lawsuit in 
another competent coun, and on how then to determine the court that shall exercise jurisdiction. 
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party has submitted the case to a foreign court. When the foreign court has ren-
dered a judgment in the case and an application is filed to a people's court for 
recognition and enforcement, the people's court shall reject the application un-
less otherwise stipulated by the treaties to which China and the country con-
cerned are parties. " 
It is obvious that these regulations are very vague and do not tally with the 
practice adopted by many other countries.74 
Some bilateral treaties concluded by China on judicial assistance contain 
provisions on lis pendens, but they are inconsistent.75 Most of the bilateral 
treaties provide that the requested country will not recognize or enforce a 
judgment rendered by the court of a requesting country if the same case is 
being handled by the court of the requested country, regardless of which court 
entertained the case first. Some other bilateral treaties stipulate that the re-
quested country may not refuse to recognize and execute a foreign judgment 
unless its court has taken cognizance of an identical case before the foreign 
court had done SO.76 
2.S. Immunities 
The Huguang Railway Bonds case77 brought about a comprehensive discus-
sion on the question of immunities in China in the 1980s.78 Almost all Chinese 
74 See ZHANG MAO, loc.cit. n. 72. 
75 See LI SHUANGYUAN, lIN PENGNIAN, ZHANG MAo and LI ZHIYONG, Zltongguo Guoji Sifa 
Tonglun [A general introduction to Chinese private international law] (Beijing, 1996) 580. 
76 See Art. 18(4) of the agreement with Mongolia, and Art. 21(5) of the agreement with Italy, in 
FEI ZONGYI and TANG CHENYUAN, Zltongguo SifaXiez}zu de Lilun Yu Shijian [Theory and 
Practice of Judicial Assistance in China] (Beijing, 1992) 267 and 303. 
77 In November 1979 some Americans initiated lawsuits in the US against the Chinese government 
claiming the repayment of bonds issued on the occasion of the building of the Huguang Railway by 
the Qing imperial government in 1911. On 9 March 1987 the US Supreme Court rejected the 
claims. 
78 Almost all Chinese general treatises on private international law contain a chapter on the matter 
of immunities. In addition, there are some articles and two monographs especially devoted to the 
issue. The articles include: SUN LIN and SUN HONGHONG, 'Guoji Zuzhi de Tequan yu Huomian' 
[Privileges and immunities of international organizations], Chinese Yearbook of International Law 
(1982); CHEN TIQIANG, 'Guojia Zhuquan Huomian yu Guojifa-Ping Huguang Tielu Zhaijuanan' 
[Immunity of sovereignty of state and international law: on the Huguang Railway Bonds Case], 
ibid.; LI ZHERUI, 'Guojia Huomian Wenti de Huigu yu Qianzhan' [State immunity: its history and 
future], Chinese Yearbook of International Law (1986); LI HAOPEI, 'Lun Guojia Guangxia 
Huomian' [On jurisdictional immunity ofa state], ibid.; HUANGJiN, 'Lun Xianzhi Guojia Huomian 
Lilun' [On the theories of restrictive immunity of states], ibid.; Jiang Zhaodong, 'Waiguo Guojia 
Huomian Guize yu Youguan Guoji Shangshi Zhongcai de Susong' [Rules of foreign state immunity 
and relevant questions of immunity and international commercial arbitration], Chinese Yearbook of 
International Law (1987); LI SHUANGYUAN, 'Meiguo 1976 nian Waiguo Zhuquan Huomian Fa suo 
Fengxing de Xianzhi Huomian Lun Pipan' [Critique on the theory of restrictive immunity adopted 
in the American Act on Sovereign Immunity of Foreign States of 1976] Faxue Pinglun [Law 
Review] (Wuhan, no. 1, 1983). The two monographs are HUANG JiN, Guojia Jiqi Caichan 
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scholars support the principle of 'absolute sovereign immunity' and criticize the 
practice of 'restrictive immunity' adopted by some developed countries.79 They 
maintain that immunities can be divided into two categories, state immunity and 
diplomatic immunity, 80 and that the following three aspects may be distin-
guished: immunity from judicial jurisdiction, immunity from litigation proce-
dures (such as giving evidence) and immunity from compulsory execution. 
The provisions on the immunities of states and their property are scattered 
among the following laws: the CPL,81 the PRC Regulations on Diplomatic 
Privileges and Immunities, and the PRC Regulations on Consular Privilege and 
Immunities. In addition, China is a party to some treaties containing special 
provisions on immunities. 82 
The Chinese principles on immunities, which have been developed through 
Chinese legal and diplomatic practice and elaborated by Chinese scholars, can 
be summarized in the following points: 
A. China views the immunity of states, and their property, from the jurisdiction 
of courts of other countries as a natural right of sovereign states, and also as a 
principle of international law. The PRC favours the doctrine of absolute sover-
eign immunity and opposes the doctrine of restrictive immunities or the aboli-
tion altogether of immunities. 
B. A distinction must be made between the state's own activities and property 
and the activities and property of state corporations and enterprises. While 
China adheres to absolute sovereign immunity, it does not seek immunity for 
the activities and property of its state corporations. "China holds that state 
corporations and enterprises are separate economic entities with their own 
independent legal status, so they should not enjoy sovereign immunity. ,,83 
C. Immunity of diplomatic agents from the civil and administrative jurisdiction 
of Chinese people's courts, with some exceptions, is laid down as a principle in 
Chinese law. 
D. The principle of reciprocity is to be applied by Chinese courts vis-ii-vis 
those countries which restrict the immunity of China and its state property in 
contravention of international law . 
Huomian Wenti Yanjiu [A Study of the Immunity of States and their Property] (Beijing, 1987); 
GONG RENREN, Guoji Huomian Wenti Bijiao Yanjiu [A Comparative Study of the Question of 
International Immunities] (Beijing, 1994). 
79 A few Chinese scholars neither approve the doctrine of absolute immunity, nor support the 
doctrine of restrictive immunity. In their view, the enjoyment of judicial immunity in international 
civil litigation by states and their property is a basic principle of international law. See LI 
SHUANGYUAN and XIE SHISONG, Guoji Minshi Susongfa Gailun [An Introduction to the Law on 
International Civil Procedure] 280. 
80 See LI SHUANGYUAN (ed.), Guoji Sifa [Private International Law] (Beijing, 1991) 458. 
81 CPL, Art. 239. 
82 Such as the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations and the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. 
83 See LI SHUANGYUAN and XIE SHISONG, op.cit. n. 4 p. 279. 
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E. Jurisdictional immunity enjoyed by sovereign states, diplomatic agents, and 
international organizations, can be waived by the states and the international 
organizations concerned. 84 
3. SERVICE OF PROCESS 
3.1. Means 
The service of documents abroad refers to the service of judicial and extra-
judicial documents to parties or other litigants residing abroad, according to 
international treaties, national law or the principle of mutual benefit.85 It may 
refer to service of Chinese documents outside China as well as service of 
documents from abroad on parties in China. 
3.1.1. In case of absence of treaties 
According to Article 247 of the CPL, a people's court may serve litigation 
documents on a party who doesn't have domicile in China by one of the fol-
lowing means if there are no treaty provisions applying to China and the coun-
try where the party to be served resides: 
A. Diplomatic Channels 
Diplomatic channels are the most important means recognized and adopted 
by China and other countries to serve documents abroad. 86 On 14 August 1986, 
the Supreme People's Court, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry 
of Justice jointly issued a Notice on Certain Matters Relating to the Service of 
Legal Documents through Diplomatic Channels between the People's Courts 
and Foreign Courts. This Notice bases the service by diplomatic channels on 
the principle of mutual benefit and lays down the procedure which the people's 
courts and foreign courts should observe in serving civil and economic judicial 
documents. 
B. By entrustment 
Service outside China may be entrusted to the embassy or consulate of the 
PRC accredited to the country where the person resides if the person is of 
Chinese nationality. 87 Similarly, foreign embassies and consulates in China may 
serve legal documents directly on their nationals in China provided that such 
84 See Art. 15, PRC Regulations on Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities. 
85 JING PENGNIAN, op.cit. n. 4 p. 109. 
86 CPL, Art. 247(2). 
87 CPL, Art. 247(3). 
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documents are not detrimental to the sovereignty or security of China and no 
coercive measures are applied. 88 
C. Service may be executed on the agent ad litem who is authorized to receive 
the documents served. 89 
D. The documents may be served on the representative who has been entrusted 
by the litigant to receive service of documents. 90 
E. Documents may be served by mail where the law of the country in which 
the litigant to be served has his abode, permits such service. If the documents 
are mailed and no certificate of delivery has been received within six months, 
service will nonetheless be regarded as having been made if it can otherwise be 
confirmed - taking account of all the circumstances - that the service has been 
carried out. 
F. When a document cannot be served through the above-mentioned means, it 
must be served by public notice. It is deemed to be served after six months 
from the date of such notice. 
The CPL strictly prohibits the service of legal documents within the juris-
diction of the PRC by foreign organizations or persons, unless expressly 
approved by the appropriate Chinese authorities. 91 Hence, in the absence of 
relevant treaty provisions, diplomatic channels remain the chief method for the 
service of documents abroad. 
3.1.2. Under bilateral treaties 
As mentioned earlier, 92 China has concluded bilateral treaties with 19 
countries on civil and commercial judicial assistance, in which the service 
abroad of judicial and extrajudicial documents is regulated. On 1 February 
1988, the Supreme People's Court issued a Notice on the implementation of 
Sino-foreign judicial assistance agreements designating the Ministry of Justice 
as the central authority to accept and send out the application papers and the 
judicial documents to be served. When the Ministry receives judicial docu-
ments to be served in China from the other party to the treaty, it shall transmit 
them to the Supreme People's Court for conveyance to a higher people's court 
for further disposal of the matter. The latter assigns the execution of the service 
88 Art. 2 of the above-mentioned Joint Circular from the Supreme People's Court, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Justice of 1986. 
89 CPL, Art. 247(4). 
90 CPL, Art. 24(5). 
91 CPL, Art. 263(3). 
92 Supra n. 33. 
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to an intermediate people's court or a special court in accordance with the 
regulations laid down in the bilateral agreement. 
3.1.3. Under the 1965 Hague Service Convention 
As the first and only Convention of the Hague Conference on Private 
International Law that has been ratified by the PRC, the 1965 Hague Service 
Convention is given much emphasis by Chinese authorities and scholars be-
cause its provisions basically tally with the spirit of relevant Chinese laws and 
judicial practice. In ratifying the Convention, China made a reservation to 
Article 8( 1 ) and to Article 10.93 According to this reservation, service by 
diplomatic or consular agents can only take place within PRC territory when 
the documents are served upon a national of the state where the documents 
have originated. Furthermore, under Article 10 of the Convention, the PRC 
has opted for objecting to, and thus not allowing, the three liberal means of 
service offered in that Article. 
In order to better implement the Convention in China, the Supreme People's 
Court, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Justice jointly 
issued two circulars (supra p.143). The Circulars designated the Ministry of 
Justice as the central authority in China to receive documents served by consu-
lar channels, and specified the concrete procedures on the service of documents 
from China to foreign countries and from foreign countries to China. 
3.2. Procedures 
Procedures for service abroad are largely determined by the means of 
service. In some circumstances, the procedures are very simple, such as service 
by mail, service by public notice, service made on the agent ad litem or the 
93 In ratifying the Convention, the Standing Committee made the following declarations: 
(1) In accordance with the provisions of Article 2 and Article 9 of the Convention, the Ministry of 
Justice of the People's Republic of China is designated as the Central Authority that is also entitled 
to receive the documents forwarded through consular channels. 
(2) It is declared, in accordance with paragraph 2 of Article 8 of the Convention, that the method of 
service regulated in the first paragraph of this Article can only be used within the territory of the 
People's Republic of China when a document is to be served upon a national of the state from 
which the documents originate. 
(3) It is not permitted to use the methods of service provided for by Article 10 of the Convention 
for service within the territory of the People's Republic of China. 
(4) It is declared, in accordance with paragraph 2 of Article 15 of the Convention, that a judge, 
notwithstanding the provisions of the first paragraph of this Article, may render judgment even if 
no certificate of service or delivery is received if all the conditions provided for by paragraph 2 of 
this Article are fulfilled. 
(5) It is declared, in accordance with paragraph 3 of Article 16 of the Convention, that a defendant 
may apply for relief from losing the right to appeal for not having taken recourse to it within a year 
from the date of the judgment. 
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representative office, etc. At present, documents are served mainly through 
diplomatic channels in China, and our discussion here consequently focuses on 
the procedures for service through diplomatic channels. The procedures speci-
fied in the 1965 Hague Service Convention and the bilateral agreements will be 
referred to briefly. 
According to the 1986 Notice on the service of legal documents through 
diplomatic channels, the following procedures shall be followed in case of 
service of legal documents upon a natural person or a legal person with the 
nationality of the PRC or of a third country on behalf of a foreign court: 
(a) The documents must be delivered to the Consular Section of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the PRC by the embassy or consulate of the country in 
question. The Consular Section transmits the documents to the relevant higher 
people's court, which designates the relevant intermediate people's court to 
serve the documents upon the party concerned. Depending on whether or not 
the party served has signed a certificate acknowledging receipt of service, the 
intermediate people's court returns this certificate or the attestation of service to 
the authorizing party through the Consular Section of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. 
(b) A letter of authorization must be issued for the service. All such letters and 
accompanying legal documents must be served together with Chinese transla-
tions attached thereto. 
(c) Legal documents containing detrimental statements relating to the sover-
eignty or security of China will be rejected; when the person towards whom the 
service must be performed enjoys diplomatic privileges or immunities, the 
document is as a rule not accepted for service. When service does not take 
place for being outside the jurisdiction of the Chinese courts, or because it is 
unclear for whom the document is intended, or for any other reason, the 
relevant higher people's court must state how the matter should be handled 
further and clearly state the reasons for the non-execution of the service. The 
Consular Section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will be responsible for 
returning the document to the authorizing party with an appended explanation. 
The 1986 Notice also stipulates the procedures and requirements which the 
people's court must observe in case of the reverse service of legal documents 
upon a party outside the territory of China through diplomatic channels: 
(a) The legal documents to be delivered abroad shall first be approved by the 
higher people's court of the province, autonomous region or municipality (from 
where the request originated) and then transmitted (to the requested country) by 
the Consular Section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
(b) The correct name, sex, age, nationality and address abroad of the intended 
recipient shall be provided, together with the document to be delivered. The 
material facts of the case shall be disclosed to the Consular Section of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
(c) A letter of authorization must be attached to the documents. If the name of 
the foreign court is not known, the request shall be addressed to the higher 
court of the jurisdiction in which the foreign party resides. A translation of the 
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authorization letter and the documents into the language of the requested 
country or, with the consent of that country, into another language, shall also 
be attached. If the requested country requires the legal documents to be legal-
ized or authenticated, the Consular Section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
shall so notify the requesting people's court. 94 
The methods of service of documents as regulated in China's judicial 
assistance agreements and the 1965 Hague Convention are to a high degree 
similar. The authorization letter requesting the service of judicial and extrajudi-
cial documents must be submitted by the requesting state's central authority, or 
consulate in the case of the Hague Service Convention,95 to that of the re-
quested country. The form of the authorization letter and the language to be 
used are stipulated in the appendices of the treaties. Typically, the authorization 
letter must be written in the official language of the requesting party and ac-
companied by a translation in the counterpart's language. 96 
Since the treaties do not prescribe detailed procedures for the effectuation of 
the service, the central authority of the requested party chooses the appropriate 
methods according to its domestic law. 97 If, however, the address of the person 
on whom a document is to be served is unclear or incomplete, the requested 
central authority may ask for further information. If the address remains un-
clear and the document cannot be served, the central authority should notify its 
counterpart and return all documents. 
A receipt is required for every document served and must bear the ad-
dressee's signature and the date of receipt. Moreover, the central authority 
must record the method of service, the place and the date on the receipt. A 
request for judicial assistance, including the service of documents, may be 
refused if the request is contrary to the sovereignty, national security, or ordre 
public of the requested state. The requested state is, however, obliged to 
provide the requesting country with an explanation for the refusal. 
94 According to Art. 7 of the Notice on the implementation of the 1965 Hague Convention, a 
bilateral agreement concluded with another state party of the 1965 Hague Convention shall have 
priority in case of inconsistency with the Convention. 
95 Hague Service Convention, Art. 9. 
96 For example, Art. 6 of the Sino-French Treaty stipulates that all judicial and extrajudicial 
documents shall include a copy and a translation in the counterpart's language. Arts. 8 and 8(1) of 
the Sino-Polish and Sino-Mongolian treaties, respectively, stipulate that judicial assistance 
applications should include either a translation in the language of the requested country or in 
English. 
97 See French-Sino Treaty, Art. 7; Sino-Mongolian Treaty, Art. 10. 
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4. TAKING OF EVIDENCE ABROAD 
4.1. Means 
The system of evidence-taking in China is quite different from that in 
common law countries as well as that in civil law countries.98 This gives rise to 
serious conflicts of laws between China and other countries. As to the taking of 
evidence abroad, regulation in China is quite undeveloped and remains, for the 
time being, dependent on domestic laws. Similar to service of process abroad 
discussed above, the means that may be used for the taking of evidence abroad, 
as stipulated by Article 262 of the CPL, may be conveniently sub-divided into 
two categories: direct and indirect means. The provision reads: 
"In accordance with the international treaties concluded or acceded to by the 
PRe, or the principle ofreciprocity, a people's court and its foreign counterpart 
may request each other to assist in the service of legal documents, in carrying 
out investigation, in collecting evidence, or in other actions regarding litiga-
tion. " 
A people's court shall not handle a request from a foreign court, if the case 
in question undermines the PRC'S sovereignty, security or social and public 
interests. 
4.1.1. in case of absence of treaties 
Under Article 263 of the CPL, when no regulation by treaty exists, the 
taking of evidence abroad is permitted through diplomatic channels on the basis 
of the principle of reciprocity. The above-mentioned Notice of 1986 jointly 
issued by the Supreme People's Court and the Ministries of Foreign Affairs 
and Justice prescribes in its Article 8 that "[i]n rendering mutual assistance in 
the taking of evidence between our courts and foreign courts, the above proce-
dures [on judicial assistance through diplomatic channels] may be applied by 
analogy". Thus the Notice also covers the taking of evidence abroad. Accord-
ing to the law and the joint Notice, except for a foreign embassy or consulate, 
no foreign organization or individual may, without the consent of the compe-
tent authorities of the PRC, serve documents or make investigations and collect 
evidence within the territory of the PRC. Moreover, the CPL places the fol-
lowing limits on the taking of evidence by consuls: (a) the person to be investi-
gated must have the nationality of the home state of the embassy or consulate; 
(b) the laws of the PRC must not be violated; (c) no compulsory measures may 
be taken. 99 
98 See JING PENGNIAN, op.cit. n. 4 pp. 126-128. 
99 CPL, Art. 263(2). 
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4.1.2. Under bilateral agreements 
Although China has not participated in multilateral conventions on the 
taking of evidence abroad, almost all the Chinese bilateral agreements on 
judicial assistance include some articles on this issue. 100 Besides, as the circum-
stances of service of documents abroad resemble those of the taking of evi-
dence abroad in many respects, quite a few provisions relating to the former 
may be applied to the latter and vice versa. 
In most of the agreements, the taking of evidence abroad includes more or 
less the following items: 101 
(a) The scope of evidence-taking, comprising the examination of the parties, 
the witnesses, and the identifier, carrying out inspection and judicial certifica-
tion, and collecting other evidence; 
(b) The form of the letter of request, which is often appended to the agreement; 
(c) The law applicable to the taking of evidence abroad. The majority of the 
agreements adhere to the lex fori as the applicable law; 
(d) The regulation of the protection of witnesses and identifiers; 
(e) The supply of documents on civil commercial substantive law, law of 
procedure and judicial practice. 
Apart from bilateral assistance agreements, China has concluded or acceded 
to some consular treaties which contain a few provisions on the taking of 
evidence abroad, but these provisions are usually limited and vague. 
On 18 March 1970, the Hague Conference on Private International Law 
adopted a comprehensive Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in 
Civil or Commercial Matters. Although China is not a party to the Convention, 
it is obvious that many provisions of the Convention are basically consistent 
with the stipulations in China's judicial assistance agreements, and the Conven-
tion is sure to have exerted much influence on China's practice in the domain 
of evidence-taking abroad. 102 
4.2. Procedures 
As the taking of evidence abroad is, for the time being, mainly carried out 
by means of a letter of request in China,103 we shall limit ourselves here to the 
procedures followed in employing this means. First, a letter of request shall be 
sent to the central authority of the state of execution in light of the procedures 
and requirements stipulated by the domestic law of that state or by international 
100 Some bilateral agreements separate the provisions on service from the provisions on evidence 
taking. Others combine and mix these provisions. 
101 See LI HAOPEI, op.cit. n. 4 pp. 195-197. 
102 See JING PENGNIAN, op.cit. n. 4 p. 129. 
103 Ibid. 
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treaties. 104 The letter of request must be in specified form and must have the 
required contents. 105 Furthermore, it must be made in the language of the state 
of execution or be accompanied by a translated version. 106 
After receiving the letter of request, the requested authority shall, according 
to its domestic law, collect the evidence. Where the letter of request requires 
special methods or procedures, the requested authority shall follow them unless 
they are in conflict with his domestic law. 107 In China, after receiving the letter 
of request, the Ministry of Justice shall transmit it to the Supreme People's 
Court which then sends it to an appointed intermediate people's court through a 
higher people's court. Generally speaking, it is the intermediate people's courts 
or special courts that undertake the responsibility for collecting evidence. 
After having collected the evidence, the requested authority shall inform the 
requesting authority and transmit the evidence materials to it. If the requested 
authority has been unable to collect the evidence for various reasons, it must 
inform the requesting authority accordingly. Under Chinese law, the people's 
court shall not collect the evidence requested by a foreign authority if it impairs 
the sovereignty, security, or social and public interest of the PRC. 108 
5. RECOGNITION AND EXECUTION OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS I09 
5.1. Essence and place 
Scholarly doctrine and the current legislation in China differ with regard to 
the relation between recognition and execution of foreign judgments and judi-
cial assistance. Recognition and execution of foreign judgments is defined by 
many Chinese scholars as a subject separate from judicial assistance. 110 But the 
Chinese bilateral agreements on civil and commercial judicial assistance cover 
also the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments and arbitral awards. 
For the sake of convenience the present paper follows the scholars' view and 
deals with the subject of recognition and execution of foreign judgments sepa-
rately from judicial assistance. 111 
104 Under Art. 2 of the 1970 Hague Convention, the Central Authority to receive letters of request 
coming from abroad and to transmit them to the authority competent to execute them is designated 
by the state itself. In China, the Ministry of Justice is designated as the Central Authority. 
105 Art. 3 of the 1970 Hague Convention lists 9 items altogether. See JING PENGNIAN, op.cit. n. 4 
p.129. 
106 CPL, Art. 264(2). 
107 Ibid., Art. 265. 
108 Ibid., Art. 262(2). 
109 "Foreign judgment" should be understood in a broad sense, comprising judgments rendered by 
foreign courts as well as written orders, mediation statements, etc. 
110 See LI SHUANGYUAN, Guo}i Sifa [Private International Law] (Beijing, 1991) 469. 
I \I In the broad sense of the term, judicial assistance should include the recognition and execution of 
foreign judgments and arbitral awards. 
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Generally speaking, to recognize foreign judgments is to endow the foreign 
judgment with the same legal effect as that of a domestic judgment. To enforce 
foreign judgments is to force the parties to fulftl their obligations provided by 
the foreign judgment. The recognition of a foreign judgment is a prerequisite 
for the enforcement of that judgment. 112 Of course, the recognition of foreign 
judgments doesn't necessarily lead to their enforcement, if only because some 
foreign judgments, such as those on the capacity of a person and divorce, only 
require recognition and do not need to be executed. 
In certain countries, foreign judgments need no explicit recognition and are 
automatically effective, but under Chinese law and the treaties concluded by 
China, we cannot find an answer to this question. In 1991, the Supreme Peo-
ple's Court issued a circular concerning the procedures to be followed by 
Chinese citizens in applying for the recognition of foreign divorce judgments. 
Article 20 of this circular points out that, as long as a party has not applied to 
the people's court for the recognition of a foreign judgment in a matrimonial 
dispute, the other party retains the right to bring a new divorce action before a 
people's court. Based on this Article, many Chinese authors have come to the 
conclusion that the legal effect of foreign judgments in China is not automatic 
and that such judgments must be recognized by a Chinese people's court in 
order to have legal effect in the Chinese legal order. 113 
5.2. The legal basis of recognition and execution of foreign judgments 
International conventions and mutual benefit are the two legal bases for the 
recognition and execution of foreign judgments. 114 Article 267 of the CPL 
stipulates that a foreign court may, in accordance with the provisions of treaties 
to which the foreign country involved and China are bound, or on the basis of 
the principle of reciprocity, request for recognition and enforcement of its 
judgment by a people's court. Article 268 further prescribes that, in examining 
the application, the people's court follow the treaties concerned and the princi-
ple of reciprocity. 
As to the principle of mutual benefit, we can hardly fmd any specific defi-
nition of this concept in Chinese law or legal practice. It has met with strong 
opposition and criticism for its vagueness. Some Chinese scholars even assert 
that recognition and execution of foreign judgments based on mutual benefit is 
neither reasonable nor practicable. 115 
112 LI SHUANGYUAN, op.cit. n. 110, p. 486. 
113 See JING PENGNIAN, op.cit. n. 4, p. 138. 
114 See FEI ZONGYI and TANG CHENYUAN, op.cit. n. 76 p. 118. 
115 LI HAOPEI, one of the most senior Chinese legal scholars, pointed out that the principle of 
benefit is in fact a principle of reprisal. See LI HAOPEI, op.cit. n. 4 pp. 140-141. 
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5.3. Requirements 
Article 268 of the CPL lays down two main requirements which foreign 
judgments must fulfil in order to qualify for recognition and enforcement: they 
must be final and they may not contradict the basic principles of the law of the 
PRC nor violate the sovereignty, security and social and public interest of 
China. Besides these requirements, Chinese authors have listed some others, 
including the followingy6 (a) the foreign court which rendered the judgment 
had jurisdiction over the case; (b) the litigation in the foreign court was fair; (c) 
the foreign judgment was not in conflict with a domestic judgment between the 
same parties on the same dispute, nor inconsistent with a judgment rendered by 
a third country and recognized by a Chinese court, between the same parties on 
the same dispute; (d) the recognition and enforcement was allowed under 
treaties in force between China and the requesting State, or there existed a 
'mutually beneficial relationship' between the two countries; (e) the judgment 
has applied the proper lex causae. 
5.4. Procedure 
According to Article 266(1) of the CPL, a litigant may directly apply to a 
competent foreign court for recognition and enforcement of a legally binding 
judgment rendered by a Chinese court. A people's court itself may also request 
a foreign court to recognize and enforce one of its judgments. Such a request 
may be made at the instigation of the victorious litigant, either under the provi-
sions of an international treaty or on the basis of the principle of reciprocity, 
whenever the convicted party or his property is not within Chinese territory. 
Reversely, the CPL also provides that a foreign litigant may directly apply 
to a Chinese people's court for the recognition and enforcement of a foreign 
judgment. 117 Similarly, the foreign court may make such a request, either under 
a treaty binding its home state and the PRC or on the basis of the principle of 
reciprocity or mutual benefit. 118 
Generally speaking, the procedure followed for the recognition and en-
forcement of foreign judgments by a Chinese people's court can be roughly 
divided into the following three stages: 
(1) the application - as mentioned above, the application may come either from 
the litigant or from the foreign court. In both cases some necessary papers have 
to be presented to the people's court, such as a verified copy of the judgment, a 
Chinese version of it, etc. 
(2) the examination - upon receipt the people's court examines the application 
to see whether it meets the requirements. In accordance with the CPL and the 
116 See JiNG PENGNIAN, op.cit. n. 4 pp. 142-148. 
Il7 CPL, Art. 267. 
118 Ibid. 
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judicial assistance agreements to which China is a party, Chinese courts have 
adopted the system of examination on form rather than examination on sub-
stance. For example, Article 18(2) of the Judicial Assistance Convention 
between the PRC and the Russian Federation stipulates clearly that the re-
quested court may limit itself to examining whether the judgment is in confor-
mity with the provisions of the Convention, without an examination on sub-
stance. 
(3) The last stage is the recognition and enforcement itself. After examination, 
the foreign judgment may be recognized and enforced by the Chinese people's 
court unless it is found to be in contravention with the basic principles of the 
law or with the sovereignty, security, and social and public interests of the 
PRC, or if it does not meet other necessary requirements. 119 For the enforce-
ment of a foreign judgment in China, an enforcement decree is issued by the 
people's court. The judgment will be enforced in accordance with the relevant 
provisions and rulings on the execution of domestic judgments. 120 
6. ARBITRATION 
6.1. The position of arbitration 
Arbitration is becoming ever more important in China as a means for the 
resolution of both domestic and international civil and commercial disputes. On 
31 August 1994 a Chinese arbitration law was adopted at the ninth session of 
the Standing Committee of the Eighth NPC. It entered into force on 1 Septem-
ber 1995. The law consists of eight chapters and 80 articles. Chapter Four, on 
"Special provisions on arbitration involving foreign elements", lays down the 
fundamental provisions on international civil and commercial arbitration. At 
present, there are two arbitration institutions dealing with international civil 
commercial and maritime disputes in China, namely the International Economic 
and Trade Arbitration Commission and the Maritime Arbitration Commission. 
Both have their own regulations and are gaining a favourable reputation for 
their fairness and promptness. 121 
According to the Arbitration Law and the two regulations, arbitration may 
take place on the basis of an arbitration clause in the contract or an arbitration 
agreement between the parties. A lawful arbitration clause or arbitration 
agreement can exclude the jurisdiction of the courts in favour of the will of the 
parties. They may submit their disputes to an arbitral tribunal in the home 
119 See supra. 
120 Arts. 207-236 of the CPL provide for the execution of domestic judgments and rulings. They 
can also be applied to the execution of foreign judgments. 
121 See JiNG PENGNIAN, op.cit. n. 4 pp. 196-203. On 17 March 1994, the Chinese International 
Commercial Commission (or Chinese Internatiol1l'l Trade Promotion Commission) amended its 
"Arbitration Rules of the Chinese International Economic Trade Arbitration Commission". The 
new Rules came into force on 1 June 1994. 
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country of any of the parties or in a third country. The arbitrators, the arbitra-
tion rules and the applicable law can also be chosen by the parties. The award 
rendered by a Chinese arbitral institution is final and binding, and the parties 
can no more file a suit concerning the same dispute in any Chinese court. If, 
however, a party refuses to perform its obligations under the arbitral award,122 
the other party may file an enforcement action in court. 
6.2. The power of the court to examine the validity of arbitration awards 
Generally speaking, the parties enjoy the right either to submit their disputes 
to arbitration or to the court. Their choice depends, inter alia, on whether or 
not they have arrived at an arbitration agreement or have included an arbitra-
tion clause in their contract. If they have done so, only the arbitral tribunal is 
competent to handle the dispute. Since arbitral institutions have no right to 
enforce their own awards, the court has the power to determine the validity of 
arbitral awards. Article 260 of the CPL stipulates that a people's court shall 
refuse to recognize the validity of an arbitral award and shall not enforce it if it 
is proven that: (a) the parties have in fact not agreed to an arbitration clause in 
the contract or have not subsequently reached a written arbitration agreement; 
or (b) the party against whom the enforcement is intended has not been given 
notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the inception of the arbitration 
proceedings, or was unable to present his case due to causes for which he is not 
responsible; or (c) the composition of the arbitration tribunal or the arbitration 
procedure was not in conformity with the rules of arbitration; or (d) the issues 
dealt with by the award fall outside the scope of the arbitration agreement or 
are matters which the arbitral organ was not empowered to arbitrate. 123 The 
people's court shall also ignore the legal effects of an arbitral award if it deter-
mines that the enforcement of the award would go against the social and public 
interests of the PRC. 
7. MEDIATION 
Mediation has for centuries been the most favoured dispute resolution 
technique among Chinese. At present it is still regarded as a useful mode of 
dispute settlement. According to the CPL, mediation includes two categories: 
mediation in litigation and mediation out of court. The main difference between 
the two is that the former is legally binding upon the parties, while the latter 
doesn't have any legal effect. 
122 Arbitration Law, Art. 62. 
123 CPL, Art. 260. 
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7.1. Mediation in litigation 
Mediation in litigation, also called mediation by court, is a basic and im-
portant method that can be carried out at any stage of the litigation,124 including 
the procedures of first or second instance and that of trial supervision. 125 It is, 
however, clearly specified in the CPL that mediation relies on the parties' 
consent and that the courts cannot force the parties to settle their dispute by 
mediation against their will. Article 9 of the CPL stipulates that the people's 
courts, in trying civil cases, shall conduct mediation for the parties on a volun-
tary and lawful basis. If mediation fails, judgment shall be rendered without 
delay. 
In most cases, when a settlement agreement is reached through mediation, 
the people's court draws up a mediation statement. The mediation statement is 
quite similar to a judgment as far as the contents are concerned. It must clearly 
set forth the facts of the case, the claims, and the result of the mediation. It 
shall, moreover, be signed by the judge and the court clerk, and appended with 
the seal of the people's court. Generally speaking, once it is receipted by the 
two parties, the mediation statement becomes legally effective. That means that 
effect of a receipted mediation statement is identical to that of a fmal judgment 
regardless of whether the mediation statement is made at the stage of first or 
second instance. No appeal is possible against a mediation statement. However, 
if there is evidence that the mediation has violated the principle of voluntariness 
or that the content of the mediation agreement is in violation of the law, a 
retrial may be requested. 
Although the CPL does not contain special provisions on mediation in 
international civil cases, the rules on domestic mediation must be deemed 
equally applicable to international cases provided the parties wish to resort to 
mediation. 
7.2. Mediation out of court 
Mediation out of court, or people's mediation, is deeply rooted in China 
and refers to mediation by a people's mediation commission. A people's me-
diation commission consists of 3 to 9 members who are elected by the people. 
Its activities must abide by the principle of lawfulness and that of voluntariness. 
The most distinct characteristic of people's mediation is that it has no legal 
effect. It is not a compulsory procedure to be followed before any litigation. 
When a dispute occurs, the parties may resort directly to the court if they are 
unwilling to try mediation by the people's mediation commission. Moreover, 
even if the parties have reached a conciliation agreement through mediation of 
124 Arts. 9, 85-91, 155 and 180 of the CPL contain provisions on mediation. 
125 See above, section 1.1.3. 
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a people's mediation commission, they may still refuse to confIrm the agree-
ment and as yet bring a lawsuit to a people's court. 

TRANSBOUNDARY CIVIL LITIGATION IN KOREA 
Suh Chul Won' 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper purports to present a concise survey of Korean law and prac-
tice relating to transboundary civil litigation. In such a presentation in the 
English language the problem arises of differences in contents and nuances 
between Korean and English legal terms. In order to facilitate understanding 
of the Korean law, an attempt has been made to use, as much as possible, 
terms popularly used in Anglo-American legal literature. This may, however, 
not eliminate the existing differences in meaning between certain Korean 
concepts and their English equivalents. 
2. GENERAL CONTEXT 
2.1. The judicial system 
Korea, being a unitary state, has a uniform judicial system. The courts in 
Korea can be classified into courts of limited jurisdiction and those of general 
jurisdiction. Courts of limited jurisdiction have jurisdiction over certain kinds 
of subject matter only. Examples are the Constitutional Court, the Martial 
Court, the Family Court, the Administrative Court and the Patent Court. The 
Constitutional Court has jurisdiction over such matters as the constitutionality 
of laws and of acts of government branches, the removal of high-ranking 
officers, the dissolution of a political party, and jurisdictional conflicts 
between different branches of government. A Martial Court hears criminal 
cases involving military or civil members of the Korean Armed Forces. 
Family Courts adjudicate cases involving family law issues, such as mar-
riage, divorce and adoption. Administrative courts deal with cases involving 
acts of government of a public law character. The Patent Court is a special 
court to adjudicate cases involving acts of the Patent Office or issues of 
intellectual property law. These Courts of limited jurisdiction are already in 
existence, except the Administrative Court and the Patent Court which are 
scheduled to be established on 1 March 1998. Apart from the Constitutional 
• Assistant Professor of Law, Soong Sil University, College of Law, Seoul. 
Asian Yearbook of International Law, Volume 6 (Ko Swan Sik et al., eds. 
co Kluwer Law International; printed in the Netherlands), pp. 169-200 
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Court, appeal in last resort for cases decided by courts of limited jurisdiction 
is with the Supreme Court. 
Courts of general jurisdiction adjudicate all civil and criminal matters 
except those falling under the scope of courts of limited jurisdiction. A civil 
case is dealt with by a court of general jurisdiction, with the exception of 
family law cases which are dealt with by the Family Court. Questions con-
cerning the constitutionality of laws fall under the jurisdiction of the Consti-
tutional Court. 
The three levels of courts of general jurisdiction are the District Court, 
the High Court and the Supreme Court. The High Court and the Supreme 
Court are exclusively panel courts. A District Court may act as a single-
judge court as well as a 3-judge panel court. The District Court has original 
jurisdiction in civil cases. The character of a case determines whether the 
first instance court is a single-judge court or a panel court. Panel court cases 
are: (a) cases involving amounts exceeding 30 million won (about US$ 
30,000), except cases arising from check and bill of exchange relationships 
which are always single-judge cases regardless of the amount involved;l (b) 
property cases, the sum of which is incalculable;2 (c) cases concerning 
immaterial rights;3 (d) cases classified as panel court cases by a panel court;4 
(e) categories of cases classified as panel court cases by the law;5 (f) multi-
claim cases one of which is under the jurisdiction of a panel court. A panel 
court case may be adjudicated by a single-judge court upon a corresponding 
decision by the panel court. 6 
A judgment by a first instance court may be reviewed twice - by the 
intermediate appellate court and by the last resort appellate court. The inter-
mediate appellate court reviews the judgments of first instance courts not 
only on the legal issues but also on those of a factual nature. The review is 
invoked by appeal from a party. There are no limits to the right of appeal to 
the intermediate appellate court. The last resort appellate court reviews legal 
issues only. This review is also invoked by appeal from a party. There is no 
system of certiorari, but in order to prevent overburdening of the court, 
small claims and cases with no real legal issues involved are excluded from 
its appellate jurisdiction. The Supreme Court is the last resort appellate court. 
Which court serves as intermediate appellate court depends on the kind of 
first instance court. If the first instance court is a single-judge chamber of the 
District Court, the panel chamber of the District Court serves as intermediate 
I Supreme Court Regulation on Material Jurisdiction in Civil and Family Litigation (Supreme 
Court Reg. 706 of 14 January 1980), Art. 2(1). 
2 Ibid. 
3 Regulation on Material Jurisdiction, Art. 2(2). 
4 Court Organization Act (Act No. 3992 of 4 December 1987), Art. 32(1)(1). 
5 Court Organization Act, Art. 32(1)(6). 
6 Regulation on Material Jurisdiction, Art. 2(1). 
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appellate court. 7 If the first instance court is a panel chamber of the District 
Court, the intermediate appellate court is the High Court. 8 One of the char-
acteristics of the Korean judicial system is that trial and appellate jurisdiction 
may be exercised by the same court. 
There is no special court for transboundary civil cases in Korea. How-
ever, in view of the increasing number of transboundary litigations, special 
divisions for this category of litigation have been set up in the Seoul District 
Court and in the Seoul High Court. In the Seoul District Court, 2 panel 
chambers and 2 single-judge chambers were established on 1 March 1994, 
under the name of "Special Division for International Transactions and 
Special Commerce Cases". In the Seoul High Court, the 1st and 12th Civil 
Cases Divisions were designated special divisions for trans boundary civil 
litigation on 1 March 1996. No such special divisions exist in the other 
courts. 9 
Except by adjudication, civil disputes can also be concluded by other 
methods, such as arbitration, conciliation and settlement. Arbitration will be 
dealt with in section 7 of this paper. Settlement can be subdivided into pri-
vate settlement and court settlement. Private settlement means that the dis-
pute is settled by agreement between the parties. The general law on contract 
applies to such an agreement. No special form or specific content is required 
for a settlement agreement to be valid, and consequently, 'seal' or 
'consideration' requirements as exist in the Anglo-American legal system do 
not apply. If, however, a settlement is the result of an unreasonable exercise 
of economic supremacy, it may be declared invalid for being in breach of a 
good moral or social order. 10 
There are two kinds of court settlement: pre-trial settlement and in-trial 
settlement. In the case of pre-trial settlement, the District Court upon request 
of the parties provides its good offices and supervises the efforts through one 
of its judges, leading to the dispute being settled by agreement between the 
parties. The agreement reached has the effect of a final judgment. ll The 
applicable procedure is laid down in Articles 355-359 of the Korean Civil 
Procedure Code (KCPC). In-trial settlement refers to settlement of the dis-
pute during the trial. Here too the dispute is settled by agreement between the 
7 Court Organization Act, Art. 32(2)(1). 
8 Court Organization Act, Art. 281(1). 
9 As to the activities of the special divisions of the Seoul District Court, reference is made to its 
21st and 22nd divisions. Kukjekeorae mit Sangsasakeon Jeondamjaepanbu [Special Division on 
International Transactions and Special Commerce Cases], Inkwonkwa Jeongeui [Human Rights 
and Justice] (April 1995) 133. 
10 LEE SIYOON, Minsasosongbub [Civil Procedure Law] (Bakyungsa, 1995) 21. 
11 Korean Civil Procedure Code (Act No. 547 of 4 April 1960), Art. 206. 
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parties with permission from the court where the case is pending, and the 
agreement has the effect of a final judgment. 12 
As to conciliation, there are again two kinds: conciliation by the court and 
conciliation by a government agency. Both may either be consensual or 
compulsory. Conciliation by a government agency has been institutionalized 
in various fields, such as environment protection, consumer protection, 
labour disputes and medical disputes. Consensual conciliation begins with the 
request of both parties to the dispute. Compulsory conciliation begins either 
with the request by the injured party or through a motion of the agency itself. 
Both types of conciliation do not take effect without the consent of both 
parties to the recommendations made. 
Conciliation by the court is regulated by law, for example in the Civil 
Conciliation Actl3 or the Family Conciliation section of the Family Litigation 
Procedure Code. 14 All kinds of civil disputes may be settled by conciliation. 
It begins with a request to a District Court either by both parties or by one of 
the parties to the dispute, or on authority of the court where the case is 
pending. IS The motion may be made at any time up to the end of the plead-
ings. 16 The provisions on regional jurisdiction (in the literature some- times 
referred to as jurisdiction ratione loci) apply in case of conciliation at the 
request of a party.17 In this case, a judge in charge of conciliation or a con-
ciliation committee of the court hears the case. In case of conciliation on 
authority of the court, the competent court is the one where the case is 
pending. 
If no agreement can be reached, the judge or committee may propose a 
compromise whenever deemed proper. The compromise takes effect if both 
parties do not file objections within 2 weeks. 18 The agreement reached 
through conciliation by court has the effect of a final judgment. 19 If no 
agreement is reached, nor a compromise proposed, or if an objection to the 
compromise proposal is filed, then the original request for conciliation is 
regarded as the filing of a lawsuit. 20 
12 Ibid. Art. 206. 
13 Act No. 4202 of 13 January 1990. 
14 Act No. 4300 of 31 December 1990. 
15 Civil Conciliation Act, Art. 6. 
16 Civil Conciliation Act, Art. 1706. 
17 Ibid., Art. 3. 
18 Ibid., Art. 34. 
19 Ibid., Art. 29. 
20 Ibid., Art. 36. 
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2.2. Sources of law 
Korea is a civil law country profoundly influenced by the German and 
Japanese legal systems. As is usual in a civil law country, the basic laws, 
including those on civil procedure, are systematically codified. The substan-
tive law applicable to trans boundary civil relationships is determined by 
applying the rules of private international law . In Korea this law is systemati-
cally codified in the Private International Law Act or, after its Korean name, 
the 'Excavational Law Act'.21 There is, however, no systematic code of the 
law of procedure relating to transboundary civil litigation. Provisions are 
scattered over various codes or acts. Some are to be found in the Korean 
Civil Procedure Code, such as provisions on regional jurisdiction 
(jurisdiction ratione loci) over foreign legal persons (Art. 4 para. 2), the 
legal capacity of foreigners to litigate (Art. 53), the method of service in a 
foreign country (Art. 176), service by public notice (Art. 179), the effect of 
foreign judgments (Art. 203), the taking of evidence in a foreign country 
(Art. 268), the presumption of authenticity of foreign official documents 
(Art. 327 para. 3), the execution of foreign judgments (Arts. 476 and 477) 
and the seizure of foreign vessels (Art. 688). International judicial co-
operation in civil matters is regulated in a separate statute. 22 Other important 
matters are not regulated by any existing statutory law. 
The question is whether the law on (principally domestic) civil procedure 
applies to transboundary civil litigation as well. A current school of thought 
answers affirmatively, precisely because there is no indication that the KCPC 
is supposed to apply to domestic cases only. 23 It is argued that the absence of 
a specific provision prescribing such limitation and the only partly available 
specific provisions on transboundary litigation should lead to the conclusion 
that all general provisions are to be interpreted as being applicable not only 
to domestic litigation but also to transboundary litigation, with the exception 
of provisions whose scope of application specifically excludes transboundary 
civil litigation. This view has been criticised as not taking sufficient account 
of the difference between domestic and international cases. The latter school 
of thought argues that the KCPC applies to trans boundary civil cases only if 
the transboundary characteristics of the case do not indicate otherwise.24 The 
controversy is especially serious with respect to the issue of international 
jurisdiction, which will be dealt with below in sub-section 3.2. 
21 Act No. 966 of 15 January 1962. It is strongly influenced by the Japanese Act on Private 
International Law. 
22 The Act on International Judicial Cooperation in Civil Cases (Act No. 4342 of 8 March 
1991). 
23 CHUNG DONGYOON, Minsasosongbub [Civil Procedure Law] (Bubmunsa, 1995) 110. 
24 CHOI KONGWOONG, Kukjesosong [International Litigation] (Yookbubsa, 1994) 234. 
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Besides the above-mentioned statutes, there are a number of Supreme 
Court regulations on civil litigation. The Korean Constitution empowers the 
Supreme Court to make regulations with legally binding force provided they 
do not violate statutory law. 
Korea is not a party to any multilateral treaty on trans boundary civil 
litigation. As to bilateral treaties, it is only in the field of criminal law that 
Korea has recently concluded judicial cooperation treaties with the US, 
Australia and Canada. 
The fact that Korea is a civil law country does not exclude the possibility 
and importance of judge-made law. Though judicial decisions have no gener-
ally binding force, they play an important role in the interpretation of the 
written law and in filling up lacunae. Their importance is particularly great in 
the field of procedural law relating to transboundary civil litigation, as there 
are a great many gaps in the written law on the matter. 
The opinion of scholars is also important in the law of procedure in 
trans boundary civil litigation. As there have not been many such litigations in 
Korea, there are not enough judicial decisions yet to provide sufficient 
predictability of Korean practice on all relevant issues. In such cases the 
opinion of scholars is the last resort in predicting possible judgment. Actu-
ally, there are several examples of opinions of scholars to which reference 
has been made in judicial decisions. 
With regard to the question of the applicable procedural law, it is gener-
ally recognized in Korea that the lex fori is applicable in transboundary civil 
litigation. 25 The problem is how to distinguish between substantive and 
procedural matters. According to the current school of thought in Korea, this 
is determined through application of the legal criteria of the forum state, 
although the result may be modified by jori (see infra, sub-section 3.2.1) in 
view of the specific features of a transboundary procedure.26 
3. JURISDICTION 
3.1. Notion of jurisdiction 
The term jurisdiction is used in several meanings in Korea. It may refer to 
the competence of a state to exercise prescriptive, adjudicative or enforcing 
power. In transboundary civil litigation it refers to the adjudicative compe-
tence of a state to hear and decide a case, which is equivalent to juris-diction 
in US legal terminology. The terms 'general jurisdiction', 'general compe-
tence' and 'international jurisdiction' are used to specify this meaningY In 
this paper, the term 'international jurisdiction' is employed. 
25 Ibid. p. 244; CHUNG DONGYOON, op. cit. n. 23 p. 110. 
26 CHOI KONGWOONG, op. cit. n. 24 p. 247. 
21 SUH HEEWON, Kukjesabubkangeui [Lectures on private intemationallaw] (I1chogak, 1996) 
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International jurisdiction can be relevant in a direct or indirect way. The 
issue may be whether the judiciary of a country has competence to hear a 
given transboundary civil case. The term 'direct international jurisdiction' is 
employed to refer to this meaning. The notion of international jurisdiction 
may also be relevant as a requirement in recognizing and enforcing a foreign 
judgment. The term 'indirect international jurisdiction' is used to specify that 
meaning. Although a different term is used, the basic idea underlying both 
jurisdictions is said to be the same.28 
The term jurisdiction is also used to refer to the competence of a specific 
Korean court to adjudicate a given case, on the presumption that the Korean 
judiciary has international jurisdiction. For this purpose, terms like 'specific 
jurisdiction', 'specific competence', 'concrete jurisdiction' and 'domestic 
jurisdiction' are employed.29 This paper uses the term 'domestic jurisdiction'. 
Domestic jurisdiction in Korea can be categorized in various ways. First, 
there is the categorization according to the basis of jurisdiction. Under this 
categorization, jurisdiction can be sub-divided into law-deciding jurisdiction, 
court-deciding jurisdiction and party-deciding jurisdiction. Law-deciding 
jurisdiction refers to jurisdiction based on the distribution of cases among the 
courts and can be sub-categorized into functional, material and regional 
jurisdiction. Court-deciding jurisdiction refers to the jurisdiction of a higher 
court to decide in a dispute over, or uncertainty about, jurisdiction of a lower 
court. Party-deciding jurisdiction refers to jurisdiction on the basis of the will 
of the parties. It can be sub-divided into jurisdiction by acquiescence and 
consensual jurisdiction. 
The second categorization distinguishes between exclusive and optional 
jurisdiction. Exclusive jurisdiction refers to jurisdiction that may not be set 
aside, irrespective of the consent of the parties concerned. It applies where 
such public interests as fair trial or due process demand adjudication of the 
case by a specific court. Functional jurisdiction, as mentioned below, is 
usually exclusive, unless the law provides otherwise, for example where a 
so-called jumping appeal is allowed. Optional jurisdiction may be substituted 
by another by consent of the parties concerned, since it is provided for the 
benefit of the private interests of the parties concerned, such as convenience 
or equal opportunity of the parties. Material jurisdiction and regional juris-
diction30 are usually optional, except where the law provides otherwise. 
Functional jurisdiction refers to the distribution of functions among 
various courts. One may distinguish between the functions of adjudication 
and execution, or may refer to the different functions of single-judge courts 
120. 
28 CHUNG DONGYOON, op. cit. n. 23 p. 109. 
29 CHOI KONGWOONG, op. cit. n. 24 p. 268. 
30 See infra. 
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and panel courts, or to the different levels of courts. An adjudication court 
assumes functions like taking and preserving evidence, and ordering provi-
sional attachment. An execution court entertains functions like compulsory 
execution of property and supervision of the process. An execution court is 
usually a single-judge court. 
The distribution of functional jurisdiction among single-judge courts and 
panel courts refers to the distribution of various functions relating not only to 
trial procedures but also to appellate procedures, and to pre-trial and post-
judgment matters as well. The general rule is that single-judge courts assume 
jurisdiction over issues that are simple and require a speedy decision, while 
panel courts adjudge issues that are complex and require careful considera-
tion. Exclusion and challenge of judges are typical examples of the functions 
of a panel court. Pre-trial settlement, preservation of evidence, special 
speedy trial3l and questions of public notice are salient examples of single-
judge court functions. Functional assignment of jurisdiction may take place 
for a case falling under the material jurisdiction of another court. 
Level jurisdiction refers to the different functions of the various levels of 
courts. The function of every court at any level begins with the filing of the 
suit or the appeal and ends with the delivery of judgment. Before a higher 
court begins its functions by filing the appeal and transferring the relevant 
documents from the lower court, actions such as provisional attachment and 
preservation of evidence remain under the responsibility of the lower court. 
Regional jurisdiction (or jurisdiction ratione loci) refers to the distribution 
of cases among courts of the same level in different districts. It is similar to 
'venue' in the US legal system. It is decided by various factors connecting 
the court and the case concerned. These factors can be categorized in two 
ways. First, categorization may take place by distinguishing between factors 
ratione personae and those ratione materiae. Jurisdiction ratione personae 
relates to the connection between the court and the parties concerned, typical 
examples of which are residence and domicile. Jurisdiction ratione materiae 
concerns the connection between the court and the facts of the case con-
cerned, such as the place of commission of the tort or the place of first 
arrival of the salvaged ship. A second categorization is the distinction be-
tween general factors and special factors. General factors apply to all the 
civil litigations of a person, regardless of their factual aspects, whereas 
special factors apply to specific kinds of claims. 
A tort suit may be brought in the court of the place where the act was 
committed. 32 A lawsuit for damages due to a collision of vessels or aircraft or 
any other accident relating to vessels or aircraft, may be brought in the court 
31 Under this procedure the court may issue an order for the payment of an alleged debt without 
hearing the debtor. The latter may follow the order or may raise objection. In the latter case a 
formal trial will follow. The Supreme Court Office uses the English translation "demanding 
procedure" for the Korean term. 
32 KCPC, Art. 16(1). 
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of the place where the damaged vessel or aircraft first arrived. 33 A suit 
relating to salvage may be brought in the court of the place where the salvage 
was effected or the place where the salvaged vessel first landed.34 A suit 
relating to a right of succession, a testamentary gift or any act that is to take 
effect by death, may be brought in the court of the place where the deceased 
was at the time of the opening of the succession.35 A suit relating to a claim 
against the estate of a deceased or relating to an incumbrance upon such 
estate may also be brought in the court where the deceased was at the time of 
the opening, but only when the whole or part of the estate lies in the juris-
dictional district of that court. 36 
3.2. Exercise of jurisdiction 
3.2.1. Requirements 
The first thing to note regarding the requirements for international juris-
diction of Korean courts is that the KCPC does not deal with them directly. It 
only contains provisions on domestic jurisdiction. The Korean Private Inter-
national Law Act contains special provisions on the requirements for interna-
tional jurisdiction of Korean courts only in some specific cases, such as the 
declaration of incompetence and its revocation, and the appointment and 
removal of guardians for incompetent persons. 37 
How then should an answer be found to the question whether a Korean 
court has international jurisdiction? There are two prominent schools of 
thought in Korean scholastic opinion. One school argues that the problem 
should be solved by analogy, i.e. by applying the KCPC provisions on 
domestic jurisdiction. 38 According to this view, one should first ask whether, 
if the case were a domestic one, the court would have jurisdiction under the 
KCPC. If the answer is in the affirmative, the Korean court also has jurisdic-
tion in transboundary cases. This school of thought is called the 'Nationalist 
School'. Another school of thought argues that the issue should be settled by 
applying jori on transboundary civil litigation. 39 lori may be translated into 
33 KCPC, Art. 16(2). 
34 KCPC, Art. 17. 
35 KCPC, Art. 20. 
36 KCPC, Art. 2l. 
31 Korean Private International Law Act, Arts. 7(2), 8 and 25(2). 
38 LEE SIYOON, op. cit. n. 10 p. 60; CHUNG DONGYOON, op. cit. n. 23 p. 114; LEE YOUNG-
SEOP, Sinminsasosongbub [New Civil Procedure Law] (Bubmunsa, 1972) 6l. 
39 KANG HYUNJOONG, 'Kukjeminsasosongbub' [International civil procedure law], Sabubhaeng-
jung [Judicial Administration] (April 1987) 48; CHOI KONGWOONG, op. cit. n. 24 p. 300. 
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'legal reasoning' or 'natural law' . It is a very vague notion which emphasizes 
the need for due respect to international comity, due process of law, fair 
opportunity for the parties concerned, and speedy and efficient trial. This 
school of thought is called the 'Internationalist School' . 
The Internationalist School criticizes the Nationalist School for putting the 
cart before the horse. It argues that international jurisdiction should be 
affirmed before the issue of domestic jurisdiction becomes relevant. The 
Internationalist School emphasizes the different rationale of international and 
domestic jurisdiction and holds that there is no reason why international 
jurisdiction should be dependent on domestic jurisdiction. However, the 
Internationalist School is also not free from criticism. The Nationalist School 
argues that the theory of the Internationalist School is too vague and that the 
core notion of jori cannot provide sufficient criteria for the court to decide on 
the issue of its international jurisdiction. 
The Korean courts seem to espouse, roughly speaking, a compromise 
view. Accordingly, the court first analyses whether the court's domestic 
regional jurisdiction would be established if the case were a domestic one. 
Next, the court considers whether jori would change the result of the appli-
cation of the general rule. Through this process, full account is taken of the 
characteristics of transboundary civil litigation. The degree of the effect of 
jori and its nuances are, however, not uniform. The following decisions of 
the Supreme Court may illustrate this. 
A trans boundary case on broker fees arose out of a broker agreement in 
respect of an international financial transaction concluded between a Korean 
company and a Japanese company in Japan. The Supreme Court recognized 
the Korean court's international jurisdiction. The reasoning reads, inter alia: 
"Art. 6 of the KCPC provides that a claim relating to a property right out of 
contract may· be brought before the court of the place of performance. Ac-
cording to the Korean Private International Law Act, the applicable law is 
Japanese commercial law, the law of the place where the contract was con-
cluded, since no special agreement on the applicable law is provided in the 
contract. The Japanese Commercial Code provides that, except in case of an 
obligation to deliver specific goods, the place of performance of the contract 
is the domicile of obligee. The Japanese company established a subsidiary in 
Seoul, Korea to manage the work concerned. Under these conditions, the ju-
diciary of Korea, being the place of performance, has international jurisdic-
tion, barring any special provision to the contrary. ,,40 
Through this reasoning the Supreme Court decided on the issue of interna-
tional jurisdiction by applying the provisions on domestic regional jurisdic-
tion by analogy. 
40 Supreme Court, 20 April 1972, Pankyul [Judgment] Da 248. 
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In a divorce case between foreigners jori was more emphasized. 41 The 
plaintiff was an American citizen who had lived in Korea since 1964. The 
defendant was also an American, with domicile in the US. The Korean 
Family Litigation Procedure Code42 stipulates that, unless otherwise provid-
ed, a family lawsuit shall be brought in a court which is the general forum of 
the defendant. It also provides that this general forum is determined by the 
defendant's residence, domicile or last domicile, and that, if there is no such 
place, the proper court is the family court of the place where the Supreme 
Court is located. Considering the nationality and domicile of the parties and 
the above provision, the Supreme Court denied international jurisdiction of 
Korean courts in the case, even though the proper court might be the family 
court of the place where the Supreme Court is located, if the case were a 
domestic one. The reason provided was that in a divorce case between aliens, 
Korean courts have international jurisdiction only if the domicile of the 
defendant is located in Korea, barring special circumstances to the contrary. 
However, there is another decision according to which the case is pre-
sumed to meet the jori on international jurisdiction if it meets the require-
ments of the KCPC on domestic regional jurisdiction. An officer of the 
Korean branch of a foreign company filed a lawsuit on grounds of unlawful 
dismissal. On the issue of international jurisdiction of the Korean court, the 
Supreme Court held: 
"As no treaty on international jurisdiction is concluded, as no generally rec-
ognized principle of international law on international jurisdiction is estab-
lished, and no provision on international jurisdiction is provided by the 
KCPC, this issue should be decided by jori, having due consideration of fair-
ness for the parties concerned and of a speedy and faithful trial. In this re-
gard, it should be acknowledged that if the requirements of the KCPC provi-
sion on domestic jurisdiction are met, the requirements of international juris-
diction are deemed to be met also, as the KCPC provisions are made in ac-
cordance with the above-mentionedjori. ,,43 
For this reason, international jurisdiction over the case was recognized by 
analogy of Article 10 of the KCPC. This Article provides that a suit against a 
person holding office or other place of business at some place may, insofar 
as the claim exclusively concerns the business affairs of such office or place 
of business, be brought before the court of the place where the office or 
place of business is situated. 
The principle adhered to in the above decision was re-affirmed in a recent 
case, as follows: 
41 Supreme Court, 22 July 1975, Pankyul Meu 22. 
42 Act No. 4300. 
43 Supreme Court, 20 July 1992, Seongo 91 Da 41897. 
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"As there is no provision in the KCPC on international jurisdiction, nor a 
treaty or a relevant generally recognized [rule of] inter-national law, [the 
question] should be settled by jori on inter-national jurisdiction consisting of 
fairness for the parties con-cerned and a speedy and faithful trial. As the pro-
visions on domestic regional jurisdiction of the KCPC follow the jori, it is 
reasonable that if one of such factors as the domicile of the defendant, the of-
fice of the legal person, the place of performance, the location of the prop-
erty, or the place of commission of the tort is in Korea, the international ju-
risdiction of the Korean judiciary is presumed, barring special circumstance 
to the contrary. ,,44 
From the above cases it may be inferred that, if a case includes one of the 
factors required by the KCPC for the determination of domestic regional 
jurisdiction, the existence of international jurisdiction is presumed unless the 
jori on international jurisdiction demands otherwise. The divorce case also 
seems to infer thatjori is more emphasized in family law cases. 
As the provisions on domestic regional jurisdiction play an important 
role, it is necessary to elaborate on them. They are laid down in Articles 1-2 
[Art. la according to Western usage] to 21. Articles 1-2 and 2 relate to 
general regional jurisdiction over natural persons. Articles 3 to 5 concern 
general regional jurisdiction over Korean diplomatic officers, Korean legal 
persons and the Korean government respectively. Articles 6 to 21 are provi-
sions on special regional jurisdiction, which means that they apply only to 
such special kinds of cases as tort, claims relating to immovable property and 
claims relating to salvage. 
Several factors, such as the domicile of the defendant and the place of 
tort, may apply to a case so that several courts may have regional jurisdiction 
over the case. In these situations the plaintiff may choose among the eligible 
courts. The choice of the plaintiff is, however, not final and he may file the 
same suit at another court. The result is that it may lead to lis pendens with 
the effect of dismissal or suspension of the later suit. 
3.2.2. Exercise ofJurisdiction in case of non-fulfilment ofJurisdictional 
requirements 
If a claim seeks the determination of personal liability of the defendant, 
his appearance in court to contest the case on its merits constitutes submis-
sion to the jurisdiction of the court, even when jurisdiction would not have 
existed otherwise. This basis of jurisdiction is called general appearance or 
jurisdiction by acquiescence. There is no rule on international jurisdiction by 
acquiescence in the KCPC which only contains a provision on domestic 
jurisdiction by acquiescence: 
44 Seoul District Court, 12 January 1996, Seongo 64 KaHab 66533. 
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"When a defendant pleads on the merits of a suit or makes statements in the 
preliminary proceedings without contesting the jurisdiction of the court of 
first instance, the said court shall have jurisdiction." 
181 
There is no court decision on whether jurisdiction by acquiescence is 
recognized with respect to international jurisdiction. It is presumed, how-
ever, that if a case meets the requirements of domestic jurisdiction by acqui-
escence and if jori on international jurisdiction does not demand otherwise, 
international jurisdiction by acquiescence would be recognized. 45 This is 
inferred from the judicial decisions on the relationship between domestic 
jurisdiction and international jurisdiction. Therefore, it is necessary to eluci-
date the requirements and effects of domestic jurisdiction by acquiescence. 
Jurisdiction by acquiescence is recognized only in cases of optional 
jurisdiction. It takes effect when the defendant pleads on the merits without 
making jurisdictional pleas. Jurisdictional pleas after pleading on the merits 
cannot prevent the effect of the jurisdiction vested by acquiescence. It has 
effect only for the case concerned, and not for a renewed suit filed after 
dismissal of the original one on the notion of the court or upon the request of 
the plaintiff. 
Joinder of causes of action or of parties may be a ground for establish-
ment of jurisdiction. It could mean that even though a court has no domestic 
regional jurisdiction over a claim, yet it may exercise jurisdiction if the court 
has jurisdiction over other claims co-related to the former one. Article 22 of 
the KCPC provides as follows: 
"(1) In the case of joinder of several claims in one suit, such a suit may be 
brought in any court having jurisdiction over anyone of the claims in accor-
dance with the provisions of Articles 1-2,2 to 5, 5-2, 6 to 21. 
(2) The provision of Paragraph (1) shall be applicable in case the right or 
duty which is the object of the lawsuit is common to more than one person, 
or if several persons become parties as common litigants due to the same ac-
tual or legal cause. " 
This provision is interpreted as giving rise to new jurisdiction in a multi-
party case if the legal or factual bases of the original claims are co-related. In 
a multi-claim case between the same parties, however, co-related jurisdiction 
is recognized although there is no common factual or legal basis between the 
various claims. The provision applies only to regional jurisdiction and not to 
other jurisdictions, such as functional, material or level jurisdiction. 
Though the provision is designed to apply only to domestic jurisdiction, it 
has been acknowledged by the Supreme Court that joinder of causes of action 
45 CHOI KONGWOONG, op. cit. n. 24 p. 308. 
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creates new jurisdiction also in transboundary litigation. The defendant in the 
case concerned requested attachment and auction of plaintiff's property in 
Korea. The plaintiff filed a counter-claim, the cause of which was related to 
the basis of attachment. In regard to the counter-claim, the defendant made a 
jurisdictional plea that the Korean court had no international jurisdiction. The 
Supreme Court rejected the plea by ruling that: 
"Contrary to his argument that the Korean court has no international juris-
diction diction over him, the defendant, a foreign company, has submitted to 
the jurisdiction of the Korean court by requesting attachment and auction to a 
Korean court. Therefore, in light of jori, it would be reasonable for the Ko-
rean court to exercise international jurisdiction over the case of which the 
facts are related to the basis of the attachment and auction. ,,46 
Thus international jurisdiction was assumed in case of joinder of causes of 
action. It is not certain whether international jurisdiction would also be 
assumed in case of joinder of parties, but it is likely to be the case if the 
claims have a common factual or legal basis. 
3.2.3. Jurisdiction of compulsory execution 
The Korean legal system does not recognize civil arrest in the sense of 
public authority taking a person in custody for the purpose of forcing him to 
answer to a civil claim. Compulsory execution in the Korean legal system 
can be divided into direct execution, substituted execution, and indirect 
execution. Direct execution is performed by public authority in regard to the 
object of the judgment. Substituted execution is performed by public author-
ity in regard to another object when the execution of the original object is 
considered not feasible by the executing court. Indirect execution aims at 
compelling the defeated party to perform or to refrain from some act by 
threatening to impose disadvantages on him. In that respect it is similar to 
civil arrest, but the only disadvantage that can be imposed in the Korean 
legal system is that of punitive damages. 
The jurisdiction to perform substituted execution and indirect execution is 
exercised exclusively by the court which has rendered the judgment. 47 The 
jurisdiction of direct execution is exercised by the public execution authority 
or court of the place where the object of the execution is located. The Court 
with jurisdiction over direct execution deals with compulsory auction of 
immovable property and direct execution of contract rights of the original 
obligor against a third-party obligor, and other property rights. 48 The public 
execution authority deals with other compulsory executions such as provi-
sional attachment, provisional execution or compulsory auction of tangible 
46 Supreme Court, 12 December 1989, Seongo 88 DaKa 3391. 
47 KCPC, Art. 693. 
48 KCPC, Arts. 557 and 667. 
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and movable property, compulsory execution of or conveyance of immovable 
or movable property. 49 
3.2.4. Jurisdiction in rem and quasi in rem 
In rem action in the US legal system purports to affect the interests of 
persons in a specific thing, instead of imposing personal liability on anyone. 
The effect is that the possible judgment only determines the status of a thing 
adjudicated. The intended result is reflected only in certain kinds of action, 
such as an action for the confirmation of title or confirmation of paternity. 
This notion is unknown in the Korean legal system. The jurisdictional effect 
of in rem jurisdiction is that the court which does not have personal jurisdic-
tion may exercise jurisdiction by the mere fact that the thing adjudicated is 
located in the district. Such reasoning is reflected in some provisions on 
regional jurisdiction, including Articles 9, 18 and 19 of the KCPC. 
Quasi in rem action in the US legal system refers to an action that would 
have been in personam if jurisdiction over the defendant had been attainable. 
It is referred to as half-way house between in rem and in personam. It is in 
rem in that the court is able to exercise jurisdiction because the defendant has 
property within the jurisdiction. It is in personam in that the subject matter of 
the suit is unrelated to the property seized. The characteristic of quasi in rem 
action is that property and intangibles are seized not as the real object of the 
litigation, but merely as a means of establishing jurisdiction over the defen-
dant. A judgment quasi in rem has no res judicata value as the court has not 
exercised jurisdiction with regard to personal liability. That notion is also 
unknown and is in fact unnecessary in the Korean legal system. Because of 
the uniform character of the Korean judicial system, the judgment of a 
Korean court is valid in all other courts in Korea. The scope of the judgment 
depends exclusively on the mode of judgment and the intention of the court. 
Things may, however, be different in transboundary civil litigation. As a 
Korean judgment is not always recognized in foreign countries, it may be 
enforced only by execution of property located in Korea. In such a situation, 
quasi in rem jurisdiction may be at issue. In this regard, Articles 9 and 12 of 
the KCPC become relevant. Article 9 provides, in part, that an action con-
cerning property rights against a person who has no domicile in Korea, or 
whose domicile is unknown, may be brought before the court of the place 
where attachable property of the defendant is situated. Article 12 provides 
that an action based on an obligation related to or secured by a vessel may be 
brought in the court of the place where the vessel is situated. Since the court 
may have no other connecting factor for its jurisdiction, the effect of a 
possible judgment is similar to that of a quasi in rem action. In fact the 
49 KCPC, Arts. 492, 527, 689 and 690. 
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Supreme Court has recognized that Article 9 applies to transboundary civil 
litigation: 
"A property right action against a person who has no domicile in Korea, or 
whose domicile is unknown, may be brought before the court located in the 
place where the subject matter or the security therefor, or any attachable 
property of the defendant is situated, even though he is a foreigner. The 
reason for the recognition of this jurisdiction is that the possible judgment 
will be enforced by the execution of such property. ,,50 
3.2.5. Constraints on the exercise ofjurisdiction 
Although jurisdiction might formally exist, special factors might constrain 
its exercise. This section will deal with two of the most frequently occurring 
factors: forum non conveniens and 'political question' . 
The doctrine of forum non conveniens in the US legal system is defined as 
the discretionary power of a court to decline to exercise the jurisdiction it 
possesses when it appears that it may be more appropriate for the case before 
it to be tried elsewhere. In the Piper Aircraft case, the US Supreme Court 
held that this doctrine applies to international civil litigation. The rationale of 
the doctrine is to avoid unreasonable inconvenience for the parties and the 
burdening of the court with cases unconnected to it. In the Korean legal 
system, the term forum non conveniens is not used and there is no provision 
dealing with it. However, the transfer of a suit may meet the rationale of 
forum non conveniens. Article 32 of the KCPC provides: 
"A court may, if it deems necessary to avoid considerable damage or delay in 
regard to a suit over which it has jurisdiction, transfer the whole or part of 
such suit to another competent court upon its own authority or upon motion 
of parties, except in case of a lawsuit under exclusive jurisdiction of the 
court. " 
Since the provision is designed for domestic jurisdiction, there is uncertainty 
as to whether and under what conditions it is applicable to international 
jurisdiction. There is no judicial decision on the issue. Some scholars argue 
that the policy consideration of forum non conveniens should be applied to 
international jurisdiction whenever exercise of jurisdiction would result in an 
unreasonable burden on the defendant. 51 
'Political questions' also constitute a constraint on the exercise of judicial 
jurisdiction. In the Korean legal system, the doctrine of political question 
means that the court refrains from the exercise of its jurisdiction in highly 
political matters. The act of state doctrine is, however, not included. In the 
50 Supreme Court, 25 October 1988, Seongo 87 Ka 1728. 
51 RYU YUNGIL, Kukjeminsasabubkongjoe Kwanhan Yunku [A Study on International Assistance 
and Cooperation in Civil and Commercial Matters], doctoral dissertation (Seoul National 
University, 1994) 34. 
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US legal system this doctrine means that an act of a state carried out within 
its own territory cannot be challenged in the domestic courts of another state. 
Such a doctrine is not recognized in Korea. Korean courts would decide on 
the validity of an act of a foreign state (under the law applicable in the case) 
whenever the issue is raised. International comity is usually considered by 
recognizing the validity of the act unless it is contrary to the good morals or 
public policy of Korea. 
3.3. Forum selection 
Article 26 of the KCPC provides the following on forum selection: 
"(1) Parties in a case may decide on a first instance court by agreement. 
(2) The agreement referred to in Paragraph (1) shall be valid only if it is 
made in writing with respect to a suit based on a specific legal relation-
ship." 
This provision is interpreted to apply only to optional jurisdiction. In the 
absence of relevant court decisions it is presumed that the requirement of 
specification of a court is considered to be fulfilled if a specific court can be 
determined by interpretation of the agreement, even if it does not specifically 
designate a court. Consequently it would seem that a forum selection is valid 
even though it only refers to a country, provided the competent court can be 
determined under the law of the forum state. The right of selection is avail-
able in all civil cases, including family cases. The only aspect of the issue 
treated in scholastic opinion is the invalidity of the selection if it is the result 
of unreasonable exercise of power by one of the parties. 
As the rule formally applies to domestic jurisdiction, scholastic opinion 
and court decisions are important in determining its applicability to interna-
tional jurisdiction. It seems that forum selection is indeed considered applica-
ble also to transboundary civil litigation, as soon as the requirements for 
domestic forum selection are fulfilled. 52 There is no court decision on 
whether forum selection is restricted to some special kinds of trans boundary 
issues, and there seems, in fact, to be no such limitation. 
Forum selection may, however, not be recognized if it were to result in a 
denial of justice. 53 Accordingly, a forum selection cannot bar the filing of a 
suit in another forum than the one selected, if the selected forum refuses to 
entertain the selection and to exercise jurisdiction. This reasoning has been 
well illustrated in a lower court decision. The issue at hand was the validity 
52 CHOI KONGWOONG, op. cit. n. 24 p. 307. 
53 Ibid. 
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and effect of a forum agreement in transboundary civil litigation. The plain-
tiff and defendant had agreed on a forum selection clause in an international 
financial transaction contract, designating the District Court of Tokyo as the 
proper forum. In spite of the clause, the plaintiff filed a suit in the Seoul 
Civil District Court in Korea. The defendant made a jurisdictional objection. 
The court upheld this objection for the following reasons: 
" . . . The case before it is not subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Ko-
rean courts. It is certain that the Japanese court would entertain the case, as 
the Japanese court does not reject a forum selection in a case where a Japa-
nese company demands payment of capital and interest arising out of a finan-
cial transaction contract concluded in Japan between a Japanese company and 
a Korean company. ,,54 
The nexus between the case and the selected forum is relevant for determin-
ing whether the original jurisdiction is optional and, consequently, the forum 
selection is allowed, and whether the selected forum will recognize the 
selection made. The forum selection agreement may contain an express 
provision as to whether the selected forum is intended to be exclusive or 
cumulative to the statutory forum. In the above case the explicit intention of 
the parties was entertained. In the absence of such express intention, the 
Supreme Court decided that if the selected forum is among the law-deciding 
forums it is exclusive, while it is cumulative if it is not one of them. 55 
Whether the parties may derogate from their own selection depends on 
whether the initially selected jurisdiction is exclusive or cumulative. In the 
above-mentioned decision, the court admitted the jurisdictional plea, as 
follows: 
"From the facts presented, the forum selection seems not to be cumulative to 
that of the Korean judiciary but an exclusive jurisdiction of the Japanese 
court [ ... J. ,,56 
As in domestic cases, forum selection in transboundary cases should be 
done in writing. 
3.4. Lis (alibi) pendens 
Article 234 of the KCPC prohibits the filing of a double suit: "With 
regard to a case pending before a court, neither party may bring another suit 
on the [same] case". This provision is considered not to apply to a duplicate 
suit in the court of a foreign state because the territorial scope of judicial 
power is limited to the territory of the state concerned. Reversely, the pend-
54 Seoul Civil District Court, 21 October 1981, Seongo 81 KaHab 949. 
55 Supreme Court, 15 May 1963, 63 Da 111. 
56 Seoul Civil District Court, 21 October 1981, Seongo 81 KaHab 949. 
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ing of a case in another state has no effect on the exercise of jurisdiction by 
the Korean court. However, in light of the economy of civil litigation and 
judicial justice, the courts constrain that exercise by way of the recognition 
of foreign judgments. 
This attitude is well illustrated in a decision by the Supreme Court. 57 A 
Korean man and a Korean woman had married in Korea and had been living 
in New York since shortly after the marriage. The woman filed a divorce suit 
in a New York court. While the suit was pending, the man returned to Korea 
for his work and instituted another divorce suit against the woman in a 
Korean court. The woman did not appear in the Korean court and, conse-
quently, did not make a plea of lis pendens. While the Korean lawsuit was 
pending, the New York court rendered a final judgment allowing divorce and 
mandating the payment of child allowance. The Korean court later rendered a 
judgment which was more favourable to the husband. The woman appealed 
to an intermediate appellate court and to a last resort appellate court. Among 
the grounds of appeal was the double suit plea. The Supreme Court re-
manded the case to the intermediate appellate court, holding as follows: 
"A foreign judgment may have res judicata effect by recognition. There-
fore, it is incorrect for the lower court not to have considered the possibil-
ity of recognition of the New York court judgment. " 
The lower court consequently decided that the judgment of the New York 
court had res judicata effect in Korea, as it fulfilled the requirements of 
Article 203 of the KCPC on recognition of foreign judgments. The man 
appealed but the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the lower court. 
It may be inferred from this case that, although a lawsuit in a foreign 
country in itself does not bar an identical claim on the same facts in a Korean 
court, the judgment of the foreign court may affect that suit if it is rendered 
first and meets the requirements for recognition of foreign judgments. In 
considering the fulfilment of these requirements, due process and the interest 
of the parties, as well as the reasonableness of an exercise of jurisdiction by 
the Korean court are taken into account. 
Some issues remain unsettled. First, it is uncertain how the new lawsuit 
should be dealt with while the foreign lawsuit is pending and judgment is not 
yet rendered. There is no judicial decision available on this issue as yet. 
Some scholars have argued that the Korean court should suspend the trial of 
the new case until the foreign court has rendered its final judgment. Others 
argue that suspension of the case is unnecessary and that the admissibility of 
the new suit should be decided later in light of the possibility of recognition 
of the future foreign judgment. 58 
57 Supreme Court, 14 March 1989, Seongo 88 Meu 184, 191. 
58 International Civil Litigation (Korean Judicial Training Institution, 1995 no. 3) 88-89. 
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It is also uncertain which of the decisions takes effect if a Korean judg-
ment is rendered and becomes final while a prior foreign final judgment, has 
remained unnoticed. Some argue that the foreign judgment will not take 
effect on the ground that it is in breach of public policy as it contradicts a 
final judgment of a Korean court. Others argue that the issue should be 
decided by the jon on transboundary civil litigation. 59 
3.5. Immunities 
There are special circumstances, due to the special status of the party 
concerned, by which the forum state lacks jurisdiction although all other 
requirements for such jurisdiction are fulfilled. Sovereign immunity and 
diplomatic immunity are typical examples. 
As to sovereign immunity, there is no written law on the subject, except 
for a reference, in Article 18(2) of the Korea-US Friendship, Commerce and 
Navigation Treaty,60 to the status of public entities of the US. The Article 
prescribes that an enterprise of one party, including a public-owned or 
public-controlled corporation, association, or government agency, does not 
enjoy tax exemption, nor immunity from judicial jurisdiction, compulsory 
execution, and other obligations regularly imposed in the territory of the 
other party on privately owned or privately managed companies, if it engages 
in commercial, industrial, shipping or other business activities. Three judg-
ments deal with the sovereign immunity of foreign public entities. The first 
two decisions seem to follow the so-called 'absolute immunity' doctrine, 
while the third one seems to tend to adhere to the so-called 'restrictive im-
munity'theory. 
First, there is a judgment of 1975 in a lawsuit against the state of Japan. 61 
The plaintiff was a Korean resident in Japan. He had a user right to public-
owned riverside land for a sightseeing boat business. The right was repealed 
when the land was needed for the construction of a highway. The Japanese 
government did not pay any compensation, whereupon the Korean filed a 
claim for damages against the Japanese government in a Korean court. The 
defendant raised the objection of sovereign immunity, which was accepted by 
the Supreme Court. The reasons provided were as follows: 
"Korea can not exercise judicial jurisdiction over a foreign country because it 
is international practice that a State does not submit to the judicial jurisdiction 
of a foreign country, with the exception of the existence of special treaty pro-
visions to the contrary, or waiver by the state enjoying immunity. Such ex-
ceptions do not apply in this case." 
59 Ibid. 89. 
60 Treaty of 27 November 1956; Korean Bilateral Treaty Series, Bk. No.2 (1940-1960) 501; 
TIAS 3947; 8 UST 2217. 
61 Supreme Court, 23 May 1975, Koji 74 Ma 281. 
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The second decision, of 1985, concerned a suit by a Korean citizen 
against Thailand. 62 An officer of the Thai Embassy in Korea had borrowed 
money from a Korean, the alleged purpose of which was the payment of 
salaries to employees of the Embassy. The officer issued a pre-dated check 
with the seal of the Thai Embassy. On the day of payment, the Thai Embassy 
declined payment on the ground that the officer was not empowered to issue 
a check with the seal of the Embassy and had embezzled the money. The 
Embassy consequently claimed not to be liable for the check. The Korean 
creditor filed a suit against the Thai Government but the defendant pleaded 
sovereign immunity. The Supreme Court accepted the plea on the same 
reason as that provided in the case mentioned above. It added the following 
reasoning: 
"Though there is a substantial number of countries which in their domestic 
laws and judicial decisions do not recognize sovereign immunity with regard 
to transactions of a private character, this practice has not attained the status 
of customary international law." 
In a recent case of 1994, the Korean court seems to have changed its 
attitude. 63 A Korean had leased an electronics shop in a US government-
managed hotel in Seoul. An officer of the hotel had said that due to the 
special status of the US Army in Korea, all goods sold in the shop were tax-
free. The Korean believed this and a corresponding clause was included in 
the contract. As it turned out that some goods sold in the shop were not tax-
free after all, the Korean filed a suit against the US Government seeking 
indemnity for the resulting loss. The defendant raised the sovereign immunity 
objection, which the Seoul District Court rejected on the following ground: 
"An act of a foreign state or its agency is not always immune from the juris-
diction of the domestic court of another state. If [the act] is of a private eco-
nomic or commercial character, it is not immune from the jurisdiction of a 
domestic court. " 
This being the typical argument in favour of restrictive immunity, it might be 
assumed that Korea has changed its attitude by following the restrictive 
immunity doctrine, but for the fact that the decision was taken by a lower 
court. Nevertheless, most authors in Korea support the doctrine of restrictive 
immunity. 64 
Diplomatic and consular immunity is covered by the Vienna Conventions 
on diplomatic and consular relations, and international customary law on the 
62 Seoul Civil District Court, 25 September 1985, Seongo 81 KaHab 5303. 
63 Seoul Civil District Court, 22 July 1994, 90 KaHab 4223. 
64 LEE SIYOON, op. cit. n. 10 p. 54; CHOI KONGWOONG, op. cit. n. 24 p. 255. 
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matter. Korea ratified the former in 1970 and the latter in 1977.65 It should 
be noted that international law binding on Korea is regarded as having the 
same effect as domestic law in the Korean legal system. 
Under Article 23 of the Korea-US Status of Forces Agreement66 the US 
Army and its personnel are immune from the jurisdiction of Korean courts or 
at least subject to special judicial procedures. The US and Korean Govern-
ments waive mutual claims for damage to military property or military 
personnel of the other party if the claim has arisen during the performance of 
official duties. In case of a claim for damage to other public property as a 
result of the performance of official duties, it is settled by arbitration. Claims 
for damage to a civilian as a result of the performance of official duties by 
US Army personnel are to be settled following the procedural and substantive 
law applicable to similar claims arising from the performance of official 
duties by Korean Army personnel. Claims for damage to a civilian arising 
from private activities of US Army personnel are to be treated as a normal 
civil case except that it is preceded by a special mediation procedure. Under 
this special procedure, the Korean government hears the case and fixes the 
amount of compensation. If the victim accepts the amount, the case ends 
there. If he refuses, a suit may be filed. 
4. SERVICE OF PROCESS 
4.1 Service of process in general 
Korea is not a party to any treaty relating to international cooperation on 
service of process, although the participation in the 1965 Hague Convention 
on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extra Judicial Documents in Civil or 
Commercial Matters is under discussion (in 1997). The only international 
law affecting service of process and binding on Korea is the Vienna Conven-
tion on Consular Relations. Domestic law on the matter is to be found in the 
KCPC67 and the International Judicial Cooperation in Civil Cases Act (IJCC) 
of 8 March 1991.68 The IJCC regulates judicial cooperation on service of 
process and taking of evidence. Before this Act took effect, the Supreme 
Court Guideline on the Treatment of Judicial Cooperation regulated the 
matters concerned. Article 3 of the IJCC prescribes the precedence of inter-
65 See 2 AsYIL (1992) 187. 
66 Agreement under Art. 4 of the Mutual Defence Treaty between the Republic of Korea and the 
USA, regarding facilities and areas and the status of US armed forces in the Republic of Korea, 
9 July 1966, Korean Bilateral Treaty Series, Bk. No.3 (1960-1970) 695; TIAS 6127; 17 UST 
1677. 
67 Art. 176 on Methods of Service in a Foreign Country, Art. 179 on Service by Public Notice. 
68 Act No. 4342. 
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national law over domestic law in case of service of process,69 but it has no 
real effect, as there is only domestic law on civil judicial assistance available 
in Korea. 
4.2. Service of process in a foreign country for proceedings in Korea 
The request for service of process in a foreign country is made by the 
presiding judge of the court where the suit is pending, through the head of 
the court to which the requesting judge belongs, the Director of the Court 
Administration Office, and the Minister for foreign affairs, to the Korean 
consul in the foreign country or to the competent public authority of the 
foreign country. 70 
Service of process by the Korean consul is invoked if the person to be 
served is a Korean national residing in the foreign country, if that country is 
a party to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and if such manner 
of service is not contrary to that country I s law or its 'declaration of intent' .71 
Japan is said to be the only country that has prohibited the service of process 
by the Korean consul on Korean nationals in its territory. 72 In case of service 
by the Korean consul, the relevant documents are delivered directly to the 
person served, or by mail with attestation that the delivery has in fact taken 
place.73 
Service by the competent public authority of the foreign country where 
the service is to be made may be entrusted to the court or another official 
agency of that country, if the country concerned has approved by law or 
'declaration of intent' to entertain such entrustment. 74 Such declaration may 
be made expressly as well as implicitly. A translation is appended to the 
related documents in the official language of the country where the service is 
to be made or in English if the official language cannot be identified.75 The 
expenses for translation shall be part of the lawsuit cost. 76 All other expenses 
69 Art. 3. In case the treaty and other international laws corresponding to it provide otherwise 
with respect to judicial cooperation procedures as prescribed by this Act, the former shall 
prevail. 
70 IJCC, Art. 5. 
71 Ibid., Art. 5(2)(1). 
72 See RYU YUNGIL, op. cit. n. 51 pp. 126-129. 
73 IJCC, Art. 8. 
74 Ibid., Art. 5(2). 
75 Ibid., Art.7(1). 
76 Ibid., Art. 7(4). 
192 ASIAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
needed for the service are to be borne by the party requesting it and the 
estimated amount shall be paid in advance. 77 
If both manners of service of process are legally or practically not possi-
ble, service by public notice is the last resort. In this case, the court official 
shall keep the documents to be served, and put up a corresponding notice on 
the court billboard. At the same time, the Korean ambassador or consul 
residing in the foreign country concerned is notified78 by the court, through 
the head of the court to which the requesting judge belongs, the Director of 
the Court Administration Office, and the Minister for foreign affairs. 79 
4.3. Service of process in Korea for proceedings in foreign country 
The IJCC provides that all services in Korea for proceedings in a foreign 
country shall be done through the Korean court. The request from the foreign 
country is made through diplomatic channels and is assigned by the Director 
of the Court Administration Office to a proper court, i.e. the District Court 
which has jurisdiction over the place where the service is to be carried out. 
Neither service by mail or personal service on the defendant directly by 
an authority of the foreign country, nor direct service between the parties are 
allowed in Korea. Yet such illegitimate ways of service are reported to be 
frequently used in practice80 although they may result in the refusal of recog-
nition of the later foreign judgment. Meanwhile, some scholars argue that 
they should be allowed for reasons of convenience and reliability. 81 
In addition to service through the Korean court, service by a foreign 
consul on his nationals is permitted, if the country concerned is a party to the 
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. Under this Convention the service 
of process is part of the functions of the consul. However, the service by a 
foreign consul on Koreans or nationals of a third country is not permitted. 
Statistics about the numbers of service of process in Korea for foreign 
proceedings are not available82 but there are reports about entrustments from 
the US, Germany, Switzerland, Singapore, the UK, Canada, Turkey, Nor-
way, Australia, Hongkong and Qatar. 83 
Some requirements must be fulfilled for an entrustment from a foreign 
country to be effective. One is that of reciprocity. There shall be either a 
judicial cooperation treaty between Korea and the entrusting country or a 
77 Ibid., Art. 9. 
78 Ibid., Art. 10(1). 
79 Ibid., Art. 10(2). 
80 Ryu YUNGIL, op. cit. n. 51 pp. 114-117. 
81 Ibid., p. 119. 
82 Supreme Court, 12 July 1992, 92 Da 2585. 
83 Kukjesabubkongjoeobmucheriyokang [Handbook on International Judicial Cooperation] (Court 
Administration Office, 1985) 6. 
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commitment from the entrusting country that it would in turn comply with 
any entrustment of judicial cooperation by the Korean court. 84 Other re-
quirements include that the entrustment may not be detrimental to the public 
morals in Korea; that the entrustment is made through diplomatic channels; 
that the entrustment of service is made in writing specifying the name, 
nationality, address or residence of the person to be served; that a translation 
in the Korean language is appended; that the entrusting country guarantees 
the payment of expenses needed for implementing the entrusted matters. 85 
5. THE TAKING OF EVIDENCE 
5.1. The taking of evidence in a foreign country for proceedings in Korea 
Like the service of process, taking of evidence is regulated only by 
domestic law. Korea is not a party to any treaty on judicial cooperation, such 
as the 1970 Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or 
Commercial Matters. The main domestic law is contained in the ncc and 
some provisions of the KCPC. 86 In the absence of a treaty, the question 
whether the requested country entertains an entrustment for the taking of 
evidence depends on international comity. 
The request for the taking of evidence in a foreign state is made by the 
presiding judge in the case at hand. As in the case of a request for service of 
process, the request for taking evidence is made through the head of the 
court to which the requesting judge belongs, the Director of the Court Ad-
ministration Office, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs. 87 The taking of 
evidence is done by the Korean consul in the foreign country or by the 
competent public authority of the foreign country concerned. A direct request 
by the parties to a foreign court or foreign authority is not permitted. The 
taking of evidence by the Korean consul can only take place if the person 
undergoing inquiry is a Korean national who is residing in the foreign coun-
try, if that country is a party to the Vienna Convention on Consular Rela-
tions, and if the mode is not contrary to that country's law or its 'declaration 
of intent'. 88 No case on the application of this procedure has been reported 
84 IJCC, Art. 12. 
85 IJCC, Art. 12. 
86 Art. 268(3) on Investigation of Evidence in a Foreign Country; Art. 327 on the Presumption 
of Authenticity of a Foreign Official Document. 
87 IJCC, Art. 6. 
88 IJCC, Art. 5. 
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yet. 89 Therefore, it is said that the only realistic way of taking evidence is by 
the court or other official agency of the country where the evidence is taken. 
A translation must be appended to the related documents in the official 
language of the country where the service is made, or in English if the 
official language thereof cannot be identified. The expenses for the transla-
tion shall be part of the lawsuit cost. All other expenses needed for the taking 
of evidence are to be borne by the requesting party and the estimated amount 
shall be paid in advance. 
The law does not exclude any kind of evidence from being acquired. 
There are, however, no reported cases on requests for the production of 
documents, the summons of a witness, or the consultations of an expert. The 
only form practised so far has been the questioning of persons. 90 
5.2. The taking of evidence in Korea for the proceedings in a foreign 
country 
Taking evidence for foreign proceedings can only be done by a Korean 
court. The entrustment by the foreign country is made through diplomatic 
channels and is assigned to the proper court by the Director of the Court 
Administration Office. 91 This is the District Court having jurisdiction at the 
place where the evidence or the other objects to be verified or appraised are 
located. 92 
In order for the entrustment by the foreign country to be entertained in 
Korea, there shall be either a judicial cooperation treaty on which the en-
trustment is based or a commitment by the entrusting country that it will 
comply with any entrustment by the Korean court. In addition there are the 
following other requirements: 
"The taking of the evidence in question must not be detrimental to the public 
morals of Korea; the entrustment is made through diplomatic channels; the 
entrustment is made in writing specifying the party, a summary of the case, 
the kind of evidence, the name, the nationality, the address or residence of 
the person to be heard and the matters to be inquired in case of the hearing of 
a witness; a translation in the Korean language must be appended; the en-
trusting country guarantees the payment of expenses needed for the imple-
mentation of the entrusted matters. ,,93 
The law does not prescribe any restrictions as to the methods of evidence-
taking such as the production of evidence, the consultation of experts, and 
89 Ryu YUNGIL, op. cit. n. 51 p. 162. 
90 Ibid. 
91 IJCC, Arts. 13 and 14. 
92 IJCC, Art. 11. 
93 IJCC, Art. 12. 
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the hearing of witnesses or the party concerned. 94 However, as is shown in 
the following case, one may presume that entrustment of compulsory evi-
dence examination is not entertained in Korea. A German court requested the 
blood sampling of the defendant in a German proceeding for the determina-
tion of a child-father relationship. The entrustment said that compulsory 
blood sampling was a permissible method of collection of evidence under 
German law if the defendant refuses to render cooperation voluntarily. The 
Korean court sent a summons to the defendant, who refused to appear. It 
thereupon terminated the procedure and concluded on the impossibility of the 
taking of evidence. 95 
6. RECOGNITION AND EXECUTION OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS 
Korea is not a party to any treaty on recognition and enforcement of 
foreign judgments, and one therefore has to turn to domestic law to look for 
an answer to the question of recognition and execution of foreign judgments. 
Recognition is dealt with in Article 203 of the KCPC and execution in Arti-
cles 476 and 477. 
A foreign judgment is recognized or executed after it is confirmed that it 
meets the formal requirements set by the law without inquiry into its con-
tents. In deciding whether a foreign judgment meets the public policy re-
quirement, its contents may, however, be considered. 96 By recognition, the 
foreign judgment obtains an effect identical to that of final and conclusive 
judgment in the country where it was rendered. The requirements for recog-
nition of foreign judgments are as follows (Art. 203 KCPC): 
"A foreign judgment which is final and conclusive shall be valid only upon 
the fulfilment of the following conditions: 
1. The jurisdiction of the foreign court is not denied by domestic or treaty 
law; 
2. The defeated defendant, if he is a citizen of Korea, has received the sum-
mons or any other orders necessary for the commencement of the suit 
through other than public notice, or has voluntarily responded to the claim 
without such notice; 
3. The foreign judgment does not violate good morals and the social order of 
Korea; and 
94 Ryu YUNGIL, op. cit. n. 51 p. 159. 
95 Family Court, 89 Cheu 1 Kongjosakun [Cooperation case]. 
96 CHOJ KONGWOONG, op. cit. n. 24 p. 401. 
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4. There is mutual guarantee. ,,97 
A foreign judgment must be final and conclusive in order to be recqg-
nized. Any kind of final and conclusive judicial decision having the character 
of a judgment is considered to meet this requirement, regardless of its name 
and format. 98 The finality, conclusiveness and judgment character of the 
foreign judicial decision are determined by Korean law. 'Conclusive' means 
that no further general remedy is available to the defeated party to obtain a 
change of the judgment. 'Final' means that no further court action is required 
to declare the matter exhaustively adjudged. 'Judgment' means an official 
decision of the court on the claim object of the litigation. Usually, it is 
rendered at the end of the proceedings, but it may be rendered in the middle 
of the proceedings if there are several claims and if an intermediate judgment 
is necessary for the further proceedings. No differentiation is made between 
the different types of judgment: execution judgment, declaratory judgment, 
or judgment changing the legal status of the parties. 
The requirement of international jurisdiction of the foreign court is called 
'indirect international jurisdiction'. As mentioned above in section 3. 1., its 
criteria are the same as that of direct international jurisdiction. This is illus-
trated by a decision of the Supreme Court of 1988 on the recognition of a 
foreign divorce judgment. In that judgment, the Supreme Court reiterated the 
reasoning provided in its decision on direct international jurisdiction, as 
follows: 
"In transnational divorce cases, the issue of the international jurisdiction of 
the foreign court should be decided by such criteria as the fair and just set-
tlement of the case and the policy consideration of the recognition of a for-
eign judgment. In light of these criteria, international jurisdiction is exercised 
by the courts of the country where the domicile of the defendant in the inter-
national divorce case is located, except in special circumstances, such as un-
known place of domicile or voluntary response by the defendant so that the 
exercise of jurisdiction does not breach his due process rights. ,,99 
In a 1995 case on the recognition of a product liability judgment by a 
court in Florida, USA, the Supreme Court repeated the above reasoning. It is 
interesting that the Supreme Court also applied the criteria of the reasonable 
expectation of the defendant and of the substantial connection, similar to 
those applied in the US legal system. It held: 
"In product liability cases, jori demands that the question of whether to exer-
cise international jurisdiction should be decided by taking into account the 
reasonable expectation of the producer that damage might arise and that a suit 
91 This Korean term has a meaning different from 'reciprocity'. It is deemed to be met if the 
other country recognizes and executes Korean judgments under the same or more favourable 
conditions than those in Korea. 
98 CHOI KONGWOONG, op. cit. n. 24 p. 396. 
99 Supreme Court, 12 April 1988, Seongo 85 Meu 71. 
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might be filed at the place where it is in fact instituted, and the existence of a 
substantial connection between the producer and the place where the damage 
occurred. In determining this connection, an important factor is provided by 
the acts of the producer which are consciously aimed at obtaining business 
profit in that very place .... The facts in the present case show that there 
was no such reasonable expectation or substantial connection. ,,100 
197 
The requirement of service of process applies only when the defeated 
defendant holds Korean nationality. Its purpose is to guarantee the right of 
Korean citizens to proper notice of the commencement of a case. Thus, the 
requirement is interpreted to include the prohibition of service by public 
notice and any other extraordinary mode of notice.101 Notice by mail to a 
Korean national residing in Korea is considered to be such an extraordinary 
mode, even though it is a legitimate mode of notice under the law of the 
country where the judgment has been rendered. 102 As to voluntary response 
in case of absence of notice, it is interpreted to include not only general 
appearance but also special appearance, as the requirement is deemed to be 
fulfilled by the mere fact that the defendant knew about the filing of the 
suit. 103 
The public policy requirement is applied in extraordinary situations where 
the international comity of recognizing foreign judgments gives way to the 
public policy of the forum state. 104 Public policy here is interpreted to include 
procedural justice as well as substantive justice. 
Finally, the 'mutual guarantee' requirement is deemed to be satisfied if it 
can be shown that a Korean judgment would be recognized in the state of the 
original court under the same or more favourable conditions. 105 
A foreign judgment may be executed only after its validity has been 
pronounced by an execution judgment (exequatur) of a Korean court. 106 As to 
jurisdiction to render an execution judgment, Article 476(2) of the KCPC 
provides that an application seeking an execution judgment falls under the 
jurisdiction of the District Court located at the place of the general forum of 
the debtor. Where there is no such general forum, it falls under the jurisdic-
tion of the court of the place where the property of the debtor is located. The 
100 Supreme Court, 21 November 1995, Pangyul [Judgment] P3 Da 33607. 
101 Supreme Court, 3 December 1968, Pangyul 68 Da 1929. This judgment stated that "[i]t does 
not meet the requirement for a service of process if notice is given at an old office where no 
member of the defendant is present". 
102 CHOI KONGWOONG, op. cit. n. 24 p. 399. 
103 Ibid., p. 400. 
104 Seoul High Court, 14 February 1985, Seongo 84 Na 4043. 
105 E.g., Supreme Court, 22 October 1971, Seongo 71 Da 1393; Supreme Court 28 April 1987, 
Seongo 85 DaKa 1767. 
106 KCPC, Art. 476(1). 
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competent District Court has jurisdiction over all kinds of foreign judgments 
including those on issues of family law. 107 
An execution judgment is rendered upon fulfilment of the formal re-
quirements, without considering the contents of the foreign judgment. These 
requirements are the same as those on recognition and are contained in 
Article 477 of the KCPC: 
"(1) An execution judgment shall be rendered without inquiring into the pro-
priety of the foreign judgment; 
(2) An application for an execution judgment shall be rejected in the follow-
ing instances: (i) if it has not been proven that the foreign judgment has be-
come final and conclusive; and (ii) if the foreign judgment does not fulfil the 
conditions required by Article 203." 
7. ARBITRATION 
Korea is a party to the UN Convention on the Recognition and Enforce-
ment of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention)108 and the Con-
vention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nation-
als of Other States (ICSID Convention). The most important domestic law on 
arbitration is the Arbitration Act lO9 which applies to both domestic and inter-
national arbitration. A treaty duly concluded and published has the same 
effect in the Korean legal order as a statute. Since the conventions relating to 
international arbitration are lex specia/is, they have priority over the Arbitra-
tion Act. Therefore, the Arbitration Act applies to international arbitration 
only if there are no treaties applying to the case or if there is no treaty provi-
sion applicable to the case. 110 
An international arbitration agreement is respected in Korea and a foreign 
arbitral award is recognized and executed if it fulfils the requirements of 
either of the above Conventions. The details are beyond the scope of this 
paper. Mention will, however, be made of the provisions necessary to obtain 
some insight into the requirements for an arbitration agreement to be re-
spected and for an arbitral award to be executed. 
107 Supreme Court, 28 December 1982, Pangyul Meu 25; Seoul High Court, 3 May 1982, 
Seongo 82 Reu 5. 
108 The Republic of Korea made a commerce and a reciprocity reservation upon ratification of 
the New York Convention. 
109 Act No. 1767 of 3 March 1966. 
110 LEE HOWON, 'Oykukjungjepanjeongeui Seunginkwa Jiphaeng' [Recognition and execution of 
foreign arbitral awards], in Seopoisabubeui Jemunje [Legal problems of transnational 
transactions] (Court Administration Office, 1986) 663; HONG CHANGSIK, 
Oykukjungjepanjeongeui Seunginkwa Jiphaenge Kwanhan Kukjeyeonhabhyubyak Haeseol 
[Commentary on the New York Convention] (Korean Arbitration Institute, 1972) 41. 
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An arbitration agreement shall be made up in writing, or stipulated in a 
contract or contained in an exchange of correspondence or telegrams. III No 
arbitration agreement is allowed regarding matters which are not at the 
disposal of the parties. These matters of public interest include patent dis-
putes and antitrust disputes. The existence of a valid arbitration agreement 
bars the institution of a lawsuit. 112 
Acts or matters which the arbitrator deems necessary for an arbitral award 
but which he cannot directly perform, shall be performed by the Court at the 
request of the arbitrator or the parties concerned. 113 An arbitrator may pro-
ceed with an arbitration procedure and deliver an award, even if a party 
challenges the validity of the arbitration agreement, or contends that the 
arbitration agreement has no relevance to the dispute, and/or that the arbi-
trator has no authority. 114 
An arbitral award shall have the same effect between the parties as a final 
court judgment. 115 An application for the annulment of an arbitral award may 
be filed on any of the following grounds within certain peremptory termsll6 : 
"1. The selection of the arbitrators or the determination of the arbitration 
rules of procedure have not come about in accordance with [the ... Act] or 
with the arbitration agreement; 
2. In the process of selecting the arbitrators or the determination of the arbi-
tration rules of procedure, a party was incompetent or his representative was 
not lawfully designated; 
3. The contents of an arbitral award requires an action which is prohibited by 
law; 
4. The parties have not been examined properly in accordance with the arbi-
tration procedures; or the arbitral award is not properly reasoned; 
5. The case falls under items 4 through 9 of Article 422 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure. " 
The right to apply for annulment of the award lapses upon agreement reached 
on the dispute relating to the above-mentioned item 4.117 The compulsory 
III Arbitration Act, Art. 2. 
112 Arbitration Act, Art. 3. 
ll3 Ibid., Art. 9. 
114 Ibid., Art. 10. 
115 Ibid., Art. 12. 
116 Ibid., Art. 13(1). 
117 Ibid., Art. 13(2). 
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execution of an arbitral award may only take place after its validity has been 
affirmed by an execution judgment. 118 
118 Ibid., Art. 14. 
LEGAL MATERIALS 





Status of refugees; Human rights; Right to equality before the law; Right to life 
and personal liberty; Applicability of human rights to aliens; Indian Constitution 
Articles 14 and 21; Indian policy of conferment of citizenship to members of the 
Chakma tribe 
Supreme Court, 9 January 19951 
AIR 1996 SC 1234, SCALE 1996 VoU p.155 
A.M.AHMADI CJ, S.C.SEN J 
NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION V. STATE OF ARUNACHAL PRADESH & 
ANOTHER2 
A. The case 
The case arose before the Supreme Court of India through a public interest action 
(class action) by the National Human Rights Commission of India (NHRC) in the 
form of a writ petition under Article 32 of the Indian Constitution: this Article pro-
vides a right to constitutional remedies through the Supreme Court for violations of 
fundamental rights. The NHRC is empowered to move the Supreme Court in appro-
priate cases, pursuant to Section 18 of the Human Rights Protection Act, 1993. The 
NHRC's allegation was that some 65,000 Chakma/Hajong tribals, settled mainly in 
the State of Arunachal Pradesh, were being persecuted by sections of the citizens of 
that State. 
A large number of Chakmas had been displaced from the erstwhile East Pakistan 
as a result of the Kaptai Hydel Power Project in 1964. They took shelter in the nearby 
Indian States of Assam and Tripura and most of them later became Indian citizens. 
When Assam expressed its inability to bear the whole burden of the refugees, some of 
them who took refuge in Assam were resettled in Arunachal Pradesh (or North East 
Frontier Agency as it then was) after consultation with the local administration. These 
• Edited by Ko SWAN SIK, General Editor . 
.. Contributed by V.S. MANI and GoVINDRAJ HEGDE, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. 
I Judgment in Writ Petition (C) No.720 of 1995. 
2 The second respondent was the Union of India. 
Asian Yearbook of International Law, Volume 6 (Ko Swan Sik et al., eds. 
<C Kluwer Law International; printed in the Netherlands), pp. 203-232 
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resettled Chakmas were about 4,012 at that time. They were allotted lands in consul-
tation with the local tribes and also granted some financial assistance. The present 
population of these Chakmas in Arunachal Pradesh, after two generations, amounts to 
some 65,000. 
In recent years, however, thanks mainly to local politics, the relations between the 
original population and the Chakmas deteriorated to a point that certain sections of the 
former took to repressive measures against the latter. The All Arunachal Pradesh 
Students Union (AAPSU) called on the Chakmas to quit Arunachal Pradesh by 30 
September 1995 and threatened to use force if its demand was not acceded to. Yet, in 
response to a communication from NHRC at the instance of a Delhi-based NGO, the 
People's Union of Civil Liberties, the State administration reported that the situation 
was totally under control. 
On 15 October 1994, a Chakma NGO (the Committee for Citizenship Rights of 
the Chakmas - CCRC) filed a representation with NHRC complaining of the persecu-
tion of Chakmas. NHRC treated this as a formal complaint and concluded prima jacie 
that the Arunachal Pradesh authorities were acting in coordination with AAPSU with 
a view to expelling the Chakmas from the State. NHRC consequently approached the 
Supreme Court to seek appropriate reliefs. 
B. The Judgment 
The Chief Justice delivered the judgment of the Court. 
The Court noted at the outset that "[t]he Chakmas have been residing in Arunachal 
Pradesh for more than three decades, having developed close social, religious and 
economic ties. Tp uproot them at this stage would be both impractical and inhuman". 3 
As to the issue of conferring citizenship on the Chakmas the second respondent 
(the Union of India) referred to the fact that Chakma children born in Indian territory 
prior to 19874 had legitimate claims to Indian citizenship. The Court's attention was 
also drawn by the Joint Statement issued by the Prime Ministers of India and Bangla-
desh in February 1972 pursuant to which the Union government had conveyed to all 
the States [of the Union] concerned its decision to confer citizenship on the Chakmas 
under Art.5(1)(a) of the Citizenship Act.5 The State government of Arunachal 
Pradesh, however, was found to frustrate the process by not forwarding the individual 
applications to the Union government authorities.6 
3 Para. 10. 
4 I.e.prior to the 1987 amendment of the Citizenship Act. 
5 Citizenship Act (No. 57) of 1955. 
6 The State government contended that the issue of citizenship of the Chakmas has been conclu-
sively determined by the decision of the Supreme Court in State of ArunachatPradesh v. Khudiram 
Chakma (1994 AIR SCW 904). In the present case the Supreme Court said that this contention was 
'misconceived'. See para. 17. That case dealt with Chakmas who migrated to India in 1964, and 
who had left the lands allotted to them and had strayed out and secured land in another area by 
private negotiations. When the State government (of Assam) questioned the legality of the transac-
tion and ordered them to move to the area earmarked for them, the order was challenged on the 
ground that Chakmas who had settled there were citizens of India, invoking Sec.6-A of the 1955 
Act. This Article (made pursuant to the so-called Assam Accord) provides that all persons of Indian 
origin who had come to Assam before 1 Jan. 1966 from territories included in Bangladesh immedi-
ately before the commencement of the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 1985, and who had been 
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The Court also noted the contention of the first respondent (the State government) 
that since the Chakmas were foreigners, they were not entitled to the protection of 
fundamental rights except Article 21 [of the Constitution, recognizing the right t6 life 
and personal liberty], and that, consequently, the authorities may, at any time, ask the 
Chakmas to move and ask the Chakmas to quit the State, if they so desire. 7 The first 
respondent emphasized the sui generis constitutional position of Arunachal Pradesh 
State resulting from its ethnicity, which debarred it from permitting outsiders to be 
settled within its territory8, and reiterated its lack of financial resources for such con-
tingencies. The Court found it "clear that there exists a clear and present danger to the 
lives and personal liberty of the Chakma". 
Having rejected the first respondent's arguments the Court held: 
"We are a country governed by the Rule of Law. Our Constitution confers certain 
rights on every human being and certain other rights on citizens. Every person is 
entitled to equality before the law and equal protection of the laws. So also, no per-
son can be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure es-
tablished by law. Thus the State is bound to protect the life and liberty of every hu-
man being, he be a citizen or otherwise, and it cannot permit any body or group of 
persons, e.g., the AAPSU, to threaten the Chakmas to leave the State, failing which 
they would be forced to do so. No State Government worth the name can tolerate 
such threats by one group of persons to another group of persons; it is duty bound to 
protect the threatened group from such assaults and if it fails to do so, it will fail to 
perform its Constitutional as well as statutory obligations. Those giving such threats 
would be liable to be dealt with in accordance with law. The State Government must 
act impartially and carry out its legal obligations to safeguard the life, health and 
well-being of Chakmas residing in the State without being inhibited by the local 
politics. Besides, by refusing to forward their applications, the Chakmas are denied 
rights, Constitutional and statutory, to be considered for being registered as citizens 
of India."9 
Accordingly, the Court allowed the NHRC petition and ordered that the State of 
Arunachal Pradesh shall protect "the life and liberty of every Chakma residing within the 
State" and shall repel, even by use of force, any attempt by any organized group to 
forcibly evict the Chakmas and that "except in accordance with law, the Chakmas shall 
not be evicted from their homes and shall not be denied domestic life and comfort 
therein" .IOThe Court also ordered that the State "shall not evict or move the concerned 
persons from his occupation on the ground that he is not a citizen of India until the com-
petent authority has taken a decision in that behalf' . 11 
ordinarily resident in Assam since their entry into Assam shall be deemed to be citizens of India as 
from 1 Jan.1966. Others who had come to Assam after 1 Jan. 1966 but before 25 March 1971 and 
had been ordinarily resident in Assam since then, could register themselves. The persons concerned 
in the case had claimed citizenship under this special provision, but the High Court, affirmed by the 
Supreme Court, held that they did not fall under the said category by having strayed away from 
Assam into an area within the later State of Arunachal Pradesh. 
7 Para. 11. 
8 Paras 12,14. 
9 Para 20. 
10 Para 21(2). 
11 Para 21(5) 
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C. Comments12 
A few comments may be offered on this case. First, India has had its share of refugees 
from its neighbouring countries in different changing economic and political contexts. Its non-
participation in the various international refugee conventions has been chiefly due to this 
continuing political and economic burden of refugees. Second, the present case highlights 
some of the problems of economic-environmental refugees, in so far as the Chakmas were 
originally displaced by a hydro-electric project in the erstwhile East Pakistan and it should 
have been the primary responsibility of the Pakistan Government to rehabilitate them. Third, 
having, however, played host to these hapless refugees since 1964, for about three decades, 
the Indian authorities (in this case, a State of the Indian Union) have a duty to protect their life 
and liberty, and respect their right to equality before the law and ensure equal protection of 
the laws. Fourth, these refugees have a right to have their citizenship applications duly con-
sidered by the Central Government and until then, a right not to be uprooted or evicted. 
Whether this amounts to a temporary right of non-refoulement is arguable. Finally, those 
fundamental rights under the Indian Constitution which apply to all persons may in appropri-
ate cases apply to refugees. These include the right to equality before the law and equal pro-
tection of laws (Article 14), the right to protection against ex post facto law (Art. 20), the 
right to life and personal liberty (Article 21), the right to protection against arrest and deten-
tion in certain cases (Article 22), the right against exploitation (Articles 23 and 24), the right 
to freedom of conscience and religion (Article 25), the right against religious taxes (Article 
26), and the right to move the Supreme Court to enforce the fundamental rights (Article 32). 
From an international law point of view, the traditional rule has been that it is the sover-
eign right of a state to decide whether or not to admit a foreigner (including a refugee) or to 
grant him shelter. However, once admitted, the law of the state shall apply to the alien. The 
dictates of the international law on human rights, however, have now become part of the legal 
systems of most civilized societies. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
1966 clearly stipulates [Art. 4(2)] that certain human rights are non-derogable in any circum-
stances and that they include the right to life (Art. 6), the right against torture or cruel, inhu-
man and degrading treatment (Art. 7), the right not to be held in slavery (Art. 8), the right 
not to be imprisoned on the ground of inability to fulfil a contractual obligation (Art. 11), the 
right not to be subjected to ex post facto law (Art. 15), the right to recognition as a person 
before the law (Art. 16) and the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion (Art. 
18). Once admitted to the territory of a state, a refugee has, therefore, the right to expect the 
protection of these non-derogable basic human rights. The above decision of the Indian Su-
preme Court appears to endorse this international law position in so far as its application 
through the Indian law is concerned, although the Court did not pause to consider interna-
tional law aspects as such. 
12 By V.S. MAN!. 
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Human rights; Right to equality hefore the law; Right to residence; Right to life 
and personal liberty; Indian Constitution Arts.14,19,21; Inter-national Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Art.ll 
Supreme Court, 14 December 1994/3 
1995 Supp (2) SCC 182 
K. RAMASWAMY, S. MOHAN AND N.VENKATACHALA JJ 
P.G. GUPTA V. STATE OF GUJARAT AND OTHERS 
A. The Case 
The Gujrat government had allotted 396 newly constructed houses to its employees 
on rental basis. Subsequently, the Government converted these houses from a "Lower 
Income Group Housing Scheme" to a "Hire Purchase Scheme". Under the converted 
scheme, houses would be allotted to various categories of employees fulfilling two 
conditions: first, continuous residence for five years; and second, not having retired 
from service. Later the Government passed two resolutions. The allotment of houses 
was sought to be given, inter alia. to certain categories of employees transferred out 
of the city of Ahmedabad. 
This was challenged before the State High Court. The latter set aside the entitle-
ment to this special allotment, while upholding the other criteria for other categories. 
In appeal it was argued that the State government had no power under the State 
law to pass any resolution contrary to the statutary regulation of allotment; that allot-
ment on priority basis defeated the rights of the weaker segments among the employ-
ees; that the criteria were irrational and arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 (equality 
before the law), 19(1)(e) (right to residence), and 21 (right to life and personal liberty) 
of the Constitution of India. 
B. The Judgment 
N. Venkatachala J. delivered the judgment. The Court held, inter alia: 
"7. It is true that Gujarat Housing Board had constructed houses under low income 
group scheme for allotment to the poorer segments of the society within prescribed 
annual income. Article 19(1)(e) protects the right to residence and settlement in any 
part of the territory of India. The protection of life assured under Article 21 has 
been given expanded meaning of right to life. It is settled law that all the related 
provisions under the Constitution must be read together and given meaning of wid-
est amplitude to cover variety of rights which go to constitute the meaningful right 
to life. The Preamble to the Constitution says that the people of India having re-
solved to secure to all its citizens social and economic justice also made it subject to 
equality of status and opportunity to promote the dignity of the individual in the 
united and integrated Bharat. Article 37 declares the rights in Part IV [as] funda-
mental law in the governance of the country. Article 39(b) enjoins that the owner-
13 Before the Division Bench of the Supreme Court through Civil Appeal NO.1529 of 1988 with 
Nos.1525-28 of 1988 from a judgment of the High Court of the State of Gujrat of 7 Nov .1987. 
With comment by GOVINDRAJ HEGDE. 
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ship and control of the material resources of the community are to promote the wel-
fare of the people by securing social and economic justice to the weaker sections so 
as to subserve the common good, to minimise the inequalities in income and en-
deavour to eliminate inequalities in status. The State, thereby, evolved the scheme to 
provide facilities and opportunities to the individuals and also groups of people who 
have no houses of their own. Article 46, in particular, enjoins that the State shall 
promote with special care the economic interest of the weaker sections of the people 
and ... protect them from social injustice. 
8. Article 11(1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights laid down that the States parties to the Covenant recognise the "right of eve-
ryone to an adequate standard of living for himself and for his family including 
food, clothing and housing and to the continuous improvement of living conditions". 
The States parties will take appropriate steps to ensure the realisation of these rights. 
Recognising these obligations of the State and [in order] to give effect to the essen-
tial importance of international co-operation [and] the directions contained in Arti-
cles 38,39 and 46, the Housing Scheme for allotment to lower income group of the 
people was made. Possession of real property is the basis for and the symbol of 
wealth and influence in society. To the poor, settlement with a fixed abode and right 
to residence guaranteed by Article 19(1)(e) remain more a teasing illusion unless the 
State provides them the means to have food, clothing and shelter so as to make their 
life meaningful and worth living with dignity." 
The Supreme Court rejected the appeal on the ground that the State I s housing 
allotment was flawed in the face of the law on human rights. 
C. Comments 
[See the comments under the next case.] 
Human rights; Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948, Art.25; Interna-
tional Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966, Art. 7; Constitu-
tion of India, Art.14 
Supreme Court, 10 May 199514 
AIR 1995 SC 1811 
K.RAMASWAMY AND N.VENKATACHALA JJ 
LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER (appellants) v. CONSUMER 
EDUCATION & RESEARCH CENTRE AND OTHERS (respondents) 
A. The Case 
Life Insurance Corporation of India (LIC) had turned down proposals for housing 
insurance as presented by insurance agents on behalf of individual respondents. LIC 
14 Through civil appeal No.7711 of 1995 and cross-appeal No. 5651 of 1995, on a Division Bench 
decision by the High Court of the State of Gujrat, of 31 January 1994. 
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imposed conditions which were assailed as arbitrary, discriminatory, and violative of 
Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and Article 21 (right to life) of the Constitution. 
The High Court of Gujrat declared a part of the conditions, namely, " ... 
[P]roposals for assurance under the plan will be entertained only from persons in 
Government or Quasi Government organisation or a reputed commercial firm which 
can furnish details of leave taken during the preceding year under Table 58" as viola-
tive of equality and hence unconstitutional and invalid. This decision came in for ap-
peal and cross-appeal before the Supreme Court. 
B. The Judgment 
The judgment was delivered by K.RAMASWAMI J. The Court held, inter alia: 
"14. From this material matrix, the question emerges whether the appellant is justi-
fied in law ... [to] restrict the term policy only to the specified class, namely, sala-
ried persons in Government, quasi-Government or reputed commercial firms. The 
Preamble, the arch of the Constitution, assures socio-economic justice to all Indian 
citizens in matters of equality of status and of opportunity with assurance to dignity 
of the individual. Article 14 provides equality before law and its equal protection. 
Article 19 assures freedoms with right to residence and settlement in any part of the 
country and Article 21 by receiving [an] expansive interpretation of [the] right to life 
... to right to livelihood. Article 38 in the Chapter [on] Directive Principles enjoins 
the State to promote the welfare of the people by securing and protecting effective 
social order in which socio-economic justice shall inform all the institutions of the 
national life. It enjoins to eliminate inequality in status, to provide facilities and op-
portunities among . . . individuals and groups of the people living in any part of the 
country and engaged in any avocation. Article 39 assures to secure the right to live-
lihood, health and strength of workers, men and women and the children of tender 
age. The material resources of the community are required to be so distributed at 
best to subserve the common good. Social security has been assured under Article 
41 and Article 47 [which] impose a positive duty on the State to raise the standard of 
living and to improve public health. 
15. Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights envisages that every 
one has the right to [a] standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of 
himself and of his family including food, clothing, housing and medical care and 
necessary social services and the right to security in the event of unemployment, 
sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in the circum-
stances beyond his control. Article 7 of the International Covenant on Economic and 
Social Rights equally assures [the] right [ot] everyone to the enjoyment of just and 
favourable conditions of work which ensures not only adequate remuneration and 
fair wages but also decent living to the workers for themselves and their families in 
accordance with the provisions of the Covenant. [The] Covenant on [the] Right to 
development enjoins the State to provide facilities and opportunities to make rights a 
reality and truism, so as to make these rights meaningful." 15 
C. Comments16 
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966 and the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights are often referred to by the Indian Courts when called 
15 Paras. 14-15. 
16 By Govindraj Hegde. 
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upon to interpret constitutional and other statutory provisions. In P.G. Gupta's case the Su-
preme Court of India encountered no intricate legal issues. The Court had to determine sim-
ply whether the State High Court was justified in disentitling certain categories of Govern-
ment employees for the allotment of houses on a special scheme. But in an oblique way this 
question had a bearing on the interpretation of the rights guaranteed under the Indian Consti-
tution, particularly the right to reside and settle in any part of the territory of India under 
Article 19(1)(e). The unique point to note here was the willingness of the Court to mention 
Article 11 (1) of the International Covenant, although it was never raised by the appellant. For 
its decision, the Court relied upon its two earlier cases, namely, Olga Tellis v. Bombay Mu-
nicipal Corporation l7 and Shantistar Builders v. Narayan Khimalal TotameY In the former 
case 'right to life' under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution was interpreted to include the 
'right to livelihood'. The right to life under Article 21 was given an extended meaning in 
Shantistar Builders encompassing in its sweep a reasonable accommodation to live in. A 
reasonable accommodation does not necessarily mean adequate housing facilities, because 
each state's economic and social problems vary. No new propositions were offered by the 
Court as it had simply applied the ratio in the above two cases to P. G. Gupta's case. 
The LIC of India case presents a different picture. A clause in an insurance policy re-
stricting benefits only to the salaried class in Government, quasi-Government and reputed 
commercial firms was declared unconstitutional. The Court in this case recalled a number of 
its earlier decisions. In CESC Ltd. v. Subash Chandra Bosel9 the Court had interpreted the 
meaning of Article 19(1)(e) of the Indian Constitution vis-a-vis Article 25(2) of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and Article 7 of the International Covenant on Economic, So-
cial and Cultural Rights. The Court in that case had held the right to 'social justice' as a fun-
damental right. Another important decision on which the Court relied was Regional Director, 
Employees State Insurance Corporation v. Francis De Cosuio where the Court emphasized 
the need to give an effective interpretation to the Indian Employees' State Insurance Act. It 
held that the right to medical benefit is a fundamental right. Therefore the Court in the LIC of 
India case struck down the conditions in the insurance policy as violative of fundamental 
rights guaranteed in the Indian Constitution in view of their arbitrary exclusion of other simi-
larly placed individuals. 
However, the merits of these decisions should not obscure the fact that the Supreme Court 
had failed to analyse properly the relevant international human rights law provisions in inter-
preting the provisions of the Indian Constitution.21 Instead it merely stated them and made no 
attempt whatsoever to analyse them. Secondly, the Court also failed to examine how 
'fundamental' are the 'second generation' human rights (social, economic and cultural rights). 
The Court appears to take the facile course of looking at all human rights through the device 
of Article 21 of the Indian Constitution. 
17 Supreme Court Cases 1985, Vol. 3, pp. 545, 572. 
18 Supreme Court Cases 1990, Vol. 1, p. 520. 
19 Supreme Court Cases 1992, Vol. 1, p. 441. 
20 Supreme Court Cases 1993, Vol. 1, Supp. 4, p. 100. 
21 Article 2(1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966 im-
poses an obligation on promotional basis "to take steps individually and through international as-
sistance and cooperation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available re-
sources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realisation of the rights recognised in the 
Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures". 
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Despite these comments, these decisions seek to develop a universal view of human rights 
based on developmental stages, and project a judicial willingness to treat the international 
human rights instruments almost as part of the domestic human rights law. 
State succession; Act of State in municipal context 
Supreme Court, 9 May 199522 
1995 Supp (3) SCC 297 
N. VENKATACHALA AND KULDIP SINGH 11 
MAHARAJA KUMAR KHARAK SINGH V. STATE OF PuNJAB AND 
MAHARAJA KUMAR GURBAX SINGH V. STATE OF PUNJAB AND OTHERS 
A. The Case 
The case related to a farm land, 'Bir Bhadson', claimed by the appellants to have 
been part of the private property of the erstwhile Ruler of the Princely State of Nabha. 
Nabha along with seven other princely states of the Punjab signed a covenant on 5 
May 1948 (which came into force on 20 August 1948) for the formation of a new 
state, the Patiala and East Punjab States Union (PEPSU). In 1956 the PEPSU merged 
with the State of Punjab, a State of the Union of India. 
On 25 April 1948 the Ruler of Nabha wrote a letter to appellant GURBAX SINGH 
(one of his brothers), whereby he made over the above farm land to his two brothers 
(appellants). GURBAX SINGH returned to India from overseas some time in November 
1948 and accepted the conveyance of the farm land. The PEPSU and later the State of 
Punjab refused to release the land and hence the present case. 
Actions for recovery of possession were initiated in 1960. The District Judge, 
Patiala, held that the non-recognition of the rights of the plaintiffs in regard to the 
grant of land covered in the above letter was an 'act of state', and hence adjudication 
by a municipaI court upon the correctness of such an 'act of state', whether it had 
reference to public or private rights, was beyond its competence as a municipal court. 
Consequently, it dismissed the suits. The case was then taken up by the plaintiffs in 
1963 before the Punjab and Haryana High Court, which agreed substantially with the 
findings of the District Judge. The case then came before the Supreme Court. 
B. The Judgment 
The judgment was delivered by VENKATACHALA, J. 
The crux of the case was whether the land in question was part of the Nabha 
ruler's private property or part of the state property of the Nabha State. Neither in his 
letter nor in the documents relating to the covenant did the Ruler clarify if the land in 
question was his private property, or whether his letter to his brother amounted to its 
effective conveyance. The crucial point of fact was that the conveyance made by the 
Ruler of Nabha in favour of his brothers was accepted by the appellant only after the 
covenant on the state merger had come into force. 
22 Civil appeal No.316 of 1978, against the judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court of 9 
March 1977. 
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"If that be so, 'Bir' continued to be the state property of Nabha State till 5-5 
1948, when [the] covenant for bringing into existence of [the] State of PEPSU 
was signed and further up till 20-8-1948 when the State of PEPSU actually came 
into existence, becomes indisputable. "23 
The question whether all the State properties came to vest in the State of PEPSU was 
answered by the Court in the affirmative. 24 The Court then continued: 
"16. Next question is ... is it open to a person, who claims title to 'Bir' ... to 
recover possession of the same from the successor State of PEPSU of Nabha 
State or the successor State of Punjab of PEPSU although it was the subject-
matter of the said covenant . . . 
17. [In case of) state properties of Nabha for which private parties have a claim 
as in the present case, can they claim . . . by filing a suit in an ordinary civil 
court (Municipal Court) on the plea that the sovereign Ruler ... entering into the 
covenant with other sovereigns had wrongly transferred that property to the new 
State of PEPSU so as to vest in it?" 
This question was answered by the Court in the negative on the ground of the act of 
state doctrine, with reference to, inter alia, Article 363(1) of the Indian Constitution. 
In the Court's view, the subject-matter of the case was "the subject of the covenant 
between sovereign Rulers of independent States" . 
Therefore, the appeal was dismissed. 
C. Comments25 
There were more than 500 princely states in India at the time of Independence in 1947 
and they became part of the Indian Union through covenants, sanads and agreements. All 
questions relating to these relationships are, pursuant to Article 363 of the Indian Consti-
tution, debarred from adjudication by the Indian judiciary. While this bar was imposed in 
view of the territorial integrity of India, there is no doubt that a host of legal issues are still 
beckoning legal researchers even after 50 years of Indian independence.26 
23 Para 12. 
24 Para. 14. 
25 By V.S. Mani. 
26 A pioneering effort in this regard has been the work by T.T. POULOSE, Succession in intema-
tionallaw: A study of India, Pakistan and Burma (New Delhi, 1974). 
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INDONESIA 
LEGIS LA TION 
Maritime territory; archipelagic waters; passage rights 
Act on Indonesian Waters (Act No. 6/1996 of 8 August 1996r 
Considering that . . . 
(c) the regulation of the archipelagic legal regime in Government Regulation in lieu of 
Act No.4 of 1960 on Indonesian Waters is no more in accordance with the develop-
ments of the law on archipelagic states as contained in Part IV of the [UN] Conventi-
on [on the Law of the Sea]; 
Decides: 
CHAPTER I: GENERAL PROVISIONS 
CHAPTER II: THE INDONESIAN WATERS 
Article 3 
1. The Indonesian waters comprise the Indonesian territorial sea, the archipelagic 
waters and the internal waters. 
2. The Indonesian territorial sea consists of a belt of sea extending to 12 nautical 
miles measured from the Indonesian archipelagic baselines referred to in Article 5. 
3. The Indonesian archipelagic waters consist of all waters enclosed by the [situated 
on the inward side of the] straight archipelagic base lines regardless of their depth or 
distance from the coast. 
4. The Indonesian internal waters consist of all waters situated on the landward side 
of the low-water line along the coasts of Indonesia, including all waters situated on the 
landward side of a closing line as referred to in Article 7. 
Article 4 
The sovereignty of the Republic of Indonesia over Indonesian waters extends to 
the territorial sea, the archipelagic waters and the internal waters and to the air space 
27 The Act is published in the Lembaran Negara [State Gazette for legislative instruments] 1996 
No.73, and the explanatory memorandum in the Tambahan Lembaran Negara [Annex to the State 
Gazette] No. 3647. 
Translation by the General Editor. Barring manifest intention of the legislature to deviate from the 
provisions of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, the text of the Convention has been 
followed in translating the corresponding provisions of the Act. 
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over the territorial sea, the archipelagic waters and the internal waters, as well as to 
their seabed and subsoil including the natural resources contained therein. 
Article 5 
1. The archipelagic baseline is drawn by using straight archipelagic lines. 
2. In case no straight archipelagic baselines as referred to in paragraph 1 can be 
drawn, normal baselines or straight baselines shall be used. 
3. The straight archipelagic baselines referred to in paragraph 1 are straight lines 
joining the outermost points of the outermost islands and drying reefs of the Indone-
sian archipelago. 
4. The length of a straight archipelagic baseline as referred to in paragraph 3 shall 
not exceed 100 nautical miles, except that up to 3 percent of the total number of base-
lines enclosing the Indonesian archipelago may exceed that length, up to a maximum 
length of 125 nautical miles. 
5. The straight archipelagic baselines referred to in paragraph 3 shall not be drawn to 
and from low-tide elevations, unless lighthouses or similar installations which are 
permanently above sea level have been built on them or where a low-tide elevation is 
situated wholly or partly at a distance not exceeding the breadth of the territorial sea 
from the nearest island. 
6. A normal baseline as referred to in paragraph 2 is the low-water line along the 
coast. 
7. A straight baseline as referred to in paragraph 2 is a straight line joining the out-
ermost points of a coastline which is deeply indented and cut into or of a fringe of 
islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity. 
Article 6 
1. The archipelagic baselines of Indonesia drawn in accordance with Article 5 shall 
be shown on charts of a scale or scales adequate for ascertaining their position. Alter-
natively, a list of geographical co-ordinates of points, specifying the geodetic datum 
may be substituted. 
2. The charts of an scale or scales adequately illustrating the area of the Indonesian 
waters or the list of geographical co-ordinates of points of the archipelagic baselines 
of Indonesia as referred to in paragraph 1 shall be established by Government Regula-
tion. 
3. The Indonesian Government shall give due publicity to the charts or lists referred 
to in paragraph 1 and shall deposit a copy of the 'lists [!!] with the Secretary-General 
of the United Nations. 
Article 7 
1. The Indonesian Government may draw closing lines at the mouth of rivers, estu-
aries, bays, inland seas and harbours in the archipelagic waters for the delimitation of 
the internal waters. 
2. The internal waters consist of (a) the internal sea and (b) the inland waters. 
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3. The internal sea referred to in paragraph 2 item (a) is that part of the sea which is 
situated on the landward side of the closing line at the seaward side of the low-water 
line. 
4. The inland waters referred to in paragraph 2 item (b) consist of all waters situated 
on the landward side of the low-water line except at a river mouth, where the inland 
waters comprise all waters situated on the landward side of the closing line of the 
river mouth. 
Article 8 
The outer limit of the Indonesian territorial sea shall be measured from the base-
lines drawn in accordance with the provisions of Article 5. 
Article 9 
1. Without prejudice to the provisions of Article 4, the Indonesian Government shall 
respect existing agreements and treaties with other states relating to areas falling 
within the archipelagic waters. 
2. The terms and conditions for the exercise of the rights and activities referred to in 
paragraph 1, including the nature, the extent and the areas to which they apply shall, 
at the request of any of the states concerned, be regulated by bilateral agreement. 
3. The rights referred to in paragraph 2 shall not be tranferred to, or shared with 
third states or their nationals. 
4. Existing submarine telecommunication cables laid by another state or a foreign 
legal entity and passing through Indonesian waters without making a landfall shall be 
respected. 
5. The Indonesian Government shall permit the maintenance and replacement of such 
cables upon receiving due notice of their location and the intention to repair or replace 
them. 
Article 10 
1. Where the Indonesian coast and that of another state are opposite or adjacent to 
each other, and failing agreement between them to the contrary, the line of delimita-
tion between the territorial seas of Indonesia and the other state shall be the median 
line every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points on the baselines from 
which the breadth of the territorial seas of the two states is measured. 
2. The provision of paragraph 1 shall not apply where it is necessary by reason of 
historic title or other special circumstances to delimit the territorial seas of the two 
states in a way which is at variance with that provision. 
CHAPTER III: RIGHTS OF PASSAGE OF FOREIGN SHIPS 
PART ONE: INNOCENT PASSAGE 
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Article 11 
1. Ships of all states, whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy the right of innocent 
passage through the territorial sea and the archipelagic waters of Indonesia. 
2. Passage means navigation through the Indonesian territorial sea and archipelagic 
waters for the purpose of: 
(a) traversing that sea without entering internal waters or calling at a roadstead or port 
facility outside internal waters; or 
(b) proceeding to or from internal waters or a call at such roadstead or port facility. 
3. Innocent passage as referred to in paragraph (1) shall be continuous and expedi-
tious, but includes stopping and anchoring in so far as the same are incidental to ordi-
nary navigation or are rendered necessary by force majeure or distress or for the pur-
pose of rendering assistance to persons, ships or aircraft in danger or distress. 
Article 12 
1. Passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or 
security of Indonesia, and so long as it takes place in conformity with the Convention 
and with other rules of international law. 
2. Passage of a foreign ship shall be considered to be prejudicial to the peace, good 
order or security of Indonesia if in the territorial sea or in the archipelagic waters it 
engages in any activity prohibited by the Convention or by other rules of international 
law. 
3. Further rules on innocent passage as referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall be 
established by Government Regulation. 
Article 13 
1. The Indonesian Government may suspend temporarily in specified areas of the 
territorial sea and archipelagic waters the innocent passage of all kinds of foreign 
ships if such suspension is essential for the protection of the security of Indonesia, 
including weapons exercises. 
2. The suspension referred to in paragraph 1 shall take effect only after having been 
duly published according to the applicable rules. 
3. Further rules on temporary suspension as referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall 
be established by Government Regulation. 
Article 14 
1. Where necessary, having regard to the safety of navigation, the Indonesian Gov-
ernment shall designate sea lanes and traffic separation schemes in the territorial sea 
and the archipelagic waters. 
2. Further rules on the use of sea lanes and traffic separation schemes in the territo-
rial sea and the archipelagic waters as referred to in paragraph 1 shall be established 
by Government Regulation. 
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Article 15 
In exercising the right of innocent passage in the territorial sea and the archi-
pelagic waters, submarines and other underwater vehicles are required to navigate on 
the surface and to show their flag. 
Article 16 
Foreign nuclear-powered ships and ships carrying nuclear or other inherently dan-
gerous or noxious substances shall, when exercising the right of innocent passage, 
carry documents and observe special precautionary measures established for such 
ships by international agreements. 
Article 17 
Further rules on the rights and duties of commercial ships, warships and govern-
ment ships operated for commercial and for non-commercial purposes when exercis-
ing the right of innocent passage shall be established by Government Regulation. 
PART Two: RIGHT OF ARCmPELAGIC SEA LANES PASSAGE 
Article 18 
1. Archipelagic sea lanes passage in specially designated sea lanes means the exercise 
in accordance with the Convention of the rights of navigation and overflight in the 
normal mode solely for the purpose of continuous, direct, expeditious and unob-
structed transit. 
2. Foreign ships and aircraft of all states, whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy the 
right of archipelagic sea lanes passage in the Indonesian archipelagic waters between 
one part of the high seas or the Indonesian exclusive economic zone and another part 
of the high seas or the Indonesian exclusive economic zone. 
3. Further rules on the rights and duties of foreign ships and aircraft when exercising 
the right of archipelagic sea lanes passage as referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall be 
established by Government Regulation. 
Article 19 
1. The Indonesian Government shall designate sea lanes and air routes thereabove, 
suitable for the exercise of the right of archipelagic sea lanes passage by foreign ships 
and aircraft as referred to in Article 18 and may also prescribe traffic separation 
schemes as referred to in Article 14 for the safe passage of ships in such sea lanes. 
2. Such sea lanes and air routes as referred to in paragraph 1 shall be defined by a 
series of continuous axis lines from the entry points of passage routes to the exit 
points through the archipelagic waters and the adjacent territorial sea. 
3. When circumstances require, after giving due publicity thereto, sea lanes and 
traffic separation schemes may be substituted by other sea lanes and traffic separation 
schemes. 
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4. In designating or substituting sea lanes or prescribing or substituting traffic sepa-
ration schemes, the Indonesian Government shall refer proposals to the competent 
international organization with a view to their adoption. 
5. The Government shall indicate the axis of the sea lanes and the traffic separation 
schemes designated or prescribed by it on charts which shall be published. 
6. Foreign ships conducting archipelagic sea lanes passage shall respect established 
sea lanes and traffic separation schemes. 
7. Further rules on sea lanes and traffic separation schemes as referred to in para-
graph 1 shall be established by Government Regulation. 
PART THREE: RIGHT OF TRANSIT PASSAGE 
Article 20 
1. All foreign ships and aircraft enjoy the freedom of navigation and overflight solely 
for the purpose of continuous, direct and expeditious transit of a strait through the 
Indonesian territorial sea between one part of the high seas or the Indonesian exclusive 
economic zone and another part of the high seas or the Indonesian exclusive economic 
zone. 
2. The right of transit passage shall be exercised in accordance with the provisions of 
the Convention, other rules of international law and legislative regulations in force. 
Article 21 
1. Where necessary, having regard to the safety of navigation, the Indonesian Gov-
ernment may designate sea lanes and prescribe traffic separation schemes for transit 
passage as referred to in Article 20. 
2. Further rules on sea lanes and traffic separation schemes as referred to in para-
graph 1 shall be established by Government Regulation. 
PART FoUR: ACCESS AND COMMUNICATION 
Article 22 
1. If a part of the archipelagic waters of Indonesia lies between two parts of the ter-
ritory of an immediately adjacent neighbouring state, Indonesia shall respect the ex-
isting rights and all other legitimate interests which that state has traditionally exer-
cised in such waters through regulation by bilateral agreement. 
2. The Indonesian Government shall respect the installation of submarine cables and 
shall permit the maintenance and replacement of existing cables upon receiving prior 
and appropriate notice. 
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CHAPTER IV: UTILIZATION, MANAGEMENT, PROTECTION AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
PRESERVATION OF THE INDONESIAN WATERS 
Article 23 
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1. The utilization, management, protection and environmental preservation of the 
Indonesian waters shall take place on the basis of national legislative regulations in 
force and international law. 
2. The administration and jurisdiction, protection and environmental preservation of 
the Indonesian waters shall take place on the basis of the legislative regulations in 
force. 
3. Where necessary for an increased utilization and an improved management, protec-
tion and environmental preservation of the Indonesian waters as referred to in para-
graph 1 a coordinating body may be established by Presidential Decree. 
CHAPTER V: UPHOLDING OF SOVEREIGNTY OND LAW ON OHE INDONESIAN WATERS 
Article 24 
1. The upholding of sovereignty and the law in the Indonesian waters, the airspace 
thereover, the seabed and the subsoil including their natural resources as well as the 
sanctions against their violation shall take place in accordance with the Convention, 
other international law and applicable legislative regulations. 
2. The exercise of jurisdiction over foreign ships traversing the territorial sea and the 
Indonesian archipelagic waters for the purpose of upholding sovereignty and the law 
shall take place in accordance with the provisions of the Convention, other interna-
tionallaw and applicable legislative regulations. 
3. Where necessary for the upholding of the law as referred to in paragraphs I and 2 a 
coordinating body may be established by Presidential Decree. 
CHAPTEF VI: TRANSITORY PROVISIONS 
Article 25 
(1) Pending the Government Regulation as referred to in Article 6 paragraph 2, an 
illustrative chart of a scale or scales indicating the territory of the Indonesian waters 
or a list of geographical coordinates of the baselines of the Indonesian archipelago 
shall be annexed to this Act. 
(2) The implementing regulations of the Government Regulation in lieu of Act No.4 of 
1960 on the Indonesian Waters shall remain in force to the extent that they are not 
contrary to the present Act or not yet replaced by new implementing regulations based 
on the present Act. 
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CHAPTER VII: CONCLUDING PROVISIONS 
Article 26 
With the coming into effect of this Act, the Government Regulation in lieu of Act 
No.4 of 1960 relating to the Indonesian Waters is abolished. 
JAPAN 
JUDICIAL DECISIONS' 
Obligation on the part of the accused of foreign nationality to bear the expenses 
for the defence counsel and the interpreter; International Convention on Civil 
and Political Rights, Article 14(3)(d) and (0 
Tokyo High Court, 3 February 1993 
x V. STATE OF JAPAN 
X, a Nigerian national, was found guilty of violating the Cannabis Control Law 
and the Customs Law at the Yokohama District Court on 5 August 1992. X appealed 
to the High Court which also found him guilty. 
X asserted that it was a misapplication of the law by the Court when it obliged the 
accused of foreign nationality to bear the expenses for the official defence counsel and 
the interpreter, as it was in violation of the International Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights, Article 14(3)(d) and (t)28 , and that the decision must, therefore, be rever-
sed. 
The Court examined the question of whether it was permitted in light of the Co-
venant to oblige the accused to bear the expenses for the litigation. First, with regard 
to the expenses defrayed to the official defence counsel, the object of Article 14(3)(d) 
• Contributed by TOMIOKA MASASHI, Nagoya Economics University, Nagoya, member of the 
Study Group on Decisions of Japanese Courts Relating to International Law. 
28 The relevant provisions read as follows, in part: 
"Art.14(3). In the determination of any criminal charge against him, everyone shall be entitled to 
the following minimum guarantees, in full equality ... 
(d) To be tried in his presence, and to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his 
own choosing; to be informed, if he does not have legal assistance, of this right; and to have legal 
assistance to him, in any case where the interests of justice so require, and without payment by him 
in any such case if he does not have sufficient means to pay for it; '" 
(t) To have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used 
in court." 
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of the Covenant is to prevent an accused from being tried if he is denied the assistance 
of defence counsel for financial reasons despite such need on his part for his defence, 
by appointing a defence counsel without any payment by the accused, thus guarantee-
ing sufficient means of defence in the process of the trial. The Court, therefore, did 
not find that Article 14(3)(d) prohibited obliging the accused to bear the expenses 
when the accused had already been found guilty and the sentence pronounced, and 
held for this reason that it could not support the claim of the accused, on the basis of 
Article 14(3)(d) of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, that it was not allowed 
to order the accused to bear the expenses for defence counsel. 
Secondly, with regard to the expenses defrayed to the interpreter, the Court found 
that the expenses for interpretation were of a different nature than those for defence 
counsel in the following three respects: 
(1) The right to the assistance of interpreters is provided a statutory basis by the Co-
venant, which has self-executing power in Japan. However, even before the Covenant 
was ratified, the assistance of interpreters was offered as a matter of customary prac-
tice in Japanese courts, reflecting an understanding that the assistance of interpreters 
for the accused constituted an indispensable element for the court proceedings. 
(2) In the case of the right to assistance of defence counsel, private defence counsel 
and defrayment by the accused himself are the rule, while the right of the accused to 
the assistance of interpreters is unconditional and absolute, and consequently the prin-
ciple of private defrayment of the costs shall not be applicable here. 
(3) In the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 14(3)(t) the 
term 'free assistance' is used, which means that the expenses are not assumed to be 
borne by private persons. Consequently, the assistance shall be offered free of charge 
regardless of the financial state of the accused. 
Based on the reasoning presented above, the Court decided that, with regard to 
the expenses defrayed to the defence counsel, the Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 
181, stipulating that the accused may be exempted from the obligation to bear these 
expenses if the accused finds himself in acute financial difficulties, should be applied, 
and, with regard to the expenses for the interpreter, Article 14(3)(t) of the Internatio-
nal Covenant should be applied and the litigation costs for the first and second instan-
ces should not be borne by the accused. 
The right to vote in local elections for foreign nationals permanently residing in 
Japan; the meaning of the terms 'the people' and 'the residents' as stipulated in 
Article 15 paragraph 1 and Article 93 paragraph 2, respectively, of the Japanese 
Constitution; the meaning of the term 'the citizens' as stipulated in Article 25 of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political rights; Articles 27 and 29 of the 
same Covenant 
Fukui District Court, 5 October 1994 
Hanrei Jiho [Judicial Reports] No.1535 (1995) p.77; Hanrei Taimuzu [Law Times 
Reports] No.881 (1995) p.76; Shomu Geppo [Monthly Bulletin of Litigations] Vo1.41, 
No.l1(1995) p.2762 
X ET AL. V. STATE OF JAPAN ET AL. 
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The plaintiffs, who were nationals of the Republic of Korea and had the right of 
permanent residence in Japan, brought a suit against the State of Japan and the elec-
tion administration 
committees of the various cities and towns where the plaintiffs resided in Japan, clai-
ming the determination of the unlawfulness of the state's behaviour by denying the 
plaintiffs the right to be registered in the electorate lists, and demanding a compensa-
tion for the violation of the plaintiffs' right to vote. The plaintiffs, who either were 
born in the former Japanese colony of Korea or were offsprings of such persons, as-
serted that they were entitled to the right to vote in the elections for heads and mem-
bers of the assemblies of local public entities where they had their residence. 
The plaintiffs' claims were mainly based on the following grounds: 
(1) Article 15 paragraph 1 of the Japanese Constitution29 stipulates that 'the people' 
have the right to vote. "The people: here refers to all those who are under a legal 
obligation to obey the decisions from the public entities of which they are constituent 
members, and foreign nationals permanently residing in Japan are included therein. 
(2) Article 93 paragraph 2 of the Constitution of JapanlO stipulates that the representa-
tives of local public entities shall be elected by 'the residents'. 'The residents' here 
refers to the constituent members of local public entities, and foreign nationals oerma-
nently residing in Japan are included therein. 
(3) Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rightsl' which 
prescribes the right to vote, stipulates that 'every citizen' (the expression "the people 
possessing the nationality" is not used) is entitled to the right to vote, which implies 
that the right to vote is not restricted to the people who have the nationality of the 
country concerned. It is, therefore, evident that under the provision foreign nationals 
permanently residing in the country are included in 'the citizens'. 
The Court, dismissing the claim of the plaintiffs, decided as follows: 
(1) 'The people' as provided in Article 15 of the Japanese Constitution refers to those 
who are the constituent members of the state, namely, "the persons possessing Japa-
nese nationality". The right to vote presupposes the existence of the state and can be 
granted only to those people meeting some specific requirements, and, due to its uni-
que nature, is rightfully granted only to the Japanese people and foreign nationals are, 
therefore, not entitled to it. 
29 Art. 15 reads as follows, in part: "The people have the inalienable right to choose their public 
officials and to dismiss them" . 
JOThe relevant provision reads as follows: 
"Art.93 ... (2) The chief executive officers of all local public entities, the members of their as-
semblies, and such other local officials as may be detertnined by law shall be elected by direct 
popular vote within their several communities." (The italicized words are the official translation of 
"jumin ga chokusetsu ... senkyosuru" which literally means "shall be elected by the direct vote of 
the residents") 
Jl The relevant provisions read as follows, in part: 
"Art.25. Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions 
mentioned in Article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions: 
(a) to take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives; 
(b) to vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal 
suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the elec-
tors." 
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(2) 'The residents' as provided in Article 93 paragraph 2 presupposes 'the people' as 
stipulated in Article 15 paragraph 1, and it is appropriate to interpret the term as re-
ferring to 'the residents' which are a constituent part of 'the whole people'. Conse-
quently, the Japanese Constitution grants only those who possess the Japanese natio-
nality the right to vote in the elections of local public entities, to which foreign natio-
nals permanently residing in Japan are not entitled. 
(3) Article 25 of the International Covenant on the Civil and Political Rights, which 
corresponds to Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, stipulates in 
paragraph Ithat everyone "has the right to take part in the government of his country" 
and declares that only those who possess the nationality of the country concerned are 
granted the right to vote. It is evident that the term 'every citizen' as used in Article 
25 of the Covenant is not intended to prohibit making the possession of the nationality 
of the country concerned a condition of the right to vote. The term 'citizens' refers to 
those who possess civil rights and should be distinguished from such terms as 
'peoples' or '[every-]one'. In the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
the term 'every citizen' is used only in Article 25 with reference to the right to vote, 
thus reflecting the exclusive nature of this right. Therefore, the term 'every citizen' as 
used in Article 25 of the International Covenant cannot be interpreted as including 
foreign nationals permanently residing in the country concerned. 
Lastly, the Court, citing the examples of countries such as Sweden where foreign 
nationals are vested with the right to vote in elections for members of the assemblies 
of the localities where they reside permanently, found that it would not be uncon-
stitutional to grant the right to vote in elections at local levels to foreign nationals who 
meet some specific requirements, and that it is a matter of legislative policy whether 
or not to grant such a right to foreign nationals. 
SINGAPORE 
JUDICIAL DECISIONS32 
Arbitration; Requirements for enforcement of foreign award; public policy; 
comity of nations 
High Court, 29 September 1995 
[1996] 1 SLR 34 
JUDITH PRAKASH J 
RE AN ARBITRATION BETWEEN HAINAN MACHINERY IMPORT AND EXPORT CORPORA-
TION AND DONALD & MCARTHY PTE LTD 
32 Texts of the decisions contributed by Soh Tze Bian, Attorney General's Chambers, Singapore. 
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The plaintiffs were an organization constituted under the laws of China; the defen-
dants were an organization constituted under the laws of Singapore. The parties en-
tered into a contract for the sale of goods by the defendants to the plaintiffs. A dispute 
subsequently arose which was submitted to arbitration in China by the plaintiffs, in 
accordance with the contract. The award was in favour of the plaintiffs. As the defen-
dants did not satisfy the award, the plaintiffs applied for an order that they be at lib-
erty to enforce the award as a judgment or order of the court. An order to that effect 
was made. The defendants then applied for the order to be set aside and for another 
order that the award should not be enforced against them. The application was heard 
by the assistant registrar and was dismissed. The defendants appealed to the High 
Court. 
Among the arguments put forward by the defendants were the following: (a) the 
subject matter of the difference was not capable of settlement by arbitration under the 
law of Singapore since the jurisdiction conferred upon the arbitrators did not specify 
the law governing the contract nor the curial law of the arbitration proceedings, and 
under section 31(4)(a) of the International Arbitration Act 1994 (see 5 AsYIL 267) the 
court may refuse to enforce the enforcement of an award on such subject matter; (b) it 
would be contrary to the public policy of Singapore to allow the award to be enforced 
because the defendants had raised facts which would give rise to the possibility that 
the award did not decide on the real matter in dispute between the parties and an in-
justice would be done to the defendants if the award were to be enforced. 
As to the first argument the court held that it was not in accordance with the facts. 
In regard to the second argument the court agreed with the plaintiffs that the argument 
was a back door route to inviting the court to look at the merits of the case. The 1994 
Act does not provide as a ground for setting aside an award the fact that the court, 
hearing the application, considered that the defendants had an arguable case. The 
court said: 
"In my view, public policy did not require that this court refuse to enforce the 
award obtained by the plaintiffs. There was no allegation of illegality or fraud 
and enforcement would therefore not be injurious to the public good. . . . [T]he 
principle of comity of nations requires that the awards of foreign arbitration tri-
bunals be given due deference and be enforced unless exceptional circumstances 
exist. As a nation which itself aspires to be an international arbitration centre, 
Singapore must recognise foreign awards if it expects its own awards to be rec-
ognised abroad. . .. " 
The appeal was dismissed. The defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals. 
Habeas corpus; Extradition; Relevant considerations governing exercise of discre-
tion by magistrate; political offence; extradition brought in conjunction with 
refugeeship 
High Court, 22 May 1996 
[1996] 2 SLR 747 
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RUBIN J 
JOHN MUHIA KANGU v. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS 
The applicant, a police officer from Kenya, was involved in an incident in which 
he and his colleague had reportedly opened fire and killed two unarmed persons owing 
to some confusion over their identities. He fled, first to Norway, and later arrived in 
Singapore using his nephew's passport. He was first granted a 14-day social visit visa 
but was later arrested for being in possession and having used another person's pass-
port. The authorities subsequently learned that he was wanted by Interpol Nairobi for 
two counts of murder and that a warrant had been issued for his arrest in Kenya, and a 
requisition from Kenya was received for the applicant's arrest and surrender. 
The Minister for Law exercised his discretion and issued a notice under section 
22(1)(a) of the Extradition Act, authorizing a district judge to issue the requisite war-
rant for the apprehension of the applicant provided that the provisions of the Act re-
lating to the issue of such a warrant had, in the opinion of the district judge, been 
complied with. The government in its affidavit averred that the minister had no 
grounds to believe that the request by the Kenyan government was politically moti-
vated. The district judge ruled that there was sufficient evidence to justify the extradi-
tion. The applicant then applied for a writ of habeas corpus. 
RUBIN J: 
The main contention of the applicant . . . is that the charges brought against him 
are not made in good faith, that they contain an element of political flavour . 
and further, that he had been framed. 
The matters that should weigh in the mind of the court to which an application 
has been made for a writ of habeas corpus are tabulated under s.25 of the 
[Extradition] Act ... 
Besides the foregoing, there is a restriction under s.20(1) of the [Extradition] Act 
in relation to the surrender of persons connected with offences of a political char-
acter. Section 20(1) provides as follows: 
" ... A person shall not be liable to be surrendered to a declared Commonwealth 
country if the offence to which the requisition for his surrender relates is, or is by 
reason of the circumstances in which it is alleged to have been committed or was 
committed, an offence of a political character. " 
It is clear ... that the court hearing a habeas corpus application does not rehear 
the case that was before the magistrate or district court. Its function, . . . is to 
consider whether the applicant was lawfully detained, besides hearing any issue 
as to whether the offence charged is political in nature. In my opinion, the princi-
pal contention of the applicant that the charges preferred against him possessed a 
political flavour, is outlandish and without any substance. The offences report-
edly committed were not in pursuance of any political objective and the feature 
that a relative of one of the victims called at the residence of a Kenyan Minister 
soon after the incident to relate the event, does not transform the offences re-
ferred to as being political by any yardstick, ... 
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The applicant also referred the court to the Geneva Convention, apparently to 
the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees signed at Geneva on 28 July 
1951. Apart from the fact that Singapore is not a signatory to the said Conven-
tion, there is no evidence whatsoever to suggest that the applicant's refusal to re-
turn to Kenya was due to his fear of being persecuted for reasons of religion, na-
tionality, membership of a particular social group or any political opinion so as to 
bring him within the description of 'refugee' within art. 1 (A) therein. At any rate 
art.lF(b) of the Convention expressly excludes from its ambit persons such as the 
applicant, who are alleged to have committed serious non-political crimes outside 
the country of refuge prior to his admission to that country as a refugee. 
It is an established principle of law that when all the evidence has been pre-
sented,the magistrate's duty is simply to enquire whether a prima facie case has 
been made out against the accused by credible evidence (see Chua Han Mow v. 
Superintendant of Pudu Prison [1979] 2 MU 70 adopting the principles enunci-
ated by BELLAMY J in Re Osman Bin Abdullah [1954] MU 237 at p.238). In my 
opinion, the dispositions placed before the learned district judge amply justified 
his issuing the warrant of commitment; he had in no way exceeded his jurisdic-
tion nor had he applied the wrong principles in arriving at the conclusion as he 
did . 
. . . As a result, I dismissed this application ... " 
Private international law; passing of property in respect to chattels; determina-
tion of lex situs 
Court of Appeal, 26 September 1996 
[1996] 3 SLR 377 
M. KARTHIGESU and L.P. TlUAN JJA, LAI KEw CHAI J 
DIAMOND CENTRE PrE & ANOTHER V. R. ESMERIAN, INC. & ANOTHER 
Jewellery was consigned by R.Esmerian, Inc. (RE, incorporated in New York) to 
Corvina Inc. (incorporated in Panama), who consigned them to Wolfers Trading AG 
(Swiss company), who in turn consigned them and handed them to FAKHREDDIN (Iraqi 
national, first defendant), all this having taken place in Geneva. Under the memoran-
dum of consignment between WOLFERS and FAKHREDDIN the jewellery were handed 
to F AKHREDDIN to enable him to do a special presentation to his customers in the 
United Arab Emirates. They might not leave the UAE for any destination except Ge-
neva. The jewellery were entrusted to FAKHREDDIN for 15 days only. Any item sold 
was to be paid for immediately and any item not paid for and not returned remained 
the property of WOLFERS. The memorandum was to be interpreted according to Swiss 
law and both parties agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of the Swiss courts. 
FAKHREDDIN was supposed to return the consignments by 11 November 1989, but he 
failed to do so or to pay for the goods. The jewellery were misappropriated by 
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FAKHREDDIN who sold them in Singapore to Diamond Centre Pte Ltd. and its di-
rector, TEO (second and third defendant). 
Some of the jewellery was traced and found in Diamond Centre's premises in 
Singapore. RE and Corvina sued the defendants for conversion, seeking the return of 
certain pieces of jewellery and damages. RE also sought a declaration that they were 
the rightful owners of the jewellery . 
The second and third defendants claimed that the recovered jewellery were pur-
chased by them in good faith from the first defendant, being a mercantile agent in 
possession of them with the consent of the owners. The defendants mounted an alter-
native defence that under Swiss law, property in the jewellery had passed to 
FAKHREDDIN. The court heard two expert witnesses. According to the first witness 
(for the plaintiffs) the memorandum of consignment was a 'commission contract', 
under which the commissionnaire undertakes to arrange the sale of movable property 
in the commissionnaire's own name, but for the account of the principal, to a third 
party buyer for a commission. As a result the commissionnaire acquires no title. Ac-
cording to the second witness (for the defendants) the memorandum was a 'con-
signment contract', whereby the consignor undertakes to transfer the goods at a fixed 
price to the consignee for the consignee to sell to a third party in the consignee's own 
name and for the consignee's own account. Consignment essentially being for a fixed 
period only, the consignee has to return the goods or pay for them at the end of the 
period, becoming their owner in the latter case. If the consignee does neither, the 
consignor can assert an ownership claim after having terminated the agreement. Until 
then the consignor only has a claim in contract for the price of the goods. 
The trial judge found that the defendants had not shown they purchased the jewels 
in good faith. He found, inter alia, that the jewels were bought at a substantial under-
value and that the invoices given by the first defendant were irregular. As to the de-
fendants' Swiss law argument, the trial judge did not appear [according to the Court 
of Appeals] to have made a finding that Swiss law applied, though apparently he ac-
cepted that the lex situs rule does not apply where the person claiming title has not 
acted bona fide. though it was not clear whether he was referring to Singapore law or 
Swiss law as the lex situs. As FAKHREDDIN had in fact elected to return the jewellery 
he could acquire no title under Swiss law and hence could not confer title on the de-
fendants. The defendants appealed. 
M. KARTHIGESU JA (delivering the judgment of the court): 
" 
We do not think that Swiss law is applicable at all. The inescapable fact was that 
the jewellery were in Singapore when Fakhreddin sold them to Teo. It seems to 
us clear beyond argument that the lex situs was Singapore law. 
Swiss law is only relevant if it was shown that under Swiss law, Fakhreddin had 
acquired title to the goods in Switzerland, before he purported to sell them in 
Singapore to Teo. According to Professor Piotet's theory, which was advanced 
by the defendants' expert witness, a consignee acquires the property to the con-
signed goods in a blocking situation when he either acquires the goods, sells them 
to a third party, or otherwise disposes of them in breach of his obligation. Fak-
hreddin did none of these acts while he was in Switzerland. It was only when the 
seized jewellery were in Singapore that he sold them to Teo. By which time, the 
lex situs was Singapore law .... " 
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The appeal was dismissed. 
THAILAND33 
LEGIS LA TION 
Contiguous zone 
Royal Proclamation establishing the Contiguous Zone, 14 August 199534 
For the purpose of exercising the rights of the Kingdom of Thailand with regard to 
the contiguous zone, which are based on generally recognized principles of interna-
tional law, it is deemed appropriate to establish the contiguous zone of the Kingdom 
of Thailand as follows: 
1. The contiguous zone of the Kingdom of Thailand is the area beyond and adjacent to 
the territorial sea of the Kingdom of Thailand , the breadth of which extends to 
twenty-four nautical miles measured from the baselines used for measuring the bread-
th of the territorial sea. 
2. In the contiguous zone, the Kingdom of Thailand shall act as necessary to: 
(a) prevent violation of customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regula-
tions, which will or may be committed within the Kingdom or its territorial sea; 
(b) punish violation of the laws and regulations defined in (a), which is committed 
within the Kingdom or its territorial sea. 
" 
JUDICIAL DECISIONS 
Extradition of nationals; Sanctity of contract and good faith in the law of treaties; 
object and purpose of a treaty 
Court of Appeal, 26 December 1995 
(unpublished) 
SOMCHAI JULNm, BANCHA SAHAKIATMONTRI, SERI CHOONHATANOM 11 
THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR v. THANONG SIRIPRECHAPONd5 
33 Contributed by Kriangsak Kittichaisaree, Royal Thai Embassy, Washington D.C. 
34 Royal Gazette, VoU12, Part 69 (Ngor), 29 August B.E.2538 (A.D.1995),p.1. Unofficial trans-
lation by the ministry of foreign affairs of Thailand. 
35 English summary made from an unofficial Thai summary provided by the Thai ministry of for-
eign affairs and from a transcript of the judgment as published in Thai newspapers. 
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The US had requested the extradition of Mr. THANONG SIRIPRECHAPONG, a former 
Member of Parliament, to stand trial for the offence of narcotic drugs trafficking in-
volving the importation into the US of multiple container loads of marijuana over a 
ten-year period between 1977-1987 in which the said person together with five or 
more others were involved and from which they gained a great amount of profit. 
The defendant sought a motion to dismiss the extradition proceedings, arguing:(I) 
the prosecution could not seek a court order for his detention pending extradition since 
the Thai Cabinet had not resolved to extradite him;(2) the offences for which his ex-
tradition was sought were committed outside the US, but since the jurisdiction in 
which the alleged offences had taken place was not specified the defendant was neither 
punishable under US law nor under Thai law;(3) the defendant was in fact not the 
same person as the one sought by the US;(4) a Thai national was not extraditable 
under section 16 of the 1929 Extradition Act36;(5) the prosecution had no sufficient 
evidence to substantiate their allegation against the defendant. 37 
The Criminal Coure8 on 17 July 1995 (Black Case No. 1973/2538) held against the 
defendant and ordered his detention pending his extradition since extradition was allo-
wed pursuant to the Thai-US Extradition Treaty of 198339 and the Extradition Act of 
1990 for the implementation of the Treaty. The defendant appealed to the Court of 
Appeal. 40 
Regarding the question of permissibility of extradition of nationals the Court of 
Appeal, en bane, started its opinion by mentioning the principal Thai law on the mat-
ter, viz. the Extradition Act,B.E.2472 (1929 AD), section 4 of which reads: 
"Even in the absence of an extradition treaty, the Siamese government may ex-
tradite an accused if it deems appropriate to do so, or if the offence carries a 
punishment in the jurisdiction of the requesting state provided that it shall also be 
an offence punishable by Siamese law with imprisonment of at least one year. " 
According to the court this provision sets out the principle that it is within the gov-
ernment's discretion to extradite a person if the stipulated requirements are met. 
The court drew attention to exceptions to the rule, such as provided in sections 5 
and 16 of the Act. Section 5 stipulates: 
"A request for extradition shall not be granted if the person sought has been tried 
and convicted or acquitted in the requested state for the offence for which extra-
dition is requested." 
Section 16 provides: 
36 46 Royal Gazette 271, Part 43, of 22 Dec.B.E.2472 (A.D. 1929). 
37 The following summary of the judgment is limited to items 1 and 4. 
38 'Criminal Court' refers to the criminal court in Bangkok. Provincial courts have jurisdiction in 
both criminal and civil matters and are identified by the name of the provinces where they are 
located. The court took its decision in the following composition: Manitya Jittjantaraklub, presi-
dent, Samakki Maneeratna and Jamras Srithawachpongse, members. 
39 Treaty of 14 Dec. 1983, not yet published in the UNTS. The treaty entered into force on 17 No-
vember 1991. 
40 By virtue of sec. 17 of the 1929 Extradition Act the Court of Appeal is the court of final judgment 
in extradition cases. 
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"If the court finds that the defendant is a Siamese subject ... the court shall re-
port to and consult the minister of justice before issuing a court order for the de-
fendant to be released. " 
Most important, however, section 3 of the Act provides: 
"This Act shall be applicable to all extradition proceedings in Siam so far as it is 
not inconsistent with the terms of any treaty, convention or agreement with a for-
eign state, or any royal proclamation issued in connection therewith. " 
Consequently, it was necessary to find out whether the extradition treaty between 
Thailand and the US of 1983 contained any term which is inconsistent with the 1929 
Act. 
The issue of the nationality of the requested person is dealt with in Article 8 of the 
Treaty: 
"(I) Neither Contracting Party shall be bound to extradite its own nationals. 
In a case in which the United States of America is the requested state, the ex-
ecutive authority shall have the power to extradite its nationals if, at its discre-
tion, it is deemed proper to do so. 
In a case in which Thailand is the requested state, the competent authority may 
extradite its nationals if not prevented from doing so. 
(2) If extradition is not granted pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article, the re-
quested state shall, at the request of the requesting state, submit the case to its 
competent authority for prosecution .... 
(3) Notwithstanding paragraph 2 of this Article, the requested state shall not be 
required to submit the case to its competent authority for prosecution if the re-
quested state has no jurisdiction over the offence." 
Article 8(1) thus lays down the principle that in case of the requested person being a 
national of the requested state, the latter is not obliged under the treaty to comply with 
the request for extradition. However, Article 8 also shows the intention of both con-
tracting parties to extradite their own nationals. 41 For Thailand, it appears from sec-
tion 4 of the 1929 Act that the competent authority specified in the treaty is the Royal 
Thai government. 
The intention of both contracting parties to benefit each other comported with their 
wish to conclude the 1983 treaty and replace the previous treaty of 30 December 
1922.42 This is evident from the preamble of the 1983 treaty which reads: " ... De-
siring to provide for more effective co-operation between the two States in the sup-
pression of crime; and Desiring to conclude a new Treaty for the reciprocal extradi-
tion of offenders; ... " 
Apparently the previous extradition treaty was not sufficiently beneficial to the 
parties. For example, Article 8 of the 1922 treaty provided that "each of the Con-
tracting Parties may decide not to extradite its own nationals to the other Contracting 
41 The 1983 Treaty with the US which, like the one with the UK, leaves room for the extradition of 
Thai nationals, is an exception to the consistent practice in 27 Thai extradition treaties under which 
Thailand denies extradition of Thai nationals. The exceptions are borne out by the practice of the 
US and the UK of pennitting extradition of their own nationals. 
42 25 LNTS 394. 
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Party", and Thailand later enacted the 1929 Extradition Act, section 16 of which pro-
hibited extradition of Thai nationals. It was true that section 3 of the Act provided an 
exception to section 16 in case of an international agreement to the contrary, but arti-
cle 8 of the 1922 Treaty was not inconsistent with section 16 of the 1929 Act. The 
issue for the court to decide was, consequently, whether the proviso "if not prevented 
from doing so" under Article 8(1) of the 1983 treaty fell within the purview of the 
provision of section 16 of the 1929 Act. 
In the opinion of the Court of Appeal, not only the sanctity of contract but also 
good faith is a factor of utmost significance in treaty relations. At a time of facilitated 
inter-state intercourse, treaties between states and the good faith of the parties to a 
treaty has become even more important. This was apparent from the provisions of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969, which, although Thailand was not 
a party, could be taken into account in deciding the present case. The court then 
quoted Article 31 of the Convention which contained a general rule of interpretation 
of treaties: "1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordi-
nary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of 
its object and purpose .... " 
The 1983 Treaty had as its object and purpose more effective cooperation between 
the two states in the suppression of crime by extending mutual cooperation. Suppose 
the contracting parties to the 1983 Treaty had indeed agreed to have unequal treaty 
obligations, with the Thai side prohibiting extradition of Thai nationals pursuant to 
section 16 of the 1929 Extradition Act by adhering to the principle of personal juris-
diction over Thai nationals even if they commit offences outside Thailand, while on 
the other hand the United States would strictly adhere to the principle of territorial 
jurisdiction, why then had the Thai government agreed to the provision of Article 8(1) 
of the 1983 Treaty, allowing the government to extradite Thai nationals in spite of the 
prohibition under section 16 of the 1929 Act? If Thailand had actually intended not to 
extradite Thai nqtionals, it would be useless for the Treaty to provide that Thailand 
had discretion to extradite Thai nationals. Instead, the Treaty would have provided 
that only the United States was obligated to extradite its nationals if, at its discretion, 
it was deemed proper to do so. 
With regard to section 13 of the 1929 Extradition Act which compels the court to 
take account of the defendant's defence of nationality, the section would be applicable 
only if there were indeed a prohibition of extradition on grounds of nationality. 
The next question was whether the 1983 Treaty has retroactive effect. Article 19 
of the Treaty provides that it shall apply to extraditable offences committed before as 
well as after the date of the entry into force of the Treaty. The court emphasized that 
the Treaty merely stipulates extradition procedures without mandating punishment and 
that the imposition of punishment by the court of the requesting state is unrelated to 
the extradition. The period in which the defendant was alleged to have committed the 
offences, from 1973 to 1987, was covered by the treaty and his extradition was, there-
fore, not prohibited for that reason. 
The next question raised in the appeal was whether the government had in fact 
resolved to extradite the defendant. According to testimony of the Secretary-General 
of the Cabinet, an inter-agency meeting had been arranged of representatives of the 
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ministries of foreign affairs and justice, the Office of the attorney-general and the 
Office of the Juridical Council for the formulation of a recommendation to be for-
warded to the Cabinet. According to the testimony the meeting unanimously agreed 
that the government should decide in favour of extradition. The question of a prohibi-
tion of extradition of nationals should be left to the court to decide, but could be dealt 
with only after the Cabinet had resolved to extradite. 
In dealing with the question the court took account of sections 8 and 9 of the 1929 
Act. These provisions deal with the procedures to be followed by the government in 
submitting the case to the court and those to be followed by the court. The court con-
cluded that according to these provisions extradition cases indeed come before the 
court only after the government has resolved in favour of extradition. The request by 
the public prosecutor to the court to order the detention of the defendant pending his 
extradition and the contents of a note sent by the Cabinet to the Attorney-General 
were considered by the court to be convincing evidence of the fact that the govern-
ment had indeed decided for extradition. 
The appeal was dismissed. 
PARTICIPATION IN MULTILATERAL TREATIES· 
Editorial introduction 
This section records the participation of Asian states in open, multilateral law-making 
treaties which mostly aim at world-wide adherence. The present Volume includes the 
cumulative and updated data contained in Volumes 1-5 of the Yearbook. For the purpose of 
this section states broadly situated west of Iran, north of Mongolia, east of Papua New Guinea 
and south of Indonesia will not be covered. The Editors wish to express their gratitude to all 
those international organizations which have so kindly responded to our request by making 
available information on the status of various categories of treaties. 
Note: 
Where no other reference to specific sources is made, data are derived from Multilateral 
Treaties deposited with the Secretary-General - Status as at 31 December 1996 
(ST/LEG/SER.E/15). 
No indication is given of reservations and declarations made. 
Sig. = signature; Cons. = consent to be bound. 
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ANTARCTICA 
Antarctic Treaty 
Washington, 1 Dec. 1959 
Entry into force: 23 June 1961 










Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958 
New York, 1958 
Entry into force: 7 June 1959 
State Sig. Cons. State Sig. Cons. 
Bangladesh 6 May 92 Malaysia 5 Nov 85 
Cambodia 5 Jan 60 Mongolia 24 Oct 94 
China 22 Jan 87 Pakistan 30 Dec 58 
India 10 Jun 58 13 Jul60 Philippines 10 Jun 58 6 Jul67 
Indonesia 7 Oct 81 Singapore 21 Aug 86 
Japan 20 Jun 61 Sri Lanka 30 Dec 58 9 Apr 62 
Kazakhstan 20 Nov 95 Thailand 21 Dec 59 
Korea (Rep.) 8 Feb 73 Vietnam 12 Sep 95 
CULTURAL MA TIERS 
Agreement for Facilitating the International Circulation of Visual and Auditory Materials 






29 Dec 49 
20 Feb 52 
31 Dec 49 
New York, 15 July 1949 
Entry into force: 12 August 1954 
Cons. 





31 Dec 49 
Cons. 
16 Feb 50 
13 Nov 52 
Agreement on the Importation of Educational, Scientific and Cultural Materials 
New York, 22 November 1950 
Entry into force: 21 May 1952 
State Sig. Cons. State Sig. Cons. 
Afghanistan 8 Oct 51 19 Mar 58 Pakistan 9 May 51 7 Jan 52 
Cambodia 5 Nov 51 Philippines 22 Nov 50 30 Aug 52 
Iran 9 Feb 51 7 Jan 66 Singapore 11 Jul69 
Japan 17 Jun 70 Sri Lanka 8 Jan 52 
Laos 28 Feb 52 Thailand 22 Nov 50 18 Jun 51 
Malaysia 29Jun 59 








Convention concerning the International Exchange of Publications 
Paris, 3 December 1958 
Entry into force: 23 November 1961 
(Starns as at 18 April 1997, provided by UNESCO) 
Cons. (deposit) 
25 Jan 85 





29 May 84 
28 Aug 92 
Convention concerning the Exchange of Official Publications and 
Government Docnments between States 
Paris, 3 December 1958 
Entry into force: 30 May 1961 
(Starns as at 18 April 1997, provided by UNESCO) 
Cons. (deposit) 
25 Jan 85 
10 Jan 67 





7 Dec 59 
28 Aug 92 
International Agreement for the Establishment of the University for Peace 





Entry into force: 7 April 1981 
Cons. (deposit) 
8 Apr 81 
10 Apr 81 






30 Mar 81 
20 Mar 84 
10 Aug 81 
Regional Convention on the Recognition of Studies, Diplomas and Degrees in Higher 








Bangkok, 16 December 1983 
Entry into force: 23 Oct. 1985 
(Starns as at 18 April 1997, provided by UNESCO) 
Cons. (deposit) 
25 Sep 84 
14 Mar 97 
26 Apr 89 
29 Aug 89 
7 Nov 95 









19 Oct 91 
2 Nov 89 
10 Jan 86 
28 Aug 92 
4Jun 96 
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of 
Armed Conflict 
The Hague, 14 May 1954 
Entry into force: 7 August 1956 
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Cons. (deposit) State Cons. (deposit) 
4 Apr 62 Mongolia 4 Nov 61 
16 Jun 58 Myanmar 10 Feb 56 
10 Jan 67 Pakistan 27 Mar 59 
22 Jun59 Tajikistan 28 Aug 92 
14 Mar 97 Thailand 2 May 58 
3 Jul95 Uzbekistan 21 Feb 96 
12 Dec 60 
Protocol for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of 
Armed Conflict 
The Hague, 14 May 1954 
Entry into force: 7 August 1956; for each state 3 months after date of deposit 
(Status as at 18 April 1997, provided by UNESCO) 
State Cons. (deposit) State Cons. (deposit) 
Cambodia 4 Apr 62 Myanmar 10 Feb 56 
India 16 Jun 58 Pakistan 27 Mar 59 
Indonesia 26Jul67 Tajikistan 28 Aug 92 
Iran 22 Jun 59 Thailand 2 May 58 
Kazakhstan 14 Mar 97 Uzbekistan 21 Feb 96 
Malaysia 12 Dec 60 
Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and 
Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, 1970 
Paris, 14 November 1970 
Entry into force: 24 April 1972; for each state 3 months after date of deposit 
(Status as at 18 April 1997, provided by UNESCO) 
State Cons. (deposit) State Cons. (deposit) 
Bangladesh 9 Dec 87 Kyrgyzstan 3 Jul95 
Cambodia 26 Sep 72 Mongolia 23 May 91 
China 28 Nov 89 Nepal 23 Jun 76 
India 24 Jan 77 Pakistan 30 Apr 81 
Iran 27 Jan 75 Sri Lanka 7 Apr 81 
Korea (DPR) 13 May 83 Tajikistan 28 Aug 92 
Korea (Rep) 14 Feb 83 Uzbekistan 15 Mar 96 
Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage 
Paris, 16 November 1972 
Entry into force: 17 December 1975 
(Status as at 18 April 1997, provided by UNESCO) 
























Cons. (deposit) State 
20 Mar 79 Maldives 
3 Aug 83 Mongolia 
28 Nov 91 Myanmar 
12 Dec 85 Nepal 
14 Nov 77 Pakistan 
6 Jul89 Philippines 
26 Feb 75 Sri Lanka 
30 Jun 92 Tajikistan 
14 Sep 88 Thailand 
29 Apr 94 Turkmenistan 
3 Jul95 Uzbekistan 
20 Mar 87 Vietnam 
7 Dec 88 
DEVELOPMENT MATTERS 
Charter of the Asian and Pacific Development Centre 
ESCAP, Bangkok, 1 April 1982 
Entry into force: 1 July 1983 
Sig. Cons. State Sig. 
9 Sep 82 Malaysia 
14 Feb 85 Maldives 
18 Feb 83 Nepal 
25 Apr 83 Pakistan 
7 Jan 83 Philippines 
9 Sep 82 Sri Lanka 9 Sep 82 
9 Sep 82 Thailand 
9 Sep 82 Vietnam 
Macau (ass. member) 3 Jun 93 
Agreement to Establish the South Centre 
Geneva, 1 September 1994 
Entry into force: 30 July 1995 
State Sig. Cons. State Sig. 
Cambodia 30 Sep 94 Malaysia 1 Dec 94 
China 4 May 95 Pakistan 
India 30 Sep 94 13 Dec 94 Philippines 13 Oct 94 
Indonesia 30 Sep 94 17 Feb 95 Sri Lanka 30 Sep 94 
Iran 30 Sep 94 Vietnam 25 Nov 94 
Korea (DPR) 6 Dec 94 31 May 95 
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Cons. (deposit) 
22 May 86 
2 Feb 90 
29 Apr 94 
20 Jun 78 
23 Jul76 
19 Sep 85 
6Jun 80 
28 Aug 92 
17 Sep 87 
30 Sep 94 
13 Jan 93 
19 Oct 87 
Cons. 
9 Sep 82 
25 Apr 83 
25 Apr 83 
9 Sep 82 
15 Dec 82 
27 Jun83 
9 Sep 82 
Cons. 
15 Jun 95 
12 May 95 
14Jun% 
16 Mar 95 
2 Jun 95 
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DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States 
and Nationals of Other States 
Washington, 18 Mar 1965 
Entry into force: 14 October 1966 
(Status as at 3 June 1997, provided by the World Bank) 
State Sig. Cons. State Sig. Cons. 
Afghanistan 30 Sep 66 25 Jun 68 Nepal 28 Sep 65 7 Jan 69 
Bangladesh 20 Nov 79 27 Mar 80 Pakistan 6Jul65 15 Sep 66 
Cambodia 5 Nov 93 Papua New 
China 9 feb 90 7 Jan 93 Guinea 20 Oct 78 20 Oct 78 
Indonesia 16 Feb 68 28 Sep 68 Philippines 26 Sept 78 17 Nov 78 
Japan 23 Sep 65 17 Aug 67 Singapore 2 Feb 68 14 Oct 68 
Korea (Rep.) 18 Apr 66 21 Feb 67 Sri Lanka 30 Aug 67 12 Oct 67 
Malaysia 22 Oct 65 8 Aug 66 Thailand 6 Dec 85 
Declarations recognizing as compulsory the jnrisdiction of the International Court of 









Date of (last) deposit 
19 Sep 57 (with res.) 
18 Sep 74 (with res.) 




Date of (last) deposit 
13 Sep 60 (with res.) 
18 Jan 72 (with res.) 
ENVIRONMENT, FAUNA AND FLORA 
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution 
of the Sea by Oil, as amended 
London, 12 May 1954 
Entry into force: 26 July 1958; for each state 3 months after date of deposit 
(Status as included in IMO doc. J/6233, as at 31 December 1995) 
Cons. State Cons. 
28 Sep 81 Papua 
4 Mar 74 New Guinea 12 Mar 80 
21 Aug 67 Philippines 19 Nov 63 







17 May 82 
International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas 
in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties 
Brussels, 29 November 1969 
Entry into force: 6 May 1975 
(Status as included in IMO doc. J/6233, as at 31 December 1995) 
Cons. E.if State Cons. 
6 Nov 81 4 Feb 82 Papua New 
23 Feb 90 24 May 90 Guinea 12 Mar 80 
6 Apr 71 6 May 75 Sri Lanka 12 Apr 83 
13 Jan 95 13 Apr 95 
Ej.! 
10 Jun 80 
11 JuI83 
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Protocol Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Pollution by 











London, 2 November 1973 
Entry into force: 30 March 1983 
(Status as included in IMO doc. J/6233, as at 31 December 1995) 
Cons. E.ij 




13 Jan 95 
International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage 
Brussels, 29 November 1969 
Entry into Force: 19 June 1975 
(Status as included in IMO doc. J/6233, as at 31 December 1995) 
Cons. E.ij State Cons. 
29 Sep 92 28 Dec 92 Korea (Rep.) 18 Dec 78 
28 Nov 94 26 Feb 95 Malaysia 6 Jan 95 
30 Jan 80 29 Apr 80 Maldives 16 Mar 81 
1 May 87 30 Jul87 Papua New 
1 Sep 78 30 Nov 78 Guinea 12 Mar 80 
3 Jun 76 1 Sep 76 Singapore 16 Sep 81 
7 Mar 94 5 Jun 94 Sri Lanka 12 Apr 83 
E.ij 
13 Apr 95 
Ej.! 
18 Mar 79 
6 Apr 95 
14 Jun 81 
10 Jun 80 
15 Dec 81 
11 Jul 83 
Protocol to the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage 
London, 19 November 1976 
Entry into force: 8 Apr 81 
(Status as included in IMO doc. J/6233, as at 31 December 1995) 
State Cons. E.ij State Cons. E.i.! 
Brunei 29 Sep 92 28 Dec 92 Korea (Rep.) 8 Dec 92 8 Mar 93 
China 29 Sep 86 28 Dec 86 Maldives 14 Jun 81 12 Sep 81 
India 1 May 87 30 Jul87 Singapore 15 Dec 81 15 Mar 82 
Japan 24 Aug 94 22 Nov 94 
1992 Protocol to amend the International Convention on Civil Liability for 
Oil Polution Damage, 1969 
London, 27 November 1992 
Entry into force: 30 May 1996 
(Status as included in IMO doc. J/62333, as at 31 December 1995) 
State Cons. 
Japan 24 Aug 94 
Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially as Waterfowl Habitat 
Ramsar, 2 February 1971 
Entry into force: 21 December 1975 
(Status as provided by UNESCO on 18 April 1997) 
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State Cons. (deposit) State Cons. (deposit) 
Bangladesh 21 May 92 Malaysia 10 Nov 94 
China 31 Mar 92 Nepal 17 Dec 87 
India 1 Oct 81 Pakistan 23 Jul 76 
Indonesia 8 Apr 92 Papua New Guinea 16 Mar 93 
Iran 23 Jun 75 Philippines 8 Jul94 
Japan 17 Jun 80 Sri Lanka 15 Jun 90 
Korea (Rep.) 28 Mar 97 Vietnam 20 Sep 88 
Protocol to amend the Convention on Wetlands of International Importance 








Paris, 3 December 1982 
Entry into force: 1 October 1986 
(Status as provided by UNESCO on 18 April 1997) 
Cons. (deposit) 
9 Mar 84 





26 Jun 87 
13 Aug 85 
Amendments to Articles 6 and 7 of the Convention on Wetlands of 
International Importance especially as Waterfowl Habitat 
Regina, 28 May 1987 
Entry into force: -
(Status as included in UNESCO Doc. CL 3343) 
Cons. (deposit) 
21 May 92 






2 Jun 88 
20 Sep 88 
International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation 
for Oil Pollution Damage 
Brussels, 18 December 1971 
Entry into force: 16 October 1978 
(Status as included in IMO doc. J/6233, as at 31 December 1995) 
State Cons. E.i.! State Cons. E.ij 
Brunei 29 Sep 92 28 Dec 92 Malaysia 6 Jan 95 6 Apr 95 
India 10 Jul90 8 Oct 90 Maldives 16 Mar 81 14 Jun 81 
Indonesia 1 Sep 78 30 Nov 78 Papua New 
Japan 7 Jul76 16 Oct 78 Guinea 12 Mar 80 10 Jun80 
Korea (Rep.) 8 Dec 92 8 Mar 93 Sri Lanka 12 Apr 83 11 Jul 83 
Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes 






London, Mexico City, Moscow, Washington, 29 December 1972 
Entry into force: 30 August 1975 
(Status as included in IMO doc. J/6233, as at 31 December 1995) 
Cons. E.ij State Cons. 
2 Apr 75 30 Aug 75 Pakistan 9 Mar 95 
14 Nov 85 14 Dec 85 Papua New 
15 Oct 80 14 Nov 80 Guinea 10 Mar 80 
21 Dec 93 20 Jan 94 Philippines 10 Aug 73 
E.ij 
8 Apr 95 
9 Apr 80 
30 Aug 75 
ASIAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 241 
Protocol Relating to the International Convention for the Prevention of 
Pollution from Ships, as amended 
London, 17 February 1978 
Entry into force: 2 October 1983 
(Status as included in IMO doc. J/6233, as at 31 December 1995) 
State Cons. Excepted State Cons. Excepted. 
annexes annexes. 
Brunei 23 Oct 86 III, IV, V Korea (DPR) 1 May 85 
Cambodia 28 Nov 94 Korea (Rep.) 23 Jul84 III, IV, V 
China 1 Jul 83 IV Myanmar 4 May 88 III, IV, V 
Annex V: 21 Nov 88 Pakistan 22 Nov 94 
Annex III: 13 Sept 94 Papua 
India 24 Sep 86 III, IV, V New Guinea 25 Oct 93 
Indonesia 21 Oct 86 III, IV, V Singapore 1 Nov 90 IV, V 
Japan 9 Jun 83 Annex III: 2 Mar 94 
Kazakhstan 7 Mar 94 Vietnam 29 May 91 III, IV, V 
Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, 1985 
Vienna, 22 March 1985 
Entry into force: 22 September 1988 
State Cons. State Cons. 
Bangladesh 2 Aug 90 Nepal 6 Jul94 
Brunei 26 Jul90 Pakistan 18 Dec 92 
China 11 Sep 89 Papua 
India 18 Mar 91 New Guinea 27 Oct 92 
Indonesia 26 Jun 92 Philippines 17 Jul 91 
Iran 3 Oct 90 Singapore 5 Jan 89 
Japan 30 Sep 88 Sri Lanka 15 Dec 89 
Korea (DPR) 24 Jan 95 Tajikistan 6 May 1996 
Korea (Rep.) 27 Feb 92 Thailand 7 Jul89 
Malaysia 29 Aug 89 Turkmenistan 18 Nov 93 
Maldives 26 Apr 88 Uzbekistan 18 May 93 
Mongolia 7 Mar 1996 Vietnam 26 Jan 94 
Myanmar 24 Nov 93 
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 1987 
Montreal, 16 September 1987 
Entry into force: 1 January 1989 
State Sig. Cons. State Sig. Cons. 
Bangladesh 2 Aug 90 Myanmar 24 Nov 93 
Brunei 27 May 93 Nepal 6Jul94 
China 14 Jun 91 Pakistan 18 Dec 92 
India 19 Jun 92 Papua 
Indonesia 21 Jul88 26Jun 92 New Guinea 27 Oct 92 
Iran 3 Oct 90 Philippines 14 Sep 88 17 Jul91 
Japan 16 Sep 87 30 Sep 88 Singapore 5 Jan 89 
Korea (DPR) 24 Jan 95 Sri Lanka 15 Dec 89 
Korea (Rep.) 27 Feb 92 Thailand 15 Sep 88 7 Jul89 
Malaysia 29 Aug 89 Turkmenistan 18 Nov 93 
Maldives 12 Jul88 16 May 89 Uzbekistan 18 May 93 
Mongolia 7 Mar 96 Vietnam 26 Jan 94 
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Asian States operating under Article 5 paragraph 1 of the Montreal protocol: Bangladesh, China, Iran, 

















Amendment to the Montreal Protocol 
London, 29 June 1990 
Entry into force: 10 August 1992 
Cons. State 
18 Mar 94 Nepal 
14 Jun 91 Pakistan 
19 Jun 92 Papua 
26Jun 92 New Guinea 
4 Sep 91 Philippines 
10 Dec 92 Singapore 
16 Jun 93 Sri Lanka 
31 Jul 91 Thailand 
7 Mar 96 Turkmenistan 
24 Nov 93 Vietnam 
Amendment to the Montreal Protocol, 1992 
Copenhagen, 25 November 1992 
Entry into force: 14 June 1994 
Cons. 
20 Dec 94 
2 Dec 94 
5 Aug 93 







18 Dec 92 
4 May 93 
9 Aug 93 
2 Mar 93 
16 Jun 93 
25 Jun 92 
15 Mar 94 
26 Jan 94 
Cons. 
17 Feb 95 
6May% 
26 Jan 94 
Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes 
and Their Disposal, 1989 
Basel, 22 March 1989 
Entry into force: 5 May 1992 
State Sig. Cons. State Sig. Cons. 
Afghanistan 22 Mar 89 Nepal 15 Oct % 
Bangladesh 1 Apr 93 Pakistan 26 Jul94 
China 22 Mar 90 17 Dec 91 Papua 
India 15 Mar 90 24Jun 92 New Guinea 1 Sep 95 
Indonesia 20 Sep93 Philippines 22 Mar 89 21 Oct 93 
Iran 5 Jan 93 Singapore 2Jan% 
Japan 17 Sep 93 Sri Lanka 28 Aug 92 
Korea (Rep.) 28 Feb 94 Thailand 22 Mar 90 
Kyrgyzstan 13 Aug 66 Turkmenistan 25 Sep% 
Malaysia 8 Oct 93 Uzbekistan 7Feb% 
Maldives 28 Apr 92 Vietnam 13 Mar 95 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1992 
New York, 9 May 1992 
Entry into force: 21 March 1994 
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State Sig. Cons. State Sig. Cons. 
Afghanistan 12 Jun 92 Maldives 12 Jun 92 9 Nov 92 
Bangladesh 9 Jun 92 15 Apr 94 Mongolia 12 Jun 92 30 Sep 93 
Bhutan 11 Jun 92 25 Aug 95 Myanmar 11 Jun 92 25 Nov 94 
Cambodia 18 Dec 95 Nepal 12 Jun 92 2 May 94 
China 11 Jun 92 5 Jan 93 Pakistan 13 Jun 92 1 Jun 94 
India lOJun 92 1 Nov 93 Papua New 
Indonesia 5 Jun 92 23 Aug 94 Guinea 13 Jun 92 6 Mar 93 
Iran 14 Jun 92 18 Ju1 96 Philippines 12 Jun 92 2 Aug 94 
Japan 13 Jun 92 28 May 93 Singapore 13 Jun 92 
Kazakhstan 8 Jun 92 17 May 95 Sri Lanka lOJun 92 23 Nov 93 
Korea (DPR) 11 Jun 92 5 Dec 94 Thailand 12 Jun 92 28 Dec 94 
Korea (Rep.) 13 Jun 92 14 Dec 93 Turkmenistan 5 Jun 95 
Laos 4 Jan 95 Uzbekistan 20Jun 93 
Malaysia 9Jun 93 13 Jul 94 Vietnam 11 Jun 92 16 Nov 94 
Convention on Biological Diversity, 1992 
Rio de Janeiro, 5 June 1992 
Entry into force: 29 December 1993 
State Sig. Cons. State Sig. Cons. 
Afghanistan 12 Jun 92 Maldives 12 Jun 92 9 Nov 92 
Bangladesh 5 Jun 92 3 May 94 Mongolia 12 Jun 92 30 Sep 93 
Bhutan 11 Jun 92 25 Aug 95 Myanmar 11 Jun 92 25 Nov 94 
Cambodia 9 Feb 95 Nepal 12 Jun 92 23 Nov 93 
China 11 Jun 92 5 Jan 93 Pakistan 5 Jun 92 26 Jul94 
India 5 Jun 92 18 Feb 94 Papua New 
Indonesia 5 Jun 92 23 Aug 94 Guinea 13 Jun 92 16 Mar 93 
Iran 14 Jun 92 6 Aug % Philippines 12 Jun 92 8 Oct 93 
Japan 13 Jun 92 28 May 93 Singapore 10 Mar 93 21 Dec 95 
Kazakhstan 9 Jun 92 6 Sep 94 Sri Lanka lOJun 92 23 Mar 94 
Korea (DPR) 11 Jun 92 26 Oct 94 Thailand 12 Jun 92 
Korea (Rep.) 13 Jun 92 3 Oct 94 Turkmenistan 18 Sep % 
Kyrgyzstan 6 Aug % Uzbekistan 19 Jul95 
Laos 20 Sep% Vietnam 28 May 93 16 Nov 94 
Malaysia 12 Jun 92 24Jun 94 
FAMILY MA TIERS 
Convention on the Recovery Abroad of Maintenance 
New York, 20 June 1956 
Entry into force: 25 May 1957 
State Sig. Cons. State Sig. Cons. 
Cambodia 20 Jun 56 Philippines 20 Jun 56 21 Mar 68 
Pakistan 14 Ju159 Sri Lanka 20 Jun 56 7 Aug 58 
Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and 
Registration of Marriages 
New York, 10 December 1962 






5 Feb 63 
Cons. 
6 Jun 91 
21 Jan 65 
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State Sig. 
Sri Lanka 12 Dec 62 
Convention on the Law Applicable to Maintenance Obligations Towards Children, 
The Hague, 24 October 1956 
State 
Japan 
Entry into force: 1 January 1962 
(Information provided by the Permanent Bureau of the 
Hague Conference on Private International Law on 14 October 1997) 
Sig. Cons. 
10 Feb 77 22 Jul77 
Convention on the Conflicts of Laws Relating to the Form of Testamentary Dispositions 







Entry into force: 5 January 1964 
(Information provided by the Permanent Bureau of the 
Hague Conference on Private International Law on 14 October 1997) 
Sig. Cons. 




30 Jan 64 
Convention on the Law Applicable to Maintenance Obligations 
The Hague, 2 October 1973 
Entry into force: 1 October 1977 
(Information provided by the Permanent Bureau of the 
Hague Conference on Private International Law on 14 October 1997) 
Sig. Cons. 
28 Feb 86 5 Jun 86 
Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in respect of 
Intercountry Adoption 
The Hague, 29 May 1993 
Entry into force: 1 May 1995 
(Status on 4 June 1997 as furnished by the Permanent Bureau of the 
Hague Conference on Private International Law) 
Sig. Cons. Sig. 
24 May 94 23 Jan 95 
State 
Philippines 17 Jul 95 
FINANCE 
Agreement Establishing the Asian Development Bank 
Manila, 4 December 1965 
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State Sig. Cons. State Sig. Cons. 
Afghanistan 4 Dec 65 22 Aug 66 Maldives 14 Feb 78 
Bangladesh 14 Mar 73 Myanmar 26 Apr 73 
Bhutan 15 Apr 82 Nepal 4 Dec 65 21 Jun 66 
Cambodia 4 Dec 65 30 Sep 66 Pakistan 4 Dec 65 12 May 66 
China 10 Mar 86 Papua 
Hong Kong 27 Mar 69 New Guinea 8 Apr 71 
India 4 Dec 65 20Jul66 Philippines 4 Dec 65 5 Jul66 
Indonesia 24 Nov 66 Singapore 28 Jan 66 21 Sep 66 
Iran 4 Dec 65 Sri Lanka 4 Dec 65 29 Sep 66 
Japan 4 Dec 65 16 Aug 66 Taipei, China 4 Dec 65 22 Sep 66 
Korea (Rep.) 4 Dec 65 16 Aug 66 Thailand 4 Dec 65 16 Aug 66 
Laos 4 Dec 65 30 Aug 66 Vietnam 28 Jan 66 22 Sep 66 
Malaysia 4 Dec 65 16 Aug 66 
Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, 1988 
















Entry into force: 12 April 1988 
(Status as at 3 June 1997, provided by the World Bank) 
Sig. Cons. (deposit) State Sig. Cons. (deposit) 
13 Mar 87 13 Mar 87 Nepal 23 Sep 92 23 Sep 93 
1 Oct 93 Pakistan 7 Jul86 1 Dec 86 
23 Apr 88 30 Apr 88 Papua New 
13 Apr 92 20 Sep 93 Guinea 9 May 90 29 Oct 90 
26 Jun86 26 Sep 86 Philippines 15 Sep 86 22 Nov 93 
12 Sep 86 5 Jun 87 Sri Lanka 3 Oct 86 27 May 88 
11 Oct 85 24 Nov 87 Vietnam 27 Sep 93 '4 Apr 94 
2 Jul 91 2 Aug 91 
HEALTH 
Protocol Concerning the Office International d'Hygiene Publique 
New York, 22 July 1946 
Entry into force: 20 October 1947 
Sig. Cons. State Sig. Cons. 
19 Apr 48 Myanmar 1 Ju\ 48 
22 Ju\ 46 Pakistan 23 Jun48 
22 Ju\ 46 12 Jan 48 Philippines 22 Jul46 
22 Jul46 27 Jan 47 Sri Lanka 23 May 49 
11 Dec 51 Thailand 22 Jul46 
HUMAN RIGHTS, INCLUDING RIGHTS OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN 
Convention on the Political Rights of Women 
New York, 31 March 1953 



















ASIAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Sig. Cons. State Sig. 
16 Nov 66 Myanmar 14 Sep 54 
29 Apr 53 1 Nov 61 Nepal 26 Apr 66 
31 Mar 53 16 Dec 58 Pakistan 18 May 54 
1 Apr 55 13 Jul55 Papua 
23 Jun 59 New Guinea 
28 Jan 69 Philippines 23 Sep 53 
18 Aug 65 Thailand 5 Mar 54 
Convention on the Nationality of Married Women 
New York, 20 February 1957 
Entry into force: 11 August 1958 
Sig. Cons. State Sig. 
15 May 57 Singapore 
24 Feb 59 Sri Lanka 
10 Apr 58 
Convention against Discrimination in Education, 1960 
Paris, 14 December 1960 
Entry into force: 22 May 1962 
(Status as provided by UNESCO on 18 April 1997) 
Cons. (deposit) 
25 Jan 85 









7 Dec 54 
27 Jan 82 
12 Sep 57 
30 Nov 54 
Cons. 
18 Mar 66 
30 May 58 
Cons. (deposit) 
4 Nov 64 
19 Nov 64 
11 Aug 63 
28 Aug 92 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966 
New York, 16 December 1966 
Entry into force: 3 January 1976 
State Sig. Cons. State Sig. Cons. 
Afghanistan 24 Jan 83 Kyrgyzstan 7 Oct 94 
Cambodia 17 Oct 80 26 May 92 Mongolia 5 Jun 68 18 Nov 74 
India 10 Apr 79 Nepal 14 May 91 
Iran 4 Apr 68 24Jun 75 Philippines 19 Dec 66 7 Jun 74 
Japan 30 May 78 21 Jun 79 Sri Lanka 11 Jun 80 
Korea (DPR) 14 Sep 81 Uzbekistan 28 Sep 95 
Korea (Rep.) 10 Apr 90 Vietnam 24 Sep 82 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 
New York, 16 December 1966 
Entry into force: 23 March 1976 
State Sign. Cons. State Sign. Cons. 
Afghanistan 24 Jan 83 Kyrgyzstan 7 Oct 94 
Cambodia 17 Oct 80 26 May 92 Nepal 14 May 91 
India 10 Apr 79 Philippines 19 Dec 66 23 Oct 86 
Iran 30 May 78 21 Jun 79 Sri Lanka 11 Jun80 
Japan 30 May 78 21 Jun 79 Thailand 29 Oct % 
Korea (DPR) 14 Sep 81 Uzbekistan 28 Sep 95 
Korea (Rep.) 10 Apr 90 Vietnam 24 Sep 82 
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Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 





Entry into force: 23 March 1976 
Cons. 
10 Apr 90 
7 Oct 94 






19 Dec 66 
Cons. 
14 May 91 
22 Aug 89 
28 Sep 95 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 1966 
New York, 7 March 1966 
Entry into force: 4 January 1969 
State Sig. Cons. State Sig. Cons 
Afghanistan 6 Jul83 Mongolia 3 May 66 6 Aug 69 
Bangladesh 11 Jun 79 Nepal 30 Jan 71 
Bhutan 26 Mar 73 Pakistan 19 Sep 66 21 Sep 66 
Cambodia 12 Apr 66 28 Nov 83 Papua New Guinea 
China 29 Dec 81 27 Jan 82 
India 2 Mar 67 3 Dec 68 Philippines 7 Mar 66 15 Sep 67 
Iran 8 Mar 67 19 Aug 68 Sri Lanka 18 Feb 82 
Japan 15 Dec 95 Tajikistan 11 Jan 95 
Korea (Rep.) 8 Aug 78 5 Dec 78 Turkmenistan 29 Sep 94 
Laos 22 Feb 74 Uzbekistan 28 Sep 95 
Maldives 24 Apr 84 Vietnam 9 Jun 82 
Amendment to article 8 of the International Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
14th Meeting of the states parties, 15 January 1992 
Entered into force: -
State Acceptance 
Korea (Rep.) 30 Nov 93 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
New York, 18 December 1979 
Entry into force: 3 September 1981 
State Sig. Cons. State Sig. Cons. 
Afghanistan 14 Aug 80 Mongolia 17 Jul80 20 Jul81 
Bangladesh 6 Nov 84 Nepal 5 Feb 91 22 Apr 91 
Bhutan 17 Jul80 31 Aug 81 Papua 
Cambodia 17 Oct 80 15 Oct 92 New Guinea 12 Jan 95 
China 17 Jul 80 4 Nov 80 Philippines 15 JulSO 5 Aug 81 
India 30 Jul80 9 Jul93 Singapore 5 Oct 95 
Indonesia 29 Jul80 13 Sep 84 Sri Lanka 17 Jul80 5 Oct 81 
Japan 17 Jul80 25 Jun85 Tajikistan 26 Oct 93 
Korea (Rep.) 25 May 83 27 Dec 84 Thailand 9 Aug 85 
Laos 17 Jul 80 14 Aug 81 Uzbekistan 19 Jul 95 
Malaysia 5 Jun 95 Vietnam 29 Jul80 17 Feb 82 
Maldives 1 Ju1 93 
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Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
New York, 10 December 1984 
Entry into force: 26 June 1987 
State Sig. Cons. State Sig. Cons. 
Afghanistan 4 Feb 85 1 Apr 87 Philippines 18 Jun 86 
Cambodia 15 Oct 92 Seychelles 5 May 92 
China 12 Dec 86 4 Oct 88 Sri Lanka 3 Jan 94 
Indonesia 23 Oct 85 Tajikistan 11 Jan 95 
Korea (Rep.) 9 Jan 95 Uzbekistan 28 Sep 95 
Nepal 14 May 91 
International Convention against Apartheid in Sports, 1985 
New York, 10 December 1985 
Entry into force: 3 April 1988 
State Sig. Cons. State Sig. Cons. 
China 21 Oct 87 Maldives 3 Oct 86 
India 12 Sep 90 Mongolia 16 May 86 16 Dec 87 
Indonesia 16 May 86 23 Jul93 Nepal 24 Jun 86 1 Mar 89 
Iran 16 May 86 12 Jan 88 Philippines 16 May 86 27 Jul87 
Malaysia 16 May 86 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989 
New York, 20 November 1989 
Entry into force: 2 September 1990 
State Sig. Cons. State Sig. Cons. 
Afghanistan 27 Sep 90 28 Mar 94 
Bangladesh 26 Jan 90 3 Aug 90 Maldives 21 Aug 90 11 Feb 91 
Bhutan 4 Jun 90 1 Aug 90 Mongolia 26 Jan 90 5 Jul90 
Brunei 27 Dec 95 Myanmar 15 Jul 91 
Cambodia 15 Oct 92 Nepal 26 Jan 90 14 Sep 90 
China 29 Aug 90 2 Mar 92 Pakistan 20 Sep 90 12 Nov 90 
India 11 Dec 92 Papua New 
Indonesia 26 Jan 90 5 Sep90 Guinea 30 Sep90 2 Mar 93 
Iran 5 Sep 91 13 Jul 94 Philippines 26 Jan 90 21 Aug 90 
Japan 21 Sep 90 22 Apr 94 Singapore 5 Oct 95 
Kazakhstan 16 Feb 94 12 Aug 94 Sri Lanka 26 Jan 90 12 Jul 91 
Korea (DPR) 23 Aug 90 21 Sep 90 Tajikistan 26 Oct 93 
Korea (Rep.) 25 Sep 90 20 Nov 91 Thailand 27 Mar 92 
Kyrgyzstan 7 Oct 94 Turkmenistan 20 Sep93 
Laos 8 May 91 Uzbekistan 29 Jun 94 
Malaysia 17 Feb 95 Vietnam 26 Jan 90 28 Feb 90 
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International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and 




















UNGA, New York, 18 December 1990 
Entry into force: -
Sig. Cons. State Cons. 
15 Nov 93 5 Jul95 Sri Lanka 11 Mar 96 
HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICT 
International Conventions for the Protection of Victims of War, I-IV 
Geneva, 12 August 1949 
Entry into force: 21 October 1950 
(Status as provided by the ICRC on 6 June 1997) 
Cons. State COilS. 
26 Sep 56 Maldives 18 Jun 91 
4 Apr 72 Mongolia 20 Dec 58 
10 Jan 91 Myanmar 25 Aug 92 
14 Oct 91 Nepal 7 Feb 64 
8 Dec 58 Pakistan 12 JUll 51 
28 Dec 56 Papua 
9 Nov 50 New Guinea 26 May 76 
30 Sep 58 Philippines 6 Oct 52 
20 Feb 57 Seychelles 8 Nov 84 
21 Apr 53 Singapore 27 Apr 73 
5 May 92 Sri Lanka 28 Feb 59 
27 Aug 57 Tajikistan 13 Jan 93 
16 Aug 66 Thailand 29 Dec 54 
18 Sep 92 Turkmenistan 10 Apr 92 
29 Oct 56 Uzbekistan 8 Oct 93 
24 Aug 62 Vietnam 28 Jun 57 
Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 









Geneva, 10 June 1977 
Entry into force: 7 December 1978 
(Status as provided by the ICRC on 6 June 1997) 
Cons. State 
8 Sep 80 Maldives 
14 Oct 91 Mongolia 
14 Sep 83 Tajikistan 
5 May 92 Turkmenistan 
9 Mar 88 Uzbekistan 
15 Jan 82 Vietnam 
18 Sep 92 
Cons. 
3 Sep 91 
6 Dec 95 
13 Jan 93 
10 Apr 92 
8 Oct 93 
19 Oct 81 
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Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating 
to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Anned Conflicts, 1977 



























Entry into force: 7 December 1978 
(Status as provided by the ICRC on 6 June 1997) 
Cons. 
8 Sep 80 
14 Oct 91 
14 Sep 83 
5 May 92 
15 Jan 82 
18 Sep 92 









Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property 
Cons. 
3 Sep 91 
6 Dec 95 
11 Dec 86 
13 Jan 93 
10 Apr 92 
8 Oct 93 
Paris, 1883, most recently revised Stockholm, 1967 and amended 1979 
(Status as included in WIPO doc. 423(E) of 3 July 1997) 
Party Latest Act State Party Latest Act to 
to which which State 
State is party is party 
3 Mar 91 Stockholm Mongolia 21 Apr 85 Stockholm 
19 Mar 85 id. Philippines 27 Sep 65 Lisbon, 
24 Dec 50 id. Stockholm 
16 Dec 59 Lisbon Singapore 23 Feb 95 Stockholm 
15 Jul1899 Stockholm Sri Lanka 29 Dec 52 London, 
25 Dec 91 id. Stockholm 
IOJun 80 id. Tajikistan 25 Dec 91 Stockholm 
4 May 80 id. Turkmenistan 25 Dec 91 id. 
25 Dec 91 id. Uzbekistan 25 Dec 91 id. 
1 Jan 89 id. Vietnam 8 Mar 49 id. 
Convention for the Protection of Literacy and Artistic Works 
Berne, 1886, most recently revised Paris, 1971 and amended 1979 
(Status as included in WIPO doc. 423(E) of 3 July 1997) 
Party Latest Act to State Party Latest Act to 
which State which State 
is party is party 
15 Oct 92 Paris Pakistan 5 Jul48 Rome, 
1 Apr 28 id. Stockholm 
5 Sep97 Paris Philippines 1 Aug 51 Paris 
15 Ju11899 id. Sri Lanka 20 Jul59 Rome, Paris 
21 Aug % id. Thailand 17 Jul 31 Paris 
1 Oct 90 id. 








Universal Copyright Convention 
Geneva, 6 September 1952, revised Paris, 24 July 1971 
Entry into force: 16 September 1955 (revision: 10 July 1974) 
(Status as provided by UNESCO on 18 April 1997) 
Cons. (deposit) 
5 May 75 
3 Aug 53 
30 Ju192 
21 Oct 57 
28 Jan 56 
6 Aug 92 
Cons. (rev.) 









19 Aug 54 
28 Apr 54 
25 Oct 83 
28 Aug 92 
Cons. (rev.) 
Protocol 1 annexed to the Universal Copyright Convention concerning the application of 
the Convention to the works of stateless persons and refugees 
Geneva, 6 September 1952 (revised Paris, 24 July 1971) 
Entry into force: 16 September 1955 (revision: 10 July 1974) 
(Status as provided by UNESCO on 18 April 1997) 
State Cons. (deposit) Cons. (rev.) State Cons. (deposit) Cons. (rev.) 
Bangladesh 5 May 75 Korea (Rep.) 1 Jul 87 
Cambodia 3 Aug 53 Laos 19 Aug 54 
India 21 Oct 57 7 Jan 88 Pakistan 28 Apr 54 
Japan 28 Jan 56 21 Ju1 77 Sri Lanka 27 Jul88 
Protocol 2 annexed to the Universal Copyright Convention concerning the application of 





Geneva, 6 September 1952 (revised Paris, 24 July 1971) 
Entry into force: 16 September 1955 (revision: 20 July 1974) 
(Status as provided by UNESCO on 18 April 1997) 
Cons. (deposit) 
3 Aug 53 
21 Oct 57 
28 Jan 56 
Cons. (rev.) 
7 Jan 88 





Cons. (deposit) Cons. (rev.) 
19 Aug 54 
28 Apr 54 
27 Ju188 
Protocol 3 annexed to the Universal Copyright Convention concerning the effective date of 
iru.truments of ratification or acceptance of, or accession to, the Convention 
Geneva, 6 September 1952 
Entry into force: 7 August 1956 
(Status as provided by UNESCO on 18 April 1997) 
State Cons. (deposit) State Cons. (deposit) 
Cambodia 3 Aug 53 Pakistan 28 Apr 54 
India 21 Oct 57 Sri Lanka 27 Jul88 
Japan 28 Jan 56 
Laos 19 Aug 54 
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International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and 
Broadcasting Organizations 
Rome, 26 October 1961 
Entry into force: 18 May 1964 
(Status as included in WIPO Doc. 432(E) of 3 July 1997) 
State Cons. (deposit) State 
Japan 26 Jul89 Philippines 
Cons. 
(deposit) 
25 Jun 84 
Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization 



















(Status as included in WIPO doc. 423(E) of 3 July 1997) 
Membership State Membership 
11 May 85 Malaysia 1 Jan 89 
16 Mar 94 Mongolia 28 Feb 79 
21 Apr 94 Nepal 4 Feb 97 
25 Jul95 Pakistan 6 Jan 77 
3 Jun80 Papua New Guinea 10 Jul97 
1 May 75 Philippines 14 Jul80 
18 Dec 79 Singapore 10 Dec 90 
20 April 75 Sri Lanka 20 Sep 78 
25 Dec 91 Tajikistan 25 Dec 91 
17 Aug 74 Thailand 25 Dec 89 
1 Mar 79 Turkmenistan 25 Dec 91 
25 Dec 91 Uzbekistan 25 Dec 91 
17 Jan 95 Vietnam 2 Jul76 
Convention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms against 
Unauthorized Duplication of their Phonograms, 1971 
Geneva, 29 October 1971 
Sig. 
29 Oct 71 
29 Oct 71 
Entry into force: 18 April 1973 
Cons. 
5 Jan 93 






21 Apr 72 
29 Apr 72 
Cons. 
19 Jun 78 
1 Jul 87 
Multilateral Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation of Copyright Royalties 
Madrid, 13 December 1979 
State 
India 
Entry into force: -
Cons. 
31 Jan 83 (except Arts. 1 to 4 and 17) 
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INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 
Slavery Convention 
Geneva, 25 September 1926 as amended in New York, 7 December 1953 









16 Aug 54 
7 Jan 85 
12 Mar 54 
29 Apr 57 
Cons. 
20 Dec 68 








30 Sep 55 
27 Jan 82 
12 Jul55 
21 Mar 58 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
New York, 9 December 1948 
Entry into force: 12 January 1951 
State Sig. Cons. State Sig. Cons. 
Afghanistan 22 Mar 56 Mongolia 5 Jan 67 
Cambodia 14 Oct 50 Myanmar 30 Dec 49 14 Mar 56 
China 20Jul49 18 Apr 83 Nepal 17 Jan 69 
India 29 Nov 49 27 Aug 59 Pakistan 11 Dec 48 12 Oct 57 
Iran 8 Dec 49 14 Aug 56 Papua New Guinea 27 Jan 82 
Korea (DPR) 31 Jan 89 Philippines 11 Dec 48 7 Jul50 
Korea (Rep.) 14 Oct 50 Singapore 18 Aug 95 
Laos 8 Dec 50 Sri Lanka 2 Oct 50 
Malaysia 20 Dec 94 Vietnam 9 Jun 81 
Maldives 24 Apr 84 
Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions 










7 Sep 56 
Geneva, 7 September 1956 
Entry into force: 30 April 1957 
Cons. State 
16 Nov 66 Mongolia 
5 Feb 85 Nepal 
12 Jun 57 Pakistan 
23 Jun60 Philippines 
30 Dec 59 Singapore 
9 Sep 57 Sri Lanka 
18 Nov 57 
Sig. Cons. 
20 Dec 68 
7 Jan 63 
7 Sep56 20 Mar 58 
17 Nov 64 
28 Mar 72 
5 Jun57 21 Mar 58 
Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft 
Tokyo, 14 September 1963 
Entry into force: 4 December 1969 
(Status as at 30 June 1997, provided by the ICAO Secretariat) 
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State Cons. Eff. date State Cons. Eff. date 
Afghanistan 15 Apr 77 14 Jul 77 Maldives 28 Sep 87 27 Dec 87 
Bangladesh 25 Jul78 23 Oct 78 Mongolia 24Jul90 22 Oct 90 
Bhutan 25 Jan 89 25 Apr 89 Myanmar 23 May 96 21 Aug 96 
Brunei 23 May 86 21 Aug 86 Nepal 15 Jan 79 15 Ap~]9 
Cambodia 22 Oct 96 20 Jan 97 Pakistan 11 Sep 73 10 Dec 73 
China 14 Nov 78 12 Feb 79 Papua New 
India 22 Jul 75 20 Oct 75 Guinea 15 Dec 75 16 Sep 75 
Indonesia 7 Sep76 6 Dec 76 Philippines 26 Nov 65 4 Dec 69 
Iran 28 Jun 76 29 Sep 76 Seychelles 4 Jan 79 4 Apr 79 
Japan 26 May 70 24 Aug 70 Singapore 1 Mar 71 30 May 71 
Kazakhstan 18 May 95 16 Aug 95 Sri Lanka 30 May 78 28 Aug 78 
Korea (DPR) 9 May 83 7 Aug 83 Tajikistan 20 Mar 96 18 Jun 96 
Korea (Rep.) 19 Feb 71 20 May 71 Thailand 6 Mar 72 4Jun 72 
Laos 23 Oct 72 21 Jan 73 Uzbekistan 31 Jul95 20 Oct 95 
Malaysia 5 Mar 85 3 Jun 85 Vietnam 10 Oct 79 8 Jan 80 






















and Crimes Against Humanity 
New York, 26 November 1968 
Entry into force: 11 November 1970 
Sig. Cons. State Sig. 
22 Jul83 Mongolia 31 Jan 69 
12 Jan 71 Philippines 
8 Nov 84 Vietnam 
28 Dec 84 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft 
The Hague, 16 December 1970 
Entry into force: 14 October 1971 
(Status as at 30 June 1997, provided by the ICAO Secretariat) 
Sig. Cons. State Sig. 
16 Dec 70 29 Aug 79 Maldives 
28 Jun 78 Mongolia 18 Jan 71 
28 Dec 88 Myanmar 
16 Apr 86 Nepal 
16 Dec 70 8 Nov 96 Pakistan 12 Aug 71 
10 Sep 80 Papua 
14 Jul 71 12 Nov 82 New Guinea 15 Dec 75 
16 Dec 70 27 Aug 76 Philippines 16 Dec 70 
16 Dec 70 25 Jun 72 Seychelles 29 Dec 78 
16 Dec 70 19 Apr 71 Singapore 8 Sep 71 
4 Apr 95 Sri Lanka 30 May 78 
28 Apr 83 Tajikistan 
18 Jan 73 Thailand 16 Dec 70 
16 Feb 71 6 Apr 89 Uzbekistan 
16 Dec 70 4 May 85 Vietnam 
Cons. 
21 May 69 
15 May 73 
6 May 83 
Cons. 
1 Sep 87 
8 Oct 71 
22 May 96 
11 Jan 79 
28 Nov 73 
26 Mar 73 
12 Apr 78 
29 Feb 96 
16 May 78 
7 Feb 94 
17 Sep79 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation 
Montreal, 23 September 1971 
Entry into force: 26 January 1973 
(Status as at 30 June 1997, provided by the ICAO Secretariat) 
















Laos 1 Nov 72 
Cons. 
26 Sep 84 
28 Jun 78 
28 Dec 88 
16 Apr 86 
8 Nov 96 
10 Sep 80 
12 Nov 82 
27 Aug 76 
10 Jul73 
12 Jun 74 
4 Apr 95 
13 Aug 80 
2 Aug 73 








Papua New Guinea 
Philippines 23 Sep 71 








4 May 85 
1 Sep 87 
14 Sep 72 
22 May 96 
11 Jan 79 
24 Jan 74 
15 Dec 75 
26 Mar 73 
12 Apr 78 
30 May 78 
29 Feb 96 
16 May 78 
7 Feb 94 
17 Sep 79 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally 
Protected Persons Including Diplomatic Agents 
New York, 14 December 1973 
Entry into force: 20 February 1977 
State Sig. Cons. State Sig. Cons. 
Bhutan 16 Jan 89 Korea (Rep.) 25 May 83 
China 5 Aug 87 Maldives 21 Aug 90 
India 11 Apr 78 Mongolia 23 Aug 74 8 Aug 75 
Iran 12 Jul 78 Nepal 9 Mar 90 
Japan 8 Jun 87 Pakistan 29 Mar 76 
Kazakhstan 21 Feb 96 Philippines 26 Nov 76 
Korea (DPR) 1 Dec 82 Sri Lanka 27 Feb 91 
International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid 















Entry into force: 18 July 1976 
Cons. State Sig. 
6 Jul83 Maldives 
5 Feb 85 Mongolia 17 May 74 
28 Jul81 Nepal 
18 Apr 83 Pakistan 
22 Sep 77 Philippines 2 May 74 
17 Apr 85 Sri Lanka 
5 Oct 81 Vietnam 
International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages 
Sig. 
22 Dec 80 
New York, 17 December 1979 
Entry into force: 3 June 1983 
Cons. 
31 Aug 81 
18 Oct 88 
26 Jan 93 







Philippines 2 May 80 
Cons. 
24 Apr 84 
8 Aug 75 
12 Jul77 
27 Feb 86 
26 Jan 78 
18 Feb 82 
9 Jun 81 
Cons. 
21 Feb 96 
4 May 83 
9 Jun 92 
9 Mar 90 







ASIAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of 
Maritime Navigation 
Rome, 10 March 1988 
Entry into force: 1 March 1992 
(Status as included in IMO doc. J/6233, as at 31 December 1995) 
Sig. Cons. 
20 Aug 91 1 Mar 1992 
Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of 
Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf 
Rome, 10 March 1988 
Entry into force: 1 March 1992 
(Status as included in IMO doc. J/6233, as at 31 December 1995) 
Sig. 
3 Feb 89 
20 Aug 91 
Cons. 




10 Mar 88 
Cons. 
Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International 
Civil Aviation, Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression 
of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation 
Montreal, 24 February 1988 
Entry into force: 6 August 1989 
(Status as at 30 June 1997, provided by the Secretariat of the ICAO) 
State Cons. Effective date State Cons. Effective date 
Cambodia 8 Nov 96 8 Dec 96 Pakistan 24 Feb 88 
China 24 Feb 88 Philippines 25 Jan 89 
India 22 Mar 95 21 Apr 95 Singapore 22 Nov 96 22 Dec 96 
Indonesia 24 Feb 88 Sri Lanka 11 Feb 97 13 Mar 97 
Kazakhstan 18 May 95 17 Jun 95 Sri Lanka 28 Oct 88 
Korea (DPR) 11 Apr 89 Tajikistan 29 Feb 96 30 Mar 96 
Korea (Rep.) 27 Jun 90 27 Ju190 Thailand 14 May 96 13 Jun 96 
Malaysia 24 Feb 88 Uzbekistan 7 Feb 94 9 Mar 94 
Myanmar 22 May 96 21 Jun 96 
International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and 





New York, 4 December 1989 
Entry into force: -
Cons. State Sig. Cons. 
11 Sep 91 Turkmenistan 18 Sep 96 
Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection 
Montreal, 1 March 1991 
Entry into force: -





1 Mar 91 
Cons. 





1 Mar 91 
1 Mar 91 
Cons. 
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INTERNATIONAL REPRESENTATION 
(see also: Privileges and Immunities) 
Vienna Convention on the Representation of States in their relations with 
International Organizations of a Universal Character 
Vienna, 14 March 1975 
Entry into force: -




30 Dec 88 




30 Oct 75 14 Dec 76 
26 Aug 80 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
Convention on the Limitation Period in the International Sale of Goods 












Entry into force: 1 August 1988 
Sig. Cons. 
14 Jun 74 
Convention on Transit Trade of Land-locked States 




Entry into force: 9 June 1967 
Cons. 








22 Aug 66 
7 Feb 96 
UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 1980 
Vienna, 1980 
Entry into force: 1 January 1988 
(Status as provided in UNCITRAL doc. A/CN.9/440, 22 May 1997) 
Sig. 
30 Sep 81 
11 Apr 80 
Cons. 
11 Dec 86 




UN Convention on the Liability of Operators of Transport Terminals 
in International Trade 
Vienna, 19 April 1991 
Entry into force: -
Sig. Cons. 
19 Apr 91 
Cons. 
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JUDICIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE COOPERATION 
Convention Relating to Civil Procedure 
The Hague, 1 March 1954 
Entry into force: 12 April 1957 
(Status as on 5 June 1997 as furnished by the Permanent Bureau of the 
Hague Conference on Private International Law) 
Sig. 
12 Mar 70 
Cons. 
28 May 70 





Convention Abolishing the Requirement of Legalisation for Foreign Public Documents 






Entry into force: 24 January 1965 
(Status on 5 June 1997 as furnished by the Permanent Bureau of the 
Hague Conference on Private International Law) 
Sig. Cons. 




12 Mar 70 
Cons. 
28 May 70 
Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents 
in Civil or Commercial Matters, 1965 
The Hague, 15 November 1965 
Entry into force: 10 February 1969 
(Status on 5 June 1997 as furnished by the Permanent Bureau of the 
Hague Conference on Private International Law) 
Sig. 
12 Mar 70 
Cons. 
1 Dec 91 





Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters 
The Hague, 18 March 1970 
Entry into force: 7 October 1972 
(Status on 5 June 1997 as furnished by the Permanent Bureau of the 




27 Oct 78 
LABOUR 
Forced Labour Convention 
1930 (ILO Convention 29) 
Entry into force: 1 May 1932 
(Status as at 31 December 1996, information furnished by the ILO) 
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State Ratif registered State Ratif. registered 
Bagladesh 22 Jun 72 Myanmar 4 Mar 55 
Cambodia 24 Feb 69 Pakistan 23 Dec 57 
India 30 Nov 54 Papua New 
Indonesia 12 Jun 50 Guinea 1 May 76 
Iran 10 Jun 57 Singapore 25 Oct 65 
Japan 21 Nov 32 Sri Lanka 5 Apr 50 
Kyrgyzstan 31 Mar 92 Tajikistan 26 Nov 93 
Laos 23 Jan 64 Thailand 26 Feb 69 
Malaysia 11 Nov 57 
Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention 






















Entry into force: 4 July 1950 
(Status as at 31 December 1996, information furnished by the ILO) 
Ratif. registered State Ratif. registered 
22 Jun 72 Pakistan 14 Feb 51 
14 Jun 65 Philippines 29 Dec 53 
31 Mar 92 Sri Lanka 15 Sep 95 
3 Jun 69 Tajikistan 26 Nov 93 
4 Mar 55 
Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention 
1249 (ILO Convention 98) 
Entry into force: 18 July 1951 
(Status as at 31 December 1996, information furnished by the ILO) 
Ratif. registered State 
22Jun 72 
15 Jul57 
20 Oct 53 
31 Mar 92 
5 Jun 61 
3 Jun 69 








Equal Remuneration Convention 
1951 (ILO Convention 100) 
Entry into force: 23 May 1953 
Ratif. registered 
26 May 52 
1 May 76 
29 Dec 53 
25 Oct 65 
13 Dec 72 
26 Nov 93 
(Status as at 31 December 1996, information furnished by the !LO) 
Ratif. registered State Ratif registered 
22 Aug 69 Kyrgyzstan 31 Mar 92 
2 Nov 90 Mongolia 3 Jun69 
25 Sep 58 Nepal IOJun 76 
11 Aug 58 Philippines 29 Dec 53 
IOJun 72 Sri Lanka 1 Apr 93 
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Abolition of Forced Labour Convention 
1957 (lLO Convention 105) 
Entry into force: 17 January 1959 
(Status as at 31 December 1996, information furnished by the ILO) 
Ratif. registered State Ratif. registered 
16 May 63 Papua New 
22 Jun 72 Guinea 1 May 76 
13 Apr 59 Philippines 17 Nov 60 
15 Feb 60 Thailand 2 Dec 69 
Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention 
1958 (ILO Convention 111) 
Entry into force: 15 June 1960 
(Status as at 31 December 1996, information furnished by the !LO) 
Ratif. registered State 
1 Oct 69 
22 Jun 72 
3 Jun60 
30 Jun 64 






Employment Policy Convention 
1964 (ILO Convention 122) 
Entry into force: 15 July 1966 
Ratif. registered 
3 Jun69 
19 Sep 74 
24 Jan 61 
17 Nov 60 
26 Nov 93 
(Status as at 31 December 1996, information furnished by the ILO) 
Ratif. registered State Ratif. registered 
28 Sep 71 Papua 
10Jun 72 New Guinea 1 May 76 
10 Jun 86 Philippines 13 Jan 76 
9 Dec 92 Tajikistan 26 Nov 93 
31 Mar 92 Thailand 26 Feb 69 
24 Nov 76 Uzbekistan 13 Jul 92 
NARCOTIC DRUGS 
International Opium Convention 
Geneva, 19 February 1925, amended by Protocol, New York, 11 December 1946 
Entry into force: 3 February 1948 
State Sig. Cons. State Sig. Cons. 
Afghanistan 29 Jan 57 Malaysia 21 Aug 58 
Cambodia 3 Oct 51 Papua 
India 11 Dec 46 New Guinea 28 Oct 80 
Indonesia 3 Apr 58 Sri Lanka 4 Dec 57 
Japan 27 Mar 52 Thailand 27 Oct 47 
Laos 7 Oct 50 
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Agreement Concerning the Suppression of the Manufacture of, Internal Trade in, 
and Use of, Prepared Opium 
Geneva, 11 February 1925, amended by Protocol, New York, 11 December 1946 






3 Oct 51 
11 Oct 46 





7 Oct 50 
27 Oct 47 
Convention for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution 
of Narcotic Drugs 
Geneva, 13 July 1931, amended by Protocol, New York, 11 December 1946 
Entry into force: 21 November 1947 
StOle Sig. Cons. State Sig. Cons. 
Afghanistan 11 Dec 46 Laos 7 Oct 50 
Cambodia 3 Oct 51 Malaysia 21 Aug 58 
China 11 Dec 46 Papua 
India 11 Dec 46 New Guinea 28 Oct 80 
Indonesia 3 Apr 58 Philippines 25 May 50 
Iran 11 Dec 46 Sri Lanka 4 Dec 57 
Japan 27 Mar 52 Thailand 27 Oct 47 
Agreement Concerning the Suppression of Opium Smoking 
Bangkok, 27 November 1931, amended by Protocol, New York, 11 December 1946 






3 Oct 51 
11 Dec 46 





7 Oct 50 
27 Oct 47 
Protocol Amending the Agreements, Conventions and Protocols on Narcotic Drugs, 
concluded at The Hague on 23 January 1912, at Geneva on 11 February 1925 and 19 








New York, 11 December 1946 
Entry into force: 11 December 1946 
Cons. StOle 
11 Dec 46 Papua 
11 Dec 46 New Guinea 
11 Dec 46 Philippines 
11 Dec 46 Thailand 
27 Mar 52 
Sig. Cons. 
28 Oct 80 
11 Dec 46 25 May 50 
27 Oct 47 
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Protocol bringing under International Control Drugs outside the Scope of the Convention 
of 1931 
Paris, 19 November 1948 
Entry into force: 1 December 1949 
State Sig. Cons. State Sig. Cons. 
Afghanistan 19 Nov 48 Myanmar 19 Nov 48 2 Mar 50 
China 19 Nov 48 Pakistan 21 Nov 48 27 Aug 52 
India 19 Nov 48 10 Nov 50 Papua 
Indonesia 21 Feb 51 New Guinea 28 Oct 80 
Japan 5 May 52 Philippines 10 Mar 49 7 Dec 53 
Laos 7 Oct 50 Sri Lanka 17 Jan 49 
Malaysia 21 Aug 58 
Convention for the Suppression of the micit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs 
Geneva, 26 June 1936, amended by Protocol, New York, 11 December 1946 
Entry into force: 10 October 1947 
State Sig. Cons. State Sig. Cons. 
Cambodia 3 Oct 51 Japan 7 Sep 55 
China 11 Dec 46 Laos 13 Jul 51 
India 11 Dec 46 Sri Lanka 4 Dec 57 
Indonesia 3 Apr 58 
Protocol for Limiting and Regulating the Cultivation of the Poppy Plant, the Production 
of, International and Wholesale Trade in, and Use of Opium 
New York, 23 June 1953 
Entry into force: 8 March 1963 
State Sig. Cons. State Sig. Cons. 
Cambodia 29 Dec 53 22 Mar 57 Pakistan 3 Dec 53 10 Mar 55 
India 23 Jun 53 30 Apr 54 Papua 
Indonesia 11 Jul57 New Guinea 28 Oct 80 
Iran 15 Dec 53 30 Dec 59 Philippines 23 Jun53 1 Jun 55 
Japan 23 Jun 53 21 Jul54 Sri Lanka 4 Dec 57 
Korea (Rep.) 23 Jun 53 29 Apr 58 
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs 
New York, 30 March 1961 
Entry into force: 13 December 1964 
State Sig. Cons. State Sig. Cons. 
Afghanistan 30 Mar 61 19 Mar 63 Malaysia 11 Jul67 
Bangladesh 25 Apr 75 Mongolia 6 May 91 
Brunei 25 Nov 87 Myanmar 30 Mar 61 29 Jul63 
Cambodia 30 Mar 61 Pakistan 30 Mar 61 9 Jul65 
India 30 Mar 61 13 Dec 64 Papua 
Indonesia 28 Jul61 3 Sep 76 New Guinea 28 Oct 80 
Iran 30 Mar 61 30 Aug 72 Philippines 30 Mar 61 2 Oct 67 
Japan 26 Jul61 13 Jul64 Singapore 15 Mar 73 
Korea (Rep.) 30 Mar 61 13 Feb 62 Sri Lanka 11 Jul63 
Kyrgyzstan 7 Oct 94 Thailand 24 Jul61 31 Oct 61 
Laos 22 Jun 73 Turkmenistan 21 Feb % 











Protocol amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961 
Geneva, 25 March 1972 
Entry into force: 8 August 1975 
Sig. Cons. State Sig. 
9 Mar 80 Mongolia 
25 Nov 87 Pakistan 29 Dec 72 
25 Mar 72 Papua 
14 Dec 78 New Guinea 
25 Mar 72 3 Sep 76 Philippines 25 Mar 72 
25 Mar 72 Singapore 
15 Dec 72 27 Sep 73 Sri Lanka 
29 Dec 72 25 Jan 73 Thailand 
20 Apr 78 
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Cons. 
6 May 91 
28 Oct 80 
7 Jun 74 
9 Jul75 
29 Jun 81 
9 Jan 75 
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs as Amended by the Protocol of 25 March 1972 
Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs 1961 
State Sig. ' 
Bangladesh 9 May 80 
Brunei 25 Nov 87 
China 
India 14 Dec 78 
Indonesia 3 Sep76 
Japan 27 Sep 73 
Korea (Rep.) 25 Jan 73 
Kyrgyzstan 
Malaysia 20 Apr 78 
Mongolia 6 May 91 
New York, 8 August 1975 
Entry into force: 8 August 1975 
Cons." 
23 Aug 85 












28 Oct 80 
7 Jun 74 
9 Jul75 
29 Jun 81 
9 Jan 75 
21 Feb 96 
Cons." 
29Jun 87 
24 Aug 95 
, Ratification or accession in respect of Protocol 1972 or participation upon deposit of an instrument of 
ratification or accession to the Convention of 1961 (art. 19 Protocol). 
" Ratification or accession in respect of the Convention as amended. 









Iran 21 Feb 71 




Convention on Psychotropic Substances 
Vienna, 21 February 1971 
Entry into force: 16 August 1976 
Cons. State 
21 May 85 Myanmar 
11 Oct 90 Pakistan 
24 Nov 87 Papua 
23 Aug 85 New Guinea 
23 Apr 75 Philippines 
19 Dec 96 Singapore 
Sri Lanka 
31 Aug 90 Thailand 
7 Oct 94 Turkmenistan 
12 Jan 78 Uzbekistan 
22 Jul86 
Sig. Cons. 
21 Sep 95 
9 Jun 77 
20 Nov 81 
7 Jun 74 
17 Sep 90 
15 Mar 93 
21 Nov 75 
21 Feb 96 
12 Jul 95 
United Nations Convention Against Dlicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances 
Vienna, 20 December 1988 
Entry into force: 11 November 1990 
State Sig. Cons. State Sig. Cons. 
Afghanistan 20 Dec 88 14 Feb 92 Malaysia 20 Dec 88 11 May 93 
Bangladesh 14 Apr 89 11 Oct 90 Maldives 5 Dec 89 
Bhutan 27 Aug 90 Myanmar 11 Jun 91 
Brunei 26 Oct 89 12 Nov 93 Nepal 24 Jul91 
China 20 Dec 88 27 Mar 90 Pakistan 20 Dec 89 25 Oct 91 
India 27 Mar 90 Philippines 20 Dec 88 7 Jun 96 
Indonesia 27 Mar 89 Sri Lanka 6 June 91 
Iran 20 Dec 88 7 Dec 92 Tajikistan 6May% 
Japan 19 Dec 89 12 lun 92 Turkmenistan 21 Feb 96 
Kyrgyzstan 7 Oct 94 Uzbekistan 24 Aug 95 
NATIONALITY AND STATELESSNESS 
Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons 
New York, 28 September 1954 
Entry into force: 6 June 1960 
State Sig. Cons. State Sig. Cons. 
Korea (Rep.) 22 Aug 62 Philippines 22 Jun 55 
Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations concerning 
Acquisition of Nationality 
Vienna, 18 April 1961 
Entry into force: 24 April 1964 









27 May 61 
30 Mar 62 
Cons. 
31 Aug 65 
15 Oct 65 
4 Jun 82 
3 Feb 65 
7 Mar 77 









20 Oct 61 
30 Oct 61 
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Cons. 
9 Nov 65 
7 Mar 80 
28 Sep 65 
15 Nov 65 
31 Jul78 
23 Jan 85 
Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations concerning 













Vienna, 24 April 1963 
Entry into force: 19 March 1967 
Sig. Cons. State Sig. 
28 Nov 77 Laos 
4Jun 82 Nepal 
5 Jun 75 Philippines 
7 Mar 77 
NUCLEAR MATERIAL 
Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage 
Vienna, 21 May 1963 
Entry into force: 12 November 1977 
(Information furnished by IAEA Secretariat) 
Cons. (deposit) E.i.f 
15 Nov 65 12 Nov 77 
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material 
Vienna, 1980 
Entry into force: 8 February 1987 
(Status as at 31 December 1996, IAEA doc. INFCIRC1274/Rev.lIAdd.6) 
Sig. Cons. State Sig. 
10 Jan 89 Mongolia 23 Jan 86 
3 Jul86 5 Nov 86 Philippines 19 May 80 
28 Oct 88 Tajikistan 
29 Dec 81 7 Apr 82 
Cons. 
9 Aug 73 
28 Sep 65 
15 Nov 65 
Cons. 
28 May 86 
22 Sep 81 
11 Jul % 
Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention (and the Paris 
Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy) 
Vienna, 21 September 1988 
State 
Philippines 
Entry into force: 27 April 1992 
(Status as at 31 December 19%, IAEA doc. INFCIRC/402/Add.2) 
Sig. 
21 Sep 88 
Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident 
Vienna, 26 September 1986 
Entry into force: 27 October 1986 
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Sig. Cons. (deposit) State Sig. Cons. (deposit) 
26 Sep 86 Korea (Rep.) 8 Jun 90 
7 Jan 88 Malaysia 1 Sep 87 1 Sep 87 
26 Sep 86 10 Sep 87 Mongolia 8 Jan 87 11 Jun 87 
29 Sep 86 28 Jan 88 Pakistan 11 Sep 89 
26 Sep 86 12 Nov 93 Philippines 5 May 97 
26 Sep 86 Sri Lanka 11 Jan 91 
6 Mar 87 9 Jun 87 Thailand 25 Sep 87 21 Mar 89 
29 Sep 86 Vietnam 29 Sep 87 
Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or 
Radiological Emergency 
Vienna, 26 September 1986 
Entry into force: 26 february 1987 
(Status as furnished by IAEA Secretariat on 13 May 1997) 
Sig. Cons. (deposit) State Sig. Cons. (deposit) 
26 Sep 86 Korea (Rep.) 8 Jun 90 
7 Jan 88 Malaysia 1 Sep 87 1 Sep 87 
26 Sep 86 10 Sep 87 Mongolia 8 Jan 87 11 Jun 87 
29 Sep 86 28 Jan 88 Pakistan 11 Sep 89 
26 Sep 86 12 Nov 93 Philippines 5 May 97 
26 Sep 86 Sri Lanka 11 Jan 91 
6 Mar 87 9 Jun 87 Thailand 25 Sep 87 21 Mar 89 
29 Sep 86 Vietnam 29 Sep 87 
OUTER SPACE 
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of the States in the 
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon 
and Other Celestial Bodies 
Sig. 
yes 
London, Moscow, Washington, 27 January 1967 
Entry into force: 10 October 1967 
(Status as included in A/46/604 and TIP) 
Cons. State Sig. 










Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space 
New York, 12 November 1974 
Entry into force: 15 September 1976 
Cons. 
yes 
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State Sig. Cons. 
China 12 Dec 88 
India 18 Jan 82 
Iran 27 May 95 
Japan 20 Jun 83 







30 Oct 75 
1 Dec 75 
31 Aug 76 
Cons. 
10 Apr 85 
27 Feb 86 
28 Dec 77 
Agreement governing the Activities of States on the Moon and other Celestial Bodies 





18 Jan 92 
Entry into force: 11 July 1984 
Cons. 
27 Feb 86 
State 
Philippines 
PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES 
Sig. 
23 Apr 80 
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations 
New York, 13 February 1946 
Cons. 
26 May 81 
Entry into force: for each state on the date of deposit of its instrument of accession 
State Cons. State Cons. 
Afghanistan 5 Sep47 Mongolia 31 May 62 
Bangladesh 13 Jan 78 Myanmar 25 Jan 55 
Cambodia 6 Nov 63 Nepal 28 Sep65 
China 11 Sep 79 Pakistan 8 Jan 48 
India 13 May 48 Papua 
Indonesia 8 Mar 72 New Guinea 4 Dec 75 
Iran 8 May 47 Philippines 28 Oct 47 
Japan 18 Apr 63 Singapore 18 Mar 66 
Korea (Rep.) 9 Apr 92 Thailand 30 Mar 56 
Laos 24 Nov 56 Vietnam 6 Apr 88 
Malaysia 28 Oct 57 
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies 






Entry into force for each state: on date of deposit or receipt of notification 
Cons. 
15 Oct 53 
26 Sep 55 
11 Sep 79 
30 Jun 81 
9 Nov 84 
10 Feb 49 
19 Oct 49 
9 Mar 55 
3 Jun 55 
3 Jul58 
3 Aug 61 
12 Apr 63 
8 Mar 72 
applicable to 
UPU 
FAO, ICAO, UNESCO, WHO, ITU, WMO 
FAO, ICAO, UNESCO, WHO, UPU, ITU, WMO, IMO 
IMF, mRD, IFC, IDA 
ILO 
ILO, FAO, ICAO, UNESCO, WHO 
IMF, mRD, UPU 
WMO 
WHO (Annex rev.), ITU 
WHO (Annex rev.) 
IFC 
FAO (Annex rev.) 
ILO, FAO, ICAO, UNESCO, IMF, mRD, WHO, UPU, ITU, 
WMO, IMO, IFC, IDA 
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State Cons. 
Iran 16 May 74 
Japan 18 Apr 63 
Korea (Rep.) 13 May 77 
Laos 9 Aug 60 
Malaysia 29 Mar 62 
23 Nov 62 
Maldives 26 May 69 
Mongolia 3 Mar 70 
20 Sep74 
Nepal 23 Feb 54 
28 Sep 65 
Pakistan 23 Jul 51 
7 Nov 51 
15 Sep 61 
13 Mar 62 
17 Jul62 
Philippines 20 Mar 50 
21 May 58 
12 Mar 59 
13 Jan 61 
Singapore 18 Mar 66 
Thailand 30 Mar 56 
19 Jun 61 
28 Apr 65 
21 Mar 66 
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applicable to 
ILO, FAO, ICAO, UNESCO, IMF, ffiRD, WHO, UPU, ITU, 
WMO, IMO, IFC, IDA 
ILO, FAO, ICAO, UNESCO, IMF, ffiRD, WHO, UPU, ITU, 
WMO, IMO, IFC, IDA 
FAO, ICAO, UNESCO, IMF, ffiRD, WHO, UPU, ITU, WMO 
ILO, FAO, ICAO, UNESCO, IMF, ffiRD, WHO, UPU, ITU, 
WMO, IMO, IFC 
ILO, FAO, ICAO, UNESCO, WHO, UPU, ITU, WMO 
WHO (Annex rev.) 
WHO, UPU, ITU, IMO 
ILO, UNESCO, WHO, UPU, ITU, WMO 
FAO 
WHO 
FAO, ICAO, UNESCO, IMF, ffiRD, UPU, ITU 
ffiRD 
IMF 
ILO, ICAO, UNESCO, WHO, UPU, ITU, WMO 
FAO, IMO 
IFC, IDA 
ILO, FAO, ICAO, UNESCO, IMF, ffiRD, WHO 
WMO 
WHO (Annex rev.) 
IFC 
ILO, FAO, ICAO, UNESCO, WHO, UPU, lTV, WMO 
FAO,ICAO 
ILO, FAO, UNESCO, IMF, ffiRD, WHO, ITU, WMO, IFC 
UPU 
FAO 
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 









Iran 27 May 61 
Japan 26 Mar 62 
Kazakhstan 
Korea (DPR) 




Entry into force: 24 April 1964 
Cons. State 
6 Oct 65 Mongolia 
13 Jan 78 Myanmar 
7 Dec 72 Nepal 
31 Aug 65 Pakistan 
25 Nov 75 Papua 
15 Oct 65 New Guinea 
4Jun 82 Philippines 
3 Feb 65 Seychelles 
8 Jun64 Sri Lanka 
5 Jan 94 Tajikistan 
29 Oct 80 Thailand 
28 Dec 70 Thrkmenistan 
7 Oct 94 Uzbekistan 
3 Dec 62 Vietnam 
9 Nov 65 
Sig. Cons 
5 Jan 67 
7 Mar 80 
28 Sep 65 
29 Mar 62 29 Mar 62 
4 Dec 75 
20 Oct 61 15 Nov 65 
29 May 79 
18 Apr 61 2Jun 78 
6 May 1996 
30. Oct 61 23 Jan 85 
25 Sep 96 
2 Mar 92 
26 Aug 80 
OptioriaI Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations concerning the 
Compulsory Settlement of Disputes 
Vienna, 18 April 1961 
Entry into force: 24 April 1964 
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State Sig. Cons. State Sig. 
Cambodia 31 Aug 65 Malaysia 
India 15 Oct 65 Nepal 
Iran 27 May 61 3 Feb 65 Pakistan 
Japan 26 Mar 62 8 Jun64 Philippines 20 Oct 61 
Korea (Rep.) 30 Mar 62 25 Jan 77 Sri Lanka 
Laos 3 Dec 62 
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations 
Vienna, 24 April 1963 
Entry into force: 19 March 1967 
State Sig. Cons. State Sig. 
Bangladesh 13 Jan 78 Maldives 
Bhutan 28 Jul81 Malaysia 
China 2Jul79 Mongolia 
India 28 Nov 77 Nepal 
Indonesia 4 Jun 82 Pakistan 
Iran 24 Apr 63 5 Jun 75 Papua 
Japan 3 Oct 83 New Guinea 
Kazakhstan 5 Jan 94 Philippines 24 Apr 63 
Korea (DPR) 8 Aug 84 Tajikistan 
Korea (Rep.) 7 Mar 77 Turkmenistan 
Kyrgyzstan 7 Oct 94 Uzbekistan 
Laos 9 Aug 73 Vietnam 
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Cons. 
9 Nov 65 
28 Sep 65 
29 Mar 76 
15 Nov 65 
31 Jul78 
Cons. 
21 Jan 91 
1 Oct 91 
14 Mar 89 
28 Sep 65 
14 Apr 69 
4 Dec 75 
15 Nov 65 
6 May 96 
25 Sep 96 
2 Mar 92 
8 Sep 92 
Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations concerning the 













Vienna, 24 April 1963 
Entry into force: 19 March 1967 
Cons. State 
28 Nov 77 Nepal 
5 Jun 75 Pakistan 
3 Oct 83 Philippines 
7 Mar 77 Seychelles 
9 Aug 73 
Convention on Special Missions 
New York, 8 December 1969 
Entry into force: 21 June 1985 
Cons. State 
4Jun 82 Philippines 
5 Jun 75 Seychelles 
22 May 85 
Sig. Cons. 
28 Sep 65 
29 Mar 76 
24 Apr 63 15 Nov 65 
29 May 79 
Sig. Cons. 
16 Dec 69 26 Nov 76 
28 Dec 77 
Optional Protocol to the Convention on Special Missions concerning the Compulsory 




UNGA, New York, 8 December 1969 
Entry into force: 21 June 1985 
Cons. 
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REFUGEES 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees 
Geneva, 28 July 1951 
Entry into force: 22 April 1954 
Cons. State 
15 Oct 92 Kyrgyzstan 
24 Sep 82 Papua 
28 Jul76 New Guinea 
3 Oct 81 Philippines 
3 Dec 92 Tajikistan 
Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees 
New York, 31 January 1967 
Entry into force: 4 October 1967 
Cons. State 
15 Oct 92 Kyrgyzstan 
24 Sep 82 Papua New Guinea 
28 Jul 76 Philippines 
1 Jan 82 Tajikistan 
3 Dec 92 
ROAD TRAFFIC AND TRANSPORT 
Convention on Road Traffic 
Vienna, 8 November 1968 
Entry into force: 21 May 1977 
Sig. Cons. State Sig. 
8 Nov 68 Philippines 8 Nov 68 
8 Nov 68 21 May 76 Tajikistan 
4 Apr 94 Thailand 8 Nov 68 
29 Dec 69 Turkmenistan 
22 Mar 94 Uzbekistan 
19 Mar 86 
Convention on Road Signs and Signals 
Vienna, 8 November 1968 
Entry into force: 6 June 1978 
Sig. Cons. State Sig. 
10 Mar 80 Pakistan 
8 Nov 68 Philippines 8 Nov 68 
8 Nov 68 21 May 76 Tajikistan 
4 Apr 94 Thailand 8 Nov 68 
29 Dec 69 Turkmenistan 
22 Mar 94 Uzbekistan 
Cons. 
8 Oct 96 
17 Ju186 
22 Ju181 
7 Dec 93 
Cons. 
8 Oct 96 
17 July 86 
22 Jul81 
7 Dec 93 
Cons. 
27 Dec 73 
9 Mar 94 
14 Jan 93 
17 Jan 95 
Cons. 
14 Jan 80 
27 Dec 73 
9 Mar 94 
14 Jan 93 
17 Jan 95 
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SEA 
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone 
Geneva, 29 April 1958 
Entry into force: 10 September 1964 
State Sig. Cons. State Sign. Cons. 
Afghanistan 30 Oct 58 Nepal 29 Apr 58 
Cambodia 18 Mar 60 Pakistan 31 Oct 58 
Iran 28 May 58 Sri Lanka 30 Oct 58 
Japan 10 Jun 68 Thailand 29 Apr 58 2 Jul68 
Malaysia 21 Dec 60 
Convention on the High Seas 
Geneva, 29 April 1958 
Entry into force: 30 September 1962 
State Sig. Cons. State Sig. Cons. 
Afghanistan 30 Oct 58 28 Apr 59 Mongolia 15 Oct 76 
Cambodia 18 Mar 60 Nepal 29 Apr 58 28 Dec 62 
Indonesia 8 May 58 10 Aug 61 Pakistan 31 Oct 58 
Iran 28 May 58 Sri Lanka 30 Oct 58 
Japan 10 Jun 68 Thailand 29 Apr 58 2 Jul68 
Malaysia 21 Dec 60 
Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas 
Geneva, 29 April 1958 
Entry into force: 20 March 1966 
State Sig. Cons. State Sig. Cons. 
Afghanistan 30 Oct 58 Nepal 29 Apr 58 
Cambodia 18 Mar 60 Pakistan 31 Oct 58 
Indonesia 8 May 58 Sri Lanka 30 Oct 58 
Iran 28 May 58 Thailand 29 Apr 58 2 Jul68 
Malaysia 21 Dec 60 
Convention on the Continental Shelf 
Geneva, 29 April 1958 
Entry into force: 10 June 1964 
State Sig. Cons. State Sig. Cons. 
Afghanistan 30 Oct 58 Nepal 29 Apr 58 
Cambodia 18 Mar 60 Pakistan 31 Oct 58 
Indonesia 8 May 58 Sri Lanka 30 Oct 58 
Iran 28 May 58 Thailand 29 Apr 58 2 Ju168 
Malaysia 21 Dec 60 
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Optional Protocol of Signature concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes 
Geneva, 29 April 1958 
Entry into force: 30 September 1962 
State Sig. Cons. State Sig. Cons. 
Cambodia 22 Jan 70 Nepal 29 Apr 58 
Indonesia 8 May 58 Pakistan 6 Nov 58 
Malaysia 1 May 61 Sri Lanka 30 Oct 58 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
Montego Bay, 10 December 1982 
Entry into force: 16 November 1994 
State Sig. Cons. State Sig. Cons. 
Afghanistan 18 Mar 83 Maldives 10 Dec 82 
Bangladesh 10 Dec 82 Mongolia 10 Dec 82 13 Aug 96 
Bhutan 10 Dec 82 Myanmar 10 Dec 82 21 May 96 
Brunei 5 Dec 84 5 Nov 96 Nepal 10 Dec 82 
Cambodia 1 Jul83 Pakistan 10 Dec 82 
China 10 Dec 82 7 June 96 Papua 
India 10 Dec 82 29 Jun 95 New Guinea 10 Dec 82 
Indonesia 10 Dec 82 3 Feb 86 Philippines 10 Dec 82 8 May 84 
Iran 10 Dec 82 Seychelles 10 Dec 82 16 Sep 91 
Japan 7 Feb 83 20 Jun 96 Singapore 10 Dec 82 17 Nov 94 
Korea (DPR) 10 Dec 82 Sri Lanka 10 Dec 82 19 Jul 94 
Korea (Rep.) 14 Mar 83 29 Jan % Thailand 10 Dec 82 
Laos 10 Dec 82 Vietnam 10 Dec 82 25 Jul94 
Malaysia 10 Dec 82 14 Oct % 
Agreement relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 
New York, 28 July 1994 
Entry into force: 28 July 1996 
<ill.! countries listed below agreed to provisional application as from 16 November 1994) 
State Sig. Cons. State Sig. Cons. 
Afghanistan Maldives 10 Oct 94 
Bangladesh Mongolia 17 Aug 94 13 Aug 96 
Bhutan Myanmar 21 May % 
Brunei 5 Nov 96 Nepal 
Cambodia Pakistan 10 Aug 94 
China 29Jul94 7Jun% Papua 
India 29Jul94 29Jun 95 New Guinea 
Indonesia 29Jul94 Philippines 15 Nov 94 
Japan 29 Jul94 20 Jun % Singapore 17 Nov 94 
Korea (Rep.) 7 Nov 94 29 Jan 96 Sri Lanka 29Jul94 28'Iul 95 
Laos 27 Oct 94 Vietnam 
Malaysia 2 Aug 94 14 Oct 96 
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SEA TRAFFIC AND TRANSPORT 
Convention Regarding the Measurement and Registration of Vessels Employed 
in Inland Navigation 
Bangkok, 22 June 1956 
Entry into force: -
State Sig. State Sig. 
Cambodia 22 Jun 56 Laos 22 Jun 56 
China 22Jun 56 Thailand 22 Jun 56 
Indonesia 22 Jun 56 
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 
London, 17 July 1960 
Entry into force: 26 May 1965 
(Status as included in IMO Doc. J/6233, as at 31 December 1995) 
State Cons. E.i.f State Cons. E.i.! 
Bangladesh 10 May 78 10 Aug 78 Maldives 29 Jan 68 29 Apr 68 
Cambodia 24 Nov 70 24 Feb 71 Myanmar 12 Jul65 12 Oct 68 
China 5 Oct 73 5 Jan 74 Pakistan 24 Feb 66 24 May 66 
India 28 Feb 66 28 May 66 Papua New 
Indonesia 26 Oct 66 26 Jan 67 Guinea 18 May 76 18 Aug 76 
Iran 31 May 66 31 Aug 66 Philippines 11 Aug 65 11 Nov 65 
Japan 23 Apr 63 26 May 65 Singapore 12 Feb 69 12 May 69 
Korea (Rep.) 21 May 65 26 May 65 Sri Lanka 10 May 74 10 Aug 74 
Malaysia 16 Aug 65 16 Nov 65 Vietnam 8 Jan 62 26 May 65 
Convention on Facilitation of International Maritime Traffic 
London, 9 April 1965 (as amended) 
Entry into force: 5 March 1967 
(Status as included in IMO doc. J/6233, as at 31 December 1995) 
State Cons. E.i.f State Cons. E.i.f 
China 16 Jan 95 17 Mar 95 Korea (DPR) 24 Apr 92 23 Jun 92 
India 25 May 76 24 Jul76 Singapore 3 Apr 67 2 Jun67 
Iran 27 Mar 95 26 May 95 Thailand 28 Nov 91 27 Jan 92 
International Convention on Load Lines, 1966 
London, 5 April 1966 
Entry into force: 21 July 1968 
(Status as included in IMO doc. J/6233, as at 31 December 1995) 
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Stale Cons. E.i.! Stale Cons. E.i.! 
Bangladesh 10 May 78 10 Aug 78 Malaysia 12 Jan 71 12 Apr 71 
Brunei 6 Mar 87 6 Jun 87 Amendm.79: 4 Mar 83 
Cambodia 28 Nov 94 28 Feb 95 Maldives 29 Jan 68 21 Jul68 
China 5 Oct 73 5 Jan 74 Amendm.79: 11 Mar 80 
Amendm.71: 1 Aug 80 Amendm.83: 25 Apr 84 
Amendm.75: 1 Aug 80 Myanmar 11 Nov 87 11 Feb 88 
Amendm.79: 1 Aug 80 Amendm.71: 11 Nov 87 
Amendm.83: 9 Sep 86 Pakistan 5 Dec 68 5 Mar 69 
India 19 Apr 68 21 Jul68 Papua New 
Amendm.75: 31 Jan 77 Guinea 18 May 76 18 Aug 76 
Amendm.79: 23 May 88 Philippines 4 Mar 69 4Jun 69 
Indonesia 17 Jan 77 17 Jan 77 Amendm.71: 1 Feb 73 
Iran 5 Oct 73 5 Jan 74 Singapore 21 Sep 71 21 Dec 71 
Japan 15 May 68 15 Aug 68 Sri Lanka 10 May 74 10 Aug 74 
Kazakhstan 7 Mar 94 7 Jun 94 Amendm.79: 27 Nov 80 
Korea (DPR) 18 Oct 89 18 Jan 90 Thailand 30 Dec 92 30 Mar 93 
Korea (Rep.) 10 Jul 69 10 Oct 69 Vietnam 18 Dec 90 18 Mar 91 
Protocol Relating to the International Convention on Load Lines 1966 
London, 11 November 1988 
Entry into force: -
(Status as included in IMO doc. J/6233, as at 31 December 1995) 
Stale Cons. E.i.! Stale Cons. E.i.! 
China 3 Feb 95 Korea (Rep.) 14 Nov 94 
International Convention on Tonnage Measurement of Ships 
London, 23 June 1969 
Entry into force: 18 July 1982 
(Status as included in IMO doc. J/6233, as at 31 December 1995) 
State Cons. E.i.! Stale Cons. E.i.f 
Bangladesh 6 Nov 81 18 Jul 82 Malaysia 24 Apr 84 24Jul84 
Brunei 23 Oct 86 23 Jan 87 Maldives 2 Jun 83 2 Sep 83 
Cambodia 28 Nov 94 28 Feb 95 Myanmar 4 May 88 4 Aug 88 
China 8 Apr 80 18 Jul 82 Pakistan 17 Oct 94 17 Jan 95 
India 26 May 77 18 Jul82 Papua New 
Indonesia 14 Mar 89 14 Jun 89 Guinea 25 Oct 93 25 Jan 94 
Iran 28 Dec 73 18 JuI 82 Philippines 6 Sep 78 18 Jul82 
Japan 17 Jul 80 18 Jul 82 Singapore 6 Jun 85 6 Sep 85 
Kazakhstan 7 Mar 94 7 Jun 94 Sri Lanka 11 Mar 92 11 Jun 92 
Korea (DPR) 18 Oct 89 18 Jan 90 Vietnam 18 Dec 90 18 Mar 91 
Korea (Rep.) 18 Jan 80 18 Jul 82 








Special Trade Passenger Ships Agreement 
London, 6 October 1971 
Entry into force: 2 January 1974 
(Status as included in IMO Doc. J/6233, as at 31 December 1995) 
Cons. E·i.f State Cons. 
10 Aug 78 10 Nov 78 Philippines 2 Jul73 
1 Sep 76 1 Dec 76 Sri Lanka 10 Dec 81 
13 Apr 73 2 Jan 74 
Protocol on Space requirements for Special Trade Passenger Ships 
London, 13 July 1973 
Entry into force: 2 June 1977 
(Status as included in IMO Doc. 6233, as at 31 December 1996) 
Cons. E.i·f State Cons. 
10 Nov 78 10 Feb 78 Indonesia 10 Oct 79 
1 Dec 76 2Jun 77 Sri Lanka 10 Mar 82 
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E.ij 
2 Jan 74 
10 Mar 82 
E.ij 
10 Jan 80 
10 Jun 82 
Convention on the International Regnlations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, as amended 
London, 20 October 1972 
Entry into force: 15 July 1977 
(Status as included in IMO doc. J/6233, as at 31 December 1995) 
State Cons. E·i.f State Cons. E.ij 
Bangladesh 10 May 78 10 May 78 
Brunei 5 Feb 87 5 Feb 87 Korea (Rep.) 29 Jul77 29 Jul77 
Cambodia 28 Nov 94 28 Nov 94 Malaysia 23 Dec 80 23 Dec 80 
China 7 Jan 80 7 Jan 80 Maldives 14 Jan 81 14 Jan 81 
Hong Kong 30 Oct 74 15 Jul 77 Myanmar 11 Nov 87 11 Nov 87 
(by dec!. UK) Pakistan 14 Dec 77 14 Dec 77 
India 30 May 73 15 Jul77 Papua New 
Indonesia 13 Nov 79 13 Nov 79 Guinea 18 May 76 15 Jul77 
Iran 17 Jan 89 17 Jan 89 Singapore 29 Apr 77 15 Jul 77 
Japan 21 Jun 77 15 Jul 77 Sri Lanka 4 Jan 78 4 Jan 78 
Kazakhstan 7 Mar 94 7 Mar 94 Thailand 6 Aug 79 6 Aug 79 
Korea (DPR) 1 May 85 1 May 85 Vietnam 18 Dec 90 18 Dec 90 
International Convention for Safe Containers, as amended 
Geneva, 2 December 1972 
Entry into force: 6 September 1977 
(Status as included in IMO doc. J/6233, as at 31 December 1995) 
State Cons. E.i·f State Cons. E.ij 
Afghanistan 24Jun 87 24Jun88 Kazakhstan 7 Mar 94 7 Mar 95 
China 23 Sep 80 23 Sep 81 Korea (DPR) 18 Oct 89 18 Oct 90 
India 27 Jan 78 27 Jan 79 Korea (Rep.) 18 Dec 78 18 Dec 79 
Indonesia 25 Sep 89 25 Sep 90 Pakistan 10 Apr 85 10 Apr 86 
Japan 12 Jun 78 12 Jun 79 
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Convention on a Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences 
Geneva, 6 April 1974 
Entry into force: 6 October 1983 
State Sig. Cons. State Sig. Cons. 
Bangladesh 24Jul75 Korea (Rep.) 11 May 79 
China 23 Sep 80 Malaysia 27 Aug 82 
India 27 Jun 75 14 Feb 78 Pakistan 27 Jun 75 
Indonesia 5 Feb 75 11 Jan 77 Philippines 2 Aug 74 2 Mar 76 
Iran 7 Aug 74 Sri Lanka 30 Jun 75 
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, as amended 
London, 1 November 1974 
Entry into force: 25 May 1980 
(Status as included in IMO doc. J/6233, as at 31 December 1995) 
State Cons. E.if State Cons. E.i.! 
Bangladesh 6 Nov 81 6 Feb 82 Malaysia 19 Oct 83 19 Jan 84 
Brunei 23 Oct 86 23 Jan 87 Maldives 14 Jan 81 14 Apr 81 
Cambodia 28 Nov 94 28 Feb 95 Myanmar 11 Noc 87 11 Feb 88 
China 7 Jan 80 25 May 80 Pakistan lOApr 85 lO Jul85 
India 16 Jun 76 25 May 80 Paupua New 
Indonesia 17 Feb 81 17 May 81 Guinea 12 Nov 80 12 Feb 81 
Iran 17 Oct 94 17 Jan 95 Philippines 15 Dec 81 15 Mar 82 
Japan 15 May 80 25 May 80 Singapore 16 Mar 81 16 Jun 81 
Kazakhstan 7 Mar 94 7 Jun 94 Sri Lanka 30 Aug 83 30 Nov 83 
Korea (DPR) 1 May 85 1 Aug 85 Thailand 18 Dec 84 18 Mar 85 
Korea (Rep.) 31 Dec 80 31 Mar 81 Vietnam 18 Dec 90 18 Mar 91 
UN Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea 
Hamburg, 31 March 1978 
Entry into force: 1 November 1992 
State Sig. Cons. State Sig. Cons. 
Pakistan 8 Mar 79 Singapore 31 Mar 78 
Philippines 14 Jun 78 
Protocol Relating to the International Convention for the Safety of 
Life at Sea, as amended 
London, 17 February 1978 
Entry into force: 1 May 1981 
(Status as included in lMO doc. J/6233, as at 31 December 1995) 
State Cons. E.if State Cons. E.if 
Brunei 23 Oct 86 23 Jan 87 Korea (DPR) 1 May 85 1 Aug 85 
Cambodia 28 Nov 94 28 Feb 95 Korea (Rep.) 2 Dec 82 2 Mar 83 
China 17 Dec 82 17 Mar 83 Malaysia 19 Pet 83 19 Jan 84 
India 3 Apr 86 3 Jul86 Myanmar 11 Nov 87 11 Feb 88 
Indonesia 23 Aug 88 23 Nov 88 Pakistan lOApr 85 lO Jul85 
Japan 15 May 80 1 May 81 Singapore 1 Jun 84 1 Sep 84 
Kazakhstan 7 Mar 84 7 Jun 94 Vietnam 12 Oct 92 12 Jan 93 
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SOCIAL MATTERS 
International Convention for the Suppression of the Circulation of and Traffic 





Geneva, 12 September 1923 
Entry into force: 7 August 1924 
Cons. 
10 May 37 
24 Feb 26 






28 Sep 32 
13 May 36 
28 Jul24 
International Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women of Full Age 





11 Oct 33 
Entry into force: 24 August 1934 
Cons. 




12 Apr 35 
Convention for the Suppression of the Circulation of, and Traffic in, Obscene Publications 
Geneva, 12 September 1923, amended by Protocol, New York, 12 November 1947 
Entry into force: 2 February 1950 
State Cons. State Cons. 
Afghanistan 12 Nov 47 Malaysia 21 Aug 58 
Cambodia 30 Mar 59 Myanmar 13 May 49 
China 12 Nov 47 Pakistan 12 Nov 47 
India 12 Nov 47 Sri Lanka 15 Apr 58 
Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women and Children 
Geneva, 30 September 1921, amended by Protocol, New York, 12 November 1947 
Entry into force: 24 April 1950 
State Cons. State Cons. 
Afghanistan 12 Nov 47 Pakistan 12 Nov 47 
China 12 Nov 47 Philippines 30 Sep 54 
India 12 Nov 47 Singapore 26 Oct 66 
Myanmar 13 May 49 
Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women of Full Age 
Geneva, 11 October 1933, amended by Protocol, New York, 12 November 1949 





12 Nov 47 
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International Agreement for the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic 
Paris, 18 May 1904, amended by Protocol, New York, 4 May 1949 
Entry into force: 21 June 1951 
Cons. 
4 May 49 
28 Dec 49 






16 Jun 52 
7 Jun 66 
14 Jul49 
International Convention for the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic 
Paris, 4 May 1910, amended by Protocol, New York 1949 
Entry into force: 14 August 1951 
Cons. 
4 May 49 
28 Dec 49 






16 Jun 52 
7 Jun 66 
14 Jul49 
Agreement for the Suppression of the Circulation of Obscene Publications 
Paris, 4 May 1910, amended by Protocol, New York, 4 May 1949 
Entry into force: 1 March 1950 
Cons. State Cons. 
30 Mar 59 Malaysia 31 Aug 57 
4 May 49 Myanmar 13 May 49 
28 Dec 49 Pakistan 4 May 51 
30 Dec 59 Sri Lanka 14 Jul49 
Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the 













New York, 21 March 1950 
Entry into force: 25 July 1951 
Sig. Cons. State Sig. 
21 May 85 Laos 
11 Jan 85 Myanmar 14 Mar 56 
9 May 50 9 Jan 53 Pakistan 21 Mar 50 
16 Jul53 Philippines 20 Dec 50 
1 May 58 Singapore 
13 Feb 62 Sri Lanka 
Final Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic 
in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others 
New York, 21 March 1950 
Entry into force: 25 July 1951 
Sig. Cons. State Sig. 
9 May 50 9 Jan 53 Myanmar 14 Mar 56 
16 Jul53 Pakistan 21 Mar 50 
1 May 58 Philippines 20 Dec 50 
13 Feb 62 Sri Lanka 
Cons. 
14 Apr 78 
11 Jul52 
19 Sep 52 
26 Oct 66 
15 Apr 58 
Cons. 
19 Sep 52 
7 Aug 58 
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TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
Constitution of the Asia-Pacific Telecommunity 
ESCAP, Bangkok, 27 March 1976 
Entry into force: 25 February 1979 
State Sig. Cons. State Sig. Cons. 
Afghanistan 12 Jan 77 17 May 77 Malaysia 23 Jun 77 23 Jun 77 
Bangladesh 1 Apr 76 22 Oct 76 Maldives 17 Mar 80 
Brunei 27 Mar 86 Mongolia 14 Aug 91 
China 25 Oct 76 2 Jun 77 Myanmar 20 Oct 76 9 Dec 76 
Hong Kong 31 Aug 77 31 Aug 77 Nepal 15 Sep 76 12 May 77 
(by UK decJ.) Pakistan 25 Jan 77 1 Ju1 77 
India 28 Oct 76 26 Nov 76 Papua New 
Indonesia 29 Apr 85 Guinea 29 Sep 76 17 Dec 92 
Iran 15 Sep 76 3 Mar 80 Philippines 28 Oct 76 17 Jun 77 
Japan 22 Mar 77 25 Nov 77 Singapore 23 Jun 77 6 Oct 77 
Korea (DPR) 22 Feb 94 Sri Lanka 3 Oct 79 
Korea (Rep.) 8 Jul77 8 Jul77 Thailand 15 Sep 76 26 Jan 79 
Laos 20 Oct 89 Vietnam 11 Sep 79 
Macau (associate member) 9 Feb 93 
Amendments to Article 11, Paragraph 2(a), of the Constitution of the 
Asia-Pacific Telecommunity 
Bangkok, 13 November 1981 
Entry into force: 2 January 1985 
State Cons. State Cons. 
Afghanistan 22 Jul83 Myanmar p Sep84 
Bangladesh 9 Feb 88 Nepal 3 Dec 84 
China 26Jul82 Pakistan 24 Aug 84 
India 15 Jul83 Singapore 22 Jul82 
Iran 10 Apr 86 Sri Lanka 26 Mar 82 
Korea (Rep.) 2Jul82 Thailand 1 Nov 82 
Malaysia 7 Jan 86 Vietnam 28 Dec 83 
Maldives 28 May 82 
Amendments to articles 3(5) and 9(8) of the Constitution of the Asia-Pacific Telecommunity 





Entry into force: -
Cons. 
4 Feb 94 
25 May 93 






18 Feb 93 
3 Feb 93 
14 Jan 94 
Convention on the International Maritime Satellite Organization (INMARSA T) 
London, 3 September 1976, as amended 
Entry into force: 16 July 1979 
(Status as included in IMO Doc. J/6233, as at 31 December 1995) 
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State Cons. Cons. State Cons. Cons. 
Amendm. 1985 Amendm. 1985 
Bangladesh 17 Sep 93 Korea (Rep.) 16 Sep 85 
Brunei 4 Oct 94 Malaysia 12 Jun 86 
China 13 Jul 79 15 May 86 Pakistan 6 Feb 85 
India 6 Jun 78 Philippines 30 Mar 81 17 Aug 87 
Indonesia 9 Oct 86 Singapore 29 Jun 79 6 Oct 88 
Iran 12 Oct 84 Sri Lanka 15 Dec 81 10 Jun 86 
Japan 25 Nov 77 Thailand 14 Dec 94 
Agreement establishing the Asia-Pacific Institute for Broad-casting Development 
Kuala Lumpur, 12 August 1977 
Entry into force: 6 March 1981 
State Sig. Cons. State Sig. Cons. 
Afghanistan 23 Aug 78 Maldives 25 Jun 85 
Bangladesh 14 Sep 77 11 Aug 81 Nepal 15 May 80 11 Sep 80 
Brunei 6 Dec 88 Pakistan 10 Apr 78 7 Jul 81 
China 5 Feb 88 Papua New 
India 20 May 80 25 Feb 86 Guinea 9 Mar 78 1 May 80 
Indonesia 12 Aug 78 31 Aug 89 Philippines 12 Sep 77 
Iran 18 Nov 96 Singapore 29 Jun 82 
Korea (Rep.) 11 Oct 78 6 Mar 81 Sri Lanka 15 Sep 78 7 Nov 88 
Laos 12 Sep 86 Thailand 25 Apr 81 
Malaysia 11 Oct 78 10 Nov 80 Vietnam 8 Sep 78 23 Feb 81 
TREATIES 
Convention on the Law of Treaties 
Vienna, 23 May 1969 
Entry into force: 27 January 1980 
State Sig. Cons. State Sig. Cons. 
Afghanistan 23 May 69 Mongolia 16 May 88 
Cambodia 23 May 69 Nepal 23 May 69 
Iran 23 May 69 Pakistan 29 Apr 70 
Japan 2 Jul 81 Philippines 23 May 69 15 Nov 72 
Kazkhstan 5 Jan 94 Tajikistan 6 May 96 
Korea (Rep.) 27 Nov 69 27 Apr 77 Turkmenistan 4 Jan 96 
Malaysia 27 Jul94 Uzbekistan 12 Jul95 




24 Apr 87 
or Between International Organizations ' 
Vienna, 21 March 1986 
Entry into force: -
Cons. State Sig. Cons. 
Korea (Rep.) 29 Jun 87 
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WEAPONS 
Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous 
















Geneva, 17 June 1925 
Entry into force: 8 February 1928 



















Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space 












Moscow, 5 August 1963 
Entry into force: 10 October 1963 
(Status as included in A/46/604 and TlF) 
Cons. State Sig. 










Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
London, Moscow, Washington, 1 July 1968 
Entry into force: 5 March 1970 

































Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of 
Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof 
London, Moscow, Washington, 11 February 1971 
Entry into force: 18 May 1972 
(Status as included in A/46/604 and TIF) 
State Sig. Cons. State Cons. Sig. 







Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of 
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction 
London, Moscow, Washington, 10 April 1972 
Entry into force: 26 March 1975 
(Status as included in A/46/604 and TIF) 
State Sig. Cons. State Sig. Cons. 
Afghanistan yes yes Malaysia yes 





Indonesia New Guinea 
Iran Philippines 
Japan Singapore 
Korea (DPR) Sri Lanka 
Korea (Rep.) Thailand 
Laos Vietnam 
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Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any other Hostile Use of 




India 15 Dec 77 




Laos 13 Apr 78 
New York, 10 December 1976 
Entry into force: 5 October 1978 
Cons. State 
22 Oct 85 Mongolia 
3 Oct 79 Pakistan 
15 Dec 78 Papua 
New Guinea 
9 Jun 82 Sri Lanka 
8 Nov 84 Uzbekistan 
2 Dec 86 Vietnam 
5 Oct 78 
Sig. 
18 May 77 
8 Jun 77 
Cons. 
19 May 78 
27 Feb 86 
28 Oct 80 
25 Apr 78 
26 May 93 
26 Aug 80 
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons 
which may be Deemed Excessively Injurions or to have Indiscriminate Effects, 
and Protocols 
Geneva, 10 October 1980 
Entry into force: 2 December 1983 
State Sig. Cons. State Sig. Cons. 
Afghanistan 10 Apr 81 Mongolia 10 Apr 81 8 Jun 82 
China 14 Sep 81 7 Apr 82 Pakistan 26 Jan 82 1 Apr 85 
India 15 May 81 1 Mar 84 Philippines 15 May 81 15 Ju196 
Japan 22 Sep 81 9Jun 82 Vietnam 10 Apr 81 
Laos 2 Nov 82 3 Jan 83 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use 
of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction 
Paris, 13 January 1993 
Entry into force: 29 April 1997 
State Sig. Cons. State Sig. Cons. 
Afghanistan 14 Jan 93 Mongolia 14 Jan 93 17 Jan 95 
Bangladesh 14 Jan 93 Myanmar 14 Jan 93 
Brunei 13 Jan 93 Nepal 19 Jan 93 
Cambodia 15 Jan 93 Pakistan 13 Jan 93 
China 13 Jan 93 Papua New 
India 14 Jan 93 3 Sep96 Guinea 14 Jan 93 17 Apr 96 
Indonesia 13 Jan 93 Philippines 13 Jan 93 11 Dec 96 
Iran 13 Jan 93 Singapore 14 Jan 93 
Japan 13 Jan 93 15 Sep 95 Sri Lanka 14 Jan 93 19 Aug 94 
Kazakhstan 14 Jan 93 Tajikistan 14 Jan 93 11 Jan 95 
Korea (Rep.) 14 Jan 93 Thailaro 14 Jan 93 
Kyrgyzstan 22 Feb 93 Turkmenistan 12 Oct 93 29 Sep 94 
Laos 13 May 93 Uzbekistan 24 Nov 95 23 Ju196 
Malaysia 13 Jan 93 Vietnam 13 Jan 93 
Maldives 4 Oct 93 31 May 94 
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1. MEMBERSHIP AND ORGANIZATION 
1. There were forty-three Members of the Committee on 4 March 1996: Bahrain, 
Bangladesh, China, Cyprus, Egypt, Gambia, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Japan, 
Jordan, Kenya, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Republic of Korea, Kuwait, 
Libya, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Pal-
estine, Philippines, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Sri 
Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Tanzania, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates and 
Yemen. Botswana is an Associate Member. 
2. The Thirty-fifth Session of the Committee was held in Manila from 4-8 March 1996 
at the invitation of the Government of the Philippines. H.E. Fidel V. Ramos, President 
of the Philippines delivered the inaugural address, and the Honorable Teofisto T. Guin-
gona, Secretary, Ministry of Justice of the Philippines, an address of welcome. The 
Honorable Teofisto T. Guingona was elected President, and H.E. Joshua T. Terer, High 
Commissioner for Kenya at New Delhi, was elected Vice-President of the Committee. 
3. H.E. Raul I. Goco, Solicitor-General of the Philippines, was elected Chairman of the 
Special Meeting on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, held from 5-6 
March 1996. Mr. Ragaa Ismail El-Araby, Prosecutor-General of Egypt, was elected 
Vice-President of the Special Meeting. Mr. Jun Yoshida, Assistant Director of the Legal 
Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, and Mr. Kwabena Baah-Doudu, 
Minister-Counsellor of the Ghana High Commission in New Delhi were elected, respec-
tively, Rapporteur and Co-Rapporteur of the Special Meeting. 
4. The Secretary-General of the Committee, Mr. Tang Chengyuan, Deputy Secretaries-
General Mr. Tohru Kumada and Mr. Waflk Zaher Kamil, and Assistant Secre-
tary-General Mr. Asghar Dastmalchi, and other members of the AALCC Secretariat 
were responsible for the organization of the Session. 
5. The Committee decided, at the seventh and final plenary meeting of the Session, to 
accept the invitation of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to hold the 
Thirty-sixth Session of the Committee in Tehran in March-April 1997, on dates to be 
determined in consultation with the Secretary-General. 
2. QUESTIONS UNDER CONSIDERATION BY THE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
COMMISSION 
6. The Committee had before it document AALCC/XXXV IMANILA/96/1 prepared 
by the Secretariat entitled Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of 
its Forty-seventh Session, containing a summary of, and comment upon, the Commis-
siQn:s work on the following topics: State responsibility, Draft Code of crimes against 
the peace and security of mankind, Law and practice relating to reservations to treaties, 
International liability for injurious consequences arising out of acts not prohibited by in-
ternationallaw, and State succession and its impact on the nationality of natural and legal 
persons. The Committee heard an introductory statement by the representative of the In-
ternational Law Commission, Dr. Kamil ldris, Deputy Director-General of the WIPO 
(Report, pp.8-18). 
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Z In the resolution (Report, p.81) adopted after discussion of the item (Report, 
pp.61-64), the Committee inter alia requests that its Secretary-General convey to the 
Commission (1) its earnest expectation that the formulation of draft articles on the "Code 
of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind", as well as the first reading of 
draft articles on "State Responsibility" would be completed at the Commission's session 
in 1996; (2) its appreciation for commencing work on the topics "Law and Practice re-
lating to Reservations to Treaties" and "State Succession and its Impact on the National-
ity of Natural and Legal Persons"; and (3) its interest that the Commission include in its 
agenda the topic "Diplomatic Protection", and initiate a feasibility study on a topic con-
cerning the law of environment, as suggested by the Commission at its Forty-seventh 
Session. 
3. LEGAL PROBLEMS REFERRED TO THE COMMITTEE BY 
PARTICIPATING STATES 
3.1. The status and treatment of refugees 
8. The Committee had before it document AALCC/XXXV/MANILAl96/2 prepared 
by the Secretariat, dealing with (a) Model legislation on the status and treatment of refu-
gees (for which see 5 AsYIL 324-44) and comment thereon by some Member States and 
the UN High Commissioner for Refugees; (b) Establishment of safety zones for dis-
placed persons in their country of origin (for the proposed legal framework currently be-
fore the Committee, see 5 AsYIL 344-9); and (c) Deportation of Palestinians in violation 
of international law, particularly the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, and the mas-
sive immigration and settlement of Jews in the Occupied Territories. 
9. In the resolution (Report, pp.81-2) adopted after discussion of the item (Report, 
pages 73-8), the Committee 
1. Takes note of the proposals advanced by the Representative of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees, in particular that of rendering financial and tech-
nical assistance to the Secretariat for the purposes of organizing a seminar; 
2. Appeals to Member States to take all possible measures to eradicate the causes 
and conditions which force people to leave their countries and cause them to suffer 
unbounded misery; 
3. Urges Member States who have not already done so to ratifY and/or accede to 
the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951 and the 1967 Protocol 
thereto; 
4. Requests the Member Governments to transmit their observations and comments 
on the Model Legislation prepared by the Secretariat and set out in Part A of 
doc.No. AALCCI XXXV/Manila/96/2; 
5. Also requests the Member Governments to send their comments and observations 
on the proposed legal framework for the establislunent of safety zones for displaced 
persons in their country of origin prepared by the Secretariat; 
6. Directs the Secretariat to study further the concept of safety zone in the light of 
the comments received and to continue to monitor and assess the developments re-
lating to the establislunent of safety zones for the internally displaced persons in 
their country of origin; 
7. Requests the Secretariat to organize in collaboration with and financial and tech-
nical assistance of the UNHCR, a seminar in 1996, on the status and treatment of 
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refugees to commemorate the 30th Anniversary of the Principles of Refugees 
adopted by the AALCC at its 8th Session in Bangkok in 1966; 
8. Takes cognizance of the hardships suffered by the Palestinian people; 
9. Expresses the hope that the next round of the peace process will witness the 
resolution of outstanding issues including the question of the Jewish Settlements in 
Palestine and the deportation of Palestinians; 
" 
3.2. Law of the sea 
10. The Committee had before it document AALCC/XXXV/MANILA/ 96/3 entitled 
Law of the Sea: Report of the Secretary-General containing a summary of developments 
since the adoption on 28 July 1994 of the Agreement Relating to the Implementation of 
Part Xl of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, its provisional entry 
into force on 16 November 1994, and the termination on 28 July 1995 of the period 
during which it had been open for signature, including an outline of the work of the third 
and final part of the First Session of the Assembly of the International Sea-bed Authority 
held at Kingston, 27 February- 17 March 1995, and of the 1995 United Nations Confer-
ence on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks. 
11. In the resolution (Report, pp.82-3) adopted after discussion of the item (Report, 
pp.65-7), the Committee 
1. Urges the Member States who have not already done so to consider ratifying the 
Convention on the Law of the Sea; 
2. Expresses its appreciation to the Secretariat for the comprehensive brief; 
3. Urges the full and effective participation of the Member States in the Interna-
tional Seabed Authority so as to ensure and safeguard the legitimate interests of the 
developing countries, and for the development of the principle of the Common 
Heritage of Mankind; 
4. Reminds Member States to give timely consideration to the need for adopting a 
common policy and strategy for the interim period before the commercial exploita-
tion of the deep seabed mineral's becomes feasible, and for this purpose urges 
Member States to take an evolutionary approach especially to the 'initial function' of 
the Authority so as to make the International Seabed Authority useful t) the interna-
tional community and developing countries during this initial period; 
5. Urges Member States to co-operate in regional initiative for the securing of prac-
tical benefits of the new ocean regime. 
3.3. Legal protection of migrant workers 
12. The Committee had before it a preliminary study of the item prepared by the Secre-
tariat containing an outline of some of the basic issues concerning migrant workers in 
Asia and Africa, as well as references to the relevant legal framework provided for 
within the UN system. 
13. After discussion of the item (Report, p. 78), the Committee adopted an essentially 
procedural resolution (Report, p. 86). 
AALCC SURVEY 291 
4. MATTERS OF COMMON CONCERN HAVING LEGAL IMPLICATIONS 
4.1. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: follow-up 
14. The Committee had before it document AALCC/XXXV /MANILA/96/4 prepared by 
the Secretariat, containing an overview of recent developments concerning (a) the 1992 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC or UNFCC) since the first session of 
the Conference of Parties in March-April 1994 adopted the 'Berlin Mandate' intended to 
launch a process to strengthen the commitments of Annex I Parties under article 4, para-
graphs (a) and (b) of the Convention through adoption of a protocol or other legal in-
strument; (b) the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity since the second session of 
the Conference of Parties held in Jakarta in November 1995; and (c) the 1994 Conven-
tion to Combat Desertification (not yet in force), in particular, discussions in the In-
ter-governmental Negotiating Committee on organizational and substantive measures in 
anticipation of its February 1996 meeting. The document highlights aspects of the diver-
gence of views between the developed and the developing countries, and contains an 
outline of AALCC's work-programme on this item. It reads, inter alia: 
1. Introduction 
1. The item entitled "United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: 
Follow-up" has been briefly considered by the Committee at its 32nd (Kampala, 
1993), 33rd (Tokyo, 1994) and 34th (Doha, 1995) Sessions. The Secretariat studies 
prepared for these sessions focused on the developments in regard to the implemen-
tation of Agenda 21 in general, and the three International Conventions namely, the 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC), the Bio-diversity Convention 
and the Convention to Combat Desertification, in particular. 
2. The FCCC came into force on 21 March 1994. The first Session of the Confer-
ence of Parties (COP) was held in Berlin from 28 March to 7 April 1994. The most 
important decision adopted at that Conference was the 'Berlin Mandate' which pro-
vided for launching a process to strengthen the commitments of Annex I Parties in 
Article 4 para 2 (a) and (b) of the Convention through adoption of a protocol or an-
other legal instrument. A note reviewing the recent developments in this regard has 
been set out in Section II of the brief. 
3. The Convention on Bio-diversity came into force on 29 December 1993. Section 
III contains a review of the Second Session of the COP held in Jakarta in November 
1995. 
4. The Convention to Combat Desertification which was adopted on 17 June 1994, 
has not yet come into force. As of 1st December 1995 it has been signed by 115 
States but so far only 16 States have ratified the Convention. Among the AALCC 
Member States only Egypt and Senegal are parties to the Convention. The discus-
sions in the Inter-governmental Negotiation Committee have been continuing on or-
ganizational and substantive matters. The Eighth Session of the INC-D will be held 
in Geneva from 5 to 16 February 1996. A note on the outcome of that Session will 
be prepared by the Secretariat. 
II. UNFCC : AN OVERVIEW OF THE RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
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AALCC Secretariat's Comments. 
1. The guiding principle set out in Article 3(1) of the Convention clearly states that 
the State parties to the Convention should "protect the Climate System for the bene-
fit of present and future generations of humankind on the basis of equity and in ac-
cordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capa-
bilities. Accordingly, the developed country parties are expected to take the lead in 
combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof'. Implementation of the 
Convention's provisions by all the Parties is the key aspect. 
2. The COP in Berlin recognized that commitments as envisaged in Article 4.2 (a) 
and (b) were inadequate to achieve the objectives of the Convention. It took the 
momentous decision to launch a process and gave a time bound mandate to take ap-
propriate action for the period beyond 2000, including the strengthening of those 
commitments of Annex I Parties through adoption of a protocol or another legal in-
strument. However, the priority should be given to implementation of the Conven-
tion in accordance with its provisions. 
3. Given the complex nature of the issues involved, one can understand why little 
progress has been made at the two sessions of the AGBM so far. It is, however, im-
perative that if the task has to be completed in time, the negotiating process needs 
focused discussion on priority issues. 
4. The need to utilize the wealth of information available from the first communica-
tions from the Annex I parties and the ongoing work in several International Or-
ganizations and National Institutions can hardly be over-emphasized. The IPCC's 
second Assessment Report finalized recently may set at rest many of the issues 
which are being raised in the context of analysis and assessment. The emphasis 
ought to be on the identification of possible policies and measures which might fa-
cilitate early elaboration of a legal instrument to supplement the Convention regime. 
5. The SBSTA and SBI have an important role to play in the AGBM process. A 
consensus, if achieved on accelerating the establishment of the Technical Advisory 
Panels, would further strengthen the institutional mechanism to deal with the matters 
concerning scientific, technical and technological assessments. 
6. Provision concerning mobilization of adequate international resources and trans-
fer of environmentally sound technologies are the two key issues which reflect the 
concern and interest of the developing countries in their effective participation in the 
implementation of the Convention. These issues need to be addressed seriously in 
the AGBM process. 
7. While no consensus has yet been achieved, it appears that the proposed legal in-
strument could be in the form of a protocol together with certain annexes. Such an 
instrument therefore should contain in clear and precise terms the commitments of 
Annex I Parties indicating quantified targets and specified time-frames. 
8. The very purpose of the AGBM is to find ways to strengthen the commitments of 
Annex I parties. Paragraph 2.b of the Berlin Mandate clearly states that "the process 
will not include any new commitments for parties not included in Annex 1, but reaf-
firm" existing commitments mentioned in Article 4.1 and continue to advance the 
implementation of' these commitments. Some of the developing countries are 
obliged to submit their national communications in 1997 but that is contingent upon 
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providing them necessary financial and technological assistance whether by the GEF 
or from other sources. 
9. The Second Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the FCCC scheduled in 
Geneva from 8 to 19 July 1996 will be an occasion to review the progress thus far 
made by the AGBM process. It is hoped that by that time issues concerning rules of 
procedure and composition of the Bureau will he resolved and the AGBM would be 
able to register satisfactory progress on substantive issues, particularly on the prepa-
ration of a working draft on the proposed legal instrument for adoption in 1997. 
III. THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY: PROGRESS OF IM-
PLEMENTA TION AT NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LEVELS 
AALCC'S FUTURE WORK-PROGRAMME IN THE FIELD OF ENVIRON-
MENT 
1. Issues concerning environmental protection have been on the agenda of the 
AALCC for over 20 years. After preliminary discussions at the Tehran (1975) and 
Kuala Lumpur (1976) Sessions, a detailed questionnaire was sent to the Member 
Governments with a view to seek information on their national legislation and the 
administrative machinery including implementation measures. The information thus 
collected was examined by an Expert Group which met in 1978. The Expert Group 
recognized the importance of collective regional action to tackle marine pollution 
problems. It also suggested that the Secretariat should take up the question of pro-
moting ratification of important international conventions in the field of protection 
of the marine environment. 
2. A second meeting of the Expert Group which was held in 1979, identified areas 
for priority consideration. A third meeting of the Expert Group which was held in 
1982 in co-operation with IMO and UNEP considered the ways and means to pro-
mote ratification of the conventions dealing with the prevention and control of ma-
rine pollution. Another meeting was held in Jakarta in 1984 to consider the revision 
of the IMO Convention on Civil Liability and the Fund Convention. In 1989, the 
AALCC took up the issues concerning a ban on transboundary movement of haz-
ardous wastes. 
3. The next phase of the AALCC's initiatives began in 1990 against the backdrop of 
the United Nations decision to convene the Rio Conference on Environment and 
Development in 1992. The AALCC Secretariat was actively involved in the pre-
paratory phase and prepared extensive material to assist the Member Governments. 
As a follow-up to the UNCED, the AALCC Secretariat has been engaged in moni-
toring the developments in the context of the implementation of Agenda 21 and the 
three recent environmental conventions namely, the Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, the Bio-diversity Convention and the United Nations Convention to 
Combat Desertification. 
4. It would be seen from the foregoing account that the AALCC has kept pace with 
the developments in the field of environment and took up issues of topical impor-
tance. It would, therefore, be desirable to give impetus to AALCC's work and 
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identify areas where it could provide useful and productive service to its Member 
Governments. 
5. Broadly, some of the areas which the Member Governments may wish to con-
sider for the future work-programme of the AALCC Secretariat could be as follows: 
(i) Preparation of studies on important international environmental conventions 
with a view to promoting their wider adherence by the AALCC Member States; 
(ii) Establishment of co-operative programmes with the United Nations Agencies 
and other Inter-governmental Organizations and research institutions engaged in 
activities related to environmental matters. In that context, co-operation with 
UNEP could be most useful in matters concerning capacity building; 
(iii) Organization of training programmes for the officials of the Member Govern-
ments to promote awareness and skills to deal with legal problems in the field of 
environment; and 
(iv) Constitution of a panel of legal experts from the AALCC Member States whose 
services could be utilized by the Member Governments. 
6. The implementation of such a vast programme would be possible only when there 
is financial and material support from the Member Governments. It may be recalled 
that the Committee has already established a Special Environment Fund in 1991. 
The Governments of Saudi Arabia and Myanmar contributed US$ 25,000 and US$ 
500 respectively to this Fund. This was utilized to meet the expenses of participation 
of the Secretariat officials in the environmental meetings during 1992 and 1993. The 
Fund now needs replenishment. The Committee, at its Doha Session urged the 
Member Governments to consider making voluntary contributions to the Special 
Fund on Environment. This would help immediately to launch new initiatives re-
lated to the AALCC's work programme on Environmental Law, particularly the 
convening of a meeting jointly with the UNEP. 
15. After discllssion of the item (Report, pp. 67-70) the Committee adopted an essen-
tially procedural resolution (Report, p. 83). 
4.2. United Nations Decade of International Law 
16. The Committee had before it two documents prepared by the Secretariat: document 
AALCC/XXXVIMANILAl96/5, containing a Note on the item by the Secretary-General 
covering inter alia the AALCC seminar on the role of the International Court of Justice, 
the 1995 Meeting of the Legal Advisers of Member States of AALCC held at United 
Nations Headquarters, and activities to mark the 40th anniversary of the Bandung Con-
ference and of AALCC, and the 50th anniversary of the United Nations, as well as the 
anticipated end (1999) of the UN Decade of International Law; and document 
AALCC/XXXVIMANILAI 96/10 entitled AALCC Legal Advisers' Meeting: Report of 
the Secretary-General. 
17. After discussion of the item (Report, pp. 64-5), the Committee adopted an essentially 
procedural resolution (Report, p. 84). 
4.3. Proposed establishment of an International Criminal Court 
18. The Committee had before it document AALCC/xxxV /MANILAl96/6 entitled 
International Criminal Court: a background note, containing inter alia an overview of 
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the Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, and a summary of the Report of the 
United Nations ad hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal 
Court dealing with contentious issues under discussion, as well as the views and com-
ments of the AALCC Secretariat. The Committee also had before it the report of 
AALCC's Special Meeting on the subject held during the Manila Session (Report, pp. 
25-29). The Report of the Special Meeting contains the following: 
12. The following countries presented their respective positions during the Special 
Meeting: Islamic Republic of Iran, Singapore, Japan, Ghana, Egypt, People's Re-
public of China, Sudan, Republic of Korea, Tanzania, India, Cyprus, Thailand, 
Qatar, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and the Philippines. Australia and Finland submitted 
their views as observers. Some countries made only oral presentations. The follow-
ing trends were identified in the country positions presented by the various delega-
tions: 
A. MODE OF ESTABLISHMENT 
13. The delegations unanimously favoured the establishment of an independent and 
impartial international criminal court, free from political pressures and tendencies. 
However, they differed on the mode of establishment of the same, viz, whether it 
should be through a resolution of the UN General Assembly, a treaty or by an 
amendment of the UN Charter. The majority favoured the establishment of the 
Court through a treaty or by a multilateral agreement. While accepting the difficul-
ties involved in amending the UN Charter, some delegations also noted the difficul-
ties of getting a sufficient number of accessions to the treaty proposal. 
Few delegations were not inclined to keep the ICC independent from the UN to 
allow it to function as a completely independent judicial body. Many of the delega-
tions generally sought the universality of the Court so as to ensure its effectiveness. 
B. THE PRINCIPLE OF COMPLEMENTARITY 
14. Several delegations sought a clear definition of the principle of complementarity . 
The mere reference to the principle in the preambular paragraphs, according to 
many delegations, did not adequately ensure its clarity. Emphasis was made by 
some delegations on the drawing up of clear jurisdictional boundaries between the 
national courts and the ICC to avoid unnecessary overlapping in the administration 
of justice over international crimes. Therefore, delegations sought to stipulate in the 
main text the principle of complementarity. 
15. The principle of complementarity is derived from the sovereignty of States. The 
clear expression of this principle, according to one delegation, meant working, as 
far as possible, within the confines of existing criminal procedures and existing re-
gimes governing extradition and mutual criminal assistance. The said delegation 
further noted that the achievement of balance in the principle would command the 
widespread acceptance of States which was essential to the draft Statute's effective-
ness. References were made to Article 42 of the ILC draft which permitted the 
Court to consider whether proceedings in national courts "were not impartial or in-
dependent or were designed to shield the accused from international criminal prose-
cution or the case was not diligently prosecuted". This Article was understood by 
some delegations as an infringement of the sovereignty of States, and thus was not 
acceptable. 
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16. Majority of the delegations favoured a consensual approach towards the applica-
tion of the principle of complementarity. According to one delegation, this principle 
was crucial and only under exceptional circumstances, where no appropriate alter-
native might be found, would an ICC be called upon to fill in the gap. 
C. ISSUES PERTAINING TO JURISDICTION AND APPLICABLE LAW 
17. The precision in the definition of the ICC's jurisdiction was felt extremely es-
sential for the effective operation of the Court as well as upholding the principle 
nullum crimen sine lege. Several delegations required a clear definition of the juris-
diction of the ICC in the Statute. The role of the Statute, it was pointed out, should 
be to set out the judicial mechanism for the prosecution of crimes rather than to deal 
with the substantive definitions of the crimes themselves. It was also suggested that 
the definitions of crimes under the purview of the Court could properly be made in 
the Statute or be dealt with by the respective multilateral treaties creating or em-
bodying those crimes. Majority agreed that the jurisdiction of the Court could be 
limited to the most serious crimes of international concern, notably, genocide, seri-
ous violations of the laws and customs applicable to armed conflicts and crimes 
against humanity. However, there was no agreement on the precise definition of 
'aggression' and its determination. Therefore, its inclusion was not unanimously ac-
cepted. Several delegations, however, felt that crimes of drug trafficking, terrorism 
and piracy could be under the scope of the Court. 
18. One delegation held the view that Article 20 should be amended by deleting ref-
erences to the crime of aggression and crimes against humanity. It also sought in 
Article 20(c) specific provisions referring to the 1949 Geneva Conventions defining 
the serious violations of the laws applicable to armed conflicts. With respect to ag-
gression and crimes against humanity, it was pointed out by some delegations, that 
these could only be dealt with upon the finalization of the draft Code of Crimes 
against the Peace and Security of Mankind. However, one delegation expressed the 
opinion that the Court should exercise jurisdiction in respect of the 'hard core' 
crimes until the draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind 
was completed. It was also pointed out that the concept of 'grave breaches' instead 
of 'serious violations' should be brought in while dealing with the crimes connected 
with laws and customs of war. 
19. Considering the evolution of the PCU and its successor ICJ, one delegate noted 
that only when the system of law had matured to an advanced degree after centuries, 
that such institutional mechanisms were set up to settle all disputes under interna-
tional law. So, in his view, it was doubtful whether international criminal law had 
developed to the same degree to warrant a permanent Court of General, Interna-
tional, Criminal Jurisdiction. Furthermore, he also noted the difficulties involved in 
determining the offences/crimes that would come within the jurisdiction of the Court 
and their relations with the draft Code of Crimes against Peace and Security of 
Mankind. For instance, he pointed out, it was not clear as to whether the crime of 
aggression would cover political or economic aggression or what violations of the 
laws of war would be 'serious' and what would not be. He agreed with the assertion 
that individuals should have the responsibility for certain serious crimes at the inter-
national level when they enjoyed certain rights at that level. However, in his view 
that did not necessarily call for the mechanism of a permanent Court of General, 
International, Criminal Jurisdiction. So, he felt that the proposed Court could be 
convened as and when required, like all its predecessors. 
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D. ICC AND ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SECURITY COUNCIL 
20. Several delegations pointed out that the inherent jurisdiction envisaged for the 
ICC upon referral by the Security Council (Article 23 of the Draft Statute) could 
cloud the objectivity and independence of the ICC and hence, not in the interest of 
developing a uniform, non-discriminatory, and impartial international criminal jus-
tice system. One delegation was of the view that in the case of the crime of geno-
cide, the invocation of the jurisdiction of the ICC should be only on the basis of 
consent of all concerned States and not as proposed under Article 25 of the draft 
Statute; otherwise it might amount to a backdoor amendment to an existing treaty. It 
was the view of another delegation that the logic behind the principle of separation 
of powers between judicial and executive branches, as employed in domestic legal 
systems, had to be taken into account in the context of the relationship between the 
Security Council and the ICC. 
21. Some delegations would want to give the Security Council only a limited role 
vis-a.-vis the ICC. According to one delegation, although the ICC should be inde-
pendent from the influence of the Security Council, it should maintain adequate re-
spect for the decisions and resolutions of the Security Council. This was felt neces-
sary in the interest of preserving international peace and security which was the 
primary responsibility of the Security Council. One delegation, referring to Article 
2 which incorporates the relationship between the ICC and the UN, sought clarifi-
cation on the scope of Article 2, particularly concerning the role which the Security 
Council was envisaged to play in the proceedings before the Court. 
E. PROCEDURAL ISSUES 
22. Some delegations favoured the rules of the Court in relation to, inter alia, the 
conduct of investigations, procedure and the rules of evidence to be drafted together 
with the Statute. According to them, procedural issues were fundamental to ensuring 
the fairness of the Court's proceedings and the adequacy of the protection accorded 
to the rights of the accused. Several delegations pointed out that the role of a prose-
cutor and surrender of the accused by States, and waiving of national jurisdiction 
were crucial issues and therefore, needed to be settled on the basis of broad consen-
sus. Some delegations also sought that extensive pre-trial investigations be left to the 
courts of the complainant State. 
23. One delegation sought to have more clarity with regard to the relationship be-
tween investigation, arrest and pre-trial detention by the Court and by a State party 
rendering judicial assistance. Some delegations found paragraph 2 of Article 45 in-
appropriate as it allowed decision to convict an accused of a criminal charge to be 
reached by a mere majority of three out of the five judges of the trial chamber. Ref-
erence was also made to the fact that the draft Statute did not require all the judges 
to be present continuously throughout the hearings. Some delegations sought to 
know what factors should be taken into account to decide the 'gravity of the crime' 
and the 'individual circumstances of the convicted person', such as (a) the aggra-
vating as well as mitigating factors; (b) the extent and severity of the damage or in-
jury caused by the commission of the offence; and (c) the antecedents of the con-
victed persons. References were made by some delegations to the necessity of pro-
viding adequate and proper protection to victims and witnesses. 
F. CONSENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
24. Several delegations favoured the exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC through 
consensus i.e. jurisdiction to be conditional upon the acceptance by concerned States 
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in a given case. It was also pointed out that while the consent of the custodial and 
territorial State was considered generally necessary, the consent of the State of na-
tionality of the accused and the State of the victim were also emphasized as impor-
tant. Some delegations, therefore, sought to invoke the Court's jurisdiction only by 
making an express declaration to this effect i.e. by 'opting-in' procedures. How-
ever, many delegations felt that the rigid consensual basis of jurisdiction implied in 
the 'opting-in' system should not frustrate the objective of the Court. 
25. One delegation referring to the principle of accountability pointed out that both 
the ICC and sovereign States had to be held accountable for actions taken or refusals 
to act. The delegation also referred to the various grounds on which the ICC could 
be held accountable. These were respect of human rights of the accused, judicial 
nature of the decision and the equal justice for all. On the other hand, it was pointed 
out that when a State refused to co-operate with the ICC, either in the case of trans-
fer of the accused from national jurisdiction to ICC or arresting an accused who 
happened to be in its territory, that State should provide ICC and the international 
community through the ICC the reasons for such a refusal. 
26. The Chairman invited H.E. Mr. Chusei Yamada, Member, International Law 
Commission, to address the Special Meeting. In his statement H.E. Mr. Yamada re-
ferred particularly to the close co-ordination between the draft Code of Crimes 
against the Peace and Security of Mankind and the draft Statute of the ICC. Dr. 
P.S. Rao, Chairman, International Law Commission, noted the problems which 
might come in the way of effective functioning of the ICC. He said that various 
quasi-legal and political factors hindered the effective functioning of the ICC. He 
wondered whether State parties were in a position to accept international criminal 
jurisdiction vis-a-vis national jurisdiction. Welcoming the establishment of the 
Court, he made pertinent reference to the contentious issues and suggested that these 
aspects should be considered with utmost care. In view of this, he felt that the es-
tablishment of the Court should not be rushed through. Dr. Idris Kami!, Member, 
International Law Commission, in his address, appraised the Special Meeting of the 
work completed on the Draft Code of Crimes by the ILC until its last session. 
27. According to one delegation, Article 6 of the draft Statute, providing for the ap-
pointment of judges, did not adequately reflect the necessary qualifications and ex-
perience required. Two experts, Mr. Adriaan Bos and Prof. Hafner while respond-
ing to the discussion requested all the countries to take part in the forthcoming Pre-
paratory Committee Meeting to be held on March 25-ApriI12, 1996 in New York. 
19. The Committee heard statements by Mr. Adriaan Bos (Netherlands), the Chairman 
of the UN ad hoc Committee, and by Professor Gerhard Hafner (Austria), the Chairman 
of the Working Group of the UN ad hoc Committee. 
20. After discussion of the item (Report, pp. 79-80), the Committee adopted an essen-
tially procedural resolution (Report, p. 84). 
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4.4. Mutual co-operation in judicial assistance 
21. The Committee had before it document AALCC/XXXV IMANILAl9617 prepared by 
the Secretariat, entitled Extradition of Fugitive Offenders, containing, inter alia, draft 
articles on the subject for inclusion in a treaty, as well as a note and commentary thereon 
prepared by the Secretariat of AALCC: 
EXTRADITION OF FUGITIVE OFFENDERS 
1. The promotion of mutual judicial co-operation among the Asian-African countries 
remains one of the primary concerns of the AALCC. In furtherance of this objec-
tive, the AALCC at its Arusha Session (1986), while considering the draft of the 
mutual bilateral arrangements for judicial co-operation in criminal matters in regard 
to service of process, recording of evidence and other related matters, expressed the 
view that as a further step forward in promoting mutual judicial co-operation, the 
current problems and issues concerning extradition of fugitive offenders should be 
taken up for study. 
2. It should, however, be noted that the topic 'Extradition of Fugitive Offenders' 
was on the agenda of the Committee since its establishment in 1956. In 1956 itself, 
it may be recalled, the Government of the Union of Burma by a reference made un-
der Article 3(b) of the Committee's Statutes, had requested consideration of this 
topic. India, by a separate reference, had requested the opinion of the Committee on 
certain specific issues. Japan had submitted a memorandum dealing with various is-
sues raised in the two references. The Committee considered these various view-
points till 1961 (in four sessions) and presented a final report in February 1961. 
That report contained a set of articles on the principles concerning extradition of 
fugitive offenders together with commentaries, without expressing any opinion 
whether extradition should take place under a multilateral convention or a bilateral 
treaty. 
3. The need for the consideration of this topic since the Arusha Session (1986) arose 
as a result of certain new developments. Although the general pattern of extradition 
arrangements on a bilateral basis continues to be the practice, some multilateral ar-
rangements as between neighbouring and closely-knit countries are evolving. For in-
stance, some special arrangements between the countries of the Commonwealth 
have been contemplated, on the lines of the pattern which had previously existed for 
extradition of offenders within the British Empire under the Fugitive Offenders Act 
of 1881. The extradition arrangements at the multilateral level could be identified in 
the following classes of offences, namely, terrorism, unlawful seizure of aircraft. 
acts against safety of civil aviation, crimes against internationally protected persons 
and taking of hostages. 
4. Considering some of the above mentioned developments, particularly in the mul-
tilateral fora, the AALCC Secretariat submitted a preliminary study to the Bangkok 
Session (1987). That study analyzed the AALCC's 1961 principles in the light of 
new developments. It also undertook the examination of each article in the 1961 
principles with the particular emphasis on the following issues, namely, the scope of 
extraditable crimes, political offences exception, the requirement of prima facie evi-
dence, the principle of double jeopardy and the rule of speciality. The Singapore 
Session (1988), while considering that study, suggested that it would he worthwhile 
to study the developments within the Commonwealth, especially the 1966 Com-
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monwealth Scheme Relating to the Rendition of Fugitive Offenders as revised in 
1983 and 1986. 
5. Pursuant to the above suggestion, the AALCC Secretariat prepared a study for 
the Nairobi Session (1989), entitled, "Extradition of Fugitive Offenders: A Brief 
Comment on the Commonwealth Scheme for the Rendition of Fugitive Offenders as 
Reviewed in 1983 and 1986". While considering this study, the Nairobi Session 
noted that the developments within the Commonwealth would be a useful source for 
the Committee's efforts to update its principles. The Nairobi Session also directed 
the AALCC Secretariat to prepare new draft principles on extradition as a basis for 
Committee's future deliberations. Accordingly, the AALCC Secretariat prepared a 
set of draft articles on extradition for the 29th Session held at Beijing (1990). While 
taking note of the draft articles, the Committee declared that it was necessary to dis-
cuss the report submitted in-depth beforehand. It also felt that it would be desirable 
to hold an intersessional meeting of experts on this topic. Due to lack of time at that 
Session, thorough discussion on the draft articles could not be undertaken. 
6. The AALCC Secretariat put forward the draft articles, with a brief note on the 
recent developments, before the Cairo Session (1991). * Once again, due to paucity 
of time the Cairo Session did not take up this item for discussion. In subsequent ses-
sions, i.e., 1992 onwards, this item did not get consideration on account of the 
Committee's extensive work programme on the United Nations Conference on En-
vironment and Development (UNCED) and other matters. 
7. In recent times, however, the issues relating to extradition have assumed impor-
tance on account of UN's increasing emphasis on 'crime prevention' and the evolu-
tion of 'criminal justice' programmes. For example, the Ninth United Nations Con-
gress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders held in Cairo from 
29 April - 8 May 1995 (Ninth UN Crime Congress, hereinafter), inter alia had on 
its agenda the following topic which elaborately dealt with the question of extradi-
tion: "International Cooperation and Practical Technical Assistance for Strengthen-
ing the Rule of Law : Promoting the United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal 
Justice Programme". One of the recommendations of the Ninth UN Crime Congress 
noted the UN's role in enhancing multilateral co-operation aimed at combating 
crime and to provide technical assistance to developing countries. This Congress 
also urged the UN Member States to intensifY efforts to strengthen the rule of law 
and to promote the use and application of UN standards and norms in crime preven-
tion and criminal justice giving due consideration to the political, economic, social 
and cultural conditions. To achieve this objective, the Ninth UN Crime Congress 
found it necessary to intensify sub-regional and regional co-operation in crime pre-
vention and criminal justice, within the framework of regional arrangements, infra-
structure and mechanisms. 
8. Considering the escalation of organized crime, particularly in the cases of tran-
snational crimes, mutual assistance and co-operation is now increasingly necessary. 
In other words, the transnational forms of criminality, such as drug trafficking, ter-
rorism and hijacking necessitate bilateral and multilateral co-operation among 
States. For instance, it may be necessary to acquire the necessary evidence for 
prosecution; or it may be necessary to deal with the convicted offender to investigate 
the crime. In these cases, extradition of the offenders would help in meeting the ob-
jectives of criminal justice . 
• See 1 AsYIL 230 et seq. 
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9. The AALCC Secretariat, while preparing the revised draft articles on extradition, 
has made an attempt to take into consideration various aspects of the law of extradi-
tion as evolved by both Common Law and Civil Law systems. Furthermore, the 
membership of the AALCC comprises States from different legal systems, in par-
ticular the criminal justice systems. In order to reflect the principles of criminal jus-
tice systems as evolved in the legal systems of the Asian and African States refer-
ences have been made to some multilateral, regional, bilateral and municipal extra-
dition arrangements. These are: the European Convention on Extradition 1967; 
1986 Commonwealth Scheme Relating to the Rendition of Fugitive Offenders; and 
the Inter-American Extradition Convention, 1981. The UN study of 1985, entitled 
"Extradition for Drug-Related Offences: A Study of Existing Extradition Practices 
and Suggested Guidelines for Use in Concluding Extradition Treaties" provides a 
useful insight into the practices relating to the law of extradition. 
10. The Draft Articles on Extradition of Fugitive Offenders have been annexed to 
this note. These articles, after due consideration by the Committee, could be for-
mulated as a model framework. 
ANNEX 
DRAFT ARTICLES ON EXTRADITION OF FUGITIVE OFFENDERS 
Article 1 : Obligation 
The Contracting Parties undertake to surrender to each other under the present 
Treaty/Convention, persons who are within the jurisdiction of one party and are 
being prosecuted or have been convicted by the judicial authorities of other parties. 
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Commentary 
Although there appears to be a fair measure of agreement among states on the 
general principles relating to the extradition of fugitive offenders, the position re-
garding a State' s obligation to extradite a fugitive and the legal basis for the same 
continues to be debated. There is a general agreement that in juridical terms "no le-
gal duty is imposed by customary international law on States to extradite fugitive of-
fenders" . I However, states, perhaps due to the exigencies of circumstances also hold 
that "extradition may, in the absence of a treaty, be effected by way of international 
co-operation in suppression of crimes on a reciprocal basis" . 2 In view of the existing 
controversy between theoretical positions such a non-obligation to extradite in the 
absence of a treaty and practical considerations that without extradition international 
crimes could not be controlled, every arrangement on extradition generally provides 
this enabling clause. Therefore, the AALCC framework should also provide for 
this. 
Article 2 : Extraditable Offences 
(1) Extradition shall not be granted unless the act constituting the offence for which 
the person sought is being prosecuted or has been convicted is punishable at least by 
two years of imprisonment under the laws of both the'requested and requesting 
States. 
(2) Where the extradition of a person is sought for the execution of a sentence in-
volving deprivation of liberty, the duration of the sentence still to be served shall be 
at least six months. 
(3) The principle of retroactivity of crimes shall not be applicable for the purposes of 
extradition. 
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Commentary 
One of the major questions arising in respect of extradition is the method of 
qualifying an extraditable offence. There are at least two differing methods namely, 
the enumeration ('list') method and eliminative ('no list') method. The adoption of 
either of these two methods has always been the prerogative of the parties concerned 
whether it is in the context of bilateral or multilateral extradition arrangements. 
The enumerative method which specifies each offence for which extradition may 
be granted is based on an exhaustive list of extraditable offences, either in the text of 
an agreement, or in an appendix forming an integral part of the treaty. Historically 
speaking this is the older approach, which was used in most extradition arrange-
ments in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries3 irrespective of the legal sys-
tem involved. Many of the municipal legislations4 as well as bilateral treaties5 even 
today adopt the enumerative method. 
The enumerative method had, however, in the course of its existence, revealed a 
number of problems in terms of both elaboration and application of exhaustive lists.6 
One of the visible shortcomings of this method relates to the choice of offences and 
their exact definition in the context of different legal systems.7 The most important 
drawback of this enumerative method however, would seem to be the permanent 
need to update the list of offences vis-a-vis emerging new crimes.8 Therefore this 
method is slowly giving way to the other method, namely, the eliminative method. 
The eliminative method is the more recent approach and in general, it is the one 
usually applied by the civil law countries including the socialist countries. It is also 
the system incorporated in several international conventions on extradition. The 
eliminative method defines extraditable offences by reference to a maximum or 
minimum penalty which may be imposed. Some of the multilateral conventions that 
have adopted the eliminative method are: The Arab League Extradition Convention 
1962,9 the European Convention on Extradition 1957,10 the Convention de 
]' organisation de la Communaute Africaine et Malgache 1961,11 the Benelux Extra-
dition Convention 196712 and the Inter-American Convention on Extradition, 
1981. 13 
Even the practice within the Commonwealth is yielding to the eliminative (no 
list) method. The Commonwealth Revised Scheme Relating to the Rendition of Fu-
gitive Offenders 1986 has opted for eliminative method,14 whereas the original 
scheme adopted in 1966 provided for the enumerative method. A vivid illustration 
of Commonwealth (common law) countries opting for eliminative (no list) method 
of late, is the Indo-Canadian Extradition Treaty 1987. IS 
As seen earlier, one of the major shortcomings of the enumerative list method is 
the constant need to update the list of the extraditable offences vis-a-vis the emer-
gence of new crimes. Of late a few new crimes such as computer frauds, due to 
their serious consequences, frequency and the difficulty in tracing the offender, have 
posed serious problems for the international community. The enumerative method, 
however, would not automatically cover these new crimes for purposes of extradi-
tion and the time-consuming process of updating the crimes might enable the of-
fender to escape punishment. Therefore, a new trend is emerging towards their in-
clusion as an extraditable offence either through specialized multilateral conventions 
or by unilateral or bilateral arrangements. Such crimes would include fiscal of-
fences, particularly international white collar crimes, drug and narcotics offences, 
terrorist acts, marine as well as nuclear offences. 
Traditionally, fiscal offences were treated as exceptions to extradition. However, 
recent trends indicate the reversal of such attitude. There is a increasing agreement 
in various quarters to incorporate fiscal and similar offences as extraditable of-
fences. For instance, the Second Additional Protocol to the European Convention, 
1978, establishes a duty to extradite for "offences in connection with taxes, duties, 
customs, or exchange regulation of the same kind as of the requesting party" .16 
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Moreover, while recognizing the different fiscal structures prevailing in various 
countries, the Convention attempts to prevent any possibility of refusal on the 
ground of dissimilarity of fiscal regulations between the requesting and the requested 
states. 17 
The Ad Hoc Inter-Governmental Working Group on the Problem of Corrupt 
Practices in International Commercial Transactions in 1977, in its report, suggested 
certain measures relating to extradition for the offences of al1 forms of illicit pay-
ments. 18 
The Council of Europe in 1981 19 , having identified as many as sixteen instances 
as economic offences, recommended that: 
"The Governments of the member states intensify their co-operation at international 
level in particular by signing and ratifying the European Conventions on Mutual As-
sistance in Criminal Matters and on Extradition, the Protocols thereto and any other 
international instruments facilitating the prosecution and punishment of economic of-
fences". 
International white col1ar crimes figure as an important item during the 1982 re-
view meeting of the Commonwealth Scheme relating to the Rendition of Fugitive 
Offenders.20 This resulted in inclusion of a general clause to the list of 'returnable 
offences' to the effect that further offences which are returnable under the law of the 
requested part of the Commonwealth should be treated as returnable 
"notwithstanding the fact that any such offences are purely of a fiscal character". It 
may be pointed out here that in view of the 1986 agreement within the Common-
wealth that al1 offences punishable with two years of imprisonment are returnable, 
most of the fiscal offences would seem to have been covered as extraditable of-
fences. 
The set of crimes that led to a wide acceptance among the States and which re-
sulted in many instances in the redoing of their extradition arrangements are crimes 
that are considered as terrorist acts. Although traditional1y, extradition arrangements 
provide that offfences such as murder, manslaughter, causing grievous harm etc. are 
extraditable offences, new forms of crimes that are committed in the context of in-
ternational political and ideological pursuits as tactics needed to be redefined 
whether they were offences for extradition purposes or extradition itself by virtue of 
their being committed for political interests. 
Several international conventions have come into existence with a view to com-
bating and controlIing several such specialized crimes irrespective of the motives for 
which they are committed. They would include: the Convention on Offences and 
Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, signed at Tokyo on 14 September 
196321 , the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, signed 
at The Hague on 16 December 197OZ2 , the Convention for the Suppression of Un-
lawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation signed at Montreal on 23 September 
197123 , the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Inter-
national1y Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, signed at New York on 
14 December 197]24, the International Convention Against Taking of Hostages 
adopted at New York on 13 December 1979 as wel1 as the Convention on the Physi-
cal Protection of Nuclear Material, concluded at Vienna on 3 March, 1980. 
In addition to the adoption of international conventions on instances of terrorism, 
the increasing incidence of these acts has also led to the conclusion of some regional 
conventions for the suppression of terrorism. These include the Convention to Pre-
vent and Punish Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes Against Persons and 
Related Extortions that are of International Significance, 1971 (OAS Convention)25, 
the European Convention on Suppression of Terrorism 197926, the Agreement on 
the Application of the European Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism, 1979 
(Dublin Agreement)27 and the SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Ter-
rorism, 1987.28 
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There are also bilateral extradition arrangements seeking to suppress terrorist ac-
tivities. For instance, the United States-Cuba Memorandum of Understanding on 
Hijacking of Aircraft and Vessels and Other Offences, 197329, the Afghani-
stan-USSR Agreement on the Hijacking of Aircraft 1971 and the Indo-Canadian 
Treaty on Extradition. 30 
Although the practice relating to the inclusion of drug-related offences in extra-
dition treaties started even before the Second World War, the two post-war interna-
tional instruments3l that serve as the basic legal framework for containing the drug 
offence seem to suffer from inadequacies. For instance, under these conventions, the 
requested state can refuse extradition if it considers that the offence is not serious 
enough. 
However, in light of the increasing activities in drug trafficking and its serious 
consequences, the General Assembly has termed the trafficking in narcotic drugs as 
'international criminal activity', the eradication of which is the 'collective responsi-
bility of all states'. 
Besides this, many extradition arrangements (among common law countries or 
between them and other countries) apply what is known as 'mixed approach' by 
adding a general eliminative clause to the list of extraditable offences. A number of 
more recent treaties apply an even broader kind of 'mixed approach'. They provide 
a list of extraditable offences, subsequently add an eliminative clause, and then 
augment that scheme by a further provision to the effect that extradition should be 
granted also in respect of any other offence that, according to the laws of both con-
tracting parties, is one for which extradition may be granted. Australia, in particu-
lar, has used this approach in a number of treaties. 
To sum-up, while the departure from the enumerative or list method is clear, the 
eliminative or no list method is increasingly resorted to qualify the extraditable of-
fences. With the Commonwealth Scheme adopting the eliminative method, it has 
become almost universal practice. 
It may be pointed out that in 1961, a majority of member States of the Commit-
tee favoured the eliminative method. Since however there was no unanimity, the 
Committee in its final report, provided three alternatives. 
The somewhat long commentary on this aspect is the consequence of the need to 
place the evolving trend relating to qualification of extraditable offence in proper 
perspective. However, it is recommended that the Committee, a unique forum com-
prising members belonging to the major legal systems of the world should not brook 
any delay in adopting the eliminative (no list) method. 
Clause (2) is to meet the situation wherein a person is sought to be extradited for 
purposes of serving a sentence which has already passed by the competent authority 
of the requesting state which the fugitive has evaded. 
All the major extradition arrangements including that of the Committee's 1961 
principles have provided different terms of imprisonment before and after trial for 
extradition. 
Clause 3 is based on the well established principle that there should not be any 
post facto laws regarding crimes. A specific mention of this time-honoured principle 
is herein called for in view of the possibility of a party to an extradition treaty speci-
fying some crimes with retroactive effect in the hasty move to capture some indi-
viduals. 
Article 3 : Political Offence Exception 
(1) Extradition shall not be granted for political offences. The requested state shall 
determine whether the offence is political. 
(2) The requested state has the right to seek information and clarification from the 
requesting state as to the nature of the offence for which extradition has been re-
quested in order to determine whether the offence is of a political character or not. 
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(3) Notwithstanding the provisions of clauses (1) and (2) the following offences shall 
not be regarded as political offence or offences of a political character. 
(4) (a) an offence within the scope of the Convention for the Suppression of Un-
lawful Seizure of Aircraft, signed at the Hague on December 16, 1970; 
(b) an offence within the scope of the Convention for the Suppression of Un-
lawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, signed at Montreal on 
September 23, 1971; 
(c) an offence within the scope of the Convention on the Prevention and Pun-
ishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, including 
Diplomatic Agents, signed at New York on December 14, 1973; 
(d) any offence within the scope of recent IMO Conventions (against hijacking 
of ships); 
(e) an offence within the scope of any Convention to which both contracting 
parties are party and which obligates to prosecute or grant extradition if the 
requested State is not willing to prosecute; 
(t) offences related to terrorism, which are as follows: 
(i) murder, manslaughter, assault causing bodily harm, kidnapping, hos-
tage taking and offences involving serious damage to property or dis-
ruption of public facilities and offences relating to firearms, weapons, 
explosive or dangerous substances (when used as a means to perpetrate 
indiscriminate violence involving death or serious bodily injury or seri-
ous damage to property); 
(ii)an attempt or conspiracy to commit an offence described in subpara-
graphs (a) through «t) or counselling the commission of such an offence 
or participation as an accomplice in the offences so described; 
(iii)an offence against the life or person of a Head of State or a member of 
his immediate family or any related offence (i.e. aiding and abetting, or 
counselling or procuring the commission of, or being an accessory be-
fore or after the fact to, or attempting or conspiring to commit such an 
offence; 
(iv)an offence against the life or person of a Head of Government, or of a 
Minister of a Government, or any related offence as aforesaid. 
Commentary 
The obligation to extradite an offender under any arrangement has always been 
subject to some exceptions, such as the political offence exception.32 Notwithstand-
ing the fact that there exists no precise definition of political offence, all extradition 
arrangements refer to political offence exception as a standard clause, and non ex-
tradition of political offenders has become a general norm relating to extradition. A 
raging controversy continues ever since its advent regarding whether an act in ques-
tion is political or criminal and who will determine - judiciary or executive. Con-
flicting legislative and judicial precedents still continue to compound the difficulties 
of this concept and in the course of its development the exception has been given 
different treatment. It may be mentioned that despite the difficulties surrounding the 
definition of political offence, certain exceptions to this have received nearly univer-
sal acceptance along with the. advent of the modern extradition practice. They would 
include: 'clause d'attentat', international war crimes, genocide, hijacking, hostage 
taking etc. and a host of other crimes as designated by some of the recent regional 
and bilateral arrangements on the suppression of terrorism. 
Although there is no universally acceptable definition for the mutually exclusive 
terms of terrorism and political offence, the recent trend is to specify several acts as 
terrorist acts which are extraditable and do not attract the political offence excep-
tion. For instance the SAARC Convention provides the following acts as not politi-
cal harm: 
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"Murder, manslaughter, assault, causing bodily harm, kidnapping, hos-
tage-taking and offences relating to firearms, weapons, explosives and dan-
gerous substances when used as a means to perpetrate indiscriminate violence 
involving death or serious bodily injury to persons or serious damage to prop-
erty. "33 
Thus, all arrangements on extradition, while honouring the political offence ex-
ception also categorically provide the circumstances and acts that would not be 
treated as political offences. In view of this fact the Secretariat wishes to emphasize 
to the Committee the inadequacy of merely mentioning of the political offence ex-
ception by stating "extradition shall not be granted for political offenders" as done 
by the Committee's 1961 principles. It would therefore be necessary to specifically 
provide for the increasing number of instances that are now considered as not within 
the ambit of 'political offences' for the purpose of extradition. That is why the draft 
article seeks to provide the long list of exceptions to the political offences in the text 
itself. The Committee may wish to consider this list to establish the validity of each 
exception and to decide whether it should be considered exhaustive or not. 
Moreover, the 1961 principles provide two important, interconnected issues. 
Firstly the requested state's right to seek information and clarification from the re-
questing State as to the nature of offence for which extradition has been requested in 
order to determine whether the offence is of political character or not. Secondary, 
the draft also states that, "in cases where the person sought to be extradited submits 
prima facie evidence that his offence is of a political character, the burden of prov-
ing the opposite lies on the requesting state". 
These provisions are extremely important in complementing and strengthening 
the genuine instances of political offences and therefore should form an integral part 
of this article. 
Article 4 : Extradition of a National 
(1) Extradition of a national of the requested State shall be a matter of discretion for 
the requested state. 
(2) In the event of refusing to extradite the fugitive who is a national, the requested 
State shall submit the case to the competent authorities for prosecution and inform 
the requesting State of the result. 
(3) In case a national of the requested state is prosecuted and is being punished by 
the requesting state, the States Parties shall negotiate to the effect that the fugitive 
may serve his sentence in the State of which the fugitive is national. 
Commentary 
The general practice relating to the extradition of nationals is the strict applica-
tion of non-extradition. The whole of civil law States and socialist States very zeal-
ously uphold this principle.34 Even at the peak of the drug offensive by the Mafia 
some governments were unable unilaterally to decide whether nationals could be 
extradited to foreign states and were forced to place the matter for referendum be-
fore citizens.35 
Within the Commonwealth, although there is no strict rule regarding the extradi-
tion of nationals, there are instances where extradition of nationals is pre-empted by 
assuming jurisdiction over the offender irrespective of the place of commission of 
the offence. This is based on the 'active nationality' principle. Inter alia, United 
Kingdom law has provided for jurisdiction over its nationals in respect of treason, 
murder, bigamy and breaches of official secrets acts wherever committed.36 Other 
Commonwealth members have also enacted legislation providing for jurisdiction 
over nationals for their crimes committed outside their territories. It might be para-
doxical that while the common law system practices the territoriality principle re-
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garding criminal jurisdiction (including the foreigners committing crimes) they nev-
ertheless seek to exercise jurisdiction over their own nationals if they happen to 
commit certain classes of crimes in other jurisdictions under the plea of active na-
tionality principle. 
Assumption of jurisdiction over one's own nationals for crimes committed be-
yond its jurisdiction indicates the intention of some states that these crimes are not 
extraditable. It could therefore lead to controversy if a national is sought to be ex-
tradited by other states. 
The rationale given when a national of a requesting state is prosecuted under the 
active nationality principle for an offence committed abroad, is that the accused is 
well within his national legal system, culture and language. This is not possible in 
the case of nationals of the requested state being extradited to the requesting State. 
Here, the fugitive might face hardships due to the differences in cultural, linguistic 
and professional aspects which would place him in a disadvantageous position in the 
requesting state. 
There is however, a concern that if the nationals of the requested State are not 
extradited, the end of justice might be defeated and the validity of the principle of 
territorial jurisdiction would be jeopardized. The necessary evidence to prosecute 
may not be easily available. Such contingencies are therefore sought to be tackled by 
demanding the extradition of nationals on the basis of reciprocity. 37 On the other 
hand reciprocity could be a basis for prosecuting nationals in their own national 
systems especially when the offence for which extradition is sought happens to be 
one of double criminality i.e. crime under both the jurisdictions. It, nevertheless, 
should be mentioned that the major trend in the world is to prosecute the nationals 
by the requested State itself rather than extraditing them. 
While the civil law and socialist legal systems are clear, the trend within the 
Commonwealth is unclear and the question is regarded as a matter of discretion of 
the parties to an extradition arrangement. 38 This divergence may be due to historical 
reasons. Before the emergence of independent States within the Commonwealth, 
extradition was a matter merely of transferring the fugitive from one part of the em-
pire to another part for reasons of expediency of administering a vast empire, since 
the issue of nationality did not arise in most cases. Commonwealth nations, how-
ever, today have independent nationality laws, constitutional safeguards for indi-
viduals during a trial etc. In fact some courts, such as Nigeria, are precluded by 
their constitution from extraditing nationals but accept the obligation, when so re-
fusing, to consider initiating prosecution locally. Article 4(3) is provided to facilitate 
the rights enjoyed by the fugitive as well as his family members to enable the con-
victed person to serve his term within his country in a familiar surrounding. The 
transfer of the fugitive to serve the sentence in his own State serves the purpose of 
meeting the demands and concerns of both the requesting and requested state. 
The draft articles, therefore, while providing discretion in the matter of extra-
diting the national of a contracting party, seeks to make it obligatory to prosecute 
the fugitive locally in case there is no extradition of the national. This would there-
fore provide a viable compromise between the civil law approach and the practice of 
the Commonwealth countries. 
Article 5 : Grounds for Non Extradition Other than Political Offence Exception 
Extradition may be denied in the following circumstances : 
1. Extradition shall not be granted for purely military offences. 
2. When the prosecution or punishment is barred by the statute of limitations ac-
cording to the laws of the requesting State or the requested State (prior to the 
presentation of the request for extradition). 
3. When the person sought (is to be tried) before an extraordinary or ad hoc tribu-
nal of the requesting state. 
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4. When there is reason to believe that extradition is sought in fact for the purpose 
of prosecuting or punishing the person on account of his race, religion, national-
ity or political opinions. 
5. If the offence for which extradition is sought is of a trivial nature. 
6. If the allegation against the fugitive is not made in good faith or in the interests 
of justice. 
7. Any other sufficient humanitarian consideration that warrant the denial of extra-
dition such as acute ill health, physical frailty etc. (In this case the requesting 
State could postpone the request until such time is required for the fitness of the 
fugitive). 
Commentary 
The grounds on which extradition could be denied as stated in the draft article 
have been in usage under various legal systems with regard to extradition. The mul-
tilateral and regional extradition arrangements traditionally contain a fairly accept-
able list of such grounds for denial of extradition. The draft article has been given 
the present shape after incorporating the familiar grounds from existing regional ex-
tradition arrangements. Thus, the draft article might appear to be a longer one than 
other schemes. However, in view of the emerging universal consensus on the 
method of prescribing an extraditable offence, efforts should be made to unify the 
trends regarding other areas of extradition such as the present one. 
The grounds for denial of extradition as propounded by the present article might 
be familiar within the Asian-African region and accordingly warrant no explanation. 
However, clause (3) which speaks of the possible trial before an ad hoc tribunal of 
the requesting State is a completely new one that was not deliberated within the 
Committee when adopting the 1961 principles. Modern extradition arrangements 
such as the Inter-American Extradition Treaty39 preclude categorically extradition, 
on that ground. 
In view of the increasing universal concern for the human rights of individuals 
and particularly the relevance of human rights to criminal procedure and justice, 
there is a visible trend within Europe to preclude extradition if the procedural law in 
the requesting State is not in conformity with the European Convention on Human 
Rights.4o Like the Inter-American Convention, a number of European States do not 
extradite a fugitive if he is to be tried before an extraordinary or ad hoc tribunal. 41 
This is perhaps due to the fear that such extraordinary or ad hoc prosecution mecha-
nisms are generally created with such powers the exercise of which may not corre-
spond with the basic principles of natural justice or the fundamental norms of crimi-
nal jurisprudence. Further, more often than not, such tribunals are also created with 
an element of subjectivism, sometimes ultra vires of the requesting state's own con-
stitution. 
Article 6 : Speciality Rule 
(1) The requesting State shall not try or punish the fugitive extradited except for the 
offence for which he was extradited. 
(2) In the event of the requesting State trying or punishing the fugitive for other of-
fences that are likely to be directly related, it shall do so only with the consent of the 
requested State. 
Commentary 
The speciality rule, like the double criminality rule, is a well respected tenet of 
the extradition process among States of all legal systems.42 The rule seeks the com-
pliance by the requesting State to try or punish the fugitive only for the offence for 
which the fugitive was extradited. The requesting State is prohibited from using the 
opportunity of an extradition grant to prosecute for other offences which mayor 
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may not have been extraditable. For any other offence allegedly committed by the 
fugitive the requesting State is obligated to make an altogether new request. 
All the major extradition arrangements, such as the Commonwealth Scheme, the 
Inter-American Convention on Extradition, 1981, the European Convention on Ex-
tradition, 1957, provide specially for the speciality rule. Most of the bilateral trea-
ties and municipal legislations also reflect the same. 
However, slight modifications are taking place with regard to the speciality rule, 
without questioning the fundamental validity of the rule. For instance, within 
Europe there seems to be a trend that the requesting State may without prior consent 
of the requested State, prosecute for an offence even if the description of the offence 
charged is altered in the course of the proceedings, provided that the offence is 
based on the same facts and constitutes itself a returnable offence. There are extra-
dition treaties that require prior consent only if, for the offence in its altered de-
scription, a higher minimum punishment is fixed than for the offence for which ex-
tradition was granted.43 
The Committee's 1961 principles have put adequate emphasis on the speciality 
rule in article 9. The present draft article, however, while retaining essentially the 
same content, is divided into separate clauses: clause (1) addresses positively the 
need to uphold the speciality rule and clause (2) provides a procedure in case the re-
questing State wishes to try or punish the fugitive on a directly related offence other 
than the one for which the extradition was sought. In other words, clause (2) still 
prohibits a State's clandestine effort to try the fugitive for other offences. 
Article 7 : Double Jeopardy (Non bis in idem) 
Extradition shall be refused if the offence in respect of which extradition is 
sought is under investigation in the requested State or the person sought to be extra-
dited has already been tried and discharged or punished or is still under trial in the 
requested State for the offence for which extradition is sought. 
Commentary 
The principle of non his in idem is primarily applicable in the domestic penal law 
which prohibits the courts from trying a person twice for the same offence. In this 
sense it has been recognized as part of the human rights.44 While all the extradition 
treaties inevitably provide for this basic rule, some variations in its application have 
been noticed. Such variations normally relate, on the one hand, to the question 
whether the double jeopardy rule is to be applied only with regard to decisions of 
the other contracting State, or also with regard to those of third States and on the 
other hand, whether all or only certain judicial decisions are to be taken into consid-
eration when deciding upon a request for extradition.45 
The legal arrangements and the practice of most of the member States of the 
Committee contain provisions against double jeopardy for the same act. See for in-
stance, the Criminal Procedure Code of Iraq, the Iraqi-Egyptian Treaty of 1941, the 
Law of the United Arab Republic (as understood in 1961), the Egypt-Iraq Agree-
ment of 1931, the laws of Japan and Indonesia. The extradition agreement con-
cluded between the countries of the League of Arab States contains the principle non 
bis in idem.46 Moreover, the 1961 rule on this principle was unanimously adopted 
by the members of the Committee. In view of its universality as well as acceptability 
within the Committee the same article has been retained. 
Article 8 : Capital Punishment 
If the offence for which extradition is requested is punishable by death under the 
law of a requesting State and the law of the requested State does not provide such 
penalty,. the requested State has the discretion to refuse extradition, unless the re-
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questing State gives such guarantee which the requested State considers sufficient 
that the death penalty will not be carried out. 
Commentary 
The question of capital punishment has generated a good deal of controversy 
since the Second World War with regard to its nature as a punishment. 
Although legislation in many countries prescribe the death penalty for capital of-
fences, there is a trend at the global level seeking to abolish capital punishment. A 
number of other States, however, have enlarged the category of capital offences. As 
far as the extradition arrangements are concerned the trend is clearly towards refusal 
to grant extradition where the fugitive is likely to be awarded the death penalty if the 
requested State does not itself provide for the death penalty. Extradition is granted 
under such circumstances only after the guarantee of the requesting State that in case 
the death penalty is awarded it will not be carried out. The trend has been explicitly 
provided for under some modem extradition treaties. For instance, both the Euro-
pean Extradition Treaty47 and the Inter-American Convention on Extradition48 up-
hold the right of the requested State to refuse extradition in case the requesting State 
does not assure the commutation of the death sentence. The Commonwealth Scheme 
has, however, left the present question as a matter of discretion to the parties to de-
cide whether to grant extradition or not in case where the fugitive is likely to suffer 
the death penalty. It has followed, in principle, the European Convention on Extra-
dition.49 
However, within the Commonwealth where several member States keep capital 
punishment in their statute books, still there is a trend toward following the Euro-
pean Convention. 50 States that still provide for the death sentence in their criminal 
law could, while dealing with the extradition of a fugitive who is likely to face the 
death sentence in the requesting State, keep in mind the relevant provisions of Arti-
cle 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which states, inter 
alia: 
.. Anyone sentenced to death shall have the right to seek pardon or commutation 
of the sentence. Amnesty, pardon or commutation of the sentence of death may be 
granted in all cases." 
"Sentence of death shall not be imposed for crimes committed by persons below 
eighteen years of age and shall not be carried out on pregnant women. " 
The Committee's 1961 principles have not addressed this question. It is oppor-
tune to consider the issue in light of the experiences of existing major regional ex-
tradition arrangements. 
Article 9 : Prerequisites of a Request 
The requisition for extradition shall be made through diplomatic channel or any 
other appropriate channel in writing and accompanied by: 
(a) information concerning the identity, description, nationality and location of the 
person sought; 
(b) a statement of the offences for which extradition is sought, the time and place of 
commission, their legal descriptions, probable punishment and a reference to the 
relevant legal provisions with utmost accuracy; 
(c) the original or authenticated copy of the conviction and sentence or detention or-
der passed by competent judicial authority and immediately enforceable or of the 
warrant of arrest or other having the same effect and issued in accordance with the 
procedure laid down in the law of the requesting State; 
(d) a copy of the statute of limitation governing prosecution and punishment. 
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Commentary 
Traditionally, an extradition request which is an act between Governments of 
sovereign States is made through the diplomatic channel. However, in view of its 
time-consuming nature the practice relating to the request has witnessed a recent 
trend in which communication could be made directly between the concerned min-
istries of both the requesting and requested States. For example article 12 of the 
European Convention on Extradition provides: 
"The request shall be in writing and shall be communicated through the diplo-
matic channel. Other means of communication may be arranged by direct agree-
ment between two or more parties." 
Regional extradition treaties such as the Inter-American Extradition Convention 
have even provided for a situation wherein there may not be any diplomatic relations 
between States. Thus the relevant provision states: 
"The request for extradition shall be made by the diplomatic agent, or if none is 
present by its consular officer, or, when appropriate, by the diplomatic agent of a 
third State to which is entrusted, with the consent of the government of the re-
quested State, the representation and protection of the interests of the requesting 
State. The request may also be made directly from government to government in 
accordance with such procedure as the governments concerned may agree upon. 51 
Thus, it is discernible that the traditional diplomatic channel of communications 
is complemented by new methods. The guidelines of the Committee's 1961 princi-
ples, while providing that "the requisition shall .... be submitted normally through 
diplomatic channel" did not envisage other possible modes of communication be-
tween the requesting and the requested States. Therefore the present article provides 
the words, "or any other appropriate channel" with a view to providing the broadest 
possible channels of communications. 
The other requisites for an extradition request have been similar in almost all the 
major extradition arrangements, though there may happen to be some trivial differ-
ences. Basic requirements, however, are two. If extradition is sought for prosecu-
tion, the basic document is a warrant of arrest signed by the competent judicial 
authority of the requesting State. If the fugitive is sought for imprisonment as a con-
sequence of an indictment, a certified copy of the final judgment must be submitted. 
As far as the texts of the relevant legal provisions are concerned, the minimum re-
quirement is to submit the text of the substantial penal law that was breached. 
Keeping in mind that the modern extradition arrangements preclude extradition if 
the offender could not be prosecuted for lapse of the limitation period, which aspect 
also finds a place in the present draft articles, there is a need for the requesting State 
to produce a copy of the statute of limitation governing the criminal prosecution and 
punishment. 
Supplementary Information or Evidence 
If the evidence or information submitted by the requesting State in support of a 
request is found to be insufficient, the requested State may ask the requesting State 
to provide supplementary information or evidence as it may consider necessary to 
finalise a decision on the request. The requested State may also set a time limit for 
the receipt of such supplementary information evidence, and if the requesting State 
fails to comply with the subsequent requirement within the prescribed time the re-
quested State may set free the fugitive. 
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Commentary 
It is not always possible that the particulars accompanying the extradition request 
be correct or adequate at the first instance itself. Therefore, there is a need to pro-
vide for a mechanism to enable the requested State to demand supplementary infor-
mation from the requesting State on all aspects of the request with a sole purpose of 
ascertaining the facts that are necessary to extradite a fugitive. All the modern ex-
tradition arrangements provide for seeking supplementary information. 52 However, 
in the event of extradition being refused the requested state has to, without fail, give 
reasons for the same. 
Article 10 : Evidential Requirement 
(1) Extradition shall not be granted unless the competent authorities of the requested 
State are satisfied that the material furnished before them establishes (sufficient evi-
dence) (prima facie case) that the fugitive has committed an offence in the request-
ing State. 
(2) When the person sought is already convicted for an offence in the requesting 
State the requesting State shall establish that he was convicted by competent judicial 
authorities in respect of an extraditable offence within the jurisdiction of the re-
questing State and that he has not served his sentence in accordance with the laws of 
the requesting State. 
Commentary 
Besides general rules, which are more or less a common feature of all extradition 
treaties, owing to the particular situation of the countries involved, there are some-
times specific additional requirements that needed to be fulfilled. One such require-
ment is the prerequisite of establishing a prima facie case by the requesting state 
against the fugitive offender. 
As regards this requirement, in case where extradition is requested for the pur-
pose of prosecution rather than for execution of punishment following conviction, 
the approaches in the common law and civil law systems are divergent. The ques-
tion arises in the former case whether or not an extradition request must be sup-
ported by further evidence if it is based solely on a warrant of arrest. 
In most common-law countries, the establishment of a prime facie case is tradi-
tionally a paramount requirement if the extradition of an accused person is sought 
for the purposes of prosecution. According to typical extradition treaties entered into 
by common law countries, prima facie evidence is "such evidence as, according to 
the law of the requested party, would justify his (i.e. accused person) committal for 
trial if the offences had been committed in the territory of the requested party. 53 
Most common law countries apply particularly a strict approach in this respect. 
The basic idea is to ensure equality of treatment for all persons who stand before the 
court accused of an offence wherever this was committed.54 
The typical approach of civil law countries on the other had may be characterized 
as a common understanding that extradition is a preliminary auxiliary system of 
bringing an offender to justice.55 According to this view, it is up to the court of the 
requesting State to take and evaluate evidence. The requested State is not called 
upon to investigate the subject and its authorities may content themselves with the 
fact that valid judicial warrant of arrest exists, based on an extraditable offence and 
that the contractually stipulated State has grounds for doubting the reasons given for 
an extradition request. 56 
The differences in the rule of evidence between common law and civil law coun-
tries have made the extradition proceedings very difficult. It seems that a high per-
centage of extradition requests submitted by civil law countries to common law 
countries fail for these formal reasons. 57 Some countries have decided that no fur-
ther extradition request should be made where a prima facie case needs to be estab-
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lished.58 In fact Spain, a civil law country, has already terminated its extradition 
treaty with the United Kingdom, due to this reason. 59 
Even though within the common law system, wherein the requirement of prime 
facie case has been zealously guarded, there are radical views questioning the valid-
ity of this rule. A case in point is the position taken by Australia within the Com-
monwealth. There are, however, trends within England also which argue for the 
abolition of the requirement. 60 Two most important common law countries India and 
Canada have not adhered to the prima facie requirement so stringently in a recent 
agreement. 61 Though such trends are discernible in bilateral and municipal settings, 
when it comes to the Commonwealth as such, the prima facie requirement has been 
largely retained. 
On the other hand, the civil law countries who follow the inquisitorial method in 
criminal prosecution do not require the establishment of a prima facie case before 
granting an extradition request. Reference may be made to Article 12 of the Euro-
pean Convention on Extradition which makes no reference to the prima facie case. 
However, Article 13 enables the requested State to seek any supplementary infor-
mation which is thought to be necessary in order to reach a decision. Although there 
is no express provision for contracting States to provide a prima facie case, some 
States have nevertheless, on acceding to the Convention, made a reservation on this 
point. Israel for instance insists upon prima facie case in all cases, whereas Norway 
and Denmark reserve the right to ask for such evidence in any particular case. The 
Federal Republic of Germany is also in the process of a radical change in this re-
gard. Following recent Court decisions, Article 10(2) of the new German Statute 
requires documents establishing a prima facie case if in the circumstances of the 
case there is reasonable doubt whether the requested person has in fact committed 
the offence. 
Thus, the rule relating to prima facie requirement within the common law and 
civil law system is changing but no distinct developments are taking place in both 
systems. Perhaps this is another area in which there could be efforts to harmonize 
the evidential requirements. One possible compromise is to make the requirement of 
prima facie case discretionary. 
The Committee's 1961 principles, however, provided specifically for the estab-
lishment of prima facie case in Articles 16 and 17. The practice in the member 
countries (as of 1961) is that a fugitive offender would be discharged if a prima fa-
cie case is not made out against him. There was a unanimity within the Committee 
then on this point. The draft article seeks to retain the requirement of prima facie 
case. However, if any change is contemplated to reduce the rigors of this require-
ment, it should seek to strike a balance between the requirement of an absolute 
prima facie case and the presentation of a simple warrant of arrest. This is essential 
since the requested state should be in a position to satisfy itself before extraditing a 
fugitive. That is the intent of the inclusion of the words 'sufficient evidence' in pa-
rentheses in the draft articles. 
Article 11 : Surrender 
(1) The competent authorities of the requested State shall take the necessary steps to 
enable the requesting State to take away the accused. 
(2) The requesting State shall be informed of the place and date of surrender and of 
the length of time for which the fugitive will be detained for the purposes of surren-
der. 
(3) The requested State may release the fugitive in question, if the requesting State 
fails to take custody of the fugitive within the prescribed time from the day of notifi-
cation to the requesting State. 
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(4) If circumstances beyond their control prevent either of the States from surren-
dering or taking over the fugitive within the time, the States shall agree on a new 
date for surrender. 
Article 12 : Reply by the Requested State 
The requested state shall inform the requesting state through diplomatic channel 
or other appropriate channel, in writing of its decision on the request for extradition. 
If the request for extradition is rejected, the reasons shall be stated. 
Commentary 
Once a request has been submitted to the requested state, the requested state has 
to act on it. The decision to grant or refuse extradition shall be made in writing and 
shall be transmitted through the same channel through which the requesting State 
made the request. In the event of extradition being refused the requested State has to 
give reasons for its decision. 
Article 13 : Concurrent Requests 
(1) If there are concurrent requests for extradition in respect of the same person the 
requested State shall have the discretion to decide upon the priority of requests. 
(2) The requested State, while doing so, shall take into account all the circumstances 
and especially the relative gravity of the offences, place of commission, order of re-
quests, penalty to be imposed and the nationality of the person claimed. 
Commentary 
It is possible that several States could make concurrent requests for the extradi-
tion of the same fugitive who has committed extraditable offences in the territories 
of all the requesting States. The major trend relating to this point is that the re-
quested State shall have the discretion to decide as to which of the requesting States 
the fugitive shall he surrendered. However, the requested State is expected to take 
into account certain factors in exercising its discretion. Such factors according to the 
major extradition arrangements currently in force include the relative gravity of the 
offences, places of commission, order of requests and the nationality of the person. 
The requested state may also take into account other necessary circumstances before 
deciding. As highlighted by the Inter-American Extradition Convention on this 
question: 
"When extradition is requested for the same offence, the requested State shall 
give preference to the request of the State in which the offence was committed. If 
the requests are for different offences, preference shall be given to the State seek-
ing the individual for the offence punishable by the most severe penalty, in accor-
dance with the laws of the requested State. If the requests involve different of-
fences that the requested State considers to be of equal gravity, preference shall be 
determined by the order in which requests are received". 
Article 14 : Seizure of Property, Articles etc. 
Articles seized which were in the possession of the fugitive, at the time of his ar-
rest, and which may be used as proof of the offence shall be delivered to the re-
questing State at the time of the actual extradition. 
Commentary 
While arresting the fugitive it is the duty of the requested State to seize all arti-
cles and objects that are found with him. This is essential since they might be 
needed during the committal proceedings in the requesting State as evidentiary ob-
jects. It is also the duty of the requested State to deliver all such articles seized from 
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the fugitive to the requesting State. In view of the unanimity that prevails within the 
Committee and elsewhere the present draft article is almost identical to that of the 
1961 principles on this matter. 
Article 15 : Abduction of the Fugitive 
If the fugitive is abducted from the requested State by the agents of the request-
ing State, the requested state shall be entitled to demand the return of the fugitive. 
Commentary 
The question of abduction instead of formal extradition of a fugitive by the agents 
of the requesting State came into the limelight after the seizure on May 11, 1960 of 
Adolf Eichmann by "private" Israeli citizens in Argentina and his transportation to 
Israel on an Israeli aircraft to face trial as a Nazi war criminal.62 It may, however, 
be noted that the extradition of a fugitive is a prerogative of the asylum/requested 
state and that the requesting State, i.e. the State which seeks jurisdiction over the 
fugitive, has an obligation to seek the consent of the territorial State where the fugi-
tive is hiding. It is not a question of protection of the fugitive by the requested State, 
but of its prerogative to have a say on the matters that take place within its territory. 
That is why the draft article makes it explicit that the requested State still has the 
right to demand the custody of the fugitive who might have been abducted by force 
by the agents of the requesting State. 
Article 16 : Deferral of Surrender 
When the fugitive is being tried or is serving a sentence in the requested State for 
an offence other than the one for which extradition is requested, surrender may be 
postponed until he is set free either through acquittal, completed service or commu-
tation of sentence, dismissal, pardon or grace. Civil suit that may be pending against 
the fugitive in the requested State would not, however, defer his surrender. 
Commentary 
There might be a situation wherein the request of extradition may be made to 
procure a fugitive who is on trial in the requested State. Under such circumstances, 
it is the practice to wait for the final disposal of the on-going trial by the requested 
State. Therefore, the surrender could be postponed until the final ruling of the case. 
However, if the trial in the requested State takes unduly long time, the States con-
cerned could arrive at a decision through negotiation as to whether to postpone the 
case 0f the fugitive to stand trial in the requesting state. Postponement or deferral of 
extradition is permissible only in a criminal case but not in civil cases. 
Article 17 : Provisional Arrest 
In case of urgency the requesting State may request the provisional arrest of the 
fugitive and the requested State may do so and keep the fugitive in custody. 
Commentary 
Normally the fugitive is kept in custody after committal proceedings are over and 
the decision has been taken that the fugitive shall be extradited. However, in urgent 
cases the custody may precede the committal proceedings. Although the requesting 
State may request the requested state to do so, ultimately it is at the discretion of the 
requested state to keep the fugitive in custody or not before committal. This matter, 
however, seems to be analogical to the preventive custody and accordingly would 
depend upon the provisions of relevant laws. 
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Article 18: Urgent Requests 
(1) In urgent cases requests for extradition may be made by post, telegram, or tele-
phone, provided that the requests include a short account of the offence, a notifica-
tion that a warrant of arrest has been issued by the competent authority and that ex-
tradition shall be requested through diplomatic channel or other appropriate chan-
nels. 
(2) The requested State may, if necessary, arrest and detain the fugitive for a period 
not exceeding thirty days, after which he shall be released unless the written request 
accompanied by the necessary details of information is received. 
(3) If the request is made by post, telegram or telephone the requested State shall 
have the right to ascertain the request by seeking a written request from the re-
questing State. 
Commentary 
This article addresses the possible modes of communication relating to urgent re-
quests for extradition. Similar provision is found in almost all the modem extradi-
tion arrangements although with slight variations. In the case of urgency it may not 
be possible to adopt all the formalities or prerequisites of a normal extradition re-
quest. That is why it may provide for the use of simpler communication means such 
as post, telegraph, telephone and other modem communication means. Such re-
quests need not even be sent through diplomatic channels and the governments could 
communicate directly at ministerial level. However, it may be pointed out that ur-
gent requests would result only in the provisional arrest of the fugitive and within 
the time limit set by the requested State. The requesting State shall have to make a 
proper and formal request in order to effect the surrender of the fugitive. The re-
quested state has the right to set free the fugitive from provisional arrest if the re-
questing state has not presented the necessary details of information within the time 
set by the former. 
Article 19 : Extradition of a Third State's National 
If the fugitive whose extradition is requested is not a national of the requesting 
State, the requested State may notify the State of which the fugitive is a national of 
that request as soon as it is received in order to enable the said State to defend him if 
necessary. 
Commentary 
There are instances in which a State may be requested to surrender the fugitive 
who may be the national of a third State, having committed an extraditable offence 
within the territory of the requesting State. This is slightly different from concurrent 
requests wherein the [national] State of the fugitive besides the requesting State may 
request the extradition on the basis of the active nationality principle. Here the 
situation may be that the national state may not be aware that one of its nationals 
having committed an extraditable crime in one country has fled to a third country. 
Although the requested State in whose territory the fugitive is found has the right to 
decide on the question of surrender, it is, however, in the interests of the comity of 
nations, to notify the national State of the fugitive, giving it an opportunity to be 
aware of the matter and if possible, to defend the fugitive. Those States who sub-
scribe to the non-extradition of their nationals may find such provision useful. 
Article 20 : Re-extradition 
The requesting State shall not without the consent of the requested State, surren-




The basic presumption of extradition law is that the fugitive is surrendered to the 
requesting State to stand trial or serve sentence only for the specific offence or sen-
tence for which he was sought to be extradited. Therefore, the requesting State has 
an obligation to obtain the consent of the requested State if there is an intention to 
hand over the fugitive to a third country. The requested State has the right to decide 
the fate of the fugitive in relation to other offences that he might have committed 
other than the one for which he was surrendered. Such provision is found in the 
European Convention on Extradition,63 and it may be adopted by the AALCC. 
Article 21 : Procedural Law 
The procedure with regard to extradition, provisional arrest or committal before 
the judicial authorities shall be in accordance with the law of the requested State. 
Commentary 
Basically extradition is a domestic matter and analogical to a trial under the do-
mestic law, although it has an international element in as much as the request for 
surrender comes from another State. However, the extradition process relating to 
provisional arrest, committal, evidence will have to be in accordance with the law of 
the requested State. 
Article 22 : Simplified Extradition (Waiver of Committal Proceedings) 
The requested State may grant extradition without a formal extradition proceed-
ing if the fugitive sought irrevocably consents in writing to the extradition after be-
ing advised by a judge or other competent authority of his right to a formal extradi-
tion proceeding and the protection afforded by such proceeding. 
Commentary 
There is a possibility where the whole process of committal proceedings might 
become superfluous in view of the possibility that the fugitive may not contest the 
decision to surrender him. This amounts to a virtual waiver of committal proceed-
ings by the fugitive and of course with the full knowledge of the consequences of 
such a voluntarism. Extradition arrangements such as the Inter-American Conven-
tion and the Commonwealth Scheme provide for such waiver of committal proce-
dure by the fugitive. It is, however, the duty of the requested State to advise him of 
his rights as a fugitive. 
Article 23 : Rights of the Fugitive 
The fugitive sought shall, during the process of extradition, e!1ioy all the legal 
rights and guarantees granted by the law of that [the requested] State. 
The fugitive shall be assisted by legal counsel and if the official language of the 
requested State is other than his mother tongue, he shall also be assisted by an inter-
preter free of cost. 
Commentary 
This article guarantees the equality before the law of the requested State if he de-
cides to contest the decision to extradite him. The requested State is obliged in such 
cases to provide the fugitive with adequate legal assistance, for instance, the service 
of a legal counsel and an interpreter free of cost. This would guarantee the fugitive 
impartiality in the requested State. 
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Article 24 : Costs of Extradition 
The requesting State shall bear all expenses incurred in the execution of the re-
quest, and if the fugitive is discharged or acquitted, the said State shall bear the ex-
penses necessary for his return to the requested state. 
Commentary 
The requesting state is expected to bear the expenses that might accrue in the 
execution of an extradition. for instance, the cost of conveyance, transport etc. from 
the territory of the requested State to the territory of the requesting State. In the 
event of the fugitive being acquitted or discharged the requesting State shall bear the 
expenses for the fugitive's return to the requested State. 
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requesting state shall be 'extradition evidence'. There is no qualification whatsoever to this 
'extradition evidence'. 
62 See Gerhard von Glahn, Law Among Nations: An introduction to Public International Law, 
Second Edition (1970) pp. 268-269. 
63 Article 15 of the European Convention. 
22. After discussion of the item (Report, p. 78) the Committee adopted an essentially 
procedural resolution (Report, p. 85). 
5. TRADE LAW MA TIERS 
5.1. World Trade Organization (WTO) 
23. The Committee had before it document AALCC/XXXV/MANILAI96/9 entitled 
"WTO as a Framework Agreement and Code of Conduct for World Trade" containing 
notes and comments on the main features of the WTO Agreement and its Annexes, and 
their possible impact on the developing countries: 
Background 
1. The Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, launched in 1986, 
[was] concluded on 15 April 1994, in Marrakesh (Morocco) with the signing of the 
Final Act embodying the results of that Round and opening for signature the 
Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO) to which all substan-
tive agreements and understandings were annexed, as well as the Ministerial Decla-
rations and Decisions adopted at Marrakesh and the Understanding on Commitments 
on Financial Services to form an integral part thereof. It was also agreed that the 
WTO Agreement must be accepted as a package deal without any exception. 
2. Of the 125 countries which formally participated in the Uruguay Round, 111 
signed the Final Act and -104 signed the WTO Agreement, in many cases with the 
stipulation that their acceptance was subject to ratification I [fn 1: International Legal 
Materials Vol. xxxm No 3 (September 1994) p. 1132. The AALCC Member 
States signatory to the WTO Agreement include Bahrain, Bangladesh, China, Cy-
prus, Egypt, Ghana, Indonesia, Kenya, Kuwait, Malaysia, Mauritius, Myanmar, 
Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Qatar, Senegal, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, 
Thailand, Turkey, Uganda and United Arab Emirates]. Seven countries, Australia, 
Botswana, Burundi, India, Japan, Republic of Korea and USA, were unable to sign 
the WTO Agreement because of domestic legislative impediments2 [fn 2: Ibid.]. 
3. The most significant feature of the Final Act was that it represented a single 
undertaking integrating all the key agreements under one umbrella, i.c. tariffs and 
now also service commitments as well as substantive trade rules are part of a single 
package. This was reinforced by the organizational and institutional framework 
which the WTO Agreement and the WTO, as the international economic organiza-
tion, provide. 
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Impact on Developing Countries 
46. The establishment of the WTO is most likely to result in an overall increase 
in the scope of obligations for all its members, but developing country members, in 
particular, will be faced with a dramatic increase in the level of their obligations. 
This is because they are required to accept all Multilateral Trade Agreements 
(MTAs) incorporated in Annexes I. 2 and 3 of the WTO Agreement without any 
exceptions or reservations, as well as to submit their schedules of concessions on 
goods and concessions with respect to market access and national treatment for trade 
in services. They are also required to accept new obligations in the area of trade in 
services, and, in particular, intellectual property rights. Prior to WTO, few devel-
oping countries were parties to the Tokyo Round CodeslO [fn 10: As of May 1994, 
15 developing countries were parties to the Agreement on Technical Barriers to 
Trade; 2 to the Agreement on Government Procurement; 13 to the Subsidies Code; 
II to the Anti-Dumping Code; 12 to the Customs Valuation Code; 12 to the Agree-
ment on Import Licensing], but under the revised codes they are required to assume 
new obligations flowing from them. The very strict conditions for accession to the 
WTO thus pose a serious challenge to the developing countries. 
47. The process of accession will also be much more difficult for those develop-
ing countries and economies in transition that are now negotiating their terms of ac-
cession to the GATT, as they will need to adopt the new agreements negotiated in 
the Uruguay Round. For example, they will have to negotiate an 'entry fee' on both 
goods and services, accept a variety of Agreements that until now had been optional 
(i.e. most Tokyo Round Codes as revised), and commit themselves to a set of new 
multilateral rules and disciplines in the areas of agriculture, subsidies and intellec-
tual property rights, among others. 
48. The setting up of the WTO, effective from 1 January 1995, represents a sig-
nificant step towards the full integration of all countries irrespective of their levels 
of economic development into a global trading system of shared commitments, 
shared rules and shared opportunities. Unlike the case of the two Bretton Woods in-
stitutions, viz. the World Bank and the IMF, in the case of the WTO developing 
countries have had a role in its evolution and establishment. More than two-thirds of 
its over 100 members are developing or transition economies, as are the great ma-
jority of those in the process of becoming its members II [fn 11: Twenty-one gov-
ernments are now negotiating accession to GATT or resumption of contracting party 
status: Albania, Algeria, Armenia, Belarus, Bulgaria, China, Crotia, Ecuador, Es-
tonia, Jordan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Mongolia, Nepal, Panama, Russian 
Federation, Saudi Arabia, Slovenia, Taiwan, and Ukraine. Fourteen governments 
can succeed to contracting party status under Article XXVI: 5(c) (GATT 1947) 
upon request: Angola, Bahamas, Cambodia, Cape Verde, Equatorial Guinea, Ki-
ribati, Papua New Guinea, Qatar, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Solomon Is-
lands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Yemen]. These prospective members include China and 
Russia whose inclusion in the multilateral system and its rules is vital not only to the 
completion of the global market but to global stability. 
49. However, membership of the WTO system requires unequivocal commit-
ment to, and enforcement of, the multilateral rules; no country can be exempt there-
from. The WTO Agreement itself imposes a general obligation on each of its Mem-
bers to ensure "the conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative procedures 
with the obligations as provided in the annexed Agreements". Many countries, in-
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c1uding the developing countries in Asia and Africa and elsewhere, have already 
brought their domestic legislation into line with the aforesaid general obligation, or 
are in the process of doing so before the expiry of the relevant transition periods. 
50. Compliance with this general obligation is particularly emergent in the case 
of the Agreements on Services, Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPs) and Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) as they call for 
not only restructuring of existing legislation, but also the building up of requisite in-
frastructure and operative mechanisms in the national domain. The Agreement on 
Services obligates the Members of the WTO to enact domestic regulations for the 
administration of services in a reasonable and objective manner (MFN, transpar-
ency). The Agreement on TRIPs obligates the Members of the WTO to establish 
procedures and remedies in their domestic laws to ensure effective enforcement of 
Intellectual Property Rights (lPRs) through civil and administrative procedures 
which include provisions on evidence of proof, injunction, damages and other reme-
dies, including the right of the judicial authorities to order the disposal or destruc-
tion of infringing goods. The developing countries and countries in transition have 
been given a five-year transition period, and the LDCs 11 years, during which they 
have to bring their laws and practices into conformity with the Agreement. Further, 
developing countries which do not presently provide product patent protection have 
been given 10 years to introduce such protection, although in case of pharmaceuti-
cal, agricultural and chemical products, the patent need not be granted until the end 
of the 10 year period. The TRIMs Agreement has prohibited investment measures 
which cause trade restrictions and distorting effects and requires mandatory notifi-
cation of such measures and their disposal within two years. Thus, the existing leg-
islation would need to be brought into line with the stipulations contained in the 
aforesaid Agreements. 
Conclusion 
51. Notwithstanding the transitional arrangements provided in the various WTO 
Agreements some of the issues involved definitely need further substantive and spe-
cific elaboration from the developing countries' standpoint before undertaking the 
revision of the relevant national legislation. The Secretariat of the AALCC, which is 
a major forum of Afro-Asian co-operation in the area of law and economic rela-
tions, can certainly assist its Member States in enacting or revising legislation so as 
to meet their obligations under the WTO system, but before embarking on the exer-
cise it would be useful to have a general discussion in the AALCC focusing on the 
problems and difficulties being faced by them in enacting the WTO obligations in 
the national domain. 
5.2 Legislative activities ofthe United Nations and other organizations 
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24. The Committee had before it document AALCC/XXXV IMANILA/96/9 entitled Re-
port on legislative activities of the United Nations and other organizations concerned 
with international trade law, prepared by the Secretariat, covering recent work by the 
UN Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) (Draft Convention on Inde-
pendent Guarantees and Standby Letters of Credit, Draft Model Law on Legal Aspects 
of Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) and Related Means of Communication, Draft 
Notes on Organizing Arbitral Proceedings, Assignment in Receivables Financing. 
Cross-border Insolvency. and Build-Operate- Transfer (BOT) projects); of the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). and the United Nations 
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Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), and of the Institute for the Unification of 
Private Law (UNIDROIT). 
25. The Committee heard statements from Dr. Mohamed Aboul-Encin, Director of the 
Regional Centre for International Commercial Arbitration at Cairo, on the activities of 
arbitration institutions in the African region (Report, pp. 45-54); and by Ms. P.G. Lim, 
Director of the Regional Centre for Arbitration, Kuala Lumpur, on the activities of arbi-
tration institutions in the Asia-Pacific region (Report, pp. 40-5). The latter statement 
contains the following: 
"An account of the Kuala Lumpur Centre's activities for 1995 appears in page XIII 
4 of the AALCC's Progress Report on the Regional Centres (Document No. 
AALCCI XXXV/Manila/96/14) and I shall not repeat them here, but I would like to 
comment on some of the current issues mentioned in the Progress Report - in par-
ticular that relating to the existing Centres of Cairo and Kuala Lumpur and the es-
tablishment of additional Regional Centres. In this respect the establishment of the 
Kuala Lumpur Centre may help to focus attention on some of the important issues 
involved in setting up a new Centre. 
HISTORY 
When the Regional Centres were set up in the late seventies, it was hard to pre-
dict whether they could fulfil the purposes for which they were established. At that 
time the practice of western style arbitration was relatively unknown in the former 
colonial territories of Asia and Africa and institutional arbitration, a rare bird. In-
stitutional arbitration centres for international arbitrations did not exist in the region 
and the Centres were created to fill that gap. The Centres were established on an 
experimental basis, were non-profit, and were to function under the supervision of 
the AALCC during the initial period of three years. I [fn 1: Article 3. Administrative 
Rules of the KL Centre]. 
FUNCTIONS 
As mentioned in the AALCC'S Progress Report (the Progress Report), the Cen-
tres were entrusted with certain broadbased functions such as the promotion of the 
institution of arbitration in dispute settlement; wider use and application of 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 1976; establishment and growth of national arbitra-
tion institutions and agencies and encouraging inter-institutional co-operation be-
tween them; rendering assistance in the enforcement of awards. In addition, the 
Centres would also function as arbitration institutions in providing facilities for ar-
bitration under their Rules.2 [fn 2: Ibid.] 
RULES OF THE CENTRES 
The procedural Rules for arbitration adopted by the Centres are those of 
UNCITRAL which had in 1976 promulgated these Rules. They were adopted by the 
UN General Assembly and were recommended to member countries for use in ad 
hoc arbitration. It was hoped that adoption of these Rules by member countries 
would lead to the harmonisation of arbitration Rules world-wide. The Regional 
Centres were the first arbitral institutions to adopt the UNCITRAL Rules. They 
were, therefore, the launching pad for these Rules which themselves were experi-
mental in nature. It was not possible at the early stages to predict with any certainty 
whether these Rules would take off. 
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NEW ARBITRAL INSTITUTIONS IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, 1985-1995 
In Asia, interest has grown in arbitration as a means of dispute settlement espe-
cially in the last decade or so, following the establishment of the Kuala Lumpur Re-
gional Centre. Its establishment was in some ways timely as it drew attention to the 
existence in the region of an international arbitral institution which could offer fa-
cilities and assistance for arbitration at a time when interest was growing in this 
field. 
This in turn led many countries in the Asian region to set up arbitral institutions 
of their own so that business disputes could be settled within their own boundaries. 
The decade following the Centre's establishment saw a burgeoning of arbitration 
centres in the Pacific Rim and the emergence of new players in the field of interna-
tional commercial arbitration, as follows : 
1. Hongkong International Arbitration Centre (HKIAC), 1985; 
2. Australian Centre for International Commercial Arbitration (ACICA), 1985; 
3. Australian Commercial Disputes Centre, Sydney (ACDC), 1986; 
4. British Columbian International Commercial Arbitration Centre (BCICAC) 
1986; 
5. American Arbitration Association (AAA) Asia-Pacific Centre in San Francisco, 
1986; 
6. Centre for International Commercial Dispute Resolution (CICDR), Hawaii, 
1990; 
7. Singapore International Arbitration Centre (SIAC), 1991; 
8. The Thai Arbitration Institute, 1994; 
9. The Vietnam International Arbitration Centre (VIAC), 1995. 
As national governments remodel their arbitration laws to create a favourable envi-
ronment for international arbitration in their countries, this will result in fewer cases 
coming to the Centre. 
In earlier years, the superior bargaining position of parties wishing to invest or 
trade in the Asian-African region meant that they could dictate the venue and the ar-
bitral institutions to which disputes and differences arising out of business transac-
tions would be referred to for arbitration. Inevitably, standard form contracts pre-
ferred by the buyers would contain reference to arbitration outside the region. In the 
two decades that followed the establishment of the Centres, the bargaining position 
of developing countries has improved from one of passive acceptance of a predeter-
mined venue to that of being able to negotiate for themselves their preferred venue 
for arbitration. As the network of commercial transactions between the developed 
and developing world has expanded from the restricted colonial markets to those 
which now encompass the globe, developing countries can now 'shop' in any coun-
try of the world that can provide them with the tools, the cash and the technology 
that they need. 
THE EXPERIENCE OF THE KUALA LUMPUR CENTRE 
With few exceptions, unless a Centre enjoys a monopoly over arbitrations, it 
would be unrealistic to expect that running an Arbitration Centre would be a profit-
able exercise, particularly if it is non-profit. Unlike the Cairo Centre, the Kuala 
Lumpur Centre does not enjoy such a monopoly. It operates in a competitive envi-
ronment where arbitrations, both domestic and international, are also administered 
by professional bodies, such as Associations of architects, engineers, quantity sur-
veyors, Chambers of Commerce, as well as commodity associations of rubber and 
palm oil. 
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Moreover, as it is non-profit, the administrative charges of the Kuala Lumpur 
Centre are a fraction of the arbitrator's fees. These charges cover the costs of serv-
icing the arbitration; advising parties on the application of procedural rules of 
UNCITRAL and - as provided in the Rules - deciding on challenges to the arbitra-
tors when questions about their impartiality or independence are raised; appointing 
arbitrators in default of appointment; and deciding on the amount of arbitrator's fees 
according to its Schedule of Fees; and collecting deposits - to name some of its re-
sponsibilities. These charges do not contribute much to the finances of the Centre. 
Nevertheless, the emphasis is to offer efficiency and quality service to the user of 
arbitration. 
Another limiting factor in the number of cases coming to the Centre is the exis-
tence of standard form contracts which refer arbitrations to the established arbitral 
institutions in the West. Until businessmen are able to effect a change of venue in 
their contracts, this is a factor to be taken into account in setting up a Centre. 
From information received, some contracts concluded in Indonesia, Thailand and 
India contain the Centre's arbitration clause but so far only one original dispute has 
been referred to the Centre and this originated from India. 
Interest in arbitral services was indicated by recent visits from the Ministers of 
Justice of Vietnam, Laos, Indonesia and Thailand, seeking information on the Cen-
tre's facilities for arbitration and on the expenses and problems involved in setting 
up an Arbitration Centre. Information was provided and assistance offered in ad-
ministering arbitrations for them, if need be. 
According to a number of surveys conducted by the Centre between the years 
1988-1993, among construction, shipping, oil and commodity sectors in Malaysia 
alone, there are now more than 5,000 contracts which have incorporated the Cen-
tre's arbitration clause in their contracts, but not all of them have reached the stage 
of arbitration. It must be concluded that a large number may have been settled. The 
fact that there is an arbitration clause which obliges parties to arbitrate sometimes 
leads to settlement before the stage of arbitration is reached. 
Thus despite the fact that in Malaysia alone there is a large number of interna-
tional contracts which contain the Centre's arbitration clause, the number of arbitra-
tions conducted at the Centre is small. In fact, with the exception of the ICC, arbi-
tration ceases form a relatively small part of the caseload of most institutions.3 [fn 3: 
I CSID (The World Bank International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes) 
cases from date of inception 1966 to 1995 is 32.] 
It is my impression that Centres which operate in an open, competitive environ-
ment cannot expect to attract a large number of international arbitrations. The new 
national Centres may, therefore, have to depend on active Government intervention 
and support to increase their international arbitration caseload. Promotional efforts 
will have to be carried out to encourage the public and private sectors to refer dis-
putes to these Centres. 
However, a Centre's importance should not be judged by the number of arbitra-
tions handled by it. What interests the user, is the efficacy with which cases are 
handled, how problems which arise during arbitrations, some of which are outlined 
earlier, are solved, and above all, what steps are taken by the Centre or institution 
concerned to prevent tactical manoeuvres to frustrate the arbitral process. 
In its pioneering efforts, the Centre was indeed fortunate to obtain from the host 
Government - Malaysia - not only financial support but legal logistics aimed at at-
tracting international arbitrations to the Centre. The steps taken were as follows: 
(1) In 1980, Malaysia amended its Arbitration Act 1952 to exclude International 
Arbitrations held under the Rules of the Centre from the ambit of the Arbitra-
tion Act (S. 34 of the Arbitration Act 1952); 
(2) In 1985, the Government of Malaysia, having ratified the 1958 New York Con-
vention, passed implementing legislation to bring its provisions into effect; 
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(3) In its Agreement with the AALCC, the Government of Malaysia guarantees the 
independent functioning of the Centre. 
In addition, the Malaysian Courts have given judicial support to the arbitral 
process in two notable decisions when they upheld : 
(I) The right of parties to be represented by persons of their own choice in arbitra-
tions held in Malaysia. [fn 4: Zublin Muhibbah Joint Venture v. Government of 
Malaysia (1990) 3 MLJ 125.] 
(2) The principle of non-intervention of the Courts in arbitrations held under S. 34 
of the Arbitration Act. The Court refused to intervene in a pending arbitration 
held under the Rules of the Centre. 
I should add that the Malaysian Ministry of International Trade has also applied 
its efforts to recommend and encourage parties in joint venture contracts to refer 
their trade disputes to arbitration under the Centre's Rules. There is no question of 
compUlsion here, as parties are free to choose where they want to arbitrate within 
Malaysia. 
As announced by the Secretary-General a new Agreement has just been con-
cluded between the Government of Malaysia and the AALCC for the continued 
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World Trade Organization (WTO) 
World War 
Japan denied a request by the US Federal Express Corp. (Fedex) to have seven 
new routes through Japan and to change its routes in order to fly to Subic Bay in the 
Philippines with stop-overs in Japanese cities.(FEER 06-07-95 p.71) Japan insisted on 
prior amendment of the 1952 US-Japanese Air Transport Services Agreement which 
entitled Japanese carriers to much more limited possibilities than US carriers. For 
example, Japanese carriers were not allowed to transport goods between points in the 
US and cannot pick up Japan-bound passengers and cargo from more than one US 
point on a single journey. 
A basic agreement was announced on 20 July 1995, under which Japan granted 
Fedex seveti new routes through Japan to other points in Asia. In exchange, the US 
would grant Japanese cargo airlines a new route between Osaka and Chicago and 
agreed to start discussions aimed at revising the cargo-related provisions of the 1952 
Agreement so as to achieve 'equality of opportunity' for Japanese and US carriers. 
According to the Japanese side, the US made a verbal promise to talk about pas-
senger service issues after the conclusion of SIX months of talks on cargo service. This 
was, however, denied by the US negotiator.(IHT06-07,22/23-7-95) Yet the two 
countries began talks to revise the 1952 Agreement in late February 1996. 
The US wanted to see 'open skies' outside Japan, which was opposed by Japan. 
The US-Japan aviation industry, was, however, divided on what it wanted from the 
talks. Airlines which were granted rights under the 1952 treaty, including Japan Air-
lines, United, Northwest and Fedex, wanted additional 'beyond' rights, while the so-
called 'have-not' companies, including ANA, Nippon Cargo Airlines, American Air-
lines, Delta, and Continental wanted a bigger share in the Japan-US aviation market in 
order to redress the existing imbalance with the 'have' companies.(FEER 14-03-96 
p.56) 
An agreement was reportedly reached on 27 March 1996 which did not include 
the issue of so-called 'beyond rights'. The new agreement amended the 1952 Agree-
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ment which granted preferential treatment to PanAm (whose rights were later pur-
chased by United Airlines), Northwest, Fedex, and (in a more limited sense) Japan 
Airlines. The new agreement liberalized air cargo services and would allow Fedex, 
Nippon Cargo Airlines and United Parcel Service to significantly increase their trans-
Pacific flights; it would also remove the limitations previously imposed on J AL. (IHT 
28-03-96; FEER 11-04-96 p.79) 
Philippines - US 
Civil aviation between the two countries is governed by an agreement of 1982 that 
contains an 'open sky' provision, but implementation of that provision had been fro-
zen through transitory agreements, the latest of which was due to end on 30 Septem-
ber 1996. In talks to liberalize the aviation markets the Philippines sought to defer the 
application of the provision for ten years as Philippine Airlines was not yet in a posi-
tion to compete with big US carriers. The US was willing to postpone the provision 
for four years but asked for one more US passenger airline and three additional US air 
cargo carriers to be allowed to operate in the Philippines on the basis of national 
treatment ('seventh freedom rights').{IHT 15-09-95) It was reported in October 1995 
that the two countries signed a memorandum of understanding to postpone the lifting 
of restrictions on US-Philippine passenger flights.{FEER 05-10-95 p.91) 
Hongkong - Australia 
The two countries settled their dispute over the number of passengers that Qantas 
Airways would be allowed to carry from Hongkong to other Southeast Asian cities. 
The dispute flared up in April 1995 when Hongkong said it would limit the number of 
passengers, whereupon Australia responded by threatening to impose a load limit on 
Cathay Pacific Airways flights between Sydney and Hongkong. 
The agreement was signed on 14 December 1995. A Hongkong government 
spokesman said that the key element of the agreement was the limitation of so-called 
'fifth freedom' 10ads.{IHT 15-12-95) 
India - US 
India signed an air services pact with the US allowing state-owned Air India to 
add five cities to the three US destinations it already served. In return, US carriers 
gained landing rights in Madras, and United Airlines will be able to fly daily from 
New Delhi to London and Hongkong.(FEER 14-12-95 p.79) 
China opened 'Mongol' route 
Beginning 31 March 1996, China allowed planes to take the 'Mongol' route 
through Chinese airspace. The opening of this airspace would allow Korean Air, for 
example, to cut flight time from Seoul to London up to one and a half hours. Previ-
ously flights were routed through Japanese and Russian airspace.{FEER 04-04-96 
p.65) 
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Thai-US Air Transport Agreement 
The two countries concluded a new air transport agreement on 8 May 1996. Un-
der the agreement the designated airlines of each party are entitled to operate 31 
weekly round trips on the agreed routes. Each party enjoys full fifth freedom traffic 
rights with a total of 14 frequencies out of 31 frequencies. The frequency of non-stop 
flights between the two countries are excluded from these 31 frequencies. The 
Agreement was in line with the Thai policy of promoting Thailand as a regional hub 
in air navigation. 
ALIENS 
See also:Diplomatic and consular protection 
Release of German hostage in Pakistan 
A German engineer was freed by his kidnappers in a tribal area of Northwest 
Pakistan on 3 July 1995. Three Germans were kidnapped on 25 June from a govern-
ment power project in the neighbourhood of the city of Peshawar.(IHT 04-07-95) 
US citizen accused of espionage in China (the HARRY Wu case) 
A Shanghai-born US citizen, who had entered China from Kazakhstan (5 As YIL 
387), was arrested on 19 June 1995 and later formally charged with "illegally sneak-
ing into China by using aliases [the man used a westernized name in his US passport 
since 1994] several times [since 1991], obtaining China's state secrets, and conducting 
criminal activities". The espionage charge also said that he "travelled to places not 
open to foreigners, spied, bought secrets, stole secret documents, carried them abroad 
and provided them to outside organizations". It was later reported that the US state 
department had urged WU not to travel to China after he was naturalized as an Ameri-
can citizen [in 1994], warning that he might be arrested for his undercover research 
into Chinese forced labour camps. The materials collected by him were used for a 
CBS and a BBC documentary program, showing that China, despite denials, con-
tinued to ship goods made by forced labour to the US.(IHT 11-07,15/16-07-95) 
The US state department accused China of abrogating the Sino-US consular 
agreement by refusing to grant American officials access to Wu within two days of 
notifying them, on 23 June, that he was being detained.(FEER 20-07-95 p.17) After 
the arrest, the US president's national security adviser expressed "the administration's 
unwavering position that Mr. Wu should be released immediately". On 1 August, the 
US secretary of state clarified to his Chinese counterpart that the proposal to have a 
Sino-US summit would be 'very difficult' while Wu was still detained.(FEER 27-07-
95p.18) 
In early August 1995, it was reported that Wu had made a purported confession 
saying that some of his television documentary evidence of prison abuses may have 
been falsified. According to the English subtitles in the videotape ofWu's admissions, 
Wu said that instead of actually showing the alleged prison abuses as claimed, the 
documentary producers at the BBC knowingly substituted footage.(FEER 10-08-95 
pp.14-17) 
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Wu was convicted and sentenced to 15 years imprisonment for espionage and for 
impersonating a police officer, but was expelled immediately after the trial court had 
handed down its decision.(IHT 25-08-95; FEER 07-09-95 p.16) 
Expulsion from China of two US officers 
Two US military attaches at the US consulate-general at Hongkong were detained 
by the Chinese authorities on 29 July 1995. They were accused of sneaking into Chi-
nese restricted military zones along the southeastern coast, in the port of Xiamen, and 
of having "illegally acquired military intelligence by photographing and videotaping". 
China's southern coast, facing Taiwan, is a sensitive area where military installations 
are located. 
The two persons had entered China on 23 July on visas for the purpose of holding 
consultations with US diplomatic personnel in China. They were detained for five 
days before being expelled on 3 August 1995. 
China lodged a protest and demanded assurances that there would be no further 
similar incidents. (IHT 03-08-95; FEER 17-08-95 P .16) 
Chinese detention of Greenpeace demonstrators 
Foreign members of the environmental group Greenpeace were detained for de-
portation on 15 August 1995 after they had started demonstrating in Beijing against 
the Chinese plan to carry out a nuclear test.(IHT 16-08-95) 
Expulsion of Hongkong journalists from China 
Two Hongkong reporters, who admitted having entered China without getting the 
required permission, were charged in China with espionage by entering the coastal 
area of eastern Fujian Province to obtain military secrets. The two allegedly photo-
graphed military bases and looked into troop movements. They were expelled on 25 
August 1995.(FEER 07-09-95 p.13) 
Vietnamese conviction of US citizens for subversive activities 
Two Vietnamese-American dual nationals were arrested in November 1993 for 
attempted subversion and topplement of the Vietnamese government. They were con-
victed in August 1995 and sentenced to serve jail terms by a court in Ho Chi Minh 
City. 
The US State Department criticized the court decision since the two Americans 
had simply 'peacefully' asserted their political views by trying to organize a meeting 
on democracy and human rights. It added that the Vietnamese treatment would not 
promote the granting of Vietnamese requests for US trade privileges, such as those 
accorded under most-favoured-nation status.(IHT 17-08,18-08-95) 
Vietnam later expelled the two persons, removing an obstacle to improved trade 
ties.{IHT 07-11-95) 
Alien residents in Japan 
The number of resident foreigners in Japan as of 31 December 1994 rose to a 
record 1.35 million, up by 2.5 percent compared to the previous year. Foreign resi-
dents included 676,793 Koreans; 218,585 Chinese including Taiwanese and Hongkong 
Chinese; 159,619 Brazilians; 85,968 Filipinos; and 43,320 Americans.{IHT 17-08-95) 
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Expulsion of aliens from China 
A Chinese news service reported that China had expelled a total of 15,000 for-
eigners in the last five years for committing various crimes.(lHT 22-11-95) 
Japanese fingerprinting of aliens 
A US citizen who challenged the Japanese law requiring foreigners to be finger-
printed lost his 14 year-old case. The Japanese Supreme Court on 15 December 1995 
upheld the statute, saying that since the procedure involved only one finger, "that 
should not cause excessive psychological or physical pain" . (IHT 16/17-12-95) 
Denial of voting rights to aliens in Japan 
On 26 June 1996, the Kanazawa branch of the Nagoya High Court turned down 
an appeal by four Korean permanent residents seeking the right to vote in local elec-
tions, thereby upholding a 1994 lower court ruling. The judge said that, while suf-
frage for aliens was not prohibited by the constitution, this was a matter for the legis-
lature to decide.(IHT 27-06-96) 
Iranian pilgrims at Mecca 
Fearful of clashes with Saudi security forces, Iran called-off an anti-Israel and 
anti-US rally by Iranian pilgrims in Mecca. The Saudi authorities had previously 
banned political rallies in Mecca. There had been violent incidents in the past at such 
rallies. In 1987 more than 400 pilgrims, mostly Iranians, were killed in clashes with 
Saudi security forces.(IHT 25-04-96) 
The 'disavowal of the pagans' ceremony, as such rallies have been called, was 
later conducted inside the confines of the Iranian camp, following the practice held the 
previous year. (IHT 29-04-96) 
Repatriation of Vietnamese from Germany 
In mid-1995, Germany and Vietnam concluded an agreement to repatriate about 
40,000 Vietnamese contract workers and illegal immigrants in Germany. The agree-
ment provided a schedule for the annual repatriation of Vietnamese, so that Vietnam 
would have taken back all 40,000 by the year 2000. Germany, in turn, would provide 
a $140 million-aid to Vietnam, to cover the cost of resettling the returnees and to 
finance other projects. Most of the Vietnamese were sent to East Germany in the 
1980s as contract workers and remained there after German unification. On 18 June 
1996 Vietnam announced that it was ready to take back more than 2,000 Vietnamese, 
the first substantial group to be repatriated under the Agreement.(IHT 19-06-96; 
FEER 27-06-96 p.13; 03-08-95 p.13) 
Vietnamese-born Americans in Cambodia 
It was reported that an anti-Vietnamese government armed group, numbering 
between several hundred and 2,000, had set up training camps in Cambodia and were 
stockpiling weapons. Many of the resistance group's leaders were identified as natu-
ralized, Vietnamese-born American citizens who had served as officers in the South 
Vietnamese army during the Vietnam War. The goverments of Vietnam, Cambodia 
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and the US had monitored the group and took steps in order to clamp down on the 
movement before it did any damage. Many of the rank and file of the resistance move-
ment were recruited in Cambodia, mostly among the Kampuchea Kraom, who are 
known in Cambodia for their anti-Vietnamese stance.(FEER 16-11-95 pp.16-17) 
Aliens in Philippine waters 
Philippine naval patrol boats seized a Chinese cargo vessel off the coast of Zam-
bales province after it had tried to ram a navy ship on 10 February 1996. The 20 crew 
aboard were arrested. A top navy officer said that the vessel may have been involved 
in piracy and the smuggling of human cargo into the Philippines.(FEER 22-02-96 
p.13) 
Undercover missionaries in North Korea 
In South Korea, the conservative wing of the Presbyterian Church trained mis-
sionaries to spread the gospel along the Sino-North Korean border, following funda-
mentalist churches that had already sent udercover missionaries on proselytizing mis-
sions inside North Korea. China, which bans foreign missionary activities, lodged 
diplomatic protests over Korean evangelists operating in its border areas.(FEER 30-
05-96 p.25) 
ARBITRATION (COMMERCIAL) 
Iranian bill on international commercial arbitration 
In September 1996 the Iranian parliament adopted the text of a "bill on interna-
tional commercial arbitration" in first reading. The bill was greatly inspired by the 
1985 UNCITRAL Model Law on international commercial arbitration. The bill con-
tained an improved regulation of the matter compared with the Articles 632-676 of the 
Code of Civil Procedure. 
China's enforcement of international arbitration award 
Under a 1988 agreement between Revpower (of Hongkong) and state-owned 
Shanghai Far East Aero-Technology Import and Export Corp. (SFAIC), Revpower 
undertook to supply machinery, raw materials and expertise, while SFAIC would 
make industrial batteries that Revpower would sell. In 1989, just before Revpower 
was to take its first shipment, SFAIC said that the battery prices would have to be 
raised due to increased costs. This apparently breached the agreement which had fixed 
prices for three years. Revpower canceled the deal. After failure of settlement by 
negotiations, Revpower submitted the case to the Arbitration Institute of Stockholm, 
which awarded compensation for breach of contract, by award of July 1993. When 
Revpower tried to enforce the award through the Shanghai Intermediate People's 
Court, the case was refused. Yet China had acceded to the 1958 New York Conven-
tion on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in 1987. 
It was reported that in view of the above case US legislators contemplated possi-
ble changes to US law. Among the proposed legislative measures was one that would 
require the US president, before agreeing to China's accession to the WTO, to deter-
mine whether China is fulfilling its obligations under the 1958 New York Convention. 
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Besides, an amendment was proposed to the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act that 
would enable American companies to seize Chinese state-owned assets in the US if 
Chinese government firms do not pay claims awarded by international arbitra-
tion.(FEER 20-07-95 p.78, 28-09-95 p.14) 
ARMS SALES AND SUPPLIES 
US arms for Pakistan 
(see also: Sanctions) 
Following on his April 1995 promise to the prime minister of Pakistan (see 5 
AsYIL 486), the US president asked the consent of the US Congress to deliver to 
Pakistan military equipment worth more than $370 million as part of a compromise 
plan to break a six-year impasse over Pakistan's order of military hardware which 
were already paid for but never delivered because of US sanctions. The Congress was 
asked for a one-time waiver of the PRESSLER Amendment, the law that bans US eco-
nomic aid to countries which develop nuclear weapons.(lHT 27-07-95) Delivery of the 
military equipment destined for Pakistan was blocked because the US president could 
not certify that Islamabad did not have a nuclear bomb. Under a proposal that would 
require a specific waiver of the law, the US would deliver to Pakistan certain military 
provisions, but not 28 F-16 jet fighters, which would be sold to third countries and the 
proceeds returned to Pakistan.(see infra) 
The announced US administration position was to 'engage' Pakistan, but the 
PRESSLER amendment had prevented it from doing so. For instance, US energy firms 
were only prepared to proceed with Pakistani projects with investment insurance from 
the (US) Overseas Private Investment Corp., which was, however, blocked because of 
the PRESSLER Amendment. 
Those who supported the application of the PRESSLER Amendment, on the other 
hand, argued that the engagement policy pursued by the US in the 1980s was largely 
unsuccessful: although Pakistan had received over $5 billion in aid from the US, it 
still continued with its programme to develop nuclear weapons.(FEER 10-08-95 p.28) 
On 24 October 1995, a US Senate-House joint committee passed the BROWN 
Amendment, which allowed for closer economic ties with Pakistan and the one-time 
delivery to Pakistan of arms and spare parts worth $370 million. The amendment 
modified the PRESSLER Amendment. Under the BROWN Amendment, US companies 
also would receive insurance coverage from the government for investments in Paki-
stan, while the latter would be able to apply for long-term loans from American 
banks. In addition, the US would be able to restart aid to Pakistan's anti-narcotics and 
counter-terrorism programmes. 
All the military equipment paid for by Pakistan, except the 28 F-16 jets, would be 
delivered. The US government also promised to return the $658 million that Pakistan 
paid for the aircraft once another buyer had been found. (FEER 09-11-95 p.31) 
The easing of the PRESSLER amendment prompted protests from India. (FEER 05-
10-95 p.15) The Indian foreign minister said earlier that "[i]f arms are supplied to 
Pakistan, ... [w]e shall also have to match their striking power".(IHT 01-08-95) 
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F-16 jets headed for Indonesia 
It was reported that Indonesia reacted coolly to the American offer to sell at a 
bargain price 28 F-16 fighters, originally destined for Pakistan. Nevertheless US offi-
cials said that the purchase of9 F-16s was a 'done deal'; the option to purchase the 19 
others would be decided by Indonesia later, depending on financial terms. It was re-
ported that Indonesia wanted guaranteed soft loans, which the US does not offer for 
such sales. The price for the entire package would be $400-$500 million.(FEER 21-
03-96 p.24) 
French arms for the Third World 
France surpassed the US as the leading arms dealer to the Third World in 1994. 
Sales from the US to developing countries fell to their lowest levels in eight years to 
$6.1 billion in 1994, down from $15.4 billion in 1993. But sales from France jumped 
from $3.8 billion to $11.4 billion over the year.The total US share of sales to Third 
World countries fell to 24 percent in 1994 from 61 percent in 1993, while France's 
share increased to 45 percent from 15 percent. Overall, arms sales to Third World 
countries dropped slightly from $25.5 billion in 1993 to $25.4 billion in 1994, con-
tinuing a steady decline since the end of the Cold War.(IHT 09-08-95) 
Missiles and frigates from France for Taiwan 
Following vehement denials, France confirmed that it was preparing to deliver 
anti-aircraft missiles to Taiwan. It said that this delivery was not violative of the 
French promise to China to halt arms sales to Taiwan, because the transaction pre-
dated the 1994 pledge.(IHT 26-10-95) 
In early 1996, after news leaked that France's arms manufacturer MATRA 
HACHETIE was selling shoulder-fired anti-aircraft rockets to Taiwan, the French 
prime minister ordered the sale delayed indefinitely. (FEER 01-02-96 p.12) 
However, the first Lafayette-class missile frigate built by France for Taiwan was 
reported to be due to arrive in Taiwan in mid-May 1996. Taiwan would be receiving 
two more frigates from France during the year.(FEER 11-04-96 p.13) 
French warplanes for Pakistan 
Pakistan confirmed on 26 October 1995 that it would buy Mirage warplanes from 
France.(IHT 27-10-95) 
F-16s for Taiwan 
In December 1995, it was reported that delivery of F-16 warplanes to Taiwan 
would start in July 1996. The aircraft would be part of a purchase of 150 F-16s agreed 
to in 1992.(IHT 18-12-95) In March 1996, however, the US defense department said 
that delivery would in fact start in May 1997. The announcement of an earlier deliv-
ery date came at a time of rising cross-strait tensions caused by Chinese missile tests 
and military exercises around Taiwan.(IHT 15-03-96) 
China bought war planes from Russia 
A Chinese foreign ministry official confirmed China's $2.2 billion purchase of 
SU-27 war planes from Russia. (FEER 22-02-96 p.13) 
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Malaysian offshore patrol vessels 
Malaysia was contemplating the purchase of 27 offshore patrol vessels over the 
next 15 years. The ships would be up to 1,300 tons in size and would have a range of 
10,000 kilometres with the capability to carry helicopters for anti-submarine warfare, 
reconnaissance, and pursuit. The ships would be needed to protect the oil and gas 
fields and fishing grounds in Malaysia's maritime territory. 
The Malaysian plan was first announced in 1993. One of the front-runners in the 
bidding was Transfield Shipbuilding Pty. of Australia. As Australia itself needed new 
patrol vessels, the Australian government and Transfield agreed to pay the cost of 
designing a ship that would suit the needs of both countries.(IHT 15-01-96) 
Arms sales to Bosnia 
The Malaysian prime minister declared that his country was willing to sell arms 
to Bosnia despite a UN arms embargo on the former Yugolsavia.(FEER 03-08-95 
p.13) 
Russian helicopter gunships for Myanmar 
Myanmar took delivery of at least two Russian-made helicopter gunships, carried 
to Yangon in November 1995 by a Russion transport plane. The delivery followed the 
trip to Moscow of a Myanmarese army commander. It was reported that the choice of 
Russia, as an alternative supplier of arms from China, was prompted by the poor 
quality of the Chinese equipment which had flooded Myanmar in the past 
years. (FEER 21-12-95 p.14) 
Chinese arms sales into the US 
On 23 May 1996, the US attorney's office announced that federal agents had 
seized 2,000 Chinese-made AK-47 assault rifles and arrested 7 California residents in 
connection with an arms-smuggling racket allegedly run by two Chinese armament 
companies, Poly technologies Inc. and Norinco. 
On the morning of 24 May, customs officers in the cargo terminal of Hongkong' s 
Kai Tak airport discovered two undeclared fighter-training bombs on their way to 
Israel from China. The bombs were being shipped to Israel by China National Aero-
Technology Import & Export Co., the marketing and transport arm of the state aero-
space conglomerate, Aviation Industries of China. 
On 25 May 1996, China's foreign trade ministry announced plans for a new ex-
port-control law that would enhance restrictions on the sale of sensistive items such as 
arms or nuclear technology.(IHT 24-05,25/26-05,29-05-96,06-06-96; FEER 06-06-96 
p.16) 
ASIA-PACIFIC ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION FORUM (APEC) 
CHRONICLE 341 
Implementation of the Bogor Declaration 
In July 1995 a meeting of officials was held at Sapporo, Japan, to develop a 'road 
map' outlining a set of general principles for the implementation of the 'Bogor Decla-
ration', adopted in November 1994. After that meeting, differences remained on what 
exactly liberalization entailed and whether it would be binding or voluntary. Japan, 
which had responsibility for developing an 'action agenda' for the next ministerial 
meeting at Osaka, proposed a two-pronged, compromise approach. It called for trade 
liberalization to be achieved through voluntary actions of individual states as well as 
through collective efforts. The officials met again in September and in October.(IHT 
06-07-95) 
A key round of talks held in Tokyo in early October 1995 revealed the differences 
among the APEC members that needed to be overcome, particularly in the field of 
agriculture markets. Japan, China, South Korea and Taiwan were opposed to making 
firm commitments to include their sensitive agricultural sectors in the free-trade plan, 
while major exporters like the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand insisted to 
include agriculture.(IHT 09-10-95) 
Osaka summit meeting of November 1995 
At the threshhold of the Osaka meeting disagreements became visible within 
ASEAN about the issue of whether anyone of its members had the right to exclude 
politically sensitive sectors of their economies from the free trade arrangement being 
negotiated by APEC. Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand and Brunei joined Australia and 
the US in supporting a comprehensive coverage for free trade. On the other hand, 
Malaysia and the Philippines were joined by Japan, China, South Korea, and Taiwan 
in supporting the principle of flexibility and no deadlines. APEC officials agreed to 
leave four issues to be resolved by the ministerial meeting on 16 and 17 November. 
In a draft declaration it appeared that APEC was retreating from its aim of liber-
alization. Instead of affirming the target dates set in the 1994 Bogor Declaration, the 
draft said that APEC "will achieve trade and investment liberalization steadily and 
progressively".(IHT 14-11,15-11-95) A joint statement of 17 November of the foreign 
and trade ministers reflected the "voluntary commitment and the political determina-
tion of each member" to achieve free and open trade and investment no later than 
2020 among developing countries and 2010 for developed economies. It remained 
unclear what was exactly meant by a voluntary commitment, and it was emphasized 
that the accord was not a binding agreement.(IHT 18/19-11,20-11-95) 
The APEC leaders who gathered for the summit meeting in Osaka on 18-19 No-
vember 1995 adopted a 33-page 'Action Agenda' for further liberalizing trade and 
investment, endorsing the ministerial joint statement of 17 November. The Action 
Agenda called for members to start implementing initial liberalization plans by Janu-
ary 1997, three years earlier than planned. However, the document allowed for flexi-
bility "due to the diverse circumstances in each economy". It was not clear whether 
the time limits set for meeting Bogor's free trade targets were strict deadlines or 
vague goals.(FEER 30-11-95 p.14) 
A distinctive feature of the Osaka meeting lay in its adopted method of decision-
making and decision-implementation. Trade liberalization would not be undertaken 
through reciprocally negotiated, precisely scheduled and legally binding commitments 
by all members across all sectors. Instead, it would be done through unilateral offers 
by members, followed by a process of consultations, review and peer pressure to 
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ensure that each APEC economy undertake comparable market-opening measures. 
The Japanese foreign minister referred to the approach as an Asia-style formula. The 
finance secretary of Hongkong described the result of the APEC meeting as a 'gentle-
man's agreement'. And the Philippine president considered the method of making 
progress - that each member will decide for itself how best to move forward to 
achieve the goal of free trade and open investment by 2020 or 2010 - as "the Asian 
way'. It was said that this was the first time that a major international economic 
grouping, with the US among its participants, had so strongly resisted the postwar 
Anglo-Saxon model of trade liberalization. (IHT 22-11 ,24-11-95; FEER 07-12-95 
p.48) 
Implications of trade liberalization 
China, with significant support from other members, particularly Japan, con-
tended that non-discriminatory or most-favoured-nation status should be an inherent 
element of APEC's regional trade liberalization program. The US, however, could not 
agree because US law requires annual renewal of the right of Communist countries to 
such MFN status. The US trade representative said that the US would not alter its law 
for APEC.(IHT 16-11-95) 
US efforts to extend APEC's scope to security matters 
The US defense secretary said that the scope of APEC should be extended to 
cover regional security issues as well. He also proposed a separate conference of 
regional defence ministers. He was careful, however, to avoid any suggestion that he 
saw the organization as a cold war defence pact. Officials of other APEC countries 
expressed concern at the proposal, saying it was premature and could be counterpro-
ductive.(IHT 16-11-95; FEER 02-05-96 p.12) 
The view of the defense secretary was contradicted by the US secretary of state 
who said on 17 November 1995 that economics, not security, should be the focus of 
APEC.(IHT 18/19-11-95) 
Membership 
During the China-Russia summit in late-April 1996, China reiterated its support 
for Russia to join the APEC forum. (FEER 23-05-96 p.40) 
APEC agreement to stabilize currencies 
In March 1996, finance ministers from APEC countries met in Kyoto and agreed 
to cooperate in stabilizing the region's currencies. They also stressed the importance 
of avoiding large exchange-rate fluctuations and of 'sound macro-economic policies' 
such as inflation control and balanced budgets. (FEER 28-03-96 p.63) 
ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK (ADB) 
Diminishing funds for the Asian Development Fund 
The ADB reported that the Asian Development Fund had only $1.3 billion left, 
enough to last to early 1997. It requested $5.3 billion for the Fund. The current fund, 
the sixth such program in the ADB's 29-year history, was originally allocated $4.2 
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billion in 1991. The Fund's money comes mainly from wealthy industrialized states 
and is lent free of interest with repayment terms of up to 40 years, to the poorest 
Asian countries. 
The US was reluctant to pay its arrears ($337 million) in restocking the Fund, 
while other Western donors were waiting to see the US attitude. These donor coun-
tries were hard-pressed with budget deficits, and the so-called Asian 'tigers' were 
challenged to raise their contributions. These countries once received loans from the 
Fund and had since become wealthy.(IHT 19-04,29-04-96) However, Singapore held 
that supporting the Fund would contravene its stand against this kind of aid, and Tai-
wan held its legislature would not approve new funds for the Bank as long as it is 
designated 'China, Taipei'. South Korea said it might raise its contribution but only if 
it obtained an increased role in running the Bank. Hongkong was not expected to co-
operate unless China, to which it would revert in 1997, would be given access to 
loans from the Fund.{IHT 30-04-96) 
In June 1996 the US disclosed that it would slash its future contributions, includ-
ing the $680 million pledged in 1991 for the development fund's sixth replenishment 
in half, while demanding to keep a leading role in setting key policies of the Bank. 
The US wanted major changes in the way the Fund should be administered in the 
future. It also firmly opposed granting India and China access to the Fund. Neverthe-
less, it would reject any moves to limit the eligibility of US firms to supply goods and 
services to projects financed by the fund. These wishes were accompanied by threats 
to leave the Fund in case the wishes were ignored.(IHT 27-06-96) 
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTH EAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN) 
See also: Inter-state relations:general aspects, Labour, Regional security, Territorial 
claims and disputes 
Membership 
At the 28th [Foreign] Ministerial Meeting in July 1995 Vietnam was accepted as a 
member and Cambodia was granted observer status. 
Myanmar acceded to the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in South-East Asia 
on 27 July 1995. Cambodia followed the next day.(Joint Communique; N49/953-
S/1995/652; IHT 25-07-95,03-08-95; FEER 03-08-95 pp. 23,26, 07-15-95 p. 23) 
In early April 1996, Laos formally applied for membership in ASEAN.(FEER 11-
04-96 p.13) 
It was reported that the Malaysian foreign minister was dispatched by ASEAN to 
warn the co-prime ministers of Cambodia not to allow their rivalry to veer out of con-
trol, otherwise Cambodia, which planned to join ASEAN, 'will be on its own' . 
(FEER 27-06-96 p.12) 
External relations 
Dialogue and consultation processes on political and security issues with China and 
the European Union, now also included the ASEAN-China Senior Officials Meeting 
(ASEAN-China SOM) and the ASEAN-European Union Senior Officials Meeting 
(ASEAN-EU SOM). 
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An ASEAN-Canada Consultation was held in May 1995 in Halifax, in order to 
present ASEAN's view to the following G-7 Meeting. 
Cooperation with 'Non-Dialogue Partners' took place on a sectoral basis. (N49/ 
953-S/1995/652) 
In early 1996, India, which maintained consultative status in ASEAN, was promoted 
to full dialogue partner. As such India would be able to participate more actively in the 
post-ministerial conference which follows the annual ASEAN ministerial meeting.(FEER 
01-02-96 p.12) 
The ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting on 10 April 1996 approved China's applica-
tion to become a full dialogue partner, subject to approval by the ASEAN summit meet-
ing in Jakarta in December 1996. China had been 'Consultative Partner' since 1991.(IHT 
16-04-96; FEER 25-04-96 p.13) In mid-June 1996 China would have an official bilateral 
dialogue with ASEAN in Indonesia.(FEER 13-06-96 p.28) 
Tariff cuts 
As part of an effort to establish a free-trade area by 2003 the ASEAN member states 
decided to reduce tariffs for unprocessed agricultural products as of January 1996. It was 
the first time for tariffs of these products to be reduced.(IHT 26/27-08-95) However, on 
10 December 1995 agreement was reached, at the initiative of Indonesia, that 15 agricul-
tural products would be exempted from tariff reductions until 2003. (IHT 11-12-95) Indo-
nesia had earlier expressed concern about opening its market to uprocessed agricultural 
goods, while Malaysia wanted extended protection for its strategic primary products. 
(FEER 21-09-95 p.80) 
In early August 1995, ASEAN Foreign Ministers agreed to push forward the target 
date for creating an Asean Free Trade Area (AFTA) to the year 2000. The Bangkok 
Summit in December (see infra) confirmed this new timetable.(FEER 10-08-95 p.15) 
Preferential trade in services 
The ASEAN would extend its preferential trade agreement to services. The member 
states agreed to start negotiations to liberalize trade in areas like aviation, shipping and 
possibly business services and construction, and an action plan would be drawn up 
within three years for approval by the summit meeting to be held in Hanoi.(IHT 12-12-
95) 
Bangkok Summit Meeting 1995 
The historic summit meeting from 14-15 December 1995, in which the heads of 
state of Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar participated, saw the adoption of a 'Bangkok 
Summit Declaration'. In the Declaration, the Southeast Asian leaders pledged to work 
towards the inclusion of all Southeast Asian countries in ASEAN as it enters the 21st 
century. 
On political and security co-operation the ASEAN leaders pledged to continue 
playing a central role in developing the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF); to seek a 
peaceful resolution of the South China Sea dispute consistent with the Treaty of Amity 
and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, the 1992 ASEAN Declaration on the South China 
Sea and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea; and to tum Southeast Asia into a 
nuclear-weapons-free zone. 
The Asean leaders also agreed to meet informally every year. 
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In the field of economic co-operation an Agenda for Greater Economic Integration 
was adopted, aimed at, inter alia, the completion of the implementation of the ASEAN 
Free Trade Area (AFTA) by the year 2000, instead of 2003; liberalization of key service 
industries such as banking, telecommunications and tourism through the accelerated 
implementation of the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services; and implementation 
of the Framework Agreement on Intellectual Property Cooperation, including the explo-
ration of the possibility of setting up an ASEAN patent system and an ASEAN trade-
mark system. The Summit also agreed to foster closer economic ties with China. 
There was mention of an ASEAN investment region as well as the implementation 
of an ASEAN Plan of Action on Cooperation and Promotion of Foreign Direct Invest-
ment and Intra-ASEAN Investment.{FEER 07-12-95, p. 26) 
In the Declaration's chapter on 'functional co-operation' reference was made to, 
inter alia, goals of striving towards technological competitiveness; upgrading human 
resources by investing in institutional capacities for education, training and research; 
science and technology and technology transfer; promoting the networking of institu-
tions; advancing economic prosperity and social well-being in a sustainable manner for 
the benefit of future generations; and conserving, preserving and promoting the cultural 
and artistic heritage.{Fijth ASEAN Summit Declaration; FEER 30-11-95 p.12; FEER 29-
12-95/04-01-96 pp.16-17) 
The Summit Meeting also discussed other issues, such as the development of the 
Mekong Basin area, the harmonization of immigration procedures, the idea of a rail link 
between Singapore and Kunming in Yunnan, a network of gas pipelines linking ASEAN 
with Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar and possibly southern China, and a common time 
zone for the ASEAN region. (ASEAN Update Jan/Feb 1996) 
Plan for free-trade zone 
The Philippines had launched a plan for opening the ASEAN Free Trade Area 
(AFT A) to all countries by the year 2000 and thus changing it from a preferential trading 
block to become a free-trade zone. It was reported that Indonesia was supporting the 
plan. The plan would be considered by the ASEAN economic ministers conference in 
September 1996.{IHT 13-05-96) 
ASYLUM 
See also: Specific territories within a state: East Timor 
South Korean-New Zealand dispute 
Relations between the two countries worsened sharply because of the disposal 
made by the New Zealand government of a request for political asylum by a South 
Korean dismissed diplomat. The person had caused a political dispute in South Korea 
in June 1995. 
As a consequence the South Korean ambassador was summoned back to Seoul. 
(IHT 13-09-95) 
Australia's attitude toward East Timorese refugees 
Protecting delicate relations with Indonesia, Australia on 10 October 1995 ruled 
out granting political asylum to people fleeing East Timor. A top-ranking official 
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referred to the fact that Portugal still considered the persons in question as its citizens: 
"These people have dual citizenship, therefore they cannot argue that they are refu-
gees" . (IHT 11-10-95) 
Asylum for North Korean defectors 
The South Korean foreign ministry said that the third secretary in the North Ko-
rean embassy in Zambia arrived in Seoul following the earlier defection of his wife 
and their friend.(FEER 08-02-96 p.13) 
Asylum for Timorese through British embassy 
Five Timorese activists sought asylum in the British embassy in Jakarta. Portugal 
afterwards offered them permanent asylum.(FEER 05-10-95 p.15) By the end of 
1995, it was reported that more than 50 Timorese had been granted political asylum 
by Portugal since 1994 after intruding into embassy premises at Jakarta, including the 
Dutch, Japanese, and French missions. (FEER 21-12-95 p.19) 
BORDERS, BORDER DISPUTES AND BORDER INCIDENTS 
India-Myanmar-Thai delimitation of the trijunction point in the Andaman Sea 
The ratification of the Agreement on the matter took place on 24 May 1995, on 
which day the Agreement also entered into force. The Indo-Thai agreement on their 
maritime boundary from Point 7 to the Trijunction Point (Point T, between Thailand, 
India and Myanmar) entered into force on 17 January 1996. 
Maritime boundaries between Kuwait and Iran 
It was reported on 18 July 1995 that the two states were to start negotiations shortly 
on the demarcation of the border between them. (UNdoc. A/50!713 para. 136) 
Closure of Myanmar-Thai border 
In the wake of accusations following the killing of Myanmarese passengers on a 
Thai trawler and reports of Thai sailors boarding Myanmarese boats and beating crew-
men while throwing others overboard, Myanmar closed the country's last overland bor-
der checkpoint with Thailand between the southern Thai port town of Ranong and My-
anmar's southernmost city of Victoria Point. The northern border town of Tachilek was 
closed earlier after an attack by guerillas.(lHT 15-08-95) 
After the closure of the land borders in March 1995, Myanmar practically aban-
doned 'constructive engagement' with Thailand and halted work on a 'friendship bridge' 
over the Moei river. It was speculated that because Myanmar had other allies and part-
ners in the region - like China, Indonesia and Singapore - it was now hitting back at its 
historicial enemies, the Thais, who had allegedly provided sanctuary for anti-government 
rebels for many years. 
Following efforts by the business community in Bangkok for the two countries to 
patch up differences, in November 1995 high level officials from Myanmar and Thailand 
met to resolve border disputes.(FEER 13-07-95 p.19; 26-10-95 p.14; 16-11-95 p.15) 
Border problems, however, persisted. In January 1996, it was reported that Myan-
mar officials complained that the small island in the middle of the Moei River which 
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marks the Thai-Myanmar border had been effectively taken over by Thailand: it filled-in 
the narrow channel separating the island from the Thai bank of the river. (FEER 11-01-
96 p.12) 
Thailand-Vietnam 
Vietnam and Thailand said they had made progress in solving a border dispute in the 
Gulf of Thailand. Officials meeting in Pattaya in September 1995 said that the two coun-
tries had agreed to use Tho Chu island, located off the Vietnamese coast, as the starting 
point in delineating a common border in future talks.(FEER 21-09-95 p.15) 
Sino-Indian border disengagement 
India and China agreed on 20 August 1995 to pull back their troops from four bor-
der posts in the northeast Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, parts of which are claimed 
by China. When the Indian prime minister visited China in September 1993, the two 
countries had already agreed to work for peace and tranqUility along the disputed fron-
tiers. (see 4 AsYIL 417)(IHT 21-08-95) 
Cambodia - Vietnam 
During a visit by the Cambodian foreign minister in September 1995 it was agreed 
between the foreign ministers of the two countries to continue talks on their common 
border.(lHT 12-09-95) In December 1995 the Cambodian king reaffirmed a January 
1995 agreement between the two countries which, among other things, required the two 
sides to resolve border matters as far as feasible at the provincial level. Diplomats from 
the two countries then met on 2 February 1996. They considered the issue of high vol-
umes of smuggled goods carried or floated across their borders, especially in the major 
smuggling haven of Chau Doc. Smuggling drains Vietnam of huge tax revenues. (FEER, 
22-02-96, p. 26) 
The Vietnamese prime minister later visited Phnom Penh in April 1996 in an effort 
to end a land border dispute. The leaders from both countries reaffirmed procedures for 
settling border disputes and agreed to refrain from airing problems in the media. (IHT 09-
and 11-04-96; FEER 25-04-96 p.13) 
Sino-Russian and Sino-Russian-Kazakh-Kyrgyz-Tajik border agreements 
The border agreement (see 4 AsYIL 418) settling a dispute over a western (56 kilo-
metre) section of the border, which was signed in September 1994, went into effect on 
17 October 1995, immediately after the exchange of ratification instruments.(IHT 19-10-
95) It was reported that on 1 December 1995 remaining border issues were resolved with 
Russia ceding about 3,700 acres.(lHT 30/31-12-95/01-01-96) (see infra p. 406) 
Among the accords signed during the visit of the Russian President to Beijing in 
late-April 1996 was an agreement to stabilize the two countries' other, 4,000 kilometer 
border through the reduction of the number of troops along the frontier. 
After the Beijing summit, the presidents of the two countries flew to Shanghai where 
they, together with the presidents of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, signed an 
agreement on confidence-building measures along their respective borders. The main aim 
of the 16-article agreement was defined in its first article, prescribing that the armed 
forces of both parties which are stationed in the border area shall not be used to attack 
the other party or carry out military activities threatening the other party and disturbing 
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tranquility and stability in the border area. (FEER 02-05-96 p.15; 23-05-96 pAO; UN-
doc. A/51/137, Annex.) 
Sino-Vietnamese border 
The two countries resumed talks on their contested border on 23 January 1996, 
being the seventh round of negotiations on the issue since October 1993. 
The talks dealt with the demarcation of the land border. The differences stemmed 
from the Chinese-Vietnamese war of 1979 when, according to Vietnam, China moved 
the border in violation of previous Sino-French agreements. The recently presented Chi-
nese proposals for a new demarcation contained about 100 differences from the Viet-
namese map.(IHT 24-01-96) 
Wall between Thailand and Malaysia 
Thai officials said they felt offended after Malaysia started to build a wall to cover 
certain sections of the Thai-Malaysian border. Malaysia informed Thailand in 1995 that 
it planned to build the wall as part of an effort to stem the tide of illegal immigrants and 
stamp out smuggling. (FEER 07-03-96 p.22) 
BROADCASTING 
See also: Space activities 
Foreign broadcasting in India 
India's state-run Doordarshan television in a landmark move signed an agreement 
to allow CNN to broadcast in India. Under the agreement CNN (Turner Int.) was to 
pay $1.5 million a year to lease a 24-hour channel on the Indian Insat-2B satellite. 
Previously, foreign organizations could only distribute news through India's do-
mestic agencies. (IHT 1/2-07,03-07-95) 
Popular protest against US broadcast in Sri Lanka 
(see 5 AsYIL 394) 
Protesters demanding the scrapping of a Voice of America project in Sri Lanka 
set fire to an American flag during a demonstration outside the US embassy in Co-
lombo. The VOA project received parliamentary backing in May 1995. The govern-
ment had given its approval despite strong opposition by local inhabitants who be-
lieved the project could deprive fishermen of their livelihood.(IHT 05-07-95) 
Radio Free Asia 
The US House of Representatives in July 1995 ordered the establishment of a 
broadcasting authority called Radio Free Asia.(IHT 22/23-07-95) It was reported that 
because of possible opposition from countries leery of upsetting China, the US gov-
ernment-funded broadcasting body, operating under the name of Asia Pacific Net-
work, was looking for alternative broadcast relay stations for the service it planned to 
start in mid-1996. The existing transmitters closest to the target audiences in China 
and Indochina were in Thailand, but Thai officials said that Thailand would not allow 
the transmitters to be used for purposes that might offend China and the socialist sta-
tes of Indochina. (FEER 04-04-96 p.12) 
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Foreign broadcasting in China 
China in 1993 banned watching foreign satellite broadcasts without government 
approval. But in 1995 new regulations allowed Chinese cable operators to show a 
limited quantity of foreign satellite programming with government approval. This pos-
sibility of purchasing programs was successfully used by foreign broadcasters.(IHT 
26-03-96) 
Chinese broadcasting abroad 
In early April 1996 PanAmSat Corp. of the US signed a lO-year contract with 
China Central Television to carry a number of channels of programming from CCTV 
to Europe, the Middle East and Africa.(IHT 04-04-96) 
'Voice of Tibet' 
A new international radio station under Norwegian auspices began broadcasting 
directly to Tibet and to exiled Tibetans in Asia. It used material from a network of 
producers in Norway, Italy, Britain and the US.(IHT 24-05-96) 
CIVIL WAR 
Tajikistan 
Texts of a "Protocol on the Fundamental Principles for Establishing Peace and Na-
tional Accord in Tajikistan", signed by the President and the leader of the opposition, 
were exchanged on 17 August 1995. The Protocol confirmed an agreement to conduct 
negotiations aimed at concluding a general agreement, consisting of several protocols, on 
political problems, military problems, the repatriation and integration of refugees, a 
commission to monitor and verify compliance by the parties with the general agreement, 
guarantees for implementing the general agreement, and a donors' conference. 
With a view to creating the conditions for conducting further negotiations, it was 
agreed to extend the period of validity of the "Agreement on a Temporary Cease-Fire 
and the Cessation of Other Hostilities on the Tajik-Afghan Border and within the Coun-
try" (Tehran, 17 Sept 1994) until 26 February 1996.(UNdocs.S/1994/1102, S/19951720, 
S/PRST/1995/54) 
Afghanistan 
On 2 July 1995, an emissary of the former king of Afgahnistan arrived in Islamabad 
to discuss a political formula for peace among the warring factions in the country. The 
plan that was set out by the King, living in exile in Rome since he was deposed in 1973, 
called for an "Emergency Council of Tribal Elders" (Loya Jirga) so that the Afghan 
people could freely and democratically express their will and bring about a government. 
The foreign ministry in Kabul issued a protest note to Pakistan condemning the invitation 
of the ex-king's emissary.(FEER 20-07-95 p.25) 
It was reported that the Taleban movement had captured the second biggest airbase 
in Afghanistan at Shindand on 3 September 1995, and the western city of Herat on 5 
September from forces loyal to the president.(IHT 06-09-95) Of Afghanistan's 31 prov-
inces, only six remained under the control of the Kabul government. Kabul blamed Paki-
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stan for backing the offensive, though Pakistan denied the charges.(FEER 21-09-95 p. 
23) 
It was said that Iran, Russia, Tajikistan and India were backing the Kabul govern-
ment to counter the advance of the militant-islamic Taleban to the Afghan capital. The 
aid came in the form of military equipment and ammunition tansported to Kabul via 
massive air and land bridges. On the other hand, the Taleban side was supported by 
Pakistan, Uzbekistan and some Arab Gulf states including Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia 
and the United Arab Emirates.(FEER 01-02-96 pp.20-21) 
The fighting on the ground continued despite efforts at the diplomatic level to re-
solve the conflict. In May 1996, the UN Secretary-General recalled his negotiator for 
Afghanistan, who was disliked by all the warring factions. 
On April 18, Pakistan approved a major review of Afghan policy and stepped up its 
diplomatic efforts with regional countries. As a result, the Iranian foreign minister vis-
ited Islamabad to iron out differences, and the foreign minister of Pakistan visited Mos-
cow at the end of the month. 
On 10 April 1996, during the first debate in the UN Security Council on the Af-
ghanistan issue in six years, a number of states among which the US supported the idea 
of an arms embargo on the Afghan factious. In mid-April, the US assistant secretary of 
state for South Asia visited Islamabad, Afghanistan and Moscow on a tour to review 
Washington's policy towards the Afghan peace process. It was reported that tacit agree-
ment for an arms embargo was obtained from Pakistan, India and five Central Asian 
republics, and indirectly from Iran; but Russia refused to join. It was also reported that 
the US would give greater support to UN efforts to convene a peace conference of all the 
Afghan factions. 
On 26 May 1996, the Taleban retreated from their outpost on a mountain ridge 
outside Kabul, and were also forced to retreat 70 kilometers on the southeast of Kabul; 
but from the southwest, the Taleban repeatedly launched rocket attacks on Kabul's civil-
ian population in retaliation for their defeat. 
Prior to the May 1996 battles, the Afghan president signed a peace agreement with 
his long time rival, the head of the opposition Hizbe Islami party. Other opposition 
forces were also aproached to join talks for a new interim coalition government. The 
Taleban, however, rejected the invitation to the talks. (IHT 28-03-96; FEER 02-05-96 
p.22; 13-06-96 p.24) 
CULTURE AND SCIENCE 
Sino-US nuclear fusion laboratory 
The two countries agreed to build the world' s largest nuclear fusion laboratory in 
China for experimenting on the controlled use of nuclear fusion.(IHT 23-05-96) 
Smuggling of Myanmar's cultural heritage 
It was reported that large numbers of Myanmarese puppets were being smuggled 
to Thailand, where they are sold along with ancient Buddha images, religious scrip-
tures, and other items of the Myanmarese cultural heritage. (FEER 27-07-95 p.63) 
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Afghanistan's cultural treasures looted 
The systematic looting of Afgahnistan's National Museum in Kabul, leading to the 
decimation of the nation's cultural heritage, was described as the "crime of the cen-
tury". It was reported that months before its destruction by devastating rocket attacks 
and machine gun fire, the museum building was repeatedly looted by mujahideen 
soldiers, often guided by antique dealers. According to the Afghan minister of infor-
mation and culture, 90% of the museum's collection had been looted. He added that 
the museum was one of the richest in the entire region, covering 5,000 years of his-
tory in Afghanistan and central Asia.(FEER 21-09-95 pp.60-62) 
Thai cultural diplomacy 
Thailand's attempt to improve ties with its neighbors also took the form of delega-
tions sent to Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar for special ceremonies to mark the end 
of the Buddhist lent. Thai foreign ministry officials were especially happy with the 
warm response to this gesture from the authorities at Yangon, which had not res-
ponded positively to diplomatic or military initiatives from Thailand.(FEER 16-11-95 
p.14) 
The 13 April 1996 Thai New Year, celebrated in Chiang Mai, was also used by 
Thai officials to boost relations with neighboring Myanmar, Cambodia and Laos, 
which also observe the festival. It was hoped that an invitation of officials from the 
three countries would add impetus to the formation of an economic subregion encom-
passing countries in the Mekong River basin. Myanmar did not send an official dele-
gation to Chiang MaL Late in 1995, Thailand even sponsored Buddhist ceremonial 
festivities in Yangon, Vientiane and Phnom Penh. For 1997 the Thai government had 
planned to take its cultural diplomacy as far as Sri Lanka.(FEER 25-04-96 p.17) 
Taiwan as centre of new Chinese culture 
During his inaugural address, the newly-elected Taiwanese president said: 
"Equipped with a much higher level of education and development than other parts of 
China, Taiwan is set to gradually exercise its leadership role in cultural development 
and take upon itself the responsibility for nurturing a new Chinese culture". (FEER 
06-06-96 p.38) 
Return of a stolen Thai sand lintel 
In 1973 or 1974 a 12th-century sand lintel was stolen from Pranom Roong Castle, 
the ruin of an ancient Khmer temple situated in what is now north-eastern Thailand. 
The lintel was later put on display at a museum in St.Louis, Missouri, USA. 
In 1995 the US defense department informed the Thai government of its intention 
to return the sand lintel. Since the lintel appeared to have been stolen by members of 
the US armed forces stationed at a US airforce base in Nakorn Ratchasima Province, 
Thailand, during the Vietnam War, the US defense department requested, in exchange 
for the lintel's return, that the Thai government sign a legal document exonerating the 
US government from all legal liability arising from the theft. This was initially re-
fused by the Thai Fine Arts Department since the relevant Thai law stipulates manda-
tory punishment for those smuggling archaeological objects out of the country. The 
US side repeated its position in 1996, emphasizing that the soldiers concerned had 
already been punished by a court of law, and that under US law and prevailing prac-
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tice a contract exonerating liability on the part of the US government must be con-
cluded between the US government and the government of the recipient country. The 
relevant Thai authorities were exploring possible solutions to the impasse. 
DEBTS 
Russian debts 
Russia signed a debt-rescheduling agreement on 10 July 1995 to repay part of a 
debt to South Korea in raw materials and weapons. The repayment of $450.7 million 
would take place until 1998. The amount was part of the principal and overdue inter-
est on a $1.47 billion loan extended to the USSR in 199O.{IHT 11-07-95; FEER 30-
11-95 p.28) 
Unpaid debt of North Korea 
According to a Thai official, Thailand stopped rice shipments to North Korea 
because North Korea had not paid its bills amounting to $15 million for nearly four 
months.{FEER 07-12-95 p.15) 
Vietnamese loans forgiven 
The Netherlands wrote off $13 million of overdue outstanding debt to Vietnam, 
which was in the midst of negotiating with foreign commercial creditors for the re-
structuring of its $800 million external debt. The written-off debts related to soft loans 
extended to Vietnam in the 1970s. A Dutch Embassy statement said that the decision 
was taken to help Vietnam's external debt situation.{FEER 11-01-96 p.81) 
Restructuring of Vietnamese loans 
On 20 May 1996, Vietnam signed a preliminary agreement to restructure its 
roughly $900 million of arrears in commercial bank: debts. The central bank of Viet-
nam and a creditor group agreed in principle on restructuring options to be presented 
to creditor banks. The terms would require creditors of the so-called London Club to 
write off about 45 % of their outstanding loans to Vietnam. Many bankers expected 
that Vietnam would ask the World Bank to help finance its commitments under the 
deal.{FEER 30-05-96 p.45) 
DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR INVIOLABILITY 
Attack on Pakistani embassy in Kabul 
About 5,000 persons attacked the Pakistani embassy in Kabul on 6 September 1995 
to protest the alleged Pakistani support for the Islamic Taleban militia in the Afghan civil 
war. Two people were killed and twenty-five, including the Pakistani ambassador, were 
injured. The embassy was ransacked and several buildings were set on fire. This was the 
second attack on the embassy in less than two years. In February 1994 Afghan protesters 
sacked the mission to protest the killing in Islamabad of three Afghan gunmen who had 
hijacked a schoolbus from Peshawar.{see: 4 AsYIL 425) 
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The Afghan acting defence minister said that security men had tried to contain the 
crowd, but lost control when a shot fired from the embassy killed an Afghan student, one 
of the two persons who had died. The Afghan authorities evacuated the embassy staff 
and escorted them to a military hospital. 
The acting minister said: "We are unhappy with what happened at the Pakistani 
embassy. . . . But we see no reason to apologize to Pakistan because the government was 
not directly involved. This was a matter for the Afghan people, who are angry about 
foreign involvement in southwest Afghanistan". [The Afghan government had accused 
Pakistan of aiding the Taleban movement.] 
Pakistan criticized the Afghan government for failing to protect the embassy despite a 
request for additional security, and denied any shooting by Pakistani embassy guards. 
The next day the wounded Pakistani diplomats and embassy personnel, as well as the 
body of the killed embassy worker, were flown to Islamabad and the embassy was 
closed.(IHT 07-09,08-09,11-09-95; FEER 21-09-95 p.23) 
After having expelled 13 Afghan diplomats, including the charge d'affaires, in Sep-
tember 1995, Pakistan on 17 October ordered 6 more diplomats to leave the country 
within 48 hours.(IHT 18-10-95) Later the Afghan government offered apologies and 
compensation. Talks opened on 6 May 1996.(IHT 07-05-96) 
Bombing of Egyptian embassy in Islamabad 
An explosives-packed truck was driven by a suicide-bomber into the Egyptian em-
bassy in Islamabad on 19 November 1995, killing 16 persons, including five Egyptians, 
and injuring 60 others. The Pakistani government condemned the violence as an act of 
terrorism and promised to do everything possible to bring the perpetrators to justice. 
Three militant Islamic groups in Egypt took responsibility for the bombing. The follow-
ing day, Pakistani authorities detained 13 Egyptian Islamic preachers who had attended 
religious conventions in Punjab Province.(IHT 20-11-95; FEER 30-11-95 p.13) By De-
cember, a total of 16 people had been arrested in connection with the bombing.(FEER 
14-12-95 p.13) 
[Pakistan had ordered foreign militants to leave the country in 1993 after several Arab 
states complained that radical groups were using Pakistan as a base for subversion. At 
that time some Egyptians, Saudis and Lebanese fled the northwestern city of Peshawar 
into Afghanistan. Pakistan and Egypt had signed an extradition treaty in 1994](IHT 21-
11-95) 
Cambodia - US/France 
The second prime minister of Cambodia warned that demonstrations might be ar-
ranged at the French and US embassies in Phnom Penh if the US and France did not stop 
interfering with Cambodia's internal affairs.(IHT 06-12-95) 
Alleged espionage by diplomats 
(see also: Aliens) 
China on 17 January 1996 accused US and Japanese air force attaches of spying and 
thus having seriously encroached upon China's sovereignty and compromised China's 
national security. 
On 8 January the two attaches were stopped near a military area on Hainan Island, 
near the southern port of Zhanjiang. Chinese authorities confiscated photo film and 
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videotapes. Several days later the same persons were stopped when they entered a mili-
tary airport in Guangdong Province. They were accused of having acted deliberately and 
premeditatedly. China then demanded their withdrawal. 
The US state department denied any trespass by the US attache, and said that the 
Chinese authorities had approved the US attache's mission in the area concerned. The 
Japanese government said that the two men had unintentionally strayed into a restricted 
area and announced that it would withdraw the attache concerned. Both the US and the 
Japanese governments lodged a protest with China over the detention and questioning of 
their attaches as being in violation of international conventions on the treatment of dip-
10mats.(IHT 18-01-96) 
Melee in the Dutch embassy in Jakarta 
On 7 December 1995, the Dutch ambassador was struck on the head with a pipe and 
two other diplomats were hurt when a melee broke out in the Dutch embassy in Jakarta. 
The incident occured as East Timor activists occupying embassy premises in sit-in dem-
onstrations were disrupted by counter-protesters who stormed over the embassy fence. 
The Indonesian foreign minister apologized to the Ambassador. It was reported that the 
embassy occupation by East Timor activists was part of a tactic that began with sit-ins at 
the Swedish and US embassies in 1994. The December 7 sit-in demonstrators all left the 
Dutch embassy compound voluntarily and were later freed after police question-
ing.(FEER 21-12-95 p.19) 
Tight security for Sri Lanka's president in China 
The Chinese government provided extremely tight security for the Sri Lankan presi-
dent during her state visit from 20-26 April 1996. China politely declined the president's 
request that she get out of her bullet proof limousine to meet crowds lined up to greet 
her. Press reports referred to a group of Tamils who had entered China in a bid to assas-
sinate her.(FEER 23-05-96 p.14) 
DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR PROTECTION 
US - China 
(see also: Aliens) 
The US protested against a turnaround by the Chinese authorities when a US offi-
cial tried to establish contact with a detained China-born US citizen (see 5 AsYIL 
387) and was misled about the person's whereabouts. The US claimed that under a 
consular treaty binding the two states China should have given the US access to the 
detainee within 48 hours upon request. 
On the other hand, the Chinese ministry said it was upset that a US consular offi-
cial based in Beijing had tried to track down the American "without the approval of 
the Chinese side". It denied that China had broken any agreements by failing to allow 
access within 48 hours. 
It was reported that diplomats in China had been allowed in recent years to travel 
freely to a growing number of areas, but still needed government permission to visit 
restricted zones.(IHT 04-07,05-07-95) 
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The US consul-general finally met with the detained man in Wuhan on 10 July 
1995. According to a Chinese statement the visit "was arranged at the request of the 
US embassy at Beijing in accordance with the China-US Consular Agreement" :(IHT 
11-07-95) 
Singapore death sentence for Filipina 
In the case of the death sentence for a Philippine woman in Singapore (the FLOR 
CONTEMPLACION case, 5 As YIL 400) the two parties had asked the US Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation to conduct another autopsy on the body of the murder victim. In 
their report the American pathologists disputed Philippine findings about the way the 
victim of the killing had died and essentially reinforced the conclusions of the Singa-
pore court. The Philippines on 14 July 1995 accepted the US findings and had since 
began normalizing ties with Singapore; Singapore for its part said that it was prepared 
to repair bilateral relations. (IHT 15/16-07-95; FEER 27-07-95 p.15, 31-08-95 p.13) 
Full diplomatic ties between the two countries were restored on 16 January 1996 
when new ambassadors were appointed by each country and the Philippine ban on 
sending domestics to work in Singapore was lifted.(IHT 17-01-96;FEER 25-01-96 
p.13) 
Consular protection for foreign workers in North Korea 
The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (5 AsYIL 547) reached 
an agreement with North Korea in late May 1996 on the status of workers, mostly 
South Korean, who would build the projected nuclear reactors. North Korea granted 
them the equivalent of a system of consular protection. (FEER 13-06-96 p.15) 
DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR RELATIONS 
See also: (Non-)Interference 
Establishment of Vietnam-US diplomatic relations 
(see also: Vietnam War) 
The US president announced on 11 July 1995 his decision to establish full diplo-
matic relations with Vietnam. Normalization of ties, the President said, "serves our 
interest in working for a free and peaceful Vietnam in a stable and peaceful Asia". US 
officials denied that the US was taking the step as a way of countering China's grow-
ing power in the region, as China welcomed the normalization of US-Vietnam ties.(-
IHT 12-07-95;FEER 20-07-95 p.16) The relevant documents were signed by the US 
and Vietnamese foreign ministers on 5 August 1995.(FEER 17-08-95 p.22) The fol-
lowing October, a Vietnamese foreign ministry official visited Washington to discuss 
arrangements for a visit by the Vietnamese president to the US capital.(FEER 05-10-
95 p.14) 
The US Commercial Service opened an office in Hanoi on 2 April 1996. The 
office, a branch of the US Department of Commerce, aimed at encouraging invest-
ment in Vietnam by small and medium-sized US businesses.(FEER 11-04-96 p.79) 
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Appointment of controversial Indonesian ambassador to Australia 
The impending arrival of the new Indonesian ambassador to Australia in mid-1995 
had stirred an uproar among the political opposition and East Timorese activist goups 
in Australia. At issue were the controversial remarks made by the ambassadorial ap-
pointee, an army general, about the 1991 Dili incident, where he was quoted as saying 
that the event was not really as serious as people overseas thought. He had made the 
remarks after his appointment as regional commander in the East Timor region and at 
a time before a military tribunal had released its findings on the Dili incident. (2 
AsYIL 374) 
The Australian foreign minister explained to parliament that the Austalian gov-
ernment did not withhold its approval over the designation of the new ambassador 
because the ambassador was chosen personally by the Indonesian president, because 
he had no personal involvement in the Dili shootings, and because he was highly re-
garded by the Australian defence establishment. 
On 7 July 1995, the Indonesian government announced that it was withdrawing its 
nomination of the retired general.(FEER 13-07-95 p.31; 20-07-95 p.13) 
China - Gambia 
China announced that it had suspended relations with Gambia on 25 July 1995, 
two weeks after Gambia resumed diplomatic relations with Taiwan.(FEER 03-08-95 
p.13) 
South Korea - Russia 
South Korea and Russia reached agreement concerning the sites for their respec-
tive embassies. A protocol on the issue was signed. Land for the two countries' em-
bassies had been one of the knotty issues in Moscow-Seoul relations. The two sides 
agreed to exchange same-size lots in downtown Seoul and Moscow to build their em-
bassy buildings. 
It was reported that the other sticking point which remained to be resolved was 
how much compensation Seoul should be paying for the site of the old Tsarist Russian 
consulate, which it took over years ago.(FEER 19-10-95 p.14;30-11-95 p.28; Korea 
Times 29-09-95) 
Iran - Jordan 
Jordan expelled the first secretary of the Iranian embassy in Amman for allegedly 
trying to incite an attack on Israeli tourists. Iran replied by expelling a Jordanian dip-
lomat on charges of "activities incompatible with his status as a diplomat". The mu-
tual expUlsions signaled a growing tension over the Arab-Israeli peace process and the 
conciliatory behaviour of the Jordanian king. (IHT 11-12-95) 
Pakistan - Afghanistan 
As a result of deteriorating relations between the two countries (see supra p. 352) 
Pakistan, on 24 December 1995, declared the Afghan consul-general at Peshawar 
persona non grata.(IHT 27-12-95) 
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Taiwan - Senegal 
Taiwan reopened formal dipomatic ties with Senegal on 3 January 1996. On 9 
January, Beijing announced that it would sever ties with Senegal, describing its deci-
sion to open an embassy in Taipeh as 'erroneous' . (FEER 18-01-96 p.13) 
Malaysia - Israel 
The Malaysian minister for international trade and industry said that Malaysia 
would start trading with Israel. She added that "the question of diplomatic ties does 
not arise", citing trade with Taiwan, with which Malaysia did not have diplomatic ties 
either.(FEER 25-01-96 p.13) 
Disagreement on protocol between Malaysia and Germany 
It was reported that the planned meeting between the Malaysian prime minister 
and Germany's chancellor at the Asia-Europe Meeting in Bangkok (infra p. 71) was 
called off because neither side could agree on who should call on whom. The Ger-
mans said that the Malaysian premier should drop in on the chancellor while the Ma-
laysians argued that since Germany had requested the meeting, the chancellor should 
make the short trip to a neighboring hotel where the Malaysian leader was stay-
ing.(FEER 14-03-96 p.12) 
France reopens consulate in Guangzhou 
As a result of the visit of the Chinese premier to France, China would allow 
France to reopen its consulate in Guangzhou. China had ordered the closure of the 
consulate in 1992 (3 AsYIL 443). In return, it was reported that France promised not 
to raise human rights issues in public. (FEER 25-04-96 p.16) 
Consulates in Hongkong 
China had asked all governments concerned to reapply for permission to open a 
consulate in the future Special Administrative Region of Hongkong, adding that the 
jurisdiction of the consultates would be limited to the territory. China also said that 
the principle ofreciprocity would have to apply, such that, for e.g., Jakarta would be 
asked to allow China to open a consulate elsewhere in Indonesia in return for keeping 
its consulate in Hongkong.(FEER 30-05-96 p.25) 
China's diplomatic offensive in Africa 
China's president made a two-week tour of Africa in May 1996. The visit was 
reported to be aimed at countering Taiwan's diplomatic efforts on the African conti-
nent. During his trip, the president praised the Organization of African Unity and said 
that China was Africa's 'all-weather friend'. In Kenya, the Chinese president extended 
a $13 million soft loan plus a $1.3 million technical assistance grant. He offered a $51 
million loan to fund joint ventures in Egypt and extended a $10 million loan plus a 
$1.2 million grant to Zimbabwe.(FEER 06-06-96 p.22) 
Transfer of embassy land 
Through an exchange of notes with the Malaysian ambassador at Bangkok the Thai 
government on 14 November 1995 approved the transfer of part of the Malaysian 
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embassy grounds to a (Thai-Malaysian) private company, exempt from Thai taxation 
and other related charges. The company would, by way of consideration, build the 
chancery, the ambassador's residence and other diplomatic residences on the remain-
ing embassy land, and, in addition, transfer to the embassy the ownership of a number 
of units of the condominium to be built on the tranferred land. 
The Malaysian side agreed to accord reciprocity and approve a similar transaction 
by Thailand regarding the development of the Thai embassy premises at Kuala Lum-
pur on a one-time basis. 
DISARMAMENT AND ARMS CONTROL 
China's White Paper on disarmament and arms control published 
Apparently in response to requests from many countries that China should make 
its defence policies and strategic planning more transparent, China published its first-
ever White Paper on arms control and disarmament. The White Paper pointed out, 
among others, that "regional conflicts must be fairly and rationally resolved and force 
or threat of force should not be used in international relations"; that "China has never 
exported sensitive technologies such as those for uranium enrichment, reprocessing 
and heavy-water production"; and that "stern legal sanctions shall be taken against 
any company or individual who transfers military equipment and technologies without 
proper government examination and approval" . (FEER 30-11-95 p.38) 
Southeast Asia nuclear weapon-free zone 
The US told Indonesia in late July 1995 that it would no longer oppose a plan to 
make Southeast Asia a nuclear-free zone. The treaty to that effect, which bans the 
manufacture, possession, storage, testing and using of nuclear arms, was at that time 
being drafted by ASEAN (Treaty of 15 December 1995, text in 5 AsYIL 605). 
[In contrast to China, Russia and the UK, the US and France had so far refused to 
sign on to a treaty on a similar zone in the South Pacific (Raratonga Treaty, 1985). 
The US argued that such zones could weaken global nuclear deterrence and impede 
the US Navy's freedom of navigation. The end of US-Soviet rivalry, the removal of 
tactical nuclear weapons from US warships and the closing of US military bases in the 
Philippines have, however, eliminated these objections, and in September 1995 the US 
announced it would sign a protocol endorsing the treaty.](IHT 01-08,11-12-95) 
The treaty is supplemented by a Protocol which the five declared nuclear weapon 
states were asked to sign in support of the treaty. China had not indicated that it would 
do so. The Chinese foreign ministry said that although China supported the establish-
ment of a nuclear weapon-free zone in Southeast Asia in principle, its position on the 
exact geographical area that should be covered by the treaty differed from that of the 
ASEAN countries. The spokesman of the foreign ministry said that China was con-
cerned that the treaty area would include extensive parts of the South China Sea 
claimed by China as well as some Southeast Asian states.(IHT 9/10-12-95) 
On 8 December 1995 the US joined China in publicly expressing concerns about 
the treaty. One of the main US concerns was that the regular movement of its nuclear-
powered or nuclear-armed naval vessels and aircraft through Southeast Asia could be 
restricted by the treaty. The US also wanted assurances that the treaty would not dis-
turb existing regional security arrangements, such as those between the US and the 
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Philippines and Thailand.(IHT 11-12-95) The US seemed also worried that ambiguous 
drafting of the treaty could enable regional states to challenge the right of other states 
to allow port visits and landing rights to ships and planes of nuclear powers unless 
prior assurances were given that they did not carry nuclear arms. The objections 
raised against the treaty also stressed that it differed from similar regional agreements 
in the South Pacific and Latin America because it included exclusive economic zones 
and continental shelf areas where national jurisdiction is normally confined to eco-
nomic resources and imposition of environmental controls. As a result the ASEAN 
countries agreed to review the Protocol in order to accomodate the objections of nu-
clear states.(IHT 16117-12-95;FEER 28-12-95/04-01-96 p.17) [The first informal 
meeting of the ASEAN heads of state and government on 30 November 1996 resolved 
that the revised Protocol should be available by the 30th anniversay of ASEAN, i.e. 8 
August 1997.] 
The treaty was signed by 10 Southeast Asian leaders in Bangkok on 15 December 
1995.(IHT 15-12-95) 
Chinese attitude towards nuclear weapons 
In a major policy statement of 16 November 1995 on arms control, China sharply 
rebuked the US, Russia, the UK and France for continuing to develop nuclear and 
outer space weapons, "including guided missile defence systems" while resorting to 
discriminatory anti-proliferation and arms-control measures as a pretext for denying 
the peaceful use of nuclear technology to the developing world. 
The statement expressed China's formal opposition to a US proposal to deploy 
ballistic missile defence systems in Asia to protect Japan and American military forces 
in Japan from ballistic missile threats. China believed that a missile defence system in 
Asia could potentially undermine the effectiveness of its strategic nuclear forces, 
which were developed to put US, Japanese and Russian targets at risk of retaliatory 
attack. 
[In May 1995 the US and Russian presidents agreed that the two countries should 
cooperate in developing ballistic missile defences.](IHT 17-11-95) 
Indian attitude toward Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 
After having co-sponsored the drafting of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, 
India reverted to its original stand at the Geneva Disarmament Conference in autumn 
1995 and insisted that the five acknowledged nuclear powers should agree to a time-
bound elimination of their nuclear arsenals. 
India feared that a test-ban treaty, along with the indefinite extension of the Nu-
clear Nonproliferation Treaty would sanction a perpetual nuclear monopoly by the 
premanent members of the UN Security Council. (IHT 09-01-96) 
The debate on the treaty resumed on 23 January 1996 in Geneva. In the following 
months, the Geneva deliberations on the CTBT encountered further complication by 
Pakistan's reluctance to agree to the treaty. Pakistan said it would not sign the treaty 
unless India does so; and India insisted that it would not join unless a ban on all test-
ing is explicitly linked to a timetable for nuclear disarmament - something the five 
declared nuclear powers were not prepared to agree to.(FEER 11-04-96 p.28) 
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Transfer of dual-use technology from the US to China 
It was reported that state-of-the-art telecommunications technology was transferred 
to Hua Mei Telecommunications, a 50-50 joint venture between US-based partnership 
SCM/Brooks and China's People's Liberation Army firm Galaxy New Techology. 
Hua Mei aims to build advanced telecom networks in the Southern Chinese city of 
Guangzhou. Hua Mei had grown from the US-China Defense Conversion Commis-
sion, a 1994 initiative co-convened by the US Department of Defense and the PLA's 
Commission for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defence, whose goal 
was to promote peace through civilian co-operation by turning arms industries into 
industries producing civilian goods and services. 
The transfer, which was backed by the US secretary of defense, alarmed US na-
tional security officials who feared that the technology could be used by the PLA to 
substantially upgrade its war communications systems. The transfer was reportedly 
made in spite of objections from the Pentagon and US National Security Agency offi-
cials. (FEER 11-01-96 p .14-16) 
In the aftermath of the Hua Mei revelations, the US president in December 1995 
vetoed a bill on a $50 million fund meant to back up the China-US bilateral Defense 
Conversion Commission. The funding's first beneficiary would have been Hua Mei 
Telecommunications. Meanwhile, a US delegation was due to arrive in China on 21 
January 1996 for a week-long tour of air-traffic-control facilities, another area pin-
pointed by the conversion commission to gain US technology. This development had 
also alarmed US security officials.(FEER 18-01-96 p.15) Besides, the US defense 
department requested the intelligence community to prepare an assessment of 
"whether the transfer of technology to Hua Mei Communications had any significant 
implications for PLA modernization goals" . (FEER 01-02-96 p.15) 
DISSIDENTS 
Release of dissident 
The Myanmarese authorities lifted the house arrest on AUNG SAN Suu KyI. She 
had been on house arrest since 20 July 1989, after her conviction for 'endangering the 
state', an offense she had alledgedly committed when she returned from abroad and 
led the opposition against the military-led government.(IHT 11-07-95) 
In the wake of the release, the US assistant secretary of state, testifying before a 
Senate Committee, said that the US wants dialogue with, not sanctions against Myan-
mar's military rulers. Imposing trade and investment sanctions, he said, would be 
counterproductive. (FEER 02-08-95 p.13) 
Vietnamese-born Americans in Cambodia 
It was reported that an anti-Vietnamese government armed group, numbering 
between several hundred and 2,000, had set up training camps in Cambodia and were 
stockpiling weapons. Many of the resistance group's leaders were identified as natu-
ralized, Vietnamese-born American citizens who had served as officers in the South 
Vietnamese army during the Vietnam War. The goverments of Vietnam, Cambodia 
and the US had monitored the group and took steps in order to clamp down on the 
movement before it did any damage. Many of the rank and file of the resistance move-
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ment were recruited in Cambodia, mostly among the Kampuchea Kraom, who are 
known in Cambodia for their anti-Vietnamese stance.(FEER 16-11-95 pp.16-17) 
DIVIDED STATES: CHINA 
See also: Arms sales, Diplomatic and consular relations 
Further consequences of the visit by the Taiwanese President to the US 
(see also infra, p. 396) 
Talks between Taiwan and the mainland, scheduled to take place in late July 1995 
in Beijing, were postponed by the Beijing side to protest the visit of the Taiwanese 
president to the US. The unsuitability of talks in the near future was confirmed by 
officials of the (Taiwanese) Mainland Affairs Council, who said that the Taiwanese 
government's annual lobbying effort to re-enter the UN would continue to irritate the 
government at Beijing. (FEER 06-07-95 p.12) 
China wanted the US to reaffirm its one-China policy and to state that Taiwan's 
president would not be a allowed into the US again. In addition, said the Chinese 
foreign ministry, the US president must declare that his original decision to admit 
Taiwan's president to the US was a mistake.(FEER 27-07-95 p.18) 
Taiwan I S relations with Hongkong after the hand-over 
On 23 June 1995 the Chinese foreign minister made a formal statement on 
China's basic policy towards Taiwanese entities operating in Hongkong after June 
1997. Thus, official contacts between Taiwan and Hongkong must be approved by 
Beijing. Taiwanese organizations and their staff must abide by the Basic Law and can-
not engage in activities which would "damage Hongkong's stability and prosperity". 
Taiwan's businessmen would remain welcome in the ex-colony although they and 
other Taiwanese would require special travel documents as Beijing does not recognize 
the Taiwanese passport. Official matters, such as setting up of representative offices 
and the signing of bilateral arrangements, would have to be negotiated through Bei-
jing. Air and sea links, meanwhile, would be put in the category of 'special regional 
routes' under the one-China principle. Details of the routes, which would require 
reciprocity, had yet to be worked out.(FEER 06-07-95 p.21, 13-07-95 p.38) 
Military exercises off the Taiwan coast 
(see also infra, p. 396) 
Chinese military exercises were held in early July 1995 north of Taiwan. It was 
widely believed that the military manoeuvres were staged to show China's displeasure 
over Taiwan's aggressive international diplomacy, especially the visit of the Tai-
wanese president to the US in June. (FEER 20-07-95 p.26) 
On 18 July 1995 China announced plans for a week-long surface-to-surface missile 
exercise beginning 21 July and warned ships and airplanes to stay out of an area about 
140 kilometres north of Taiwan's north coast and within 25 kilometres of Pengchia, a 
sparsely populated island claimed by Taiwan. After the exercise had started, Taiwan 
began naval war drills, firing shells off the island's northern coast. China ended its 
missile-training exercise on 26 July.(IHT 19,20,26,27-07-95; FEER 27-07-95 p.15) 
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The Taiwanese president's response included a strong reaffirmation of his poli-
cies, including the eventual reunification of China under democratic rule, and contin-
ued efforts to gain 'international space' for Taiwan to participate in world af-
fairs.{FEER 10-08-95 p.21) 
On 15 August 1995 China started a second series of testing of guided missiles in 
the East China Sea about 100 kilometres north of Taiwan, in combination with a 
three-month military exercise along the Chinese coast. The tests were to last till 25 
August. According to experts China used to test missiles every year. However, it was 
the first time this year that the exercises were so publicly announced. 
On its part Taiwan said it would hold a military exercise before 10 October. The 
exercises which started 27 September had a much more limited scope than the original 
plans in an apparent effort to avoid provoking China.{IHT 11-08,16-08,26/27-8,28-
09-95) 
In late November 1995 China held military exercises in the coastal area of Fujian 
Province opposite Taiwan. They were seen in connection with parliamentary elections 
held in Taiwan.{IHT 27-11-95) 
China meanwhile announced that it would hold, renewed missile tests northeast and 
southwest of Taiwan from 8 to 15 March 1996, two weeks before presidential elec-
tions on the island. The announcement warned ships to stay away from an area 35 to 
65 kilometres off Keelung and about 30 to 50 kilometres off Kaohsiung. It was ac-
knowledged that the tests were intended to change the behaviour of the Taiwanese 
president towards actual independence of the island (creating two Chinas), and to 
show the Chinese determination and capability to saveguard Chinese sovereignty and 
territorial integrity. Exercises with live ammunition were scheduled to start on 13 
March 1996 in a sea area southwest of Taiwan near the Chinese coast, to continue up 
to 20 March. 
The US defense secretary deplored the Chinese plans, expressed his concern about 
the political impact, but did not believe that the tests would be a threat to shipping in 
the area. (CUnJra p. 398) The Japanese foreign ministry said that the escalation of 
tension in the Taiwan Straits was 'undesirable' and could imperil ships passing in the 
area. Indonesia was not concerned, according to its foreign ministry spokesman. The 
Philippines' response was similar but "we are concerned about the fact that some 
miscalculation might happen" . 
While ending its missile tests on 15 March, China announced a new round of 
military exercises northwest of Taiwan beginning 18 March 1996, within 17 kilome-
tres of the islands of Matsu and Wuchiu, which are under Taiwan's control.{IHT 
06,07,12 and 16/17-03-96) 
On 2 April 1996, the Taiwanese defence ministry suspended military exercises on 
off-shore islands until the end of June. It said the halt was intended to ease tensions in 
the Taiwan Strait and to avoid any misunderstandings. (FEER 11-04-96 p.13) 
Boarding of fishing vessels 
It was reported that an armed Chinese patrol boat had boarded and inspected two 
Taiwanese fishing vessels in the Spratly achipelago in July 1995, the first time that 
such activity occurred.(IHT 21-07-95) 
CHRONICLE 363 
Chinese press berates Taiwanese president 
The official Chinese press agency in a commentary started a vehement attack on 
the Taiwanese president on 23 July 1995, accusing him of advocating independence 
for the island. The commentary criticized his call for Taiwan to be given an expanded 
"space of existence in the international community". Another long attack on the char-
acter and personality of the Taiwanese president was launched in the press on 24 
August 1995.(IHT 24,25, and 26-07,25-08-95) 
Denial of re-establishment of US-Taiwan relations 
On 19 July 1995, the Speaker of the US House of Representatives called on the 
US to re-establish diplomatic ties with Taipei. In reaction, a spokesman from the 
Taiwanese foreign ministry said that "we don't want Taipei-Washington ties to affect 
the US relationship with Beijing, and vice versa". A member of the ruling KMT party 
also played down the statement: "So far, it has not been government policy to pro-
mote full diplomatic relations with the US or any of the G-7 nations". "We are sur-
prised by his comments" . . . "because formal recognition is not what we are seeking 
at this moment. ... We are not publicly asking the international community to recog-
nize us as two Chinas. We are still saying publicly that we will be reunited .... If we 
publicly promote this two-country approach ... we risk being attacked" . (FEER 27-
07-95 p.19) 
Taiwan pledge to reunification 
Speaking to the National Assembly, the Taiwanese president insisted that he stood 
for reunification of Taiwan and the mainland, but condemned the Chinese government 
for ignoring the reality of separate governments since 1949. He also criticized domes-
tic advocates of formal separation, saying independence would "put an end to stability 
and prosperity" and "destroy the future" of Taiwan.(IHT 04-08-95) However, on 4 
December 1995 he said that the island would not reunify with an undemocratic China: 
"[D]emocracy and freedom on the mainland is a prerequisite to national reunifica-
tion". (IHT 05-12-95) Amid tensions and Chinese military exercises the Taiwanese 
president said on 20 March 1996 that he sought better relations and eventual reunifi-
cation with the mainland.(IHT 21-3-96) 
In his inaugural address on 20 May 1996 the Taiwanese president, who won the 
elections on 23 March 1996, said that he was willing to visit the mainland for talks: 
"In the future, at the call of my country and with the support of its people, I would 
like to embark upon a journey of peace to China, taking with me the consensus and 
will of 21.3 million people". He also said that "I am also ready to meet with the top 
leadership of the Chinese communists for a direct exchange of views". But he also 
vowed to continue raising the island's international profile despite protests and pres-
sure from the Beijing government. He said: "The Republic of China has always been 
a sovereign state. Disputes around the strait center around system and lifestyle; they 
have nothing to do with ethnic or cultural identity. Here in this country it is totally 
unnecessary or impossible to adopt the so-called course of "Taiwan independ-
ence'''.(IHT 20-05-96; FEER 30-05-96 p.14) 
The Taiwanese president's 'journey of peace' proposal marks a change in Tai-
wan's position according to which the best venue for a meeting between the leaders of 
the two sides was in an international conference to be held in a third country. (FEER 
06-06-96 p.38) 
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Repatriation of Chinese hijackers 
Taiwanese authorities announced that Chinese hijackers who were serving their 
prison terms in Taiwan would be repatriated after the end of their sentences. There 
were 16 mainland Chinese involved in 12 hijacking cases who were serving prison 
terms in Taiwan.(IHT 18-08-95) 
Offshore shipping centre 
In response to long-standing Taiwanese shipowners' complaints that they were 
denied the benefits of direct commercial ties with the mainland, Taipei proposed to let 
shippers operate special transshipment centres for cargo from China. Under the plan, 
ships would be allowed to move goods across the Taiwan Strait, stopping at three 
designated transshipment centres, including the port of Kaohsiung. There, the goods 
would be loaded onto larger vessels. The goods would then have to move on to third 
destinations, as the shippers are not allowed to deliver cargo from China to Taiwan or 
vice versa. The plan awaited approval from Beijing, which had expressed concern 
about that part of the proposal which would allow foreign carriers to share the cross-
straits market with vessels owned by mainland Chinese and Taiwanese companies.(see 
5 AsYIL 405) China had always preferred direct transport links between the mainland 
and Taiwan.(IHT 01-09-95;FEER 06-07-95 p.69) 
Meanwhile, the Taiwanese minister of transport and communications agreed to 
remove references to the Republic of China from shipping documents involved in 
cross-strait trade. The name would be replaced with reference to 'our country' in the 
hope that China would permit shipments from designated 'offshore' zones as the first 
step in direct shipping between the two sides. (FEER 01-02-96 p.57) 
Taiwanese freighter attacked by Chinese vessel 
On 26 January 1996, a Taiwanese freighter was attacked by a Chinese-flagged 
vessel in the Bashi Channel, 300 kilometres off the Fujian coast and 70 kilometers off 
Taiwan's southern coast. After pursuing the freighter for several hours, the smaller 
boat fired automatic weapons and struck the starboard side of the ship. The boat fled 
after being rammed by the freighter. (FEER 08-02-96 p.20) 
Mutual calls on 50th anniversary of the Second World War 
On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of Japan's surrender in World War II, the 
Chinese and Taiwanese presidents addressed the issue of the separation of the two 
sides. The Taiwanese president on 3 September 1995 called for reconciliation with the 
mainland, saying that both sides must be more pragmatic in order to achieve real har-
mony and eventual unification. "Chinese people should help Chinese people", and 
Beijing must not misinterpret his moves to increase Taiwan's international profile as 
attempts to seek global recognition for Taiwan's separate status. He said that a conci-
liatory speech by the Chinese president in January 1995 and his reply in April 1995 
(see 5 AsYIL 403) should form the basis of the relationship. 
In his address the Chinese president said, inter alia: "There does exist a force in 
Taiwan that intends to split the nation and sabotage the cause of peaceful reunifica-
tion. . . . They went so far as to go abroad to say to foreigners that Taiwan is an in-
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dependent sovereign state and advocate the idea of Taiwan independence .. ".(IHT 
04-09-95) 
Rejection of Taiwanese effort to obtain UN seat 
For the third successive year, a proposal to consider "Taiwan's lack of represen-
tation' in the UN General Assembly was rejected by the steering committee. Accord-
ing to the proposed agenda item Taiwan's 'exceptional situation' would be considered 
"in accordance with the established model of parallel representation of divided coun-
tries at the United Nations".(IHT 22-09-95) Taiwan's vice-minister of foreign affairs 
was quoted as saying that Taiwan offered to donate $1 billion to a special international 
development fund in the UN if it can gain admission to the world body.(FEER 06-07-
95 p.13) 
The question of Taiwan's membership bid in the UN is closely linked to the reso-
lution of the China-Taiwan impasse. In this regard, it was proposed that in order to 
end this impasse, the two countries should agree that there is only one China, and that 
eventually Taiwan and the mainland will be reunified. In the meantime, China would 
not use force against Taiwan on the understanding that Taiwan would abandon the 
independence option. But neither side would force the issue until the other side is 
ready. A proposed accompanying agreement would have to shelve the dispute over 
sovereignty, which could pave the way for Taiwan to rejoin the UN on the basis of 
parallel representation, similar to the representation of the two Koreas or the two 
Germanies.(FEER 21-09-95 p.42) 
China called the move an infringement upon its sovereignty and a gross interfer-
ence in its internal affairs. As for Taiwan's admission into some regional organiza-
tions, China said this was based on a special arrangement made through agreement 
and understanding between China and the parties concerned based on the one China 
principle under which Taiwan acts as a region of China and in the name of 'Chinese 
Taipei". (UNdoc.A/50/145, A/50/298) 
Suggestion of exchange of presidential visits 
It was reported that the Chinese president had expressed his willingness to receive 
the Taiwanese president in Beijing and to go to Taiwan himself. He did not say, how-
ever, whether he would treat the Taiwanese president as a head of state.(IHT 17-10-
95) 
Invitation to peace talks 
The Taiwanese president in a television campaign forum on 25 February 1996 
invited the mainland government to hold peace talks.(IHT 26-02-96) 
Following the election victory of the incumbent Taiwanese president on 23 March 
1996 the Chinese foreign ministry called for a meeting between the Chinese and Tai-
wan presidents and for the opening of direct air, shipping and mail links across the 
Taiwan Strait. The Taiwanese side responded by saying it wanted to explore both a 
'peace agreement' and a long-term policy of 'detente' .(IHT 25-03-96) 
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Air links 
The official Chinese Xinhua news agency reported that preparations for direct air 
links between the mainland and Taiwan would continue despite escalating cross-strait 
tensions.(FEER 15-02-96 p.13) 
Mainland-Taiwan trade 
Trade between the two territories grew 27 percent in 1995, to $21 billion. Taiwan 
posted a surplus of $14.8 billion, up 16 percent from 1994.(IHT 01-03-96) 
Taiwan investments on the mainland 
Taiwan's government liberalized its investment ceiling on the mainland to 60 mil-
lion Taiwan dollars (US$2.18 million) from 40 million. (IHT 01-03-96) 
Taiwan reserves reach record high 
The Taiwanese Central Bank reported that foreign exchange reserves climbed to a 
record $100 billion at the end of May 1995. This was second only to Japan's $157 
billion. (FEER 27-07-95 p.83) 
Reiteration of Chinese attitude 
The Chinese prime minister said on the opening day of the National People's Con-
gress that "the question of Taiwan is China's internal affair and China will brook no 
interference by outside forces under whatever pretext and in whatever form". He said 
that China preferred peaceful reunification but he reiterated China's position that "we 
shall not undertake to renounce the use of force" .(IHT 06-03-96) 
In this speech, which was delivered on the anniversary of a major speech delivered 
by the Chinese President JIANG ZHEMIN in 1995, the prime minister reaffirmed the 
earlier speech's message that "[w]e fully respect the lifestyle of our Taiwanese com-
patriots and their aspirations to become masters of their own destiny". He also re-
newed the offer of peace talks in order to "end the state of hostility and accomplish 
peaceful reunification step by step". He emphasized that "adhering to the principle of 
'one China' is the basis and premise of peaceful reunification" . (FEER 15-02-96 p.29) 
DIVIDED STATES - KOREA 
See also: Korean War, Emergency aid, Inter-state relations: general aspects 
Pilot iuter-Korean joint venture 
On 17 May 1995 Daewoo Corp. of South Korea won approval from the South Ko-
rean government to invest $5.1 million in a joint venture with Samchonri (Samcholli?) 
General Corp. of North Korea. The venture, under the name of National Industrial Gen-
eral Corporation, in the North Korean port of Nampo, would produce garments and 
other light-industry goods.(see 5 AsYIL 407) 
In July 1995 the South Korean government gave approval for a team from Daewoo 
Corp. to work in North Korea.(IHT 07-07-95; FEER 09-05-96 p.79) 
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Inter-Korean rice-aid and economic co-operation talks 
It was reported that the talks held in Beijing on South Korean rice deliveries under an 
agreement reached on 21 June 1995, broke off on 19 July 1995, but would be continued 
in August, to include issues of economic co-operation. (IRT 19-07,20-07-95) 
The talks were suspended by an incident over alleged spying by a South Korean (see 
infra) but were to resume on 27 September 1995.(IHT 06-09-95) 
Rice aid linked to peace talks 
In May 1996 the US, Japan and South Korea agreed to withhold any more rice aid to 
North Korea until the latter accepted four-way talks to reduce tension in the Korean 
peninsula (infra). The US assistant secretary of state said that his government would 
consider lifting sanctions only when North Korea implemented the 1994 nuclear accords 
and participated in talks. (FEER 23-05-96 p.15) 
Arrest of South Korean vessels 
North Korea had detained the South Korean freighter 'Samsun Venus' and its crew 
on spying charges for a week but released them on 13 August 1995. After three days of 
talks in Beijing, South Korea acknowledged a photo-taking incident that led to the seizure 
as being a violation of North Korean law and expressed its apology.(IHT 14-08-
95;FEER 24-08-95 p.22) 
With regard to the crew members of the South Korean trawler 'Woosung' which was 
seized in May 1995 (see 5 AsYIL 407), North Korea on 26 December 1995 released the 
five surviving crew members. Also released as part of North Korea's 'peace gesture' 
were the cremated remains of two crew members who were killed during the capture, 
and the remains of a third sailor who had died of illness.(IHT 23/24/25-12 and 27-12-95) 
Reunification efforts 
In a speech marking the end of World War II the South Korean president on 15 
August 1995 urged North Korea to jointly work out a way to end their cold-war division. 
In the meantime, North Korea went ahead with a unification rally at Panmunjom, inside 
the demilitarized zone.(IHT 16-08-95) 
In response to the statement made by the South Korean president before the UN 
General Assembly on 22 October 1995 on the occasion of the 50th UN anniversary, the 
DPRK issued a written statement which, in part, reads: 
"The great leader President Kim II Sung proposed that national reunification should 
be realized through confederation based on the concept of one nation and one State, 
two systems and two Governments, while leaving two different systems and ideas 
existing in the north and south of Korea as they are .... " (UNdoc.A/50/732, 07-
11-95) 
It was reported that the two Koreas held secret, direct talks in May-June 1996, with 
at least one session held in Beijing. The two Koreas had held top level talks only twice in 
the past 25 years. The first foundered in 1972 when South Korea rejected a proposal on 
mutual arms reduction, the second was held in 1991-92, but the resulting agreements (2 
AsYIL409) were frustrated in 1993 after North Korea's threat to pull out from the Nu-
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clear Non-prolifereation Treaty triggered suspicions that North Korea was producing 
nuclear weapons.(FEER 06-06-96 p.12; 13-06-96 pp.14-15) 
Defection of North Korean pilot and aircraft 
A North Korean Air Force captain defected to South Korea with his fighter plane on 
23 May 1996.(IHT 24-05-96) 
North Korean incursion into South Korea 
The South Korean defence ministry said that on 4 June 1996, three North Korean 
vessels crossed into South Korean waters on the west coast for about three hours. The 
vessels were chased out by South Korean navy ships without incident. The defence min-
istry said the incursions seemed unintentional.(FEER 27-06-96 p.13) 
EAST ASIA ECONOMIC CAUCUS (EAEC) 
Australian attitude 
In a significant change of its policy, Australia said on 15 March 1996 that it no 
longer objected to Malaysian efforts to form an East Asia Economic Caucus.(IHT 
16/17 -03-96) 
ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND ASSISTANCE 
See also: Nuclear capacity 
Japanese aid to Myanmar 
It was reported that the Laotian prime minister, during his visit to Japan in early 
June 1995, requested the Japanese government to resume full development assistance 
to Myanmar. It was the first time that Laos had made an appeal on behalf of a third 
country.(FEER 20-07-95 p.12) 
Japan said that it was considering resuming full-scale economic aid to Myanmar 
after the unconditional release of the dissident AUNG SAN Suu KYI on 10 July 1995 
(supra p. 360). Tokyo had frozen aid since 1988. The first amount of aid would go 
towards expanding a nursing school in Yangon. Officials of the two countries ex-
changed documents on Japanese grants in late October 1995.(IHT 29/30-07,28/29-10-
95 ;FEER 10-08-95 p.13) 
Suspension of Japanese grant-aid to China 
Japan decided to freeze grant-aid to China except for emergency and humanitarian 
use, in protest against China's nuclear tests in August 1995 (infra p. 436). The deci-
sion met with fierce Chinese criticism. China filed a protest, asserting that China 
opposed linking economic aid with political issues and that the move could harm bilat-
eral relations. Japan's grant aid to China totaled $79 million in fiscal 1994.(IHT 18 
and 29-08-95) 
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IMF assistance to Myanmar 
Myanmar was pushing with an ambitious economic reform agenda which the IMF 
and the World Bank had asked for. In a meeting of the IMF's executive board on 20 
October 1995, the IMF expressed confidence in the reform process and in the eventual 
devaluation of the kyat. 
A US official said, however, that the US would oppose any financial assistance to 
Myanmar unless there is progress on three issues: human rights, democracy and 
counter-narcotics efforts. It was said that, on the other hand, other key IMF board 
members - Japan, Germany, France and Switzerland - wanted to see loans extended to 
Myanmar.(FEER 23-11-95 p.5) 
Three-Gorges Dam project in China 
The US Exim Bank said it would not help finance American firms bidding for the 
$30 billion Three Gorges Dam project. Following US opinion, the bank said it 
doubted the project could meet environmental guidelines. US construction giants Cat-
erpillar and ROTC Industries criticized the decision.(FEER 13-06-96 p.71) 
EMBARGO 
See also: Arms sales 
New export control system for weapons and high-technology goods: 'New Forum' 
At the end of 1995, the US and 27 other industrial states (including France, Rus-
sia, Germany, the UK and Italy) agreed to set up a new export control system in April 
1996, which would replace the much more rigid cold war system of the Coordinating 
Committee on Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM). Unlike the latter which had 
the power to block exports, the sucessor system, to be named the New Forum, would 
leave all export decisions to individual governments, although the participating states 
reached a common understanding that they would not sell arms or sophisticated 
equipment to at least Iraq, Iran, North Korea and Libya. 
The agreement called for withholding armaments and sensitive items that have 
military application "if the behaviour of a state is or becomes a cause for serious con-
cern". But the group was unable to reach an understanding of the type of behaviour 
that should provoke such concern. 
China was not invited to join the group because of the US concerns about its al-
leged exports of weapons to Pakistan and Iran. Under the new export control regime, 
China would itself still be subject to export licensing.(IHT 21-09-95;FEER 08-02-96 
p.17) 
Chinese aid in setting up Iranian chemical industry 
The US defense department testified before a US Congressional committee that 
China was providing assistance to Iran, consisting of infrastructure for building 
chemical plants and some of the precursors for developing chemical agents.{lHT 
11112-11-95) 
EMERGENCY AID 
See also: Divided states: Korea 
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Food aid for North Korea: South Korea, Japan, China 
For the first time since the country's division in 1946, a merchant vessel flying 
South Korea's flag steamed into a North Korean port on 26 June 1995. The vessel 
carried 2,000 tons of rice as the first part of South Korea's effort to help in the wors-
ening food shortage in the North. The shipments were stopped on 30 June 1995 be-
cause of a dispute over which flag the ships should fly in North Korean ports, but 
were resumed on 4 July.(IHT 04-07-95) 
South Korea said it did not believe that the situation was as bad as presented by 
North Korea and kept additional aid conditional upon the renewal of a political dia-
logue. (IHT 05-02-96) However, it later joined the US in pledging additional aid in 
response to a UN appeal. It announced on 11 June 1996 that it would provide $3 mil-
lion in food aid, consisting of ground grains and milk powder, for humanitarian rea-
sons.(IHT 12-06-96; FEER 20-06-96 p.13) 
It was reported that Japan would ship 44,000 ton of rice to North Korea in the 
middle of July 1995. Half the shipment would be a gift and the other half would be 
paid over a period of thirty years (see 5 AsYIL 411).(IHT 04-07-95;FEER 06-07-95 
p.13,13-07-95 p.15). This would be the first delivery of a 300,000-ton food-aid pack-
age negotiated in June 1995. 
Japan and North Korea in late September 1995 negotiated on additional rice aid in 
late September 1995. Japan offered 200,000 tons of rice on deferred-payment terms, 
and a deal was signed on 3 October.(IHT 02 and 04-10-95) However, it was reported 
in late December that the shipments were delayed because of North Korea's problems 
in sending vessels to carry the rice. (IHT 29-12-95) 
In January 1996 Japan rejected a request from North Korea for more food aid, 
saying it had no surplus rice to donate, and stressed that 100,000 tons of the already 
promised rice was still awaiting collection by North Korea. However, after the US 
granted additional aid (see infra) Japan later also decided to do so and to donate ex-
actly the same amount, $6 million, as the US.(IHT 24-01-96,12-06-96) 
Chinese officials said in January 1996 that China was not considering increasing a 
$3.6 million offer of assistance.(IHT 24-01-96) 
North Korean request for rice from the US 
It was reported that North Korea had requested the US for a large donation of rice 
one month after South Korea and Japan had pledged rice shipments.(IHT 24-07-95) 
Officials from the US, Japan and South Korea met in Hawaii on 25-26 January 
1996 and agreed on a joint response to North Korea's appeal for emergency food aid. 
The three countries agreed that any food aid must be used to draw North Korea out of 
its isolation. South Korea would agree to deliver aid only if North Korea showed its 
readiness to resume talks with the South. After the officials noted that American food 
aid must be provided only as part of an international humanitarian relief effort and not 
as a government-to-government deal, the meeting closed with the consensus that any 
provision of government aid should be contingent on North Korea allowing donors to 
monitor distribution.(IHT 01-02-96;FEER 08-02-96 p.29) The US decided to donate 
$2 million to the UN Food Program as a symbolic gesture.(IHT 05-02-96;FEER 15-
02-96 p.13) 
It was reported in June 1996 that the US planned to grant an additional $6 million 
of food aid. The decision was said to have been made under an informal arrangement 
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that North Korea would respond by making a concession regarding the proposed mul-
tilateral talks on a peace treaty. (IHT 8/9-06-96) 
UN relief aid for North Korea 
North Korea, suffering from torrential rains and severe floods, appealed for emer-
gency relief aid from the UN. It had asked UNICEF for more rice but the organi-
zation had rejected the request upon allegations that some of the rice it previously sup-
plied might have been diverted to the market to raise cash. UNICEF insisted to see 
first-hand where the rice had gone, but Pyongynag was reluctant to give a UNICEF 
representative an entry permit.(FEER 17-08-95 p.12) 
After a UN humanitarian mission toured North Korea, the UN on 12 September 
1995 appealed for $15.7 million in disaster relief for North Korea. The UN World 
Food Program in November 1995 sent 5,140 tons of rice which was to arrive later 
that month. The North Korean authorities allowed WFP monitors to be at the port at 
the time of arrival and to follow the aid to the provinces where it would be distrib-
uted.(IHT 30-08,13-09 and 24-11-95) In March 1996, the WFP sent a freighter car-
rying 5,600 tons of rice bought from Thailand and 903 tons of supplies from the aid 
group Caritas, to North Korea. The WFP said it was finalizing plans for a another 
shipment in April 1996. (FEER 21-03-96 p.13) 
Red Cross estimates of North Korean flood damage 
Officials of the International Committee of the Red Cross said that flood damage 
in North Korea was far worse than originally estimated and would necessitate interna-
tional aid until late 1996. The flooding of August 1995 had affected an estimated 5 
million people, leaving about 500,000 homeless.(IHT 19-12-95) 
North Korean food shortage 
According to a report by the FAO and the UN World Food Program, the food 
shortages in North Korea were not only caused by hailstorms and devastating summer 
floods. These resulted from its stagnating agriculture and its overreliance on Soviet-
era intensive farming methods. North Korea's previously-assured economic ties with 
the former Soviet Union, China and Eastern Europe had masked shortages and bad 
harvests and its little capacity to pay for food in the international market. Without a 
dramatic increase in foreign assistance, North Korea would fall short of its 6 million 
ton annual grain requirement by at least 1.2 million tons.(IHT 30/31-12-95/01-01-96) 
Thai rejection of request for aid 
(See also: Debts) 
Thailand rejected a request for 140,000 metric tons of rice by North Korea, be-
cause the latter was not able to offer the purchase price. The Thai commerce ministry 
said that North Korea already owed Thailand $20 million from previous rice pur-
chases.(IHT 19-01-96;FEER 07-12-95 p.15) 
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ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION AND PROTECTION 
Transfrontier Biodiversity Conservation Area 
Malaysia and Indonesia in October 1994 declared a nearly Soo,ooo-hectare rain 
forest stradling the Sarawak-Kalimantan border a nature reserve. After the Sarawak 
part of 187,000 hectares was made a reserve in 1992, Indonesia in 1994 set aside an 
additional 600,000 hectares in 1994. The forest reserve and wildlife sanctuary is 
known as the Lanjak Entimau/Bentaung Karimun Transfrontier Biodiversity Conser-
vation Area. (FEER OS-12-94 p.2S) 
Sanctions for increased fauna protection 
The US lifted sanctions against Taiwan on 30 June 1995. The sanctions were im-
posed under the 1967 PELLY Amendment in 1994 on certain fish and wildlife imports 
from Taiwan in response to an international call for increased protection of tigers and 
rhinos.(4 AsYIL 435). The US president certified that Taiwan had taken 'substantial 
steps' to halt commercial trade in the animals, such as tough penalties for illegal trad-
ers and the establishment of a conservation police.(IHT 112-07-95; FEER 13-07-95 
p.15) 
Oil spill off the Korean coast 
On 23 July 1995 the Cyprus-registered 140,000 -ton oil tanker 'Sea Prince' was 
unloading its cargo of more than 83,000 metric tons of oil when it was hit by a ty-
phoon. The vessel smashed onto rocks off the Korean coast. An estimated 700 metric 
tons of oil spilled over a 32-kilometre and later even a 50-kilometre radius to the 
southern coastline. The crude oil cargo tanks were unruptured.(IHT 26 and 27-07-95) 
Implementation of Biodiversity Convention in the region 
At the second meeting of the parties to the Convention on Biodiversity in Jakarta 
in November 1995, three questions concerning the regulation of 'bioprospecting' - the 
search for wild species of flora and fauna whose genes can yield new medicines and 
improved crops - were raised: Who should have access to genetic resources? Who 
should monitor this access? Who should get what share of the financial reward of 
biotechnology? The meeting was not able to reach any consensus on these questions. 
Much of the implementation of the Convention is left to the discretion of national 
legislation. In Indonesia the government's efforts to come to terms with bioprospec-
ting were reported to be proceeding very slowly. The Philippines was the first country 
in Asia to enact a law regulating access to genetic resources, with an executive order 
signed by the President in May 1995. Thailand and India completed draft laws. In 
Malaysia, a national committtee on biodiversity was working to amend existing 
laws.(FEER 11-01-96 pp.66-69) 
Sino-US co-operation 
Despite their strained relations, China and the US embarked on a programme of 
environmental co-operation to deal with rapid urbanization, pollution from energy 
consumption, and the changing agricultural patterns of a growing population. Details 
were considered during a three-day meeting of senior officials held in early 1996 in 
Washington, D.C.(IHT 02-05-96) 
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ESPIONAGE 
See also: Aliens, Diplomatic and consular inviolability 
Japanese protest against US espionage 
Japan asked the US for an investigation of reported spying by the CIA during 
recent US-Japanese trade talks.(IHT 17-10-95) On 26 October the US assistant secre-
tary of state told the Japanese ambassador that he could not comment on US intelligen-
ce-gathering activities, whereupon the ambassador expressed regret that the US did 
not firmly deny the reports. (IHT 28/29-10-95) 
ETHNICITY 
See also: Inter-state relations, infra p. 408 
Relevance of ethnicity 
It was reported that the Reserve Bank of India would permit ethnic Indians over-
seas to invest in certain bond issues of the Industrial Bank of India. (IHT 24125-02-96) 
FINANCIAL CLAIMS 
Westinghouse pays Philippine government $100 million 
It was reported that the Philippines would settle out-of-court its claim against US 
company Westinghouse Electric for building a defective nuclear plant in the mid-
1980s.(see 3 AsYIL 377) The company would pay $100 million. In return, the gov-
ernment would lift a ban on Westinghouse taking part in Philippine energy pro-
jects.(FEER 26-10-95 p.79) 
Transfer of Marcos-accounts 
(1 AsYIL 330) 
A Swiss court approved the transfer to the Philippines of nearly $500 million from 
Swiss bank accounts of the late president MARCOS. Under the decision, which was 
still subject to appeal, the money would be put in an escrow account in the Philippines 
pending court action there to settle various claims to the money.(IHT 29-08-95; FEER 
07-09-95 p.13) 
Several weeks later the victims of human rights abuses under the MARCOS regime 
reached agreement with the government to divide up the above amount. A complete 
settlement would be reached if Mr. MARCOS' heirs agreed to contribute another $50 
million. In return, the victims would drop all claims against the estate. If an agree-
ment signed by the president were reached, it would set aside a ruling of a US federal 
court in Hawaii under the Alien Tort Claims Act, which ruled that Mr. MARCOS es-
tate was liable for human rights abuses carried out during his rule and which awarded 
the victims about $2 billion in damages.(IHT 19-09-95; FEER 28-09-95 p.15) 
On 15 January 1996 talks were started in Hong Kong between the representatives 
of the 10,000 claimants in the US case and two Swiss banks concerning the evidence 
that was introduced at the US trial showing that the banks were holding an estimated 
$475 million in MARcos-linked funds. In the absence of a settlement the Swiss banks 
feared that the US court would impose significant penalties if they continued to main-
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tain that they did not have to disclose the amounts they were holding, and that they 
would face court orders in different countries which would force them to pay claims 
more than once. (IHT 28-11-95, 12-01-96) 
Pakistani claim against the US 
(AsYIL Vol. 1 p. 271, Vol. 2 p. 286, Vol. 3 p. 442, Vol. 4 p. 508, Vol. 5 p. 486. 
See also: Arms sales) 
The government of Pakistan said on 24 January 1996 that it would consider legal 
action if the US failed to refund $658 million paid for 28 F-16 fighter planes that had 
been withheld since 1990 because of US suspicion of Pakistan's nuclear plans. (IHT 
25-01-96) 
FISHERIES 
Chinese fishermen convicted by the Philippines 
The Philippine president hinted that 62 Chinese fishermen who were detained 
since March 1995 might be released soon. The fishermen were originally charged 
with using explosives and poison to catch fish in a Philippine-claimed sector of the 
Spratlys, but later pleaded guilty to a lesser misdemeanour, for which they would 
soon complete their jail term.(IHT 16-08-95) 
On 29 December 1995 China demanded the release of four fishermen who were 
sentenced to a 10-month jail sentence for entering waters claimed by the Philip-
pines. (IHT 30/31-12-95/01-01-96) 
Four Chinese fishing boat captains who were detained by the Philippines since 
1995 were deported on 25 January 1996. The Chinese consul-general in Manila reiter-
ated China's position that the captains had been fishing in Chinese territory. (IHT 26-
01-96) 
Japanese-Russian talks on fishing rights 
The two countries held talks in late August 1995 over fishing rights off the Kuril 
Islands. (IHT 24-08-95) 
Negotiations to ensure the safety of Japanese fishing vessels ended without agree-
ment on 21 February 1996, but the two parties agreed to hold a next round of talks 
soon. Discussions on the issue started after a series of incidents in which Russian 
patrol boats fired at Japanese fishing vessels near the four disputed islands off Hok-
kaido.(IHT 22-02-96) 
Thai-Malaysian fisheries incidents 
The Thai fishing vessel 'Tor Laksana 14' was apprehended by a Malaysian naval 
vessel on 6 November 1995. The captain and a crew member were killed by shots 
from the naval vessel and three other crew members were sentenced to four months' 
imprisonment after having pleaded gUilty to the charge of illegal fishing in Malaysian 
fisheries waters. 
Thailand protested against the allegedly unnecessary and excessive use of force 
and sought an apology and compensation. On 27 November 1995 about 300 Thai 
fishermen rallied in front of the Nakon Si Thammarat provincial townhall near the 
Malaysian border to protest the Malaysian action and to launch various threats. While 
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Thai authorities came out against these threats as they might adversely affect Thai-
Malaysian relations, the Malaysian authorities paid an amount to the families of the 
two dead fishermen as a humanitarian gesture. With regard to the imprisoned fisher-
men the Malaysian side promised to find ways to release them as soon as possible. 
Besides, the owner of the seized vessel would be allowed to contact the Malaysian 
authorities for the return of the vessel. 
On 3 December 1995 the Malaysian authorities repatriated the bodies of the dead 
fishermen by air at the former's expense. As a result of an autopsy performed on the 
bodies it was revealed that the men had been shot at close range and it was concluded 
that they had been shot point-blank: while raising their hands in surrender. 
The matter was raised by the Thai prime minister with his Malaysian counterpart 
on the occasion of the ASEAN Summit in December 1995. During these talks the 
Malaysian prime minister expressed his regret about the incident and agreed that long-
term solutions needed to be sought. The prime ministers agreed to resuscitate the 
moribund Thailand-Malaysia Sub-Committee on Fisheries under the Thailand-
Malaysia Joint Commission. The Thai prime minister expressed as his opinion that the 
only way to avoid disputes was for the Thai navy to increase its capabilities and to 
patrol more strenuously. The Thai fishermen were dissatisfied with the outcome and 
threatened to resort to another protest demonstration. 
The situation worsened when three more Thai fishing vessels were arrested on 17 
December 1995 and confiscated by the Malaysian navy while passing through the 
Malaysian EEZ on their way to fish in Indonesian waters under licences. The Malay-
sian side argued that the vessels had been caught fishing in the Malaysian EEZ. The 
crew of two of the three vessels pleaded guilty and the captains as well as the other 
members of the crews were fined, while the vessels were ordered impounded. 
Later in December 1995 the Malaysian government granted pardon to the three 
imprisoned crewmen of the 'Thor Laksana 14' and allowed the owner of the vessel to 
get the vessel back. 
Thailand-Vietnam fisheries problems 
A Thai naval ship detained a Vietnamese fishing boat which Thai officials de-
scribed as a pirate ship. The Vietnam News Agency in turn reported that 40 Thai 
fishing vessels were charged with illegal activity in Vietnamese waters.(FEER 07-03-
96 p.13) 
According to reports from the Vietnamese news media 40 Thai fishing vessels had 
been engaged in (illegally) fishing off Vietnam's Cape Ca Mua on 16 February 1996, 
under the protection of two Thai naval vessels, and that subsequently, on 18 February, 
the Thai vessels arrested two Vietnamese vessels. 
The Thai foreign ministry denied the report and the Thai navy emphasized that it 
always warned Thai fishing vessels not to fish illegally in the maritime zones of a 
foreign country. According to the Thai navy, on 16 February 1996 an armed vessel 
with no identifiable nationality pursued the Thai fishing vessel 'Chok Veera' and fired 
at the latter in the maritime area claimed by both Thailand and Vietnam, despite the 
fact that both countries had agreed in March 1995 not to arrest fishing vessels of their 
respective countries when found fishing in that area. On 18 February the Thai navy 
responded to these and similar reports and went to the rescue of the Thai fishing ves-
sels. As a result the suspected vessel was arrested, with eight Vietnamese nationals on 
board. It transpired that the vessel had once been a Thai fishing vessel named 
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'Sithiwat 2', arrested by the Vietnamese provincial authority of Kien Yang in 1994. 
The eight Vietnamese crew were charged with piracy and the Vietnamese ambassador 
was informed of the action on 21 February 1996. 
In April 1996, the bilateral Joint Committee on Fisheries and Order at Sea agreed 
to set up a contact channel for emergency situations and to operate a joint patrol in 
order to prevent undesired incidents. 
Thai fishing in Myanmar waters 
A Thai-Myanmar inter-agency meeting in November 1995 adopted a number of 
measures to solve fishing problems in the maritime zones of Myanmar, such as the 
requirement for Thai trawlers to be equipped with radio communications devices to 
verify their position at sea, the screening by the Thai department of fisheries of appli-
cations to fish in Myanmar maritime zones, and the posting of financial guaranty 
against breach of obligations. 
The poaching of Thai fishermen in Myanmar waters led Myanmar to abrogate 
earlier agreements and bar Thai fishermen from Myanmar waters. Although 50 Thai 
boats were arrested during the period of January to April 1996, Thai fishing boats had 
reportedly tried to circumvent the ban by incorporating in Singapore. It was said that 
the potential profits far outweigh the risks of capture. (FEER 25-04-96 p.12) 
FOREIGN INVESTMENT, TRANSNATIONAL CONTRACTS, AND JOINT 
VENTURES 
Enron Corp. power plant project in India 
(see 5 AsYIL 418) 
Dabhol Power Co., the Indian company founded by Enron Development Corp., a 
subsidiary of Enron Corp.of the US and its minority partners, General Electric Co. 's 
'GE Capital' unit and Bechtel Enterprises, said in early July 1995 that it was ready to 
come up with alternatives to please the new government of ths state of Maharashtra 
which was reviewing its $2.8 billion power-plant project. The project was to be by far 
India's largest single foreign investment. The Enron plant was one of the most advan-
ced projects to come out from India's decision of September 1991 to open the power 
sector to private investment. It was one of two firms as of July 1995 to secure financ-
ing, with power-purchase agreements backed by state and central government guar-
antees. 
The state cabinet's committee reviewing the Enron power project handed its report 
to the Chief Minister on 18 July 1995. 
On 3 August 1995 the government of Maharashtra state announced that it was 
scrapping the whole project [which had been approved by the former, different party 
government] as being "against the interests of Maharashtra besides being harmful to 
the environment". It alleged that costs of the project had been inflated and that the 
contract had been negotiated in secret without competitive bidding. The state elec-
tricity board was ordered to pay compensation "if necessary". Enron said that ih case 
of cancellation it would claim more than $300 million in compensation. (IHT 03-
07,06-07,04-08,5/6-08,09-08-95; FEER 27-07-95 p.80) 
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Some confusion arose when the state electricity board wrote that the government 
had 'repudiated' the first phase of the project and canceled the second phase, but that 
the power-purchase agreement had not been terminated. It was also said that the gov-
ernment would put a power plant contract out to tender. Meanwhile Enron sent an 
arbitration notice to the state government on 4 August.{IHT 17-08-95) 
The Chief Minister of India's Maharashtra state announced on 23 September 1995 
that his government would agree to renegotiate with Enron after the latter had pro-
posed earlier in the month that it would cut costs and reduce the electricity tariff at 
competitive rates.{FEER 05-10-95 p.82) In October the state government formally 
invited Enron to discuss reviving the power plant project while Enron was considering 
Maharashtra's request to delay arbitration proceedings. {FEER 12-10-95 p.159) 
In November 1995 it was reported that the renegotiations were completed. Under 
the tentative agreement Enron would cut the costs of the power plant by at least $750 
million and the costs of the whole project by $1 billion, while the capacity of the proj-
ect would be increased so that the cost per megawatt could fall to 26.5 million rupees 
from 49 million. Dabhol Power Co. would save about $470 million by transferring the 
cost of one of its facilities to a separate company. This facility would sell its output 
(liquefied natural gas turned back into gas) to the plant. Further, Enron would tender 
for equipment for the project's second phase rather than buying it from its partners in 
the venture. As a reciprocal goodwill gesture Enron suspended its London arbitration 
proceedings while the state would not pursue its Bombay lawsuit for the repudiation of 
the dea1.{IHT 22-11,23-11,24-11-95; FEER 30-11-95 p.72) 
The government would announce its decision on 17 December (IHT 14-12-95) but 
it finally announced on 8 January 1996 that Enron could go ahead with the project if it 
cut its proposed tariff 1.6 percent to 1.86 rupees a unit, from the 1.89 rupees to which 
Enron had already offered to reduce the earlier 2.40 rupees.{IHT 09-01-96) 
Formal agreement was reached on 21 January 1996. The cost of the project was 
reduced from $2.8 billion to $2.5 billion while the capacity of the projected plant was 
increased to 2,450 megawatts. The cost of the electric power per kilowatt-hour would 
be lowered, and 30 percent interest in Dabhol Power Corp., the Indian subsidiary of 
Enron, would be sold to the Maharashtra State Electricity Board.(IHT 23-01-96) 
Enron's Chairman said that it would take up to three months to get the project on 
line, and unless the tractors and builders return to the site, Enron would not cancel the 
arbitration proceedings it launched. It was reported that in spite of the appearance of 
huge concessions made in favor of the Maharashtra government, the details of the 
repackaged agreement revealed that Enron may not really have conceded that 
much. {FEER 01-02-96 p.54) 
Investment in Myanmar 
It was reported that since late 1988, $2.7 billion of foreign investment had come 
into the country, and it was expected that the amount would reach $4 billion by 
March, 1996.(IHT 8/9-07-95) 
As of March 1995, the US was the fourth-largest investor in the country. The 
California-based Unocal oil company held a 33.25 % stake in a $1 billion joint venture 
including a 416-kilometre gas pipeline to carry gas into Thailand. This venture was 
the biggest foreign investment in Myanmar since the supression of the pro-democracy 
movement in 1988. When completed in 1998, the pipeline would carry an estimated 
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525 million cubic feet of gas per day for export and 125 million cubic feet per day for 
Myanmar's domestic market.(FEER 13-07-95 p.65) 
In January 1996, Myanmar awarded a contract to the Singaporean company Sum 
Cheong Exploration to explore and conduct a feasibility study for gold in a 1,400 
square kilometer block in the Northern Shan state. The block was one of 16 for which 
the government had invited bids from foreign companies in October 1994.(FEER 25-
01-96 p.57) 
Development of Iranian oil fields 
Total SA of France signed an agreement with the National Iranian Oil Co. on 13 
July 1995 to develop two sensitive Gulf oil fields, in defiance of US pressures to iso-
late Iran. In March of the same year the US president had barred a US oil company 
(Conoco Inc., see 5 AsYIL 430) from proceeding with a similar contract. 
Total would be responsible for securing all financing, and would get about a third 
of the crude oiul in return for its investment. The capacity of the oil fields was esti-
mated at 120,000 barrels per day.(IHT 14-07-95) 
Philippine-Taiwanese joint venture at Subic Bay 
The Nationalist Party at Taiwan and the Philippine government formed a joint 
venture to develop an industrial park on the site of the former US military installation 
at Subic Bay in the Philippines. The venture would be 25 percent owned by China 
Development Corporation which is run by the Nationalist Party, 25 percent by Cen-
tury Development Corp., a consortium of twenty Taiwanese and one Singapore com-
panies, and 50 percent by the Philippine government.(IHT 20-07-95) 
Singapore investments abroad 
It was reported that Singapore Technologies Industrial Corp.(STIC) was to sign a 
financing deal for a resort project in Indonesia. These STIC initiatives were seen as 
part of the efforts by Singapore to sustain economic growth at home, where it lacks 
natural resources and space, by finding profitable investments elsewhere in Asia. 
Similarly, STIC is involved in the development of industrial parks in China and Indo-
nesia, and is looking to similar projects in norther China, Myanmar and Vietnam. 
STIC is majority-owned by the government.(IHT 20-07-95) 
China contracts with German companies 
On the occasion of the visit by the Chinese president to Germany in July 1995 a 
$1.4 billion agreement was concluded between China and the Mercedes-Benz AG of 
Germany for a joint venture to build minivans and engines, while a separate, smaller 
deal concerned the production of buses and bus chassis. (IHT 13-07-95) 
Besides Siemens AG signed agreements for three joint ventures and two power-
plant projects, the Audi unit of Volkswagen AG entered into a joint venture for the 
eventual production of cars and engines, and the Walter Bau construction company 
signed a preliminary agreement to take a majority stake in a state-owned Chinese 
company.(IHT 15/16-07-95) 
The state visit took place amidst a crisis in China-US relations; the Chinese presi-
dent stressed that the eight joint-venture agreements signed during his visit were de-
cided solely on business grounds. (FEER 27-07-95 p.22) 
CHRONICLE 379 
American investment lobby for Pakistan 
It was reported that Pakistan was preparing to launch a lobbying organization in 
Washington similar to the one established in 1994 by US businesses investing in India. 
Having seen the effectiveness of US firms lobbying in support of China and India, 
Pakistan wanted to enlist the help of American investors to influence the US admini-
stration and Congress. The US is one of the largest investors in Pakistan, especially in 
the energy-related industries. (FEER 10-08-95 p.12) 
Korean investments in foreign companies 
South Korean conglomerates had made several investments in well-known US 
companies dealing in consumer products and high-technology recently. While they 
amounted only to a small fraction of the Japanese-led purchases in the past, the invest-
ments were taking place for the same reasons: to gain technology or entry into new 
markets. 
In mid-1995 LG Electronics bought a controlling stake in Zenith Electronics Corp. 
In February 1995 Samsung Electronics Co. bought a 40 percent stake in AST Re-
search Inc.(personal computers) and also invested in six other, small US high-tech-
nology companies. In 1994 Hyundai bought a micro-electronics division from AT&T 
Corp., and in the year before it bought 40 percent of Maxtor Corp. (disk-drives). In 
April 1995 Cheil Food & Chemicals Inc. agreed to buy a 11.1 percent stake in 
Dreamworks SKG (entertainment). Samsung also bought two Japanese concerns 
among which an audio equipment producer. (IHT 20-07,22123-07-95; FEER 27-07-95 
p.83) 
It was reported in August 1995, however, that the government had introduced new 
regulations under which a company had to put its own money for at least 20 percent of 
an investment abroad.(IHT 10-08-95) 
Gas pipeline projects 
Japan's Mitsubishi, China's National Petroleum and Esso China, an affiliate of 
America's Exxon, agreed to study the feasibility of building an 8,OOO-kilometer pipe-
line to transport natural gas from Turkmenistan through China to supply the Asia-
Pacific p'gion. The construction cost would run to $10 billion.(FEER 31-08-95 p.65) 
A 778-kilometre pipeline, which had been under construction for three years, 
linking a gas field in the South China Sea south of Hainan island, to Hongkong, was 
closing to completion in late-1995. The ambitious gas pipeline project is a joint ven-
ture between China National Offshore Oil Corp., Kuwait Foreign Petroleum Explora-
tion and Atlantic Richfield Oil Co.(Arco). The pipeline is expected to supply about 85 
billion cubic meters of gas over 20 years and generate about $12 billion in reve-
nue.(FEER 05-10-95 p.17) 
Oil refinery in Malaysia 
The giant US oil company Conoco, a fully owned subsidiary of US chemical pro-
ducers Du Pont, formed an alliance with Malaysia's national oil corporation, Petro-
nas. In early October 1995 construction began on a $1.1 billion oil refinery in Mal-
acca in which Conoco has a 40% stake and Petronas 45%. The remaining 15% is held 
be Statoil of Norway. (FEER 26-10-95 p.78) 
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Withdrawal of Elf from Chinese refinery project 
Elf Aquitaine S.A. of France decided to withdraw from a project to build a $2.5 
billion refinery in Shanghai following a feasibility study. The project was launched in 
1991. The company said the decision was also part of a strategy review emphasizing 
smaller projects.{IHT 24-10-95) 
China-General Motors co-operation 
China selected General Motors as a partner in a $1 billion project for an assembly 
plant in Shanghai, implying the beginning of negotiations for a joint venture agree-
ment. It was said that GM promised to be liberal with export rights, and that it met 
Chinese demands for technology transfer.{IHT 25-10-95) 
Expiration of preferential policies for foreign investors in China 
It was announced that all but one of the preferential policies for foreign investors 
in China's special economic zones would expire at the end of 1995, leaving one un-
changed: foreign enterprises in the zones would continue to pay less income tax than 
the national rate.{IHT 25-10-95) However,the new tax laws would cut tax benefits 
enjoyed by foreign companies. Joint ventures would be required to begin paying duty 
and V AT on imports of capital equipment, tax breaks for joint-venture income would 
be abolished, imports for projects funded by multilateral lenders would lose duty free 
status, and the VAT rebate allowed for manufacture inports that are later exported 
would be cut.{FEER 21-12-95 p.56) 
It was emphasized in January 1996 that China would not remove a five-year busi-
ness tax exemption currently enjoyed by foreign banks operating in the country's six 
special economic zones (Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Xiamen, Shantou, Hainan and the Pudong 
district of Shanghai). (IHT 23-01-96) 
Caltex gas storage unit in China 
It was reported that Caltex Petroleum Corp. Uointly owned by Texaco Inc. and 
Chevron Corp.) and the Shantou Ocean Enterprises (Group) Petroleum and Petro-
chemical Co. would form a joint venture in building China's largest liquid petroleum 
gas storage facility. The underground granite vaults would be able to store 100,000 
metric tons of gas, and to blend more than 1 million tons a year of liquid petroleum 
gas by combining butane and propane.{IHT 14-12-95) 
Foreign investments in Vietnam 
It was reported that the pace of foreign investment in Vietnam was picking up 
sharply after the establishment of diplomatic relations with the US (supra p. 355). The 
Japanese were especially encouraged by the US move, while Taiwan was currently the 
top foreign investor in the country. (FEER 10-08-95 p .12) 
It was also reported that Vietnam was anxious to get more American firms in-
volved in its oil and gas industries. Industry sources said that PetroVietnam was eager 
to negotiate with US company Emon on the construction of a $150 million processing 
plant for LPG.(FEER 30-05-96 p.12) 
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Vietnam oil refinery 
The first oil refinery, $1.2 billion project in Vietnam was relaunched after the 
withdrawal of Total SA of France. In its place Vietnam had invited the LG Group of 
Korea, Petronas of Malaysia and Conoco Inc., a unit of Du Pont Co. 
Petro Vietnam and LG Group would each take a 30 percent stake, Petronas and 
Conoco would get a combined stake of 30 percent. Chinese Petroleum Corp. and 
Chinese Investment Development Corp., both of Taiwan, would get the remainder. 
The refinery would be built at Dung Quat Bay, 130 kilometres south of Danang, 
and would have a capacity of 130,000 barrels a day. 
Total had considered the project to be unviable because the site was too far from 
the main source of crude oil and isolated from its major consumption base, and be-
cause the area was lacking in infrastructure.{IHT 11-01-96) 
Chinese natural gas field 
On 1 January 1995, the Yacheng project, located 90 kilometres southwest of 
Hainan Island, started supplying natural gas to Hong Kong's Black Point power plant, 
775 kilometres away, through the world second longest undersea pipeline. The Yach-
eng project, China's biggest offshore natural gas field in the South China Sea, is a 
joint venture involving Atlantic Richfield Co.{Arco) of the US holding 34.3 percent 
stake in the $1.2 billion project, China National Offshore Oil Corp. 51 percent, and 
Kuwait Foreign Petroleum Exploration Co. the remaining 14.7 percent. In 1992 Cas-
tle Peak Power Co.{Capco) - a US-Hong Kong joint venture - won user rights to the 
gas for the life of the Yachen reserves, estimated at more than 20 years. Capco con-
tracted to buy 85 % of the projected yield for its Black Point power plant. (IHT 11-01-
96; FEER 28-12-95/04-01-96 p.120) 
Three-Gorges Dam project in China 
The US Exim Bank said it would not help finance American firms bidding for the 
$30 billion Three Gorges Dam project. Following US opinion, the bank said it 
doubted the project could meet environmental guidelines. US construction giants Cat-
erpillar and ROTC Industries criticized the decision.{FEER 13-06-96 p.71) 
Foreign fast-food chain protested in India 
A Kentucky Fried Chicken restaurant in Bangalore was the object of nationalist 
protests since it opened in June 1995. The protests, led by a farmers' association, 
accused KFC of undermining local agriculture and threatening public health by serv-
ing carcinogenic chicken. Within three months of its opening, the outlet was closed by 
local authorities, alledgedly for using more taste-enhancers than permitted, but the 
outlet reopened hours later after the company appealled to the state High 
Court. (FEER 28-09-95 p.103) Farmers later broke through a police cordon on 30 
January 1996 and ransacked the outlet, demanding that it leave India.{IHT 31-01-96) 
KFC's New Delhi outlet, its second in India, was also ordered to close on health 
grounds. The chief minister, who was a member of a political party opposed to for-
eign fast foods, cited unhygenic conditions and the presence of a banned chemical in 
the chicken.{FEER 23-11-95 p.83) Here again, KFC reopened after a court over-
turned a municipal order canceling its operating license.{FEER 14-12-95 p.79) 
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Foreign investments in North Korea 
In spite of North Korea's push since 1993 to bring in foreign investors to the Ra-
jin-Sonbong free-trade zone, effectively the only place where foreigners may directly 
invest in the country, foreigners had only committed 10 % of the $ 200 million planned 
investment. Western companies found the facility lacking in infrastructure. Other 
identified deterrents to foreign investments included relatively expensive labour costs 
and the absence of legal safety nets. North Korea has not signed treaties protecting 
investments from nationalization or double taxation. (FEER 2S-01-96 p.S4) 
In early 1996, upon invitation by a firm owned by Taiwan's ruling Kuomintang 
party, a five-person official delegation from North Korea led by the deputy director of 
the country's foreign trade bureau visited Taiwan for discussions on investment in 
North Korea.(FEER 11-04-96 p.13) 
Foreign investments in Bangladesh 
Between July and November 1995, foreign investors proposed a record $8S0 mil-
lion in projects for Bangladesh. In the previous year ending on 30 June 1995, foreign-
ers had proposed $7S0 million. These figures contrasted with the $S3 million foreign 
investors registered in fiscal year 1993. It was reported that the time lag between 
proposed and actual projects could be brief, as Bangladesh's Board of Invesment sim-
ply registers projects and does not submit investment proposals for reviews.(FEER 
2S-01-96 pp.SS-S6) 
Intra-Asian investments 
It was reported that NEC of Japan planned to invest about $1 billion in China over 
the next five years, in addition to about a same amount already invested, to expand its 
semiconductor and telecommunications-equipment business there. 
According to another report the LG Group (formerly Lucky-Goldstar) of South 
Korea planned to invest about $S billion over the next five years in oil refining, semi-
conductor, petrochemical, construction and telecommunications ventures in Southeast 
Asia and India.(IHT OS-02-96) 
Canadian investment in Myanmar 
Nortel, a Canadian company, was doing business in Myanmar through the Israeli 
company Telerad. Nortel had long standing ties with Telerad and had bought 20% of 
the company in 1995. The deal allowed Nortel "to be in a market it would be otherwi-
se hard to reach" due to protests and shareholder resolutions in Canada.(FEER 29-02-
96 p.12) 
Southeast Asian investments in Pakistan 
A delegation of Pakistani businessmen headed by the Pakistani prime mlmster 
visited Indonesia and Brunei in early March 1996. The special assistant to the Prime 
Minister said that "Pakistan has always concentrated on markets in the west and ig-
nored the growth areas in Southeast Asia. Last year we decided to correct this with a 
focus on five countries - Japan, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and 
Brunei". As a result of the initiative, Singapore and Malaysia would finance three 
power-generation projects. Malaysia also put up a $100 million oil terminal near Ka-
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rachi and recently signed a joint venture deal to explore oil and gas in Pakistan. (FEER 
04-04-96 p.24) 
European investments in Asia 
The Japan External Trade Organization reported that EU countries provided 10.8 
percent of foreign investments in Asia excluding Brunei in 1994, down from 13.3 
percent in 1990.(IHT 28-02-96) 
Power plants in Indonesia 
A group of foreign banks led by America's Chase Manhattan and the Industrial 
Bank of Japan agreed to finance $1.8 billion for Paiton Energy's two coal-fired power 
units to be built on the northeast coast of Java. Power from the Paiton plants, expected 
to be generated by 1999, would be sold to the state electricity company PLN under a 
30-year purchase agreement signed in 1994. (FEER 27-07-95 p.83) 
Enron Development Corp. of the US and the Indonesian state-owned oil company 
Pertamina were reported in May 1996 to be close to an agreement for the development 
of large power plants fueled by natural gas from a gas field operated by Mobil Corp. 
The deal would be worth about $525 million. Under the agreement Enron would 
build, own and operate a 500-megawatt power plant near Wates in East Java in a joint 
venture with two Indonesian concerns. The state-owned power utility PLN would buy 
electricity from the plant under an agreement negotiated in 1995.(IHT 21-05-96) 
General Motors investment in Thailand 
The Opel AG unit of General Motors Corp. announced on 30 May 1996 that it 
would build a $750 million factory in Thailand, to be completed in the year 
2000. (lHT 31-05-96) 
HIJACKING OF AIRCRAFT 
Hijack of Iranian aircraft to Israel 
An Iranian airliner on a domestic flight with more than 170 people aboard was 
hijacked by a crew member on 19 September 1995 and directed to land in Israel. The 
hijacker sought political asylum in the US but was charged with hijacking in Israel. 
Iran demanded the return of the hijacker but Israel refused. The airplane was released 
on 20 September.(IHT 20,21-09-95,16-10-95) 
HONGKONG AND MACAO 
See also: Divided states: China; Diplomatic and consular relations 
Agreement on airport financing 
China and the UK reached a final agreement on 30 June 1995 on the financing of 
the new airport, thus ending a four-year dispute. The agreement set specific borrow-
ing amounts and borrowing conditions. 
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Simultaneously China approved a consortium to run an air cargo service that inclu-
ded a company related to the British colonial trading house Jardine Matheson Hold-
ings Ltd.(IHT 112-07-95) 
British Dependent Territories Citizenship and right of abode 
A suggestion by the Governor of Hongkong that the colony's 3.2 million holders 
of British Dependent Territories Citizen passports be given the right to abode in Brit-
ain was rejected by China as well as Britain.(IHT 25-09,26-09-95;FEER 05-10-95 
p.22) 
[The BDTC status (and corresponding passport) under British law entitled the person 
to obtain British consular protection abroad, but did not permit the person to settle in 
the UK ('non-patrial', no 'right of abode'). Consequently the BDTC passport was for 
all intents and purposes a travel document. As the status of BDTC based on a connec-
tion with Hongkong would be abolished with the hand-over of Hongkong, Hongkong 
BDTCs could, between 1987 and the hand-over, apply for and obtain another, newly 
created status under British law, viz. British National (Overseas)(BNO). Those who 
would not apply for BNO-status and who would consequently become stateless, would 
become British Overseas Citizen (BOC) by operation of law as of 1 July 1997. Nei-
ther BNOs nor BOCs would have right of abode in the UK.] 
Hongkong passports 
China unveiled a new passport that would be issued to permanent Chinese resi-
dents of Hongkong after resumption of Chinese sovereignty over the territory. The 
passport would not be available for the some 7,000 members of ethnic minorities. 
China would try to persuade countries with close ties to Hongkong to exempt 
Hongkong residents from visa requirements. The central government would authorize 
the immigration authorities of Hongkong to issue the passports beginning 1 July 
1997. (IHT 17-10-95) 
The British prime minister announced during a visit to Hong Kong in early March 
1996 that after the 1997 hand-over, Britain would allow people who hold passports 
issued by the new Hong Kong Special Administrative Region the right to visit the UK 
without first obtaining a visa. 
Meanwhile large numbers of people were applying to become [British Nationals 
(Overseas)]. It was to be expected that the corresponding travel document (see supra) 
would give visa-free access to many more countries than the Hongkong passport [See 
Chinese memorandum on the occasion of the 1984 Joint Declaration, permitting Chi-
nese nationals in Hongkong who were previously BDTCs, to use UK travel documents 
after 1 July 1997. 5 AsYIL 590]. (FEER 04-04-96 p.40, 11-04-96 p.14) 
Sino-British agreement on hand-over issues 
On 3 October 1995 a four-item plan was agreed between the Chinese foreign min-
ister and the British foreign secretary, outlining procedures for better communication 
between the two sides in the remaining 21 months of British rule. 
Among other things a liason office would be set up to promote contacts between 
the Hongkong government and the Chinese Preparatory Committee, and provision was 
made for the addition of consulates in the two countries. (IHT 06-10-95; FEER 12-10-
95 p.15,19-1O-95 pp.16-17) 
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British involvement after hand-over 
In early March 1996, the British prime minister said that in light of the Joint Dec-
laration prescription that Hongkong would remain a capitalist society for 50 years 
after the handover, "we would have a duty to pursue every legal and other avenue 
available to us" if China would breach the Joint Declaration.(FEER 04-04-96 p.40) 
Issue of Macao currency (patacas) by Bank of China 
Under an agreement between China and Portugal the Bank of China began issuing 
Macao currency on 16 October 1995.(lHT 17-10-95) 
Nationality issue in Macau 
With the approach of the hand-over to China in 1999, it was reported that the 
Macanese - those of mixed Chinese and Portuguese descent - feared that they would 
be forced to relinquish their Portuguese nationality, because China does not recognize 
dual citizenship. The 50,000 or so Macanese have traditionally filled senior posts in 
the civil service.(FEER 10-08-95 p.12) 
Review of Hongkong Bill of Rights 
On 18 October 1995 the Preliminary Working Committee proposed that the 1991 
'Bill of Rights' be amended after the return of Hongkong to Chinese rule. The Work-
ing Committee found several elements of the Bill to be inconsistent with the 
Hongkong Basic Law, and accused the UK of ignoring repeated Chinese calls not to 
enact the Bill. The 'Bill of Rights' consisted of a package of laws designed to enshrine 
the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which China is not a party, in local 
laws. 
China subsequently confirmed its intention to review the Bill of Rights and other 
laws which had lately been modified by the British administration, in order to bring 
them in line with the Basic Law. 
The proposed changes would repeal a provision that requires Hongkong laws to 
conform with the Bill and eliminate its connection to the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights.(IHT 19 and 20-10-95) 
A foreign ministry spokesman said that the Basic Law would be the major, cardi-
nal law to which other laws must be subordinated. He accused the British administra-
tion of violating agreements by 'unilaterally' passing the Bill of Rights and other laws 
in an effort to fold them into the Basic Law.(IHT 25-10-95) 
Nationality of Indians in Hongkong 
The British government refused an appeal by the Hongkong governor on behalf of 
7,000 Indians living in Hongkong to be given full british citizenship with right of 
abode in the UK.(IHT 30-10-95) 
In March 1996 the Chinese authorities gave an assurance that the ethnic Indian 
minority could obtain Chinese nationality.(IHT 15-03-96) 
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Hongkong air agreements 
Hongkong was to sign air services agreements with Japan and the US by the end 
of November 1995. Both agreements would be subject to approval by the Chinese-
British Joint Liaison Group.(IHT 01-11-95) 
US attitude toward Hongkong 
It was reported that as the 1997 hand-over came near, US policy towards 
Hongkong changed from a largely hands-off to a more pro-active one. 
In response to publicly aired worries by a number of prominent US politicians 
about the future of Hongkong, the US government set up a special inter-agency task 
force on Hongkong in March 1995, and the US state department would issue its bi-
annual report on Hongkong in March 1996, a year earlier than scheduled. In May 
1995, the US consul general in Hongkong delivered a speech concerning the colony's 
political autonomy, the rule of law and democratic institutions. He said that these 
fundamentals "are not to be impaired" and that "the US government is carefully 
watching developments on all these fronts". He added that the US would continue to 
support Hongkong's participation in international institutions and to maintain bilateral 
agreements such as extradition. The consul general later said that "if Hongkong 
ceases to have an independent voice in trade, then the US may not be able to treat it 
independently for trade policy". 
China denounced these US moves as interference in its domestic affairs, but did 
not threatened any retaliation. (IHT 08-11-95; FEER 06-07-95 p.26) 
Hongkong and the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
In late October 1995, the UN Human Rights Committee held its fourth hearing on 
Hongkong. The hearings focused on a British report to the Committee, prepared with 
the guidance of the British governor. [The Covenant was extended to Hongkong in 
1976.](FEER 19-10-95 p.38) 
The Committee later issued a report made public on 3 November 1995. The 
Committee in its report welcomed the enactment of the 1991 Bill of Rights Ordinance 
in Hongkong and "noted with appreciation the various ordinances that have been re-
viewed as to their conformity with the Bill of Rights and amended accordingly". The 
Committee· also reiterated the view that "once the people living in a territory find 
themselves under the protection of the [Covenant], such protection cannot be denied 
them by virtue of the mere dismemberment of that territory or its coming within the 
jurisdiction of another state or of more than one state". The Committee went on to say 
that "As the reporting requirements will continue to apply, the Human Rights Com-
mittee considers that it is competent to receive and review reports that must be sub-
mitted in relation to Hongkong" . 
It was reported that China's initial response to the Committee's report was nega-
tive. The China-appointed Preliminary Working Committee had recommended that the 
Bill of Rights be watered down by removing clauses stating that all other legislation 
must be consistent with it. (see supra) (FEER 23-11-95 p.40) The Chinese foreign 
ministry said that since China is not a party to the UN Covenants, it would not report 
to the UN on human rights in Hongkong after China resumed control of Hong 
kong.(IHT 15-11-95) 
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Preparatory Committee on Hongkong 
The Preliminary Working Committee, appointed by China to advise jt on 
Hongkong's transition, was replaced by a new, more powerful, body, the new 150-
member Preparatory Committee on Hongkong. Its tasks included the setting up of a 
new Hong Kong government and the formation of a provisional legislature until elec-
tions can be held. The Committee was formally appointed on 26 January 1996.(IHT 
08-12,28-12,29-12-95,27/28-01-96) 
Residence and nationality questions 
During a visit by the British foreign minister to China in January 1996 agreement 
was reached that those who were permanent residents in Hongkong at the time of 
reversion to Chinese rule, including those belonging to non-Chinese ethnic minorities, 
would be allowed to stay.(IHT 1O-01-96} 
According to Chinese policy a distinction was made between Chinese and non-
Chinese residents. The latter have foreign nationality but would be allowed living in 
Hongkong after the return of Hongkong to Chinese rule.(IHT 10-04-96) 
On the right of abode of Hongkong Chinese who were living abroad the Chinese 
foreign minster said that ethnic Chinese exiles who were permanent residents of 
Hongkong would be allowed to retain the privilege after 1997, so long as their stay 
abroad did not exceed a certain number of years, a period to be worked out by the 
Joint Liaison Group.(FEER 25-01-96 pp.14-15) 
The head of the Hongkong and Macao Affairs Office said that China did not care 
what other (foreign) passports Hongkong residents hold, provided they do not rely on 
consular protection from other countries and claim Chinese nationality at the same 
time. Hongkong residents who would choose to declare their foreign nationality on 
entering the territory after the 1997 hand-over would automatically have no right to 
vote and to be employed and would be granted conditional residency and work rights. 
On the other hand, if Hongkong residents would choose to travel abroad on non-
Chinese travel documents without notifying the local Hongkong authorities, that 
would be acceptable also although it would constitute a departure from the normal 
Chinese stance of not recognizing dual nationality. There were an estimated 700,000 
to 1 million people in Hong Kong with foreign passports. (IHT 13/14-04-96) 
The question whether Hongkong people would acquire Chinese nationality after 
the 1997 takeover was clarified. It was opined that from a British standpoint, those 
who hold British Dependent Territories Citizen passports (or are British subjects) 
would become British overseas nationals (BNO or BOC, see supra p. 384). From the 
Chinese standpoint, ethnic Chinese residents of Hongkong were considered Chinese 
nationals before the handover and would remain Chinese nationals while the others 
would remain aliens. 
The issue was raised about the status of the hundreds of thousands of holders of 
'certificate of identity' documents (CI's) - which had been issued to those Chinese 
who had acquired some foreign citizenship but chose to stay in Hongkong after having 
relinquished their acquired citizenship. (FEER 29-02-96 p.33) 
It was reported that the Preparatory Committee, which had effectively replaced the 
Sino-British Joint Liaison Group for discussion of transition issues, would find diffi-
CUlty settling issues related to immigration. China was said to be perplexed about 
whether to allow Hongkong Chinese with foreign passorts to retain their right to re-
side permanently in the territory. Allowing it would require changes in China's na-
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tionality law, which does not recognize dual citizenship. China was aware, however, 
of the importance to Hongkong's economic future of keeping home some 700,000 
locals who had a right of abode abroad, as well as coaxing some 40,000 rich locals, 
who had moved abroad after the 1989 Tiananmen incident. (FEER 27-06-96 p.28) 
Agreement on container terminal facilities 
China had protractedly refused to allow the old colonial British-controlled Jardine 
Matheson conglomerate, which had played an important role in the 19th-century 
opium trade, to participate in new large-scale construction projects, such as the buil-
ding of new shipping container handling facilities. Other participants in the consor-
tium had requested the withdrawal of Jardine Matheson but this was rejected by the 
UK. 
The dispute on the matter between Britain and China was resolved during negotia-
tions between the UK foreign minister and the Chinese government in January 1996. 
China was prepared to endorse the outcome of any agreement among the participating 
companies concerned.(IHT 11-01-96; FEER 25-01-96 p.14-15) 
Abolition of existing Legislative Council 
In October 1995, the Chinese foreign minister said that China would disband 
Hongkong's existing, largely elected, legislative council.(FEER 12-10-95 p.15) The 
Hongkong Preparatory Committee (see supra) accordingly decided on 24 March 1996 
to abolish the Council as of 1 July 1997 and to replace it with an appointed Provi-
sional Legislative Council.(IHT 25-03-96; FEER 11-04-96 p.14) 
HUMAN RIGHTS 
See also: Hongkong 
German attitude toward China 
As eight Sino-German business deals were signed on the occasion of the visit by 
the Chinese president to Germany, the German chancellor, while saying that Germany 
wanted an "open dialogue that is marked by mutual recognition of universal human 
rights principles", added that in view of China's different stage of economic develop-
ment and different cultural traditions "it is to be respected that there are still differ-
ences in forms and understanding of human rights" . (lHT 14-07-95) 
This attitude reinforced the announced new EU policy on China which was un-
veiled in mid-1995 (infra p. 395) and which firmly backed a circumspect approach to 
China on issues such as human rights, Tibet and nuclear weapons. (FEER 20-07-95 
p.20, 27-07-95 p.22) 
Vietnamese attitude toward linkage of trade and human rights 
Responding to comments by the US state department regretting the imprisonment 
of a number of dissidents, the Vietnamese foreign ministry said Vietnam would not 
accept human rights conditions on trade accords with the US. (see also Aliens, supra 
p. 335)(lHT 18-08-95) 
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Western condemnation of Chinese conviction of dissident 
The conviction of the Chinese dissident WEI JINGSHENG on 13 December 1995 on 
criminal charges gave rise to expressions of indignation and protest from Western 
countries, such as the US, Britain, France, Germany, and the EU, and also from the 
British governor of Hongkong. On the other hand, Asian states were restrained, in 
accordance with the practice of not passing public judgement on their neighbours' 
internal affairs.(IHT 15-12 and 20-12-95) 
Chinese human rights report 
China published a government report on human rights in China. Justifying China's 
human rights record it stressed group rights over individual ones and noted that China 
had given priority to the people's rights to economic development and political or-
der. (IHT 28-12-95) 
UN report on human rights in Myanmar 
In his report to the UN Commission on Human Rights, the (Japanese) UN Special 
Rapporteur on Myanmar said that forced I~bour, torture and arbitrary killing are still 
widespread in Myanmar. (IHT 17-04-96) 
No UN action on issue of human rights in China 
For the sixth straight year the UN Commission on Human Rights upheld a Chinese 
motion to take no action on a Western draft resolution criticizing China's human 
rights record. (IHT 25-04-96) EU foreign ministers had backed an American-
sponsored resolution calling on the UN to condemn China's human rights rec-
ord. (FEER 11-04-95 p. 13) 
French attitude on human rights in China 
It was reported that after the visit of the Chinese premier in April 1996, France 
promised not to raise human rights issues in pUblic. The French foreign minister said 
that "[i]f France forges a partnership with China, then it can hope to make China shift 
its stance" on human rights.(FEER 25-04-96 p.16) 
US inspection of Chinese prison facilities 
In April 1996 China allowed a US customs official to inspect a prison factory, 
approximately a year since the previous visit. China had agreed to such visits under a 
Sino-US memorandum of understanding on prison labour but did not allow them after 
the deterioration of China-US relations in 1995.(IHT 07-05-96) 
IMMUNITY 
See also: Diplomatic inviolability 
Thai law on state immunity 
The Thai government established an inter-agency committee on 21 November 
1995 to study and draft legislation on state immunity. The resolution was motivated by 
the fact that, in view of the developments in international business relations and joint 
390 ASIAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
ventures, it is more likely than ever before that a foreign sovereign might be sued in a 
Thai court and the defendant might raise state immunity as a defence. So far Thailand 
did not have legislation on the matter, nor was there a judicial decision setting a legal 
precedent in the field. 
INSURGENTS 
See also: Red Cross 
Muslim insurgents in the Philippines 
It was reported that since the 1992 truce between the Government and the MNLF 
(Moro National Liberation Front), the breakaway Moro Islamic Liberation Front 
(MILF) had been using the negotiated cease fire to build up its strength and that it 
might start an MILF offensive if the MNLF-government talks would collapse. Aware 
of these developments, the MNLF demanded the implementation of the Tripoli 
Agreement including autonomy for 13 provinces in the southern Philippines (see 5 
AsYIL 426)(FEER 13-07-95 p.24) 
The government insisted on constitutional grounds that a referendum be held be-
fore autonomy could be granted to the 13 provinces. It referred to a final paragraph in 
the Tripoli Agreement which read: "The government of the Philippines shall take all 
necessary constitutional processes for the implementation of the entire agreement". 
On the island of Mindanao, which is their homeland, the Muslims are, however, out-
numbered by the Christians and, therefore, were against a plebiscite. The rebels said 
such a referendum would violate the 1976 Tripoli Agreement which called for 13 
provinces in the south to become an autonomous region with the MNLF serving as 
provisional government until a legislature would be elected. They emphasized that in 
fact the idea of a referendum was explicitly rejected when the agreement was negoti-
ated. 
After their third round of talks in July 1995 the government and the Front had 
agreed on nearly all the details of the Tripoli Accord's implementation, except the 
issue of the process of establishing the autonomous region. As a way-out, the presi-
dent proposed that the MNLF leader run as a government candidate for governor in 
the 1996 elections in the already existing (limited) Autonomous Region of Muslim 
Mindanao (see AsYIL Vol.3 p.393, Vol.5 p.426). As a governor he would then be in 
a position to prepare a referendum for an extended autonomous region. 
A next round of talks in Jakarta in November-December 1995 failed to produce 
results.(IHT 03-07,27-11-95; FEER 24-08-95 p.23, 14-12-95 p.13) 
In early 1996, an intelligence memorandum reported that the MILF was set "to 
declare an independent Islamic State" and that "some Islamic countries" would sup-
port the declaration.(FEER 15-02-96 p.12) While the government said that the MILF 
had just about 8,000 troops - far below the 20,000 estimated by a Philippine senator 
and former defence secretary, or the 40,000 estimate from Western intelligence 
sources - the MILF claimed that it had 120,000 troops. It was said that in the past two 
years the MILF had landed 29 arms shipments from Islamic-fundamentalist allies in 
the Middle East. (FEER 28-03-96 p.26-28) 
The government on 13 May 1996 offered the chairman of the MNLF the post of 
chairman of a proposed "Southern Philippines Council on Peace and Develop-
ment" . (FEER 23-05-96 p.15) The MNLF chairman went to Tripoli alledgedly to get 
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Lybian support before agreeing to head the government-proposed Council. Lybian 
support was needed to convince the MILF to go along with the proposal.(FEER 30-
05-96 p.12) 
A breakthrough was achieved in early June 1996.(IHT 06-06-96) It was announced 
on 7 June 1996 that the two sides had agreed on "a fresh approach" to the long stalled 
peace talks. The government offered to set up a "transitional implementation struc-
ture" which would consist of a 5-man body called the Southern Philippines Develop-
ment Council which would be headed by MNLF leader NUR MISUARI. An aide to the 
President said that the Council would "monitor, coordinate, and even propose and 
implement peace and development projects in Mindanao". He added that it would 
have "administrative powers and functions independent of the existing local govern-
ment units". It was suspected, however, that the proposal skirted the only remaining 
question in the peace talks - how the provisional government provided for under the 
1976 Tripoli agreement would be set up.(FEER 20-06-96 p.21) A joint statement 
issued at Davao City on 23 June 1996 expressed the hope that a peace agreement 
might be signed in July 1996 at Jakarta. 
The Muslim revolt was launched in 1972.(IHT 24-06-96) 
Peace plan to end Sri Lankan insurgency 
(See also: Inter-state relations: general aspects, infra p. 395) 
The Sri Lankan government proposed a peace plan that would establish strong 
local councils in the country's eight provinces, including one where Tamil rebels had 
been fighting for autonomy. The plan was part of a constitutional amendment that 
would require the approval of two-thirds of Parliament and a national referen-
dum.(IHT 28-07-95) The President on 3 August 1995 unveiled her devolution propos-
als, including the merger of the Northern and Easterm provinces demanded by the Ta-
mils. Such a merger would form a Tamil majority region covering 30% of the coun-
try's territory and two-thirds of its coastline, including the best deep-water harbour in 
the region. The package sought to grant control over sensitive subjects such as land 
and law and order to the regions.(FEER 17-08-95 p.17) 
A radical Sinhalese group, however, denounced the proposals as a 'giant step' 
toward breaking the country in two.(IHT 01-08-95) The plan also met opposition from 
the Buddhist leadership and from members of the cabinet itself. They preferred a 
military defeat of the rebels before implementing political reforms.(IHT 04-09-95) 
The 'Liberation Tigers of Tarnil Eelam' never cared to consider the plan. (IHT 27-11-
95). 
The city of Jaffna was conquered by the government forces on 5 December 1995. 
A Tiger leader announced that peace talks would be impossible as long as government 
troops occupied the city. (IHT 06-12-95;FEER 14-12-95 p.13) 
On 16 January 1996, a legal draft of the government proposals was published. It 
contained specific clauses denying the regional councils the power to hold a referen-
dum on secession. (FEER 01-02-96 p.25) 
On 31 January 1996, a bomb exploded in a business district in Colombo killing 
80, injuring 1,400 and damaging property worth millions of dollars. The explosion 
was set off by a suicide squad, a telltale sign that the Tigers were responsible for the 
blast. Yet, speaking at the 4 February 1996 Independence Day celebrations, the Sri 
Lankan president affirmed the government's commitment to find a solution to the 
ethnic questions by political means.(FEER 15-02-96 p.14) 
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On 19 April 1996 government forces launched an offensive against the rebels in 
the eastern part of the Jaffua Peninsula.(IHT 20121-04-96) Also on 19 April, the gov-
ernment forces started an operation to encourage the return of displaced civilians to 
Jaffna. The operation was described a success, and the ICRC confirmed that around 
250,000 people had returned, or were in the process of returning, to a Jaffna suburb. 
Later in the month it was reported that the rebel movement was looking for a third 
party to come forward to mediate between the government and the L TTE (IHT 29-04-
96) and that Tiger supporters in London and Berne had asked the Swiss government to 
act in that capacity. (FEER 09-05-96 p.26) 
Myanmar 
In June 1995 the cease-fire between the government and the Karenni rebels (see 5 
AsYIL 427) collapsed when government troops pushed into the Karenni heartland 
between the Salween river and the Thai border.(IHT 23-08-95) 
In the meantime, the Karen National Union guerilla group was hit by a rash of 
defections, about 400 since early July 1995, to a rival organization allied to the gov-
ernment - the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army.(FEER 02-08-95 p.13) It was later 
reported that the Karen National Union and the Myanmarese government planned to 
hold peace talks on 14 February 1996.(IHT 14-02-96) 
It was reported in early January 1996 that government troops had overrun the 
headquarters of KHUN SA, the leading opium warlord who also claimed to be fighting 
for an independent state for the Shan minority people. There were rumours that KHuN 
SA was selling out his troops (Mong Tai Army) for an amnesty. Earlier in 1995 part 
of the Mong Tai Army had broken away from KHuN SA'S leadership, accusing him of 
lack of interest in Shan national aspirations.(IHT 03 and 04-01-96) The formal surren-
der of 5,000 insurgents took place on 5 January 1996. 
The surrender of KHUN SA'S Mong Tai Army ended the decades-old control by 
KHUN SA of the 'Golden Triangle'. Reportedly, the to-point agreement included an 
amnesty for the drug lord, his retention of a smaller militia, and promises that he 
would not be extradited to the US. (FEER 25-01-96 p.15) 
KHUN SA had been indicted on heroin trafficking charges in the US in 1989, and 
the US had since demanded his extradition. (FEER 14-12-95 p.12) However, the 
Myanmarese foreign minister said on 9 February 1996 that Myanmar would not extra-
dite him to the US. (IHT 19-02-96) (Cf. the extradition of THANONG SIRIPRICHAPONG 
5 AsYIL 270) In April 1996 the Myanmarese authorities announced that KHUN SA 
was freed and would not be tried more or less as a reward for his surrender. (IHT 
27/28-04-96) 
After KHuN SA'S surrender, some 2,000 guerillas from the Shan-minority Mong 
Tai Army crossed into northwestern Laos to set up base there. Another 1,000 insur-
gents joined the Shan factions that merged under one command in February 1996 and 
vowed to continue armed resistance against the Myanmarese government. (FEER 29-
02-96 p.12) 
Philippine talks with communist insurgents 
The communist-led National Democratic Front refused to join peace talks with the 
Philippine government which were scheduled in late June 1995 in Brussels. The rebels 
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said that Manila must first release one of the Communist Party's ranking members 
and allegedly a member of their negotiating team, who was arrested in May 1995. 
It was announced about a year later that a Manila court had ordered the release of 
a senior communist leader who had been held since May 1995. The Philippine presi-
dent said on 19 June 1996 that the talks would be resumed.(IHT 20-06-96; FEER 06-
07-95 p.13) 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
Singapore patents law 
A new Patents Act had been adopted under the name of Patents (Amendment) Act 
1995. It entered into force on 23 February 1995, and brought the Patents Act into 
conformity with the WTO Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights (TRIPS). 
Intellectual property protection in Vietnam 
Among the subjects dealt with by negotiators from the US and Vietnam, who were 
resuming talks on the normalization of trading relations, was the protection of intel-
lectual property. It was reported that the protection of trademarks in Vietnam is 
among the best in the region - Vietnam's patent and trademark office, the National 
Office of Industrial Property, being a model government body. Vietnam had already 
acceded to various international agreements on intellectual property and hoped to join 
the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works and the WTO. 
A new copyright law was passed in October 1995.(FEER 18-01-96 p.28) 
Japanese copyright protection of recordings 
The US launched a complaint against Japan at the WTO on 9 February 1996 be-
cause of the limited character of the protection of foreign recordings dating from be-
fore 1971 under the Japanese current copyright law. The US contended that the 1993 
Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights that took effect in 
developed countries on 1 January 1996 obligated Japan to extend copyright protection 
to foreign recordings of fifty years old. 
Japan argued that the 1993 Agreement provided for exceptions, and that Japan got 
approval for its position from the US and the EU during the Uruguay Round negotia-
tions. There were signs, though, that Japan would concede. According to newspaper 
reports on 5 February 1996 the Japanese government decided to extend the period of 
protection for recordings back 50 years, the same as in the US.(IHT 07-02 and 10/11-
02-96) 
Chinese court decision 
In a landmark decision of April 1996 a Beijing court ordered a computer retailer to 
pay damages to Microsoft and two other US software producers.(IHT 10-05-96) 
US-China relations on intellectual property rights protection in China 
In October 1995 China and the US started new talks on intellectual property rights 
and market access.(IHT 11-10-95) Testifying before the US Senate subcommittee on 
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East Asian and Pacific Affairs the deputy US trade representative said that while 
China had staged thousands of raids on retailers and established special courts to try 
offenders, "China's overall implementation of the [26 February 1995] agreement [on 
intellectual property rights, 5 AsYIL 428] falls far short of the requirements of the 
agreement". (IHT 01-12-95) The US subsequently threatened that if China would not 
enforce the agreement within 90 days [until the end of February 1996] it would again 
risk the imposition of serious trade sanctions.(IHT 2/3-12-95) In late January 1996 the 
US again warned China with economic sanctions in the next months. 
While acknowledging that China had made significant efforts to improve its intel-
lectual property protection, the US wanted China to revoke business licenses of an 
estimated 34 plants believed to be making pirated cd's, destroy their equipment and 
products and prosecute their owners, all before 15 May 1996. To stem a flow of pi-
rated cd's into international markets China was asked to better police its borders, 
especially with Hong Kong. To reduce the financial incentives for unauthorized local 
copying, the US would' press China to lower its tariffs on licensed computer software, 
movies, music and other copyrighted goods imported from the US. 
China responded by warning that US businesses would suffer if the US imposed 
sanctions.(IHT 05 and 07-02-96) But it was reported in early March 1996 that the 
business licenses of two foreign companies would be revoked for illegally copying 
compact disks and that four to six cd-plants would be closed.(IHT 06-03-96) 
In April 1996 the US delivered an ultimatum, warning that if China continued to 
tolerate abundant violation of the 1995 IPR agreement it would be difficult for the US 
government to obtain Congressional approval for renewal of most-favoured nation 
status for China.(IHT 17-04-96) The Chinese ministry of foreign trade and economic 
co-operation (MOFTEC) responded that "[if] the US goes so far as to implement its 
trade retaliation, China will, according to its foreign trade law, take countermeasures 
to safeguard its sovereignty and national esteem". (IHT 4/5-05-96) This developed 
even as the US ambassador to China said that China would not face a deadline to 
crack down on intellectual property rights infringements. He said that China had taken 
steps to clamp down on domestic piracy but had fallen short on the other terms of the 
guidelines to implement the IPR agreement.(FEER 02-05-96 p.81) 
On 15 May 1996 the US announced punitive trade sanctions affecting more than 
$2 billion in textile and electronic goods, unless the talks would result in a break-
through in the following month, before 17 June.(IHT 15-05-96) The sanctions would 
mean imposing 100% tariffs on $2 billion worth of US imports from China unless the 
latter would agree by June 17 to crack down on counterfeiters. As it was analyzed, the 
sanctions to be imposed on China on June 17 would hit hardest the trade in the fol-
lowing sectors: the $2 billion export trade in textiles and apparel, $500 million in 
consumer electronics, and $500 million in other consumer products.(FEER 30-05-95 
p.49, 51) The following day China issued its list of counter-measures, consisting of, 
inter alia, the halting of the approval process for US-funded ventures seeking to set up 
joint ventures, branches or representative offices in China. China would also block 
imports of all US-made audio-visual products, and would levy 100 percent punitive 
tariffs on a wide range of US exports to China.(IHT 16-05-96) The two parties agreed 
to resume talks on the issue as from 6 June.(IHT 31-05-96) 
[The EU trade commisioner said on 9 May 1996 that the EU would not support the 
US in the latter's threat of trade sanctions against China for failing to stop copyright 
piracy.(FEER 30-05-95 p.49)] 
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On 13 June 1996 the US trade representative said that last minute Chinese meas-
ures were still insufficient unless China, inter alia, would agree on a long-term 
mechanism for monitoring plants to ensure that, once closed, they did not reopen 
unless they had negotiated licenses with the foreign companies to produce their goods 
legally. (IHT 14-06-96) 
On 17 June 1996 the US withdrew its threat of punitive sanctions, confirming that 
China had taken genuine steps to curb piracy, to prosecute those who were in viola-
tion of the law and to prevent future infringements, such as heightened border controls 
to prevent export and increased access for legitimate US products, the introduction of 
identification codes on cd's, regulating the importation of cd-presses, the suspension 
of the establishment of any new cd-production enterprises, and the permission for 
foreign recording companies to license their entire repertoire of artists to Chinese 
companies.(IHT 18-06-96; FEER 27-06-96 p.65) 
INTER-STATE RELATIONS: GENERAL ASPECTS 
European Union - China 
The European Trade Commissioner outlined plans on 5 July 1995 for a global EU 
policy toward China. In recognition of "China's worldwide and regional economic 
and political influence" the EU Commission unveiled a blueprint for upgrading Euro-
pe's relations with China. The EU paper which outlined the new EU strategy was said 
to assert that China is set to become "a cornerstone in Europe's external relations, 
both with Asia and globally". It promised 'wholehearted' support for China's in-
volvement in the international community, including speedy Chinese membership in 
the WTO. The main focus of the new EU policy would be on developing closer eco-
nomic ties with China. [Bilateral Euro-Chinese trade had grown from $12 billion in 
1985 to over $40 billion in 1994] 
The policy firmly backed a circumspect approach to China on issues such as hu-
man rights, Tibet, and nuclear arms. Unlike past relations, trade, human rights and 
even scientific and cultural ties would be brought under one umbrella, and the test of 
any policy should be its effectiveness rather than 'easy popularity at home' . (IHT 06-
07-95; FEER 20-07-95 p.20, 27-07-95 p.22) 
Indian support for Sri Lanka 
It was reported that India offered to help the Sri Lankan armed forces in their 
fight against the Tamil Tigers with non-lethal defence equipment including mine de-
tectors and anti-missile flares for aircraft. The Indian navy would also try to tighten 
its cordon around the sea approaches to the Jaffna Peninsula, the Tigers' stronghold. 
India's recent formal request for extradition of a Tiger leader in connection with 
the assassination of prime minister RAnv GANDHI in 1991 had tipped India's policy 
closer to the Sri Lankan government. (FEER 13-07-95 p.14) 
Laos - Cambodia - Myanmar 
It was reported that Laos was playing a crucial role in negotiations aimed at im-
proving relations between Cambodia and Myanmar. Laos was seen as a neutral gound 
for such talks and Cambodia wanted to conduct negotiations in a discreet environ-
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ment, as openly flaunting its relationship with the military government in Yangon 
would anger Cambodia's backers in the West. Laos also seemed to have played a 
useful role when the Laotian prime minister, during his visit to Japan in early June 
1995, requested the Japanese government to resume full development assistance to 
Myanmar.(see supra p. 368) It was the first time that Laos had made an appeal on 
behalf of a third country.(FEER 20-07-95 p.12) 
Besides, common political views coupled with anti-Thai feelings appeared to have 
resulted in the emergence of a new mini-block in Southeast Asia. As Thai policy was 
maintaining links with rebels against the governments in Laos, Cambodia and Myan-
mar, the three countries mistrusted Thailand's intentions.(FEER 18-04-96 p.23) 
China - US 
It was reported that China was suspecting a containment-like pattern in recent US 
actions, such as the decision to allow the Taiwanese president to visit the US, the esta-
blishment of diplomatic relations with Vietnam, a historically troublesome neighbour 
for China, the open discouragement of Chinese sales of nuclear equipment to Iran and 
arms sales to Myanmar and Pakistan, the opposition to China's admission to the 
WTO, the criticism of China's nuclear tests, the US discussions on a security relation-
ship with India, the insistence on undisrupted navigation in the South China Sea where 
China and other countries have rival claims, the pressure on China over human rights, 
the similar pressures over trade issues. The Chinese suspicions could be summarized 
in four points: the US was trying to divide China territorially, subvert it politically, 
contain it strategically and frustrate it economically.(IHT 10-07,02-08-95) 
In his speech to the UN General Assembly in September 1995 the Chinese foreign 
minister criticized the US for pursuing 'hegemonic' aims, seeking to contain 
China.(lHT 28-09-95) 
It was reported that China wanted the US to denounce independence movements in 
Taiwan and Tibet, and an assurance that there would be no repeat of a visit by the 
Taiwanese president to the US, as a condition for sending its ambassador back to 
Washington (see 5 AsYIL 434). 
After the US State Department publicly restated the US one-China policy on 10 
July 1995, it was reaffirmed by the US White House on 13 July that Taiwan is part of 
China. As to visits by the Taiwanese president, the spokesman said: "According to 
our policy, President Lee would not be allowed to make an official visit to the US", 
adding that any furture requests for private visits "we would consider on a case-by 
case basis" . (lHT 13-07, 14-07-95) 
In early October 1995 the Chinese foreign minister referred to a US offer to make 
a commitment in these terms, but said that China was not satisfied, urging a new 
formulation of US policy toward Taiwan clearly distancing itself from a Taiwan strat-
egy of achieving an international status independent of the mainland. (lHT 02-10-95) 
Among the positive gestures offered by the US in July 1995 aiming at halting the 
deterioration in its relations with China was the suggestion by the US president to the 
Chinese president to meet during the celebration of the UN's 50th anniversary when 
the latter would be in New York, and even to invite the Chinese president to Wash-
ington, but only provided China would release the arrested US citizen who was ac-
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cused of espionage (see supra, Aliens, p. 334). The following day China rejected the 
idea of releasing the arrested man before completion of the investigation and the trial. 
The meeting between the US and Chinese foreign ministers in Brunei on the occa-
sion of the ASEAN Regional Forum talks on 1 August 1995 resulted in agreement to 
continue high-level contacts, but failed to resolve the key issues undermining Sino-US 
relations. Nor was there agreement on resuming talks on human rights or arms pro-
liferation which were broken off by China following the Taiwanese president's trip to 
the US. 
The US secretary of state clarified to his Chinese counterpart on 1 August 1995 
that he "could not rule out possible future visits" by the Taiwanese premier to the US, 
although such visits would be "strictly private and strictly unofficial". 
As to a Chinese demand for a US apology for allowing the Taiwanese president to 
visit the US, the US assistant secretary of state for East Asia and the Pacific said: 
"We cannot meet that condition".(IHT 31-07,01-08,02-08-95; FEER 10-08-95 pp.14-
17) 
The official Chinese press agency said on 23 August 1995 that relations with the 
US were at their worst since ties were established in 1979, and warned against the 
start of a Chinese-US Cold War. The commentary also included a harsh attack on the 
US media for articles that were feeding animosity by depicting China as belligerent 
and dangerous. 
Sino-US relations had sharply deteriorated since May 1995 when the US agreed to 
let Taiwan's president become the first Taiwanese leader to visit the US. China had 
accused the Taiwanese and the US of attempting to make Taiwan independent.(IHT 
24-08-95) 
Relations started improving with the expUlsion of the US citizen convicted for 
espionage (see Aliens, supra p. 334), China deciding in late August 1995 to send its 
ambassador back to Washington, and the US government's decision that the US presi-
dent's wife would visit China as the head of the US delegation to the UN World Con-
ference on Women. (see 5 AsYIL 402)(IHT 29-08-95;FEER 07-09-95 p.16) 
After a three-months delay, China agreed to the nomination of a next US ambas-
sador to Beijing. Reversely, the Chinese ambassador, who had been called back in 
June 1995 after the row about the visit of the Taiwanese president to the US (5 AsYIL 
434), returned to his post in October 1995 in order to be present at the planned meet-
ing in New York between the Chinese and US presidents.(IHT 18-10-95; FEER 05-
10-95 p.15) 
There was disagreement initially over the ceremonial aspects of a meeting that 
could take place during the presence of the Chinese president in the US to attend the 
commemoration of the UN's 50th anniversary. China insisted on a full state visit in 
case of a meeting in Washington. When the US refused to give in, China accepted a 
meeting of the presidents in New York.(IHT 02-10-95; FEER 12-10-95 p.18) The 
meeting took place in New York on 24 October 1995. 
It was reported that China tried hard right up until the last moments leading to the 
summit, to get the US to agree to a fourth communique (besides those of 1972, 1979 
and 1982) setting out the principles underlying their bilateral relationship. But Wash-
ington rejected these attempts since it did not want to change the wording of the pre-
vious three communiques issued since 1972, in particular with regard to Taiwan. On 
the eve of the summit, the Chinese president said that "the question of Taiwan is the 
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most important and sensitive issue in China-US relations".(IHT 26-10-95;FEER 02-
11-95 p.14) 
The improvement of Sino-US relations progressed on 17 November 1995 by the 
resumption of a program of high-level military contacts, agreed during a visit by the 
US assistant secretary of defense to China.(IHT 18/19-11-95) 
The US assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs said in late 
January 1996 that the US was tracking China's military build-up, "including its pro-
jection capabilities near its borders", clarifying that he referred to Taiwan and the 
South China Sea. Yet he said that this did not mean that the US considered China to 
be a threat, nor that the US was out to contain China.(IHT 25-01-96) 
It was reported in January 1996 that on 19 December 1995 a US aircraft carrier 
had passed through the Taiwan strait for the first time in 17 years. Although US offi-
cials blamed bad weather for the unusual route, it was seen as a sign of the tensions 
between China and the US over Taiwan's impending elections. Aircraft carriers usu-
ally pass to the east of Taiwan.(IHT 27128-01-96) China filed a protest.(IHT 29-01-
96) 
After having granted a visa to the Taiwanese vice-president for a stopover in the 
US on his flight to Guatemala in early January 1996, the US again granted a visa to 
the Taiwanese vice-president for stop-overs in the US on his flights to Haiti and EI 
Salvador in February 1996. According to the US spokesman there would be "no pub-
lic activities" by the official during the stopovers. China made representations to the 
US over the issuance of the visa.(IHT 01 and 02-02-96) 
Upon reports that China planned to conduct a large military exercise in the Taiwan 
strait beginning early February 1996, apparently as part of an effort to intimidate 
Taiwan before the presidential elections on the island on 23 March 1996, it was re-
ported that the US would explicitly warn China that heightened tension could lead to 
miscalculation and accident. Although the Chinese foreign ministry called the military 
exercises a normal occurrence, the US side considered the planned operation excep-
tionally large and meant to be destabilizing. The US approach to the problem for three 
decades had been to sell Taiwan enough arms to defend itself, deterring China from 
attack and reducing the chances that US forces would be drawn in.(IHT 06-02-96) 
The US defense minister said on 13 February 1996 that China had failed to fulfill 
its promise to become a 'responsible world power' by conducting missile tests and 
large military maneuvres off Taiwan and allegedly exporting nuclear weapons tech-
nology and abusing human rights. He said that US policy toward China was based on 
'constructive engagement' because the US could not ignore the world's most populous 
country. (IHT 14-02-96) Advocating closer American ties to the Chinese military lead-
ership, he said: "We can not make our entire relationship hostage to a single issue". 
In the same month it was reported that the US had decided to conduct more high-
level talks with China. These intentions were depicted as the beginning of a new 
'strategic dialogue' aimed at fostering closer ties despite the growing frictions. The 
underlying idea was the hypothesis that the two countries have more to agree about 
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than squabble over, if they consider a broad range of common concerns instead of 
focusing only on problems.(IHT 22-02-96) 
By way of response to Chinese missile tests off the Taiwan coast in March 1996 
(supra p. 362) the US on 10 March 1996 moved an aircraft carrier group close to 
Taiwan although still between Okinawa and Taiwan and not yet in the Taiwan Strait. 
Meanwhile the US called the tests 'reckless' and 'risky' and warned that there would 
be 'really grave consequences' if China continued to threaten Taiwan.(lHT 11-03-
96;FEER 21-03-96 pp.14-16) It was later reported that US and Taiwan officials met 
'unofficially' in a New York hotel on 11 March 1996 and discussed China's position 
on Taiwan as well as the prevention of provocative responses from the Taiwanese 
side. It was the highest level meeting held since the severance of formal relations in 
1979.(IHT 4/5-05-96) 
The following day, 11 March 1996, the Chinese foreign minister warned the US 
against intervening, saying: "It is ridiculous for some people to call openly for inter-
ference by the Seventh Fleet or even for protecting Taiwan. These people must have 
forgotten that Taiwan is part of China and not a protectorate of the US". He added 
that "Should foreign forces collude to interfere in Taiwan or try to split the mother-
land, then the situation would become very risky". 
Meanwhile the US government said it was sending extra warships, including a 
second aircraft carrier, to the region as a 'precautionary measure'. The US assistant 
secretary of state for East Asia and the Pacific said that the two nuclear-powered car-
riers were dispatched to ensure that there would be no further escalation by China and 
to reassure Asian countries that the US was willing to play a stabilizing role in the 
region. A US administration official further said that "from a policy of comprehensive 
engagement we have suddenly lurched into containment".(IHT 12-03-96; FEER 21-
03-96 p.14~ 16, 28-03-96 p.16) 
It was reported the following day that China had been sending signals to the US 
that China did not intend to invade or attack Taiwan, while the Taiwanese vice-
president was reported to have circulated a document in which he stated: "I reiterate 
that the Republic of China government is adamant in its pursuit of national reunifi-
cation and strong opposition to Taiwan independence" . (IHT 13-03-96) It was later 
reported that on 8 March 1996 Chinese and US officials had met privately and had 
reached an 'understanding' that the US would use its influence to try to restrain Tai-
wan from any more far-reaching moves toward independence, and in return China 
would not use military force to resolve its dispute with Taiwan.(IHT 25-03-96,4/5-05-
96) At a news conference the Chinese prime minister on the one hand warned the US 
not to make a show of force in the Taiwan Strait, but on the other hand said that 
China could resolve its differences with Taiwan peacefully, while expressing himself 
about Sino-US relations in a conciliatory way.(lHT 18-03-96) On 19 March 1996 it 
was announced that the Chinese and US foreign ministers would meet on 21 April 
(IHT 20-03-96), and on 26 March the US announced that its aircraft-carriers would be 
withdrawn from the area, while Taiwan announced a plan to lift the ban on direct 
travel, trade and communication links to the mainland that had existed since 
1949.(IHT 26 and 27-03-96) 
The Chinese foreign ministry warned the US in March 1996 it "must immediately 
stop its activities designed to interfere with China's internal affairs", referring to, 
inter alia, US arms sales to Taiwan. 
400 ASIAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Although the US under-secretary of state said that the US had no plans to speed up 
arms deliveries to Taiwan, the US and Taiwan agreed during the same month on the 
sale of missiles, an advanced targeting and navigation system for fighter planes and a 
package of electronic warfare devices. The sale was presented as resulting from a 
long-standing US commitment to bolster the defence of Taiwan and "not out of the 
historical pattern" . (IHT 21-03-96) 
Meanwhile, the US House of Representatives approved a non-binding resolution 
on 19 March 1996 according to which US forces "should defend Taiwan in the event 
of invasion, missile attack, or blockade by China". [This refers to the State Depart-
ment authorization bill, later also adopted by the US Senate on 28 March 1996. The 
bill included inviting the Taiwanese president to the US, increasing ties with Taiwan, 
toughening human rights pressure on China, designating an envoy to Tibet and setting 
up Radio Free Asia broadcasts into China].{IHT 01-04-96; FEER 28-03-96 pp.16-18) 
The Chinese foreign ministry denounced the resolution as having 'intensified tensi-
ons' and accused the US of "attempting to obstruct the Chinese nation from realizing 
the reunification of the motherland". As to the US arms deliveries to Taiwan the Chi-
nese foreign ministry said that it violated the 1982 US pledge to limit weapons sales to 
Taiwan and contradicted the US calls for a reduction in international arms sales.{IHT 
22-03-96) 
It was reported that after having decided to extend MFN-status to China in late 
May 1996 the US president in early June was preparing to send his national security 
adviser to China to try to ease the frictions between the two countries. The most re-
cent visit of a top-level US official was that of the US commerce secretary in October 
1995.{IHT 03-06-96) 
Vietnam - US 
(see also Aliens) 
After the US president announced his decision to grant full diplomatic recognition 
to Vietnam on 11 July 1995 (supra p. 355), it was reported that there still remained 
the question of granting MFN trade status to Vietnam: being a communist country like 
China, its trade status would be subject to renewal annually.{FEER 20-07-95 p.16) 
Under the terms of the 1974 US law that governed US commerce with Vietnam, be-
fore the US could grant most-favoured-nation status to Vietnam a trade agreement 
must be concluded between the two countries, eliminating the high tariffs faced by US 
companies when they export to Vietnam.(IHT 13-07-95) On 5 August 1995, the US 
secretary of state said that US officials would visit Hanoi to begin work on a trade 
treaty. MFN status and US government insurance for investments in Vietnam should 
follow eventually.{FEER 17-08-95 p.22) 
Cambodia - Vietnam 
The Vietnamese president made a state visit to Phnom Penh aimed at 
'consolidating the friendship' between the two countries 'despite some remaining 
issues'. The two countries have disputes over borders and migration. Vietnamese 
troops invaded Cambodia in 1978 and eventually toppled the Khmer Rouge govern-
ment.{FEER 17-08-95 p.13) 
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us - Asia 
It was reported that the US government considered the 100,000 US troops sta-
tioned in Japan and South Korea vital to the security in Asia, particularly because of 
threats from China and North Korea. The US was spending about $2.7 billion a year 
to station 37,000 troops in South Korea, supplemented by $300 million, to be in-
creased to $390 million by 1998, from South Korea for their maintenance.(IHT 11-04-
96) 
On the occasion of his visit to Japan in April 1996 the US president said, inter 
alia: "I believe that our presence is needed here as long as people have any fear at all 
that some countries might seek to dominate others, or that Asia might become a bat-
tleground for any sort of security problem that would affect the freedom and inde-
pendence and the safety of the people of Japan or our other allies in the area". He said 
no one was "immune to the threat posed by rogue states, by the spread of weapons of 
mass destruction, by terrorism, crime and drug trafficking, by environmental decay 
and economic dislocation" .(IHT 18-04-96) 
Thailand - Myanmar 
Relations between the two countries had deteriorated since late 1994. Contentious 
issues were fishing activities and Myanmarese accusations that Thailand was harbor-
ing ethnic rebels who fought the Myanmarese government. On 1 September 1995 a 
Thai delegation arrived in Yangon for a two-day visit to try to repair the strained 
relations.(IHT 2/3-09-95) 
A visit by the prime minister of Thailand to Yangon - the first visit by a Thai 
premier since 1980, planned for January 1996 - finally took place in March 1996. On 
that occasion the two countries agreed that Myanmar would release 100 Thai nationals 
who were serving prison terms in Myanmar. Most of them were believed to be fish-
ermen who had intruded into Myanmarese waters.(IHT 19-03-96; FEER 11-01-96 
p.12)(see supra p. 374) 
Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) 
The EU gave its endorsement to the ASEAN intitiative [at the first ASEAN-EU 
Senior Officials Meeting, Singapore, May 1995] for a summit of Asian and European 
leaders in March 1996. The idea was originally launched by the prime minister of Sin-
gapore during a 1994 visit to France. The projected meeting was to consist of the 
members of the European Union, the members of ASEAN, China, Japan and South 
Korea. 
The plan was bluntly criticized by the Indian foreign minister because it left out 
India. "How could you hold an Asian summit without taking India into it, a country 
with the second largest population in the world? It is almost like playing Hamlet with-
out the Prince of Denmark" .(IHT 05-12-95) 
The meeting was intended to focus on economic co-operation, especially expan-
sion of trade and investment. Asian officials were concerned that some European 
countries, influenced by domestic political pressures, would bring up issues that 
would sour the atmosphere of the summit, divert its attention from matters of mutual 
interest and prompt the Asian side to reply in kind.(IHT 13-02-96) 
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At the threshhold of the meeting, the French president urged Asian and European 
leaders to forge a 'new relationship' .(IHT 29-02-96) The president of the EU Council 
of Ministers said that "what we need is a global partnership, covering trade, but also 
politics,science and culture". While the EU Trade Commissioner stated earlier that 
"Europe has no intention of trying to enforce a social diktat on the rest of the world", 
he asserted that "the question of the relationship between social standards and trade 
needs to be looked at carefully and openly" . (FEER 29-02-96 p.16) 
The meeting finally took place on 1 and 2 March 1996. Senior officials of the 
participating states would hold follow-up talks in Brussels on 25 July 1996.{IHT 2/3-
03-96) 
The meeting agreed to launch an Asia-Europe Partnership for Greater Growth to 
cover expanded trade, investment, technology, scientific, educational and cultural 
exchanges. It did not establish a new organization nor did it set firm targets for eco-
nomic liberalization. It was agreed to reconvene in Britain in 1998 and in South Korea 
in 2000, with foreign, economic and possibly finance ministers meeting in the interim, 
as well as businessmen, officials and experts. The meeting also decided to back a 
Malaysian-coordinated study to build an integrated Asian railroad network, and to 
form an Asia-Europe Business Forum. It also decided to set up an Asia-Europe Foun-
dation in Singapore to promote exchanges between think-tanks, peoples and cultural 
groups, and an Asia-Europe University Program to develop better understanding of 
the cultures, histories and business practices of both regions.{IHT 04-03-96) 
North Korea - US 
On the occasion of the opening of a Korean War memorial in Washington in July 
1995 the US president said that further US efforts to improve ties with North Korea 
would be contingent upon North Korea's willingness to talks with South Korea. 
Later in early 1996 the same assurance was again given by the US national secu-
rity advisor to allay fears that the US might deal with North Korea behind the South's 
back, especially in connection with the US decision to contribute a symbolic $2 mil-
lion to famine aid in North Korea.{IHT 06-02-96; FEER 10-08-95 p.22) 
A US delegation was to visit North Korea beginning 23 September 1995 to discuss 
setting up a liaison office. This was part of the North Korea-US 'Agreed Framework' 
(5 AsYIL 545). It was expected that the first US mission would be set up at the Ger-
man embassy which had ample room.{IHT 07-09,28-09-95) 
The US began to alter US policy towards North Korea since late 1995. It believed 
that North Korea, suffering under food shortage and longer-term economic problems, 
might some time collapse as East European governments did in the late 1990s. Such 
change should be made more gradual, and a decision to provide $2 million of food 
was to be seen in this context. [see supra p. 370]{IHT 12-02-96) 
The two countries agreed to start talks on the production and sale of missiles on 19 
April 1996 in Berlin.(IHT 19-04-96) 
A US emissary was sent to North Korea in an effort to entice North Korea to ac-
cept the US proposal for quadrulateral peace talks.{IHT 25126-05-96)(see infra p. 423) 
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North Korea - Russia 
Russia announced on 7 September that it would abolish a 1961 Treaty of friend-
ship, co-operation and mutual assistance with North Korea that obliged Russia to 
military intervention in case North Korea come under attack. A foreign ministry spo-
kesman said that the agreement "has become outdated and does not correspond to new 
realities in Russia, in Russian-Korean relations and in Northeast Asia". The treaty had 
been renewed automatically every five years, but could be revised or canceled one 
year before the expiration date.(IHT 08-09-95) 
After the Treaty expired on 10 September 1995, discussions between the two 
countries produced a new draft treaty based 'on friendly relations.' The new accord 
removes a key element in the old treaty which called for either side to come to the 
other's aid in the event of an armed attack. (FEER 05-10-95 p .14) 
South Korea - Russia 
The visit by the Russian prime minister to Seoul in late September 1995 resulted 
in a Declaration on the Promotion of Trade, Economic, Scientific, and Technological 
Co-operation. Under the Declaration the two countries agreed, inter alia, to seek the 
implementation of large-scale joint projects, such as the development of gas deposits 
in Siberia, and the laying of gas pipelines to Korea. 
The Declaration also referred to Korean support for Russian membership in 
APEC. Further, reference was made to an agreement on the resolution of part of the 
outstanding Russian debts, which was signed on 10 July 1995. The two countries 
would also encourage mutual private investment and the conclusion of agreements 
between their respective institutions and companies dealing with air, sea and other 
transportation, promote exchanges of economic, scientific and technological informa-
tion, develop co-operation in the field of basic and applied science research, further 
protection of each other's intellectual property rights, further economic and other 
exchanges between provinces of the two countries, and reinforce co-operation within 
the framework of the international economic system and international financial in-
stitutions. (Korea Times 29-09-95) 
Indonesia - New Zealand 
New Zealand apologized to Indonesia after several incidents of burning of the 
Indonesian flag by East Timorese activists demanding independence for East Timor, 
and following Indonesian protest.(IHT 16/17-09-95) 
Legality of Japan's annexation of Korea in 1910 
In response to a question in the Japanese parliament on 9 October 1995 the prime 
minister said that the Japanese-Korean annexation treaty of 1910 had been concluded 
and carried out following proper procedures and had been 'legally effective'. [The 
treaty was in fact signed under duress by a Korean prime minister who was widely 
considered a Japanese puppet] 
The South Korean government immediately rejected these remarks. A South Ko-
rean foreign ministry statement said: "The government has made it clear time and 
again that the Korea-Japan annexation treaty was enforced on the Korean people 
against their will, so the treaty was null and void". (IHT 11-10-95) The Japanese 
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prime minister later expressed regret over his remarks but did not retract them, while 
admitting that the parties were not on an 'equal footing'. 
As a result of the incident a planned Japanese-Korean summit meeting at the UN 
was scrapped and an annual South Korean-Japanese parliamentarians' meeting sched-
uled for November 1995 was shelved.(IHT 13-10,19-10-95) 
Restatement of Chinese policy 
The Chinese president in his speech on the occasion of the 50th UN anniversary 
celebration warned other countries against dictating China's internal politics, espe-
cially on Taiwan. (IHT 25-10-95) 
Indonesia - Israel 
The normalization of Indonesian-Israeli relations progressed with the second 
meeting of the heads of state in New York in October 1995. The meeting came two 
years after the Israeli prime minister briefly visited Jakarta in 1993.(FEER 02-11-95 
p.13) 
Iran - Bangladesh 
The Iranian president made an official 4-day trip to Dhaka in October 1995. His 
delegation promised to build an oil refinery and a liquefied petroleum gas plant in 
Bangladesh, worth $1 billion. The visit was part of a three-country Asian tour aimed 
at boosting Iran's ties with Vietnam, the Philippines and Bangladesh. 
During the Dhaka visit, Iran managed to successfully broker a tripartite transit 
deal involving Bangladesh, Iran and Turkmenistan. Under the agreement, Turkmeni-
stan would be allowed to ship goods via Iran and Bangladesh and vice versa. Bangla-
desh would also be allowed to ship goods through Turkmenistan to other Central 
Asian republics.(FEER 26-10-95 p.74) 
China - South Korea 
The Chinese president came to South Korea on 13 November for a five-day visit, 
to discuss security on the Korean Peninsula. It was the first trip to Seoul by a Chinese 
head of state since diplomatic ties were established in 1992. 
The two countries signed an agreement under which China could benefit from a 
Korean Economic Development Cooperation Fund, set up in 1987 to offer soft loans 
to Korean companies investing in developing countries in the region. 
In his speech to the South Korean National Assembly the Chinese president 
pledged that China would "never take part in an arms race, never engage in expan-
sion, never seek hegemony". (IHT 01-11,14-11,15-11-95) 
China - North Korea 
It was reported that North Korea rejected a proposed state visit by the Chinese 
president. The Chinese wanted to balance the visit of the president to South Ko-
rea.(FEER 30-11-95 p.12) 
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Pakistan-Iran friction on Afghanistan 
The Pakistani prime minister paid a visit to Iran early November 1995 to try to 
end a dispute with Iran over Afghanistan. 
Iran had been alarmed by the rapid rise of the Sunni Muslim Taleban militia in 
Afghanistan, and accused it of being supported by Pakistan and the US. Pakistan de-
nied the allegations.(IHT 07-11-95) 
Japan - US 
On the occasion of a visit by the US president to Japan in April 1996 two declara-
tions were issued, one on security matters [see injra,p. 427] and another on expansion 
of co-operation on global issues as earlier included in a joint statement of July 1993, 
by adding food shortages, terrorism, infectious diseases, democracy, technological 
education and natural disasters. (IHT 18-04-96) 
In an address to the Japanese parliament during the above visit the US president 
urged Japan to forge an alliance with the US for the next century and to develop an 
international leadership role. Besides he strongly defended the US' presence in 
Asia.(IHT 19-04-96) 
South Korea - Japan 
In an off-the-record briefing in November 1995 the Japanese minister in charge of 
the management and coordination agency said about the period of Japanese coloni-
zation of Korea: "During the colonial period, Japan also did good things". This re-
mark was angrily rejected by both South and North Korea. The row threatened a bi-
lateral meeting scheduled between the Japanese prime minister and the South Korean 
president at the Osaka summit of the APEC on 18 November.(IHT 11112-11-95) 
The minister concerned resigned some days later.(IHT 14-11-95) 
The South Korean president and the Japanese prime minister held a meeting at the 
Korean island of Cheju on 23 June 1996 aimed at improving ties. The impetus for the 
meeting was the joint hosting of the 2002 (football) World Cup.(IHT 22/23-06,24-06-
96) 
India - France 
India postponed a meeting of the Indo-French Joint Commission planned for late 
November 1995, allegedly because of French plans to sell Mirage fighter aircraft to 
Pakistan.(supra p.339) It would have been the first meeting of the commission in four 
years.(IHT 17-11-95) 
India - China 
On the occasion of a visit by the chairman of the Chinese National People's Con-
gress to India the two countries pledged to strengthen economic ties and resolve their 
border dispute. (IHT 18/19-11-95) 
China - Japan 
On the occasion of a visit by the Japanese foreign minister to China the Chinese 
foreign minister reiterated that awareness of the past was the key to unlocking a better 
future, and expressed the hope that the Japanese government could fully recognize the 
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importance and sensitiveness of the historical issue, and would treat properly ques-
tions in this regard. The Japanese minister underscored his country's commitment to 
view the country's wartime past in a 'correct manner' and said that the development 
of relations between Japan and China was the highest purpose of Japan's foreign pol-
icy.(IHT 20-12-95) 
China - Japan - US 
(see: Military alliance, infra p. 429) 
Iran - Russia 
During a visit to Iran the Russian deputy prime minister called for an increase of 
economic and trade ties between the two countries. Joint financial commissions were 
set up and agreement was reached on banking structures and expanding economic and 
technological co-operation. It was reported that a 10-year economic co-operation 
agreement was being prepared. (IHT 28-12-95) 
China - Russia 
It was reported that in the context of improving relations the two countries agreed 
in September 1995 to cease aiming nuclear weapons at one another.(IHT 30/31-12-
95101-01-96) 
The Russian president visited China in late April 1996. The relationship between 
the two countries was called a 'strategic partnership' towards the 21st century. 
During the visit the two countries concluded 14 agreements, many of which reiter-
ated earlier ones yet to be implemented. They ranged from trade deals and nuclear 
energy co-operation to a partnership to fight crime. Besides a declaration gave ex-
pression to a joint stand on major regional and international problems, while an 
agreement among China, Russia and three Central Asian republics (see irifra) con-
tained confidence-building measures along their common borders. A most notable 
agreement provided that Russia and China would set up a telephone hot line linking 
the two capitals. 
The two presidents also agreed to renew efforts to remove the existing controversy 
over the demarcation of the 4,300-kilometre common border. This demarcation would 
take place under a 1991 border agreement (1 AsYIL 274).(IHT 25-04,26-04-96;FEER 
23-05-96 p.40) 
China-Russia-Central Asia 
(see also: Borders) 
The presidents of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan ana Tajikistan signed a 
treaty on 26 April 1996, stipulating that the military forces of the five countries would 
not attack each other, inform each other of any exercises, and establish friendly 
ties.(IHT 24-04,27/28-04-96;FEER 02-05-96 p.17) 
Iran - Syria 
The foreign minister of Iran acknowledged on 3 January 1996 that there were 
differences between Iran and Syria, apparently on Syrian efforts to make peace with 
Israel. Iranian officials and the press had been sharply rebuking Syria for resuming 
CHRONICLE 407 
peace talks with israel and backing the United Arab Emirates in a territorial dispute 
with Iran (2 AsYIL 379).(IHT 04-01-96) 
India - Pakistan 
The Indian foreign minister said that India was ready to resume bilateral talks with 
Pakistan, stalled since January 1994. He welcomed a statement by Pakistan's prime 
minister that Pakistan was keen on further dialogue with India. He ruled out any third 
party role on bilateral issues.(IHT 16-01-96) 
Upon the istallation of a new Indian cabinet early June 1996 the Pakistani prime 
minister appealed for bilateral talks to stabilize the subcontinent to which the Indian 
prime minister responded positively, writing: "As we approach a new millennium, I 
believe there is a historic opportunity for us who are at the helm of affairs in our re-
spective countries to give a lead in this direction" .(IHT 10-06-96) 
Singapore - Australia 
Increasingly close ties between the two countries over a broad spectrum, from 
security to trade and investment, had paved the way for a wide-ranging bilateral 
agreement to be formally concluded shortly under the name "Singapore-Australia New 
Partnership" .(IHT 17-01-96) 
China - Vatican 
It was reported that China launched new efforts to revive talks with the Vatican on 
ending their 45-year-long rift. But China still demanded that the Vatican should cut its 
links with the Taipei government. Earlier talks had broken down because of the 1989 
Tiananmen incident. (IHT 29-02-96) 
China - Haiti 
During the UN Security Council discussions on the extension of a UN force man-
date to support the new Haitian government, China tried to mess up the plans by opt-
ing for a maximum of 1,200 instead of the requested 1,900 troops, by way of punis-
hing Haiti for its ties to Taiwan. [Canada made up for the missing 700 by promising to 
send them at its own expense](IHT 2/3-03-96) 
Iran - Western powers 
Iran was accused by the US of being involved in recent suicide bombings in Israel 
and Jerusalem that had taken place since late February 1996. The bombings were 
claimed by the Muslim 'Hamas' organization. The US alleged that Iran had provided 
"encouragement, funding and perhaps some direction" which was denied and rejected 
by Iran as being 'baseless', 'uncorroborated', 'reckless' and 'irresponsible'. 
France called in the Iranian ambassador to protest Iran's gloating over the bomb-
ings ('divine retribution'), but Germany and the UK said they would prevail with the 
policy of 'critical dialogue' adopted by the EU towards Iran in 1992, rather than fol-
low the US demands for the complete isolation of Iran.(IHT 07-03-96) France later 
also adhered to this view. At a conference on terrorism on 13 March 1996 in Cairo 
the US and Israel tried to have Iran singled out for condemnation but failed to obtain 
the necessary support.(IHT 15-03-96) 
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Japan - North Korea 
In a letter to Japanese officials in Tokyo, North Korea requested talks on boosting 
aid and normalizing relations between the two countries. (FEER 28-09-95 p.15) The 
Japanese prime minister confirmed in early April 1996 that preparatory discussions 
between the two countries were under way for the resumption of talks on normalizing 
relations. In this context the three coalition parties in Japan might send a mission to 
South Korea to seek the latter's understanding before resuming such talks. 
The two countries had held eight rounds of talks since 1991. The most recent talks 
took place in November 1992, and broke down when Japan brought up the case of a 
Japanese woman allegedly abducted by North Korea to train spies. 
The talks followed a landmark visit by leaders of the (Japanese) Liberal Demo-
cratic Party and the Social Democratic Party to North Korea.{IHT 04-04-96) 
Vietnam - Cambodia 
The Vietnamese prime minister visited Cambodia on 10 April 1996 for talks in-
cluding the issue of the poorly defined border. (see: Borders) (IHT 09 and 11-04-96) 
China - France 
The Chinese prime minister arrived for a visit in France on 9 April 1996. It was 
the first visit by a Chinese prime minister in 12 years. The visit resulted in the signing 
of deals worth $2 billion, including an order for $1.5 billion worth of Airbus passen-
ger planes.{IHT 10 and 11-04-96; FEER 25-04-96 p.16) 
China - Southeast Asia 
(see also: Association of South East Asian Nations) 
China proposed to issue a joint declaration of principles on the maintenance of 
good relations.{IHT 16-04-96) 
China - Sri Lanka 
The Sri Lankan president made a state visit to China from 20-26 April 1996. 
(FEER 23-05-96 p.14) 
Malaysia - Singapore 
Singapore's Senior Minister said that reunification with Malaysia could be possible 
as Malaysia developed its economy, since growing prosperity lessens racial tensions 
between Chinese and Malays in both countries. He mentioned as one of the conditions 
for a merger the adoption by Malaysia of a policy of 'meritocracy' similar to Singa-
pore in which no race has a privileged position; another condition was that Malaysia 
had to pursue Singapore's goal of bringing maximum economic benefits to its people. 
In reaction, the Malaysian prime minister said that at the moment "the likelihood of 
that happening is remote". (FEER 20-06-96 p .17) 
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China - Germany 
As a consequence of a German parliamentary resolution critical of China's Tibet 
policy in June 1996 (see: Specific territories within a state:Tibet), China withdrew an 
invitation for the German foreign minister to visit China in July 1996.(IHT 26-06-96) 
(NON-)INTERFERENCE 
See also: Diplomatic and consular inviolability 
Alleged interference in Afghanistan by Pakistan 
In a letter of 10 September 1995 the foreign minister of Pakistan reacted to Afghan 
allegations about Pakistani interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, particularly 
its support to the Taleban movement in the latter's conquest of western parts of Afghani-
stan. 
The letter denied Pakistani involvement, and posed that the continuance of the armed 
conflict in Afghanistan was in fact attributable to the fact that the Kabul government had 
reneged on its commitment to relinquish power on 21 March 1995 and to hand over 
power to an interim mechanism. According to the letter the accusations against Pakistan 
were in fact an attempt to justifY a mob attack on the Pakistan embassy at Kabul on 6 
September 1995. (supra p. 352) 
The letter recalled that Pakistan followed a policy of strict neutrality and non-
interference in Afghanistan's internal affairs. While emphasizing that a solution to the 
Afghan problem had to emerge from the Afghans themselves, Pakistan had, as an imme-
diate neighbour, a vested interest in peace and stability as this would enable 1.6 million 
Afghan refugees in Pakistan to return to their country.(A/49/962-S/1995/786) 
In a letter of the Afghan government to the UN Secretary General of 14 September 
1995 it was alleged that "the western parts of Afghanistan, including the city of Herat, 
have been overrun by the Pakistani militia, backed by Pakistani regular air and ground 
forces, in collusion with the mercenaries known as Taliban, forged by the Pakistani 
Interservice Intelligence, in an attempt to impose the subsequent transfer of power to a 
Pakistani-approved regime in Kabul". 
The letter referred to "incontestable reports saying that hundreds of Pakistani mili-
tary personnel marched inside the city" and to "these acts of aggression". It called atten-
tion to the point that "the situation developing out of this direct aggression will bear 
grave and irreparable consequences for peace and security in our region" . (S/I995/795) 
In letters of 12 October and 12 November 1995 the Afghan foreign minister again 
accused the government of Pakistan of interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan 
by their backing of the Taleban forces, allegedly "under the direct control of the Paki-
stani Government". (UNdoc. S/1995/88,S/1995/950, S/1995/950, S/1995/961) 
US objections against Thai ministerial posts 
The US warned that relations with Thailand could be strained if drug-tainted politi-
cians were appointed to posts in a new cabinet to be formed as a result of recent parlia-
mentary elections in Thailand. While the dominant Thai party described the warning as 
an interference in Thai internal affairs, the US embassy in Bangkok said "the US 
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govenment has no intention of interfering" in the formation of the [Thai] govern-
ment" . (IHT 06-07-95) 
Thai ambassador visits Myanmar dissident 
The Thai ambassador on 3 August 1995 visited the Myanmar dissident AUNG SAN 
Suu KY!, being the first ambassador from an ASEAN country to do so.(IHT 04-08-95) 
Dalai Lama meeting with US president 
(see infra, p. 455) 
US covert actions against Iran 
The US government agreed to accept a bill from the Congress authorizing secret 
spending of up to $20 million for a small-scale covert action program aimed at "mode-
rating" the government of Iran, including cultivating new opponents to the regime. The 
bill does not authorize any spending for lethal military aid to anti-Iran forces. 
The US government had resisted the funding of any program aimed at overthrowing 
the Iranian government, but agreed with a less ambitious program.(IHT 23/24/25-12-95) 
Anonymous weapons drop in India 
There had been a clandestine and unexplained drop of arms near the east Indian town 
of Purulia in West Bengal on 17 December 1995. As a result controls over aircraft flying 
over India were tightened. On 22 December an aircraft, believed to have carried out the 
airdrops, was forced by the Indian Airforce to land in Bombay. The six crew members, 
consisting of West and East Europeans, were detained. According to Indian news reports 
arms had been purchased in Bulgaria, of which two consignments were left in Pakistan, 
one was dropped near Purulia and a fourth was dumped in the sea off Thailand. (lHT 
27,28-12-95) 
Upon Indian allegations that Pakistan was involved the Pakistani foreign minister said 
that "[i]t has become a knee-jerk habit of the Indian leadership to blame Pakistan for all 
their ills" . (IHT 29-12-95) 
Intervention in Pakistani crisis 
It was reported that the US State Department stepped up behind-the-scenes talks with 
the Pakistani prime minister and the opposition Muhajir Qaumi Movement to resolve the 
escalating crisis in Karachi. The prime minister of Pakistan was also told by the Japanese 
government during her state visit to Japan in mid-January that unless she solved the cri-
sis, Pakistan cannot expect more Japanese private investment. (FEER 01-02-96 p.12) 
European Parliament invites Indonesian separatists 
The Indonesian foreign minister protested against an invitation by the European Par-
liament to separatist rebels from the Indonesian province of Irian Jaya, stating that it was 
an interference in Indonesian internal affairs.(IHT 27-03-96) 
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Accusations of Iranian intervention in Bahrain 
Iran recalled its ambassador to Bahrain on 6 June 1996 as "a sign of protest against 
the accusations of the Bahraini government that Iran was backing a plot to topple it". 
Bahrain had also recalled its ambassador to Tehran.(IHT 07-06-96) 
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS 
See: Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation, supra p. 341. 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS AND TRADE 
Japan-US pact on flat glass 
Japan and the US signed a market-opening pact in December 1994 in the long-
disputed area of flat glass (5AsYIL 446). Under the so-called framework agreement, 
Japanese distributors pledged to start handling foreign glass products, while Japan 
accepted 'objective criteria' to measure the extent of market access. In the first quar-
ter of 1995, imports soared 75% from a year earlier, although foreigners still claim 
only 5 % of the market for flat glass. (FEER 20-07-95 p. 69) 
Vietnam - EU trade on textiles 
A textile agreement between Vietnam and the EU became void at the end of 1995 
because of non-ratification by Vietnam. The agreement was meant to boost Vietnam's 
textile quota to the EU by about 15 %, and to give Vietnam more leeway in switching 
goods from one quota category to another. Officials said Vietnam stood to gain $50-70 
million annually in textile exports. In return Vietnam was supposed to lower import 
tariffs on some European goods and to guarantee minimum exports of certain raw 
materials, such as silk, to European importers. {FEER 08-02-96 p.12) 
Kodak complaint of Japanese unfair practices 
The US government announced it would launch an investigation into allegations by 
Eastman Kodak Co. about unfair practices by Fuji Photo Film Co. Kodak contended 
that the film market in Japan was dominated by four wholesalers loyal to Fuji. The 
investigation would take place under sec.301 of the US Trade Law, allowing the US 
Trade Representative up to one year to conduct a review of the charges and seek a 
market-opening agreement with Japan. If no deal is reached, the government can im-
pose trade sanctions against Japan. 
Kodak claimed that Fuji and the Japanese government had conspired to block its 
entry into the Japanese photographic $9.37 billion-a-year market. The Japanese coun-
tered that Kodak's film is not particularly cheap and that when prices were the same, 
Japanese consumers simply preferred the better-known Fuji. The current market 
shares in Japan were: Fuji, roughly 70 percent; Kodak, 10 percent. 
Tariffs on imported rolls of film hovered at 40 percent for years and quotas re-
stricted those imports. In 1990, however, Japanese tariffs had fallen to zero, while the 
US still imposed a duty of 3.7 percent on imported film. In 1970 guidelines were 
issued, factually preventing Kodak from expanding and driving others out. The guide-
lines called for low rebates to distributors, an infrequent delivery schedule to keep 
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costs low for young companies, and strict accounting for payments among manu-
facturers, wholesalers and retailers. The measures were intended to ensure that com-
petition would be fair, but were seen by the American side as proof of collusion be-
tween the Japanese government and Japanese industry to restrict US products.(IHT 04 
and 06-07-95,22-02-96) 
On 13 June 1996 the US announced it would file complaints with the WTO for 
alleged collusion of the Japanese government with Fuji to block sales in Japan by 
Eastman Kodak and other non-Japanese rivals. The shift in strategy might mean that 
the US was bowing to the accusation that it had used the threat of sanctions too often 
and was undercutting the authority of the WTO.(IHT 14-06-96; FEER 27-06-96 p.54) 
US most-favoured-uation treatment for Cambodia 
The US granted most-favoured-nation status to Cambodia on 11 July 1995.(IHT 
13-07-95) 
World financial services agreement 
Japan joined the EU and 70 other countries in forging a global financial services 
agreement that was intended to become effective in August 1996 for an initial 17-
month period. 
The treaty became possible when Japan and South Korea, which had been hesitat-
ing, announced their agreement. India, Pakistan and Egypt finally also agreed to join. 
The US so far had preferred not to join since it refused on 29 June 1995 to extend 
blanket most-favoured-nation status to other countries because some Asian and Latin-
American countries had not offered enough market-opening measures.(IHT 27-07-95) 
Malaysia refrains from asking trade preferences 
The Malaysian government announced on 17 August 1995 that it would not ask the 
US to retain special trade privileges under the Generalized System of Preferences 
when the US would decide to remove Malaysia from that system.(IHT 18-08-95) 
South Korea - US 
The US Trade Representative threatened to impose punitive tariffs on South Ko-
rean car exports to the US unless Korea announces market-opening measures. The US 
trade representative was expected to decide by 30 September 1995 whether to use a 
provision in the US trade law allowing investigation of the American car makers' 
complaints (Sec. 301). American trade officials also said that they may take their 
complaint to the WTO. American frustration with South Korea's import policies was 
shared by the EU.(FEER 05-10-95 p.80) The US move less than three months after 
the conclusion of a similar dispute with Japan reflected a determination to prevent 
other Asian countries from following Japan in building up exports behind the sanctu-
ary of protected domestic markets. The US exported about 1,900 cars to South Korea 
in 1994, against South Korea exporting 206,000 vehicles to the US. In 1994 foreign 
car imports accounted for 0.3 percent of the Korean automobile market, in contrast to 
5 percent in Japan, 38 percent in France and Germany, and 33 percent in the US. 
South Korean and US negotiators reached agreement on 28 September 1995 and 
issued a memorandum of understanding, allowing foreign car-producers enhanced 
access to the South Korean market. According to a high Korean official "the basic 
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logic of the US demands, including the notion that Korea must import more American 
cars since Korea is selling huge quantities in the US, could have been questioned but 
political considerations had to take precedence". 
The Korean concessions, including the reduction of the special excise tax on cars 
with engines larger than 2,OOOcc, would cut the cost of buying and driving an im-
ported car in the first year by 15 %. These changes were expected to have only mini-
mal effect on the import of US cars. The import tax remained 8 percent.(IHT 20-09-
95,29-09-95; Korea Times 29-09-95, Korea Herald 30-09-95; text MOU in KT 30-09-
95) 
China - US 
(see also: Intellectual property) 
The US Trade Representative decried the US trade deficit with China. The mag-
nitude of the trade deficit as measured by the US was, however, criticized as under-
stating the value of US exports to China while overstating the export figures for Chi-
na. According to US officials the US trade deficit with China might reach $38 billion 
in 1995 and $45 billion to $50 billion in 1996. The US had a trade deficit of $30 bil-
lion with China in 1994, second to the $66 billion deficit with Japan. According to 
China these figures were exaggerated. Chinese data showed that the Chinese trade 
surplus in 1994 was only $7.4 billion and that of 1995 was $8.6 billion. The dis-
crepancy was caused by the US practice of including re-exports from Hongkong as 
being goods originating from mainland China, and overlooking the fact of goods proc-
essed in China but imported from elsewhere. These processed goods accounted for 69 
percent of China's exports to the US in 1994. The Brookings Institution in Was-
hington, factoring-in the trade that passed through Hong Kong, said that the bilateral 
deficit would be $23 billion in 1995.(IHT 7/8 and 09-10-95,12-02-96; FEER 22-02-96 
p.33, 30-05-96 p.50) 
The US president on 20 May 1996 called for the unconditional renewal of MFN 
status for China, emphasizing that the US would continue to pursue a nuanced carrot-
and-stick policy of engagement with China, which might at times produce apparently 
contradictory measures.(IHT 21-05-96) 
Japan-US semiconductor trade agreement 
(see AsYIL Vol.1 p.321, Vol.2 p.339, Vol.3 p.411) 
As the 1986 US-Japan bilateral agreement to raise foreigner's share of the Japa-
nese electronic chip market drew nearer to its expiration on 31 July 1996 (after re-
newal in 1991), there was disagreement between the two countries on whether to 
continue the bilateral approach to trade. The goals of the agreement had been achie-
ved. American observers claimed that it was the pact that played a major role in al-
lowing foreigners to break into the Japanese market; Japan argued that it was market 
forces that allowed the key objective of the agreement to be reached, the agreement 
should therefore be scrapped. 
On 4 June 1996 the Electronic Industries Association of Japan (EIAJ) proposed the 
creation of a World Semiconductor Council, a voluntary private-sector body that 
would represent all the key players in the industry and examine trade flows and inter-
national standards for the next generation of computer chips. The chairman of EIAJ 
said that "some features of the current semiconductor agreement are not only unreal-
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istic, but also in violation of WTO rules".The semiconductor agreement became the 
model for the US government's later 'results-oriented' approach to trade negotiations, 
rejected by Japan as 'managed trade' .(IHT 03-11-95; FEER 27-06-96 p.54) 
Liberalization of China's foreign trade 
The Chinese president on 19 November 1995 announced that two-thirds of the 
country's tariffs on imports would be cut by at least 30 percent in 1996. Even at the 
lower level, however, the duties would still be among the highest in APEC.{IHT 20-
11-95) The announcement was confirmed in a decision of late December 1995 by 
which the average import tariff rate was reduced from 35 to 23 percent, beginning 
April 1996. The reduction would affect more than 4,000 of about 6,000 possible 
items. This was the biggest trade liberalization package since the country opened up in 
1979.(IHT 29-12-95; FEER 07-12-95 p.44,48) 
China-Japan trade imbalance 
According to the Japanese finance ministry, China's trade surplus with Japan in-
creased sharply to $12.27 billion in the first ten months of 1995, compared with $8.8 
billion for the whole of 1994. However, according to Chinese statistics, which ex-
clude trans-shipped goods via third-country ports like Hong Kong, the surplus over 
the first ten months of 1994 was only $300 million.{IHT 22-11-95) 
EU charge of Chinese textile dumping 
The EU started investigations into dumping charges against about 30 Chinese 
textile companies, accusing them of exporting unbleached fabric to Europe at below-
market prices. The targeted products were, however, "under export quota restrictions 
by the EU". Similar dumping charges were made in 1994 but were dropped for lack 
of evidence. 
China condemned the EU's practice of substituting figures from a third country to 
estimate the production costs of Chinese exports to ascertain whether dumping had 
occurred. This so-called surrogate approach, designed for countries where govern-
ment-set prices do not provide a basis for estimating production costs, was considered 
to fail to take account of China's market-oriented reforms or low labour-costs.{IHT 
11-03-96) 
Phase-out of Multifibre Arrangement (MFA) 
The implementation of a 1994 agreement to phase-out the Multifibre Arrangement 
was the subject of controversy between the EU and the US, on the one hand, and 
Asian textile exporters on the other. The lO-year phase-out began in January 1995 and 
would be completed in 2005. In a first stage 16% of the European and US textile trade 
was transferred out of the MFA and placed under the WTO general rules, 17 % would 
follow in a second stage, 1998, and a further 18% in 2001. The remaining 49% would 
be transferred in 2005. Although the US and the EU had technically met the require-
ments of the phase-out agreement, it was argued that their action had no real liberal-
izing effect on the textile trade. The EU and the US had started to 'liberalize' items 
that were not under any quota restriction at all, and were in any case not commercially 
meaningful, representing, for instance, only 8% in value terms of EU imports from 
developing countries. 
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The EU's chief textile negotiator said that a more rapid dismantling of the MFA 
barriers could occur by 1998 when the next round of liberalization would begin, if 
Asian countries agreed to open their markets to European textiles and clothing. The 
International Textile and Clothing Bureau, which represents Asian and Latin Ameri-
can textile exporters, was against such deals, saying that "Asian countries made their 
market-opening commitments in the WTO and are implementing them".(FEER 11-04-
96 p.74) 
Chinese aircraft purchases from Europe 
On the occasion of a visit by the Chinese prime minister to France in April 1996 
China agreed to buy 33 Airbus aircraft at a price of $1.5 billion. Thus far it had 
bought or leased 24 planes with 16 more on order.(IHT 11-04-96) 
Japan - European Union 
The record high of EU-Japan trade of $119 billion in 1995, and the significant fall 
of Japan's trade surplus with the EU since 1993, was attributed to the EU's new ap-
proach to trade talks with Japan. In contrast to the US strategy of high profile ministe-
rial encounters, the EU was organizing up to 30 low-key 'technical meetings' with 
their Japanese counterparts every year to discuss trade problems. According to Ja-
pan's mission to the EU, "the trade-assessment mechanism is a useful vehicle for 
discussing trade problems" . (FEER 16-05-96 p.74) 
South Korea - European Union 
On 10 May 1996, the EU Trade Commissioner complained to the WTO that South 
Korea excluded EU companies from bidding to supply telecommunication equipment, 
and that it favoured American suppliers over European ones. South Korea had signed 
two bilateral deals with Washington that, according to the EU, gave US telecom-
equipment suppliers assured access to Korean markets. It was alleged that as a result 
AT&T held an estimated 20 % of the South Korean market for switching equipment. 
South Korea promised to open the sector to EU suppliers by 1998; but then it was 
said that these suppliers would need an additional two years to complete qualification 
and certification procedures. (FEER 30-05-96 p.48) 
Japanese insurance market 
An agreement between Japan and the US that would open the Japanese insurance 
market to foreign companies was concluded in 1994, but was vague and open to dif-
ferent interpretations. A Japanese law for the implementation of the agreement that 
had come into force on 1 April 1996 was considered by the US to be in violation of 
the agreement. The regulation would allow insurance companies working in the field 
of 'life' or 'non-life' insurance [the normal division in the insurance business] to enter 
the other field through subsidiaries, causing US fear that they would be able, by using 
local competition forms, to diminish the existing US share (about 5 percent) of the 
market. 
[In Japan, the second-largest insurance market in the world, insurance companies are 
generally required to offer the same rates. When a new product is proposed, all com-
petitors generally are entitled to offer it at the same time. So competition has taken 
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other forms, such as offers to make stock purchases or loans or to donate comput-
ers.](IHT 12-04-96) 
Asian share of Japanese export 
For the first time ever Japan exported more goods to its Asian neighbours than to 
the US and Europe combined. Exports to Asian countries rose 16.9 percent to 
$192.78 billion in the financial year ending March 1996, while combined exports to 
the US and Western Europe totaled $188.80 billion. 
A sharp rise in production in Asia by Japanese industries had led to a jump in 
Japanese exports to the region of components and manufacturing machinery. US and 
European regulations requiring Japanese transplants to use a specified amount of local 
components had made moving to Asian countries a more attractive option.(IHT 19-04-
96) 
Indonesian preferential tax and tariff treatment (The 'Timor' case) 
The EU trade commissioner said that preferential tax and tariff treatment granted 
by the Indonesian government to domestic car companies on 28 February 1996 was in 
violation of WTO rules. The measure introduced a national car project by granting an 
exemption from import duties on components and a luxury sales tax for local car pro-
ducers who (none as yet) could meet certain requirements, such as regarding local 
content. Simultaneously, the Indonesian government assigned the implementation of 
the national car project to Kia-Timor Motors, an Indonesian-South Korean joint ven-
ture, which was accorded 'pioneer status'. As such the company was granted an ex-
clusive 3-year exemption of the duties and tax, provided the 'Timor' would attain a 
20 % local content after the first year, 40 % at the end of the third year and 60 % by 
September 1999. Apparently since Kia-Timor could not yet meet the requirements, the 
Indonesian president on 4 June 1996 promulgated decree No. 42/1996 that allowed the 
importation of 45,000 Timor sedans from South Korea during an initial period until 
June 1997. It was expected that by then the joint venture is expected would have ope-
ned its first production line near Jakarta. 
Diplomats said that the decree contravenes WTO most-favored-nation rules that 
forbid importing from one country at terms more favourable than from other coun-
tries. 
Eager to avoid damage in relations the Japanese ambassador to Indonesia said that 
the national car issue and the subject of Japanese development aid were entirely sepa-
rate issues.(IHT 24-04,06-06,28-06-96; FEER 20-06-96 p.60) 
Unilateral trade sanctions 
The Japanese government called for an end to the use of unilateral trade sanctions 
as such action was inconsistent with the rules governing international trade and the 
WTO. While acknowledging the problems with which a trading country may be faced 
it was against the method of solving them.(IHT 20-05-96) 
Days later the US through its ambassador to the OECD rejected the Japanese call 
and "reject[ed] entirely the notion that these actions are aimed at undermining the 
multilateral trading system" .(lHT 21-05-96) 
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Foreign law firms in China 
For the first time since early 1995 China authorized 16 foreign law firms to open 
offices, bringing the number of foreign law firms in China to 73: five from the US, 
the others from Japan, Hongkong, Britain, Italy and Jordan.(IHT 28-06-96) 
Foreign law firms in Vietnam 
The Vietnamese ministry of justice released a circular (No.791) which obliged the 
25 foreign law firms operating in Vietnam to apply for a 'branch' license by January 
1996, or else leave Vietnam. According to the circular, law firms are eligible to open 
up to two branches, and must employ at least two full-time lawyers with at least five 
years experience. They may not hire Vietnamese lawyers but they may employ Viet-
namese 'law trainees' for up to three years, although the trainees may not advise on 
Vietnamese law. Foreign law firms are stricly limited to giving advice on international 
[and foreign? Ed.] law. All questions concerning Vietnamese law must be referred to 
local firms, which are not allowed to employ foreign lawyers. Exclusive partnerships 
between Vietnamese and foreign law firms were prohibited. (FEER 09-11-95 p.34) 
US embargo on import of wild shrimps caught without turtle excluder devices 
(TEDs) 
On 19 April 1996 the US banned the importation of shrimps, effective 1 May 
1996, from countries not certified to be using TEDs or comparable devices (for the 
protection and conservation of sea turtles). Asian countries or territories potentially 
affected were Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Indonesia, Philippines, 
Singapore, Malaysia, Myanmar, Vietnam, China, Taiwan, Macao, Japan, South Ko-
rea, and Hongkong. The eight countries with the largest shrimp export to the US are 
Thailand, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Malaysia, Brazil, South Korea and Japan. 
Senior officials of ASEAN met on 23 April 1996 and concluded that the embargo 
should not be imposed on any ASEAN country, basically because these countries had 
already extensive sea turtle conservation programs in place, because the record in the 
region showed that incidental catches of sea turtles had been minimal, and that most 
trawlers in use in tbe ASEAN region were devoted to fishing while the catch of 
shrimp was only an incidental activity. These conclusions were conveyed to the US 
secretary of state on 10 June 1996. 
Besides, Thailand, Malaysia, India and Pakistan had entered into consultations 
with the US under Article 22 of the GATT, alleging that the US "fails to carry out its 
obligations and commitments under several provisions of the GATT and WTO Agree-
ments, including but not limited to Art.I, Art.XI and Art.XIII of the GATT, and tbat 
such failure is not justified by any provision of the said Agreement, including the 
exceptions set forth in Art.XX of the GAIT". The case found strong support in the 
GATT Panel report of 3 September 1991 regarding US Restrictions on Imports of 
Tuna where the panel ruled unequivocally that "a contracting party may not restrict 
imports of a product merely because it originates in a country with environmental 
policies different from its own". 
At the bilateral level the Thai side by note of 5 September 1996 asked the US to 
remove Thailand from the list of countries subjected to the embargo on grounds of the 
minimal rate of incidental catch of sea turtles in Thai waters, equaling that in the US. 
Meanwhile Thailand introduced new rules including, inter alia, the requirement that 
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shrimp trawl nets used in Thai fishery waters be installed with a Thai Turtle-Free 
Device (TTFD) or a comparable device. As a result the US state department certified 
that Thailand fulfilled the conditions under the US law. 
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE MUNICIPAL LEGAL ORDER 
Japanese courts and international treaties 
A number of Japanese living near an American air base filed a law suit against the 
Japanese and US governments, demanding a ban on night flights and damages. In the 
past local residents had sued the Japanese government for failure to protect them from 
the noise. In 1993, the Japanese Supreme Court ruled that they could claim compen-
sation from the Japilnese government, but it refused to order a ban on night flights 
because they arose from the US-Japan Security Treaty and were considered to be 
beyond the jurisdiction of the court. (IHT 11-04-96) 
ISLAM 
See: United Nations 
JAPAN'S MILITARY ROLE 
Participation in UN peace-keeping 
Japan was to send troops to the Middle East in February 1996 for the first time in 
its history, as part of a UN peacekeeping force in the Israeli-occupied Golan 
Heights.{IHT 26/27-08-95; 07-09-95 p.13) The troops would be dispatched to partici" 
pate in the UN Disengagement Observer Force. A total of 113 members would help 
provide transport, medical care, and other logistical support until August 1996.{FEER 
14-12-95 p.13) 
Constitutional ban on collective security arrangements; scope of 'the Far East' 
Successive Japanese governments had interpreted the Japanese constitution as 
prohibiting the country to enter collective security alliances. This was affirmed by the 
current governing coalition, which also decided not to expand the definition of the 
notion of 'the Far East' as the area protected by US forces under the Japan-US secu-
rity treaty. According to the Japanese interpretation 'the Far East' includes the Philip-
pines.{IHT 23-04-96) 
JOINT DEVELOPMENT AND JOINT VENTURES 
See also: Foreign investment 
Thai-Malaysian landbridge 
The Malaysian prime minister proposed that Malaysia and Thailand should de-
velop a so-called landbridge as an alternative to the searoute through the Strait of 
Malacca. Under the $10 billion project, an oil pipeline would be built and an existing 
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road upgraded into a superhighway. Both the pipeline and the road would run in a 
northeastern direction from Pulau Paya in Langkawi, Malaysia, crossing the Thai 
border and ending at Songkhla, located on the Gulf of Thailand. 
The aim is to save tankers a passage through the Straits of Malacca and reduce the 
risk of collissions and spillage. Currently, 10,000 million barrels of oil pass through 
the Straits each day, and this was expected to increase to 16,000 million barrels by the 
year 2000. 
Officials and businessmen from Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia and 
Thailand met in Kuala Lumpur in late September 1995 to discuss the idea. Thai sup-
port for the proposal was ambiguous because it clashes with Thailand's plans for a 
similar but far more ambitious development program that would be entirely within 
Thai territory. The all-Thai program would link Krabi on the Andaman Sea just north 
of the entrance to the Strait of Malacca with Nakhon Si Thammarat on the Gulf of 
Thailand.(IHT 04-07-95; Japan Times 28-09-95) 
Fibre-optic cable system for six countries 
It was reported that China would build a transnational fibre-optic cable system 
linking it to Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore. The 7,000-kilometer 
land cable would provide 30,000 digital telecoms upon completion in 1997. Each 
country would set up its own section of the cable.(FEER 03-08-95 p.57) 
Gas pipeline projects 
Japan's Mitsubishi, China's National Petroleum and Esso China, an affliate of 
America's Exxon, agreed to study the feasibility of building an 8,000-kilometre pipe-
line to transport natural gas from Turkmenistan through China to supply the Asia-
Pacific region. The construction cost would run to $10 billion.(FEER 31-08-95 p.65) 
A 778-kilometre pipeline, which had been under construction for three years, 
linking a gas field in the South China Sea south of Hainan island, to Hongkong, was 
closing to completion in late-1995. The ambitious gas pipeline project is a joint ven-
ture between China National Offshore Oil Corp., Kuwait Foreign Petroleum Explora-
tion and Atlantic Richfield Oil Co.(Arco). The pipeline is expected to supply about 85 
billion cubic meters of gas over 20 years and generate about $12 billion in reve-
nue. (FEER 05-10-95 p.17) 
Vietnam's joint venture deals in the South China Sea 
Vietnam rejected an offer by US-based Crestone Energy to cooperate in exploring 
for off-shore oil in an area which both China and Vietnam claim. China had awarded 
Crestone the right to explore part of the disputed area. A Vietnamese official said that 
Crestone would have to withdraw from its contract with China before any joint devel-
opment plans could be considered.(FEER 26-10-95 p.15) 
On 10 April 1996, PetroVietnam leased two off-shore exploration blocks located 
about 400 kms from Ho Chi Minh City to the American company Conoco. The area 
granted by the leases total more than 14,000 square kilometres and, significantly, 
cover more than half of the zone which China leased to US company Crestone in May 
1992.(see also infra, p. 458)(FEER 25-04-96 p.65) 
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Sino-Korean commercial airplane project 
The ambitious venture by South Korea and China to jointly produce mid-sized 80 
to 11O-passenger commuter jets with a foreign partner became the focus of heated 
marketing campaigns by aircraft manufacturers in the US and Europe. The project has 
its roots in the Phoenix Programme, a South Korean plan to build a 50-seat commuter 
plane. Seoul's plan received a boost at a summit meeting in Beijing in March 1994, 
when the South Korean president promised the Chinese premier to turn Phoenix into a 
Sino-Korean venture.(FEER 03-08-95 p.50) 
China and South Korea delayed the choice of a Western partner for their planned 
project until the end of 1995 because of wrangling over the location of the final as-
sembly plant. The foreign partner would take a stake of about 20 percent in return for 
technology and assistance. The Korean consortium and government would jointly hold 
a stake of between 35 and 40 percent in the project. The Chinese side would match 
that stake, and a smaller Asian investor would hold 10 percent.(IHT 13-10-95) The 
decision on the Western partner was later delayed. (IHT 28-12-95) 
Kazakhstan oil exploitation 
The 1993 oil exploration contract between Kazakhstan and Chevron (see 3 AsYIL 
380 and 434) was obstructed by a dispute over the construction of a pipeline from 
Tengiz to the West. The Caspian Pipeline Consortium, founded by Oman and includ-
ing Amoco Corp.,Pennzoil Co., Unocal Corp., Exxon Corp. and McDermott Interna-
tional Inc., as well as companies from the UK, Norway, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Oman 
and Turkey had the exclusive rights to build the pipeline, but had difficulty in arrang-
ing the financing. Kazakhstan had begun talks with Mobil Corp. on selling half of its 
stake in the joint venture, while Chevron, Mobil and other energy companies had 
started talks on helping finance the pipeline.(IHT 14/15-10-95,07-03 and 12-03-96) 
On 27 April 1996 a protocol was signed under which the original consortium founders 
(Russia, Kazkhstan, Oman) would have their shares scaled back to a combined 50 
percent. Eight oil companies would take on the remainder and commit themselves to 
funding the entire cost of the pipeline.(IHT 29-04-96) 
Korean-Russian and Sino-Russian energy deals 
The Russian premier's visit to Seoul in September 1995 had given new impetus to 
the plan to pipe Russian gas to South Korea via North Korea. South Korea and Russia 
agreed to put up $10 million each for preliminary surveys. The project, expected to 
cost $22 billion, would reach completion by 201O.(FEER 30-11-95 p.28) 
It was announced in Moscow in December 1995 that China and Russia would sign 
a framework accord in March 1996 on a project to pump Russian oil and gas to China 
via Mongolia. The deal would be worth about $8 billion.(IHT 29-12-95) According to 
a later report the two countries would sign an agreement in principle for the joint 
development of a pipeline to bring natural gas from Siberian fields to the Yellow 
Sea.(IHT 19-04-96; FEER 02-05-96 p.17) 
China's interest in joint development 
It was reported that China had asked Thailand for information about the Joint 
Development Area that was set up between Thailand and Malaysia to resolve an 
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overlapping maritime boundary in 1994 (4 AsYIL 479). The Thai foreign minister 
said that the Chinese were interested in the concept and had asked for relevant docu-
ments. He also pointed out that recent Beijing statements on its claims in the South 
China Sea had referred to joint development of seabed resources, which is the central 
point of the Thai-Malaysian agreement.(FEER 11-01-96 p.12) 
Sino-French aircraft development 
During the Chinese prime minister's visit to France in April 1996 it was agreed 
that China would cooperate with Airbus Industrie in the development of airplanes for 
short-haul flights. A declaration of intent was signed to carry on discussions.(IHT 15-
04-96) 
JURISDICTION 
See also: Military co-operation 
Indonesian police investigation in Germany denied 
It was reported that German authorities refused to grant entry visas to Indonesian 
police searching for evidence of who was behind a series of demonstrations against 
President Suharto during his state visit to Germany in April 1995. It was also reported 
that the investigators wanted to look into the role of an outspoken former Indonesian 
parliamentarian who claimed that he was merely a bystander in a protest demonstra-
tion in Hannover. (FEER 06-07-95 p.12) 
Rape incident in Okinawa 
Three US servicemen were suspected of abducting and raping a 12-year old Japa-
nese girl on 4 September 1995 in Okinawa. Although the US ambassador expressed 
the US government's regret and promised to cooperate with the Japanese authorities in 
bringing the perpetrators of the crime to justice, the three suspects were in US cus-
tody, and the US authorities initially refused to turn them over to Japanese police 
because of a clause in the status of forces agreement (SOFA) that bars such a rendi-
tion until the Japanese prosecution had issued a formal indictment. The incident led to 
an outcry, and the governor of Okinawa urged the agreement to be revised. The sus-
pects were later turned over on 29 September.(IHT 22-09-95,30-09/01-10-95) 
Okinawa is host to 27,000 US military personnel and three-quarters of the 135 US 
military facilities in Japan, for which Japan pays about 70 percent of the non-salary 
cost. (IHT 06-10,01-11-95) 
[The US had gradually given up its claims to jurisdiction. In 1957 a US soldier shot and killed 
a Japanese woman. Eventually the US handed over the suspect and he was convicted. The sol-
dier was never sent to prison, however, but was released and returned to the US. Nowadays 
American soldiers are routinely convicted in Japanese courts and serve their sentences in Japa-
nese prisons.] (IHT 26-10-95) 
Revision of Japan-US Status of Forces Agreement 
Japan and the US agreed on 21 September 1995 that they would review the crimi-
nal jurisdiction procedures for US troops stationed in Japan. The resulting negotia-
tions centered on Japanese requests to allow Japanese police officers to take custody 
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of US military suspects before indictment. On 25 October 1995 the US agreed in a 
'side letter' to hand over to the Japanese police American troops accused of murder or 
rape. This was possible under the existing provision that the US "will give sympa-
thetic consideration" if Japan requests custody of US military suspected of murder or 
rape who have not yet been indicted. The new policy brought the SOFA with Japan in 
line with the SOFAs between the US and its European and Canadian partners.{IHT 
22-09-95,30-09/01-10-95,09-10-95,26-10-95, 15-11-95) 
South Korea-US Status of Forces Agreement 
Following Japanese efforts South Korea also asked the US to revise the SOFA 
between the two countries that dated from 1966. The SOFAs between the US and host 
countries regulate jurisdiction over US personnel stationed on foreign soil. While the 
Japanese SOFA calls for US officials to turn over American suspects to the custody of 
local authorities when they are indicted, under the Korean SOFA the US is obliged to 
transfer jurisdiction only after conviction and the completion of all appeals. 
A senior US official explained that while the US was willing to renegotiate its 
SOFA with Japan, it would resist any such revision with South Korea. He said that 
not only are the reasons for US troop presence in the two countries different; the cost-
sharing for the US military presence in the two countries is also different: Japan pro-
vides 75 % of the cost of US bases in its territory while South Korea pays only 35 %. 
Early November 1995 the two sides agreed to establish a panel which would make 
recommendations in order to put it in line with the new Japan-US arrangements. The 
panel was likely to recommend that the US authorities hand over military personnel 
accused ofrape or murder.{IHT 20-10,03-11-95; FEER 23-11-95 p.14) 
SALMAN RUSHDIE death edict 
A top Iranian official who was scheduled to become Iran's next president, said that 
Iran would not send death squads to carry out the death edict against SALMAN 
RUSHDIE, but it would never give the pledge in writing because it would hurt the 
country's honour. (IHT 01-11-95) 
On 15 February 1996 the European Parliament urged Iran in a resolution "to make 
a written declaration that it will not carry out the Jatwa and will seek to restrain Ira-
nian citizens from trying to do so" .(IHT 16-02-96) 
German investigation of Iranian official 
The German federal prosecutor launched an investigation of the Iranian minister 
for security affairs who headed the Iranian intelligence service, relating to his alleged 
role in the death of four Iranian Kurdish opposition militants in Berlin in September 
1992 (the so-called Mykonos-case named after the Berlin restaurant where the killing 
took place). It was the first time that a Western country had directly challenged a 
senior Iranian official over a 'terrorism' incident.{IHT 11-12-95) In a later develop-
ment a German investigating magistrate issued a warrant for the arrest of the Iranian 
minister for intelligence and security affairs on suspicion of murder and attempted 
murder although, as was reported, the German foreign ministry had sought to block 
the issuance of the warrant.(IHT 16/17-03-96) 
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KOREAN WAR 
North Korean-US talks on m.i.a. 
North Korea and the US held talks in January 1996 on the return of remains of US 
servicemen killed during the Korean War. The two sides agreed in principle on joint 
excavation teams for the remains, but disagreed on US insistence that they start work 
immediately. North Korea and the US began discussing the search for the remains of 
lost US soldiers in 1987.(IHT 16-01-96; FEER 18-02-96 p.13) 
In May 1996 the two countries reached agreement to start their joint search efforts 
later in the year. It was reported that the US would pay $2 million to North Korea for 
its efforts to locate the remains of more than 8,100 American and UN personnel re-
ported missing as a result of the Korean war.(FEER 18-02-96 p.13, 23-05-96 p.15) 
North Korea had so far delivered more than 200 sets of US remains. The US had 
reimbursed North Korea for the cost of search and recovery.(IHT 11112-05-96) 
North Korean proposal for peace accord 
North Korea on 22 February 1996 proposed a temporary peace accord with the US 
to replace the truce agreement of 1953, pending a definitive peace treaty.(IHT 24/25-
02-96) 
North Korean repudiation of demilitarized zone 
North Korea issued a statement on 4 April 1996 according to which it would 'give 
up its duty' of controlling the demilitarized zone, while accusing South Korea of 
moving military personnel and equipment into the buffer zone. The statement said that 
North Korean personnel and vehicles would no longer bear distinctive insignia and 
markings when entering the six kilometre demilitarized zone.(IHT 05-04-96) Between 
5 and 7 April 1996 North Korean soldiers entered into the demilitarized zone but 
pulled out some hours later. The armistice agreement allows no more than 35 soldiers 
and 5 officers to enter the DMZ.(IHT 08-04-96) China urged North Korea on 9 April 
1996 to respect the truce and to desist from intruding into the DMZ. It expressed the 
hope of North and South Korea reaching a peace agreement.(lHT 10-04-96) 
Proposal for four-country peace talks 
The South Korean and US presidents on 16 April 1996 publicly invited North 
Korea to take part in quadrilateral talks involving the two Koreas, the US and China 
to achieve permanent peace on the Korean peninsula. China responded positively to 
the proposal. In agreeing to four-way talks, South Korea had relaxed its insistence that 
any peace treaty be negotiated only by the two Koreas. The two leaders rejected North 
Korea's bid for separate exclusive talks with the US to replace the 1953 armistice 
agreeement with a new peace treaty. (IHT 17-04-96;FEER 25-04-96 p.13) 
LABOUR 
Linkage of labour standards with international trade 
The ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting in July 1995 reiterated their stand to oppose 
any attempt to link labour standards with international trade and to use labour standards 
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to interfere in the internal affairs of developing countries. They welcomed the position 
adopted by the ILO Governing Body's Working Party to suspend any further discussion 
of the link between international trade and social standards. However, they renewed their 
calion the ILO to undertake a thorough review of labour standards, some of which are 
not relevant to the economic and labour environment of developing countries on the road 
to industrialization.{Joint Communique; Al49/953-S/1995/652) 
The agenda of the ministerial-level meeting of the WTO to be held in Singapore in 
December 1996 was the subject of controversy, although the meeting was still a year 
away and although the WTO Director-General said that the agenda would focus on 'non-
controversial' issues. 
The US trade representative said that the debate should include the social clause - lin-
king labour rights to trade. The EU trade commissioner insisted that it was legitimate to 
look at issues such as child labour, prison labour and the right of association. On the 
other hand, an Asian dipomat said that the focus should be on market access - imple-
menting the trade liberalization commitments made in the Uruguay Round.{FEER 11-01-
96 p.76) 
A communique issued on 3 April 1996 after a G-7 summit [including Japan] on em-
ployment held in France noted the importance of "enhancing core labour standards 
around the world". Asians, on the other hand, expressed cynicism about the attempt to 
make a connection between labour standards and trade. The Pakistani envoy to the EU, 
for example, said that labour-rights pressures were driven by the desire of Western un-
ions and industrialists to protect jobs and market share; while the proper way to deal 
with social conditions in Asia was to give more development aid.{FEER 18-04-96 p.82) 
MIGRANT WORKERS 
See also: Diplomatic protection 
Phase-out of migrant workers 
The president of the Philippines on 13 July 1995 ordered a phase-out on the de-
ployment of Philippine domestic workers and bar girls abroad. The presidential com-
mission's report which was endorsed by the presidential order, called for an "im-
mediate phase-out of all women domestic helpers in the Middle East" and a stop to 
the deployment "of the so-called women entertainers for Japan, Greece and Cyprus". 
However, on 17 July the president retreated and decided to have another panel investi-
gate the conclusions of the earlier panel.{IHT 14-07,18-07-95) 
Migrant workers in Malaysia 
The Malaysian government said in mid-1995 it would allow foreigners working in 
construction, manufacturing, hotels and restaurants to stay for up to five years. The 
current limit was two years plus a one year extension. More than 1 million overseas 
workers in Malaysia sent home $1 billion in 1994. {FEER 27-07-95 p.83) 
A Malaysian-based non-governmental organization, Tenaganita, called a press 
conference on 27 July 1995 and offered details about alleged maltreatment of illegal 
immigrants in Malaysia's holding centres for illegals. It was said that between January 
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and May 1995 at least 10 illegal immigrants, mostly from Bangladesh, had died from 
contageous diseases caused by unsanitary conditions. According to Tenaganita, the 
majority of the illegal immigrants, who came to Malaysia for work, were frail, weak 
and undernourished. 
Malaysian authorities denied the allegations and the Bangladeshi High Commission 
in Kuala Lumpur declined to comment.(FEER 10-08-95 p.26) The following month, 
the Malaysian government froze the recruitment of Bangladeshi workers, saying it 
sought to prevent their exploitation by both local and Bangladeshi agents.(FEER 24-
08-95 p.15) 
Joint investigation into death of maid 
A Filipino maid in Singapore plunged from a ninth-storey appartment on 7 De-
cember 1995 and died. The Philippine president formed a group to investigate the 
incident, whereupon the Singapore government offered to cooperate in the investigati-
on.(IHT 22-12-95) 
Migrant workers in Asia 
It was reported that while migrant workers have become part of the Asian eco-
nomic progress, the current migration of Asians to other Asian destinations was un-
precedented. An Australian study conservatively put the number of migrants across 
East Asia at 2.6 million. As of May 1996, Southeast Asian figures showed, for exam-
ple, that Brunei had 49,000 migrant workers from 4 neighboring countries; Malaysia 
had at least 1 million guest workers, Thailand hosted 400,000 Myanmarese workers; 
and Singapore had 170,000 migrant workers. The same figures showed that the Phil-
ippines sent out 372,000 workers to its neighbors; Indonesia, 653,000; and Thailand, 
122,OOO.(FEER 23-05-96 pp.60-66) 
MILITARY ALLIANCES 
Japanese contribution for US military bases 
Japan and the US on 27 September 1995 signed a five-year agreement on the Japa-
nese financial contribution for US military bases in Japan, replacing an earlier agree-
ment of 1991. The agreement would be called Special Measures Agreement. Japan's 
contribution would be $5 billion a year, implying an increase of $0.5 billion annually. 
The figures pale in comparison to the initial demands by the US which has about 100 
bases and 40,000 troops in Japan.(IHT 14-09-95; Japan Times 28-09-95) 
US bases on Okinawa 
The Japanese government had requested the governor of Okinawa that Okinawa 
landlords renew land leases with the US forces on the island, but the governor refused 
to agree, arguing that after fifty years since the end of the war there should be a re-
duction of the bases. The attitude of the islanders was strongly influenced by the rape 
incident (see: Jurisdiction). The governor's stance led the Japanese prime minister to 
declare that he would force the landowners to renew the leases, some of which would 
expire in March 1996. Okinawa hosts over 28,000 US troops and is home to 40 bases 
that occupy a fifth of the island. The governor of Okinawa vowed not to sign docu-
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ments ordering land owners to extend base leases, although the prime minister can 
overrule him.(IHT 31-10,22-11-95,24-01-96; FEER 23-11-95 pp.16-22) [The US-
Japan Security Treaty requires the Japanese government to provide land, facilities and 
part of the cost of stationing US servicemen in Japan.] 
In December 1995 the Japanese government sued the Okinawa governor, and on 
25 March 1996 the Naha branch of the Fukuoka High Court ruled that the governor 
must sign the leases. If he continued to refuse, the prime minister would be permitted 
to sign in his place.(IHT 26-03-96; FEER 04-04-96 p.13) 
Meanwhile the US secretary of defense said the US was prepared to scale back the 
US military presence on Okinawa, but adjustments had to be made within the con-
straint of keeping a tptal of 47,000 troops in Japan. He said in essence that the bases 
were in Japan for the latter's good more than that of the US.(IHT 01 and 2-11-95) It 
was reported in February 1996 that the US had proposed to the Japanese government 
to transfer part of its air base from Okinawa to the Japanese mainland.(IHT 19-02-96) 
The US agreed on 12 April 1996 to return a major American air base, Futenma 
Air Station at Okinawa, in five to seven years. It was later announced that about 20 
percent of the land at Okinawa used for US purposes would be returned to Okina-
wans. In return, Tokyo agreed to supply spare parts and services to the US when 
taking part in joint training exercises and peacekeeping missions.(IHT 15-04-96; 
FEER 25-04-96 p.13, 02-05-96 p.15) 
Revision of Japan-US security arrangements 
On the occasion of the US president's visit to Japan in April 1996 the two coun-
tries agreed to revise their security arrangements by increasing Japan's role in de-
fending its own security. Japan would share transportation, refueling, food, water, 
clothing, medical care, maintenance and weapons parts during peacetime. Japan 
would also reconsider Japan's military role during a war in East Asia involving US 
forces. Japan promised to 'review' the joint guidelines for military co-operation that 
were agreed upon in 1978.(IHT 16-04-96; FEER 02-05-96 pp.14-16) 
The 1960 Japan-US security treaty was established for the purpose of enabling the US 
to defend Japan from communist aggression, without Japan having to maintain a mili-
tary force for purposes other than self-defence. The treaty said nothing about Japanese 
assistance in case of conflict with third countries. The premise of the arrangement was 
that defence was provided against countries with which neither the US nor Japan 
would develop significant economic ties. The treaty was originally a lO-year pact but 
was extended indefinitely in 1970, subject to one year's notice of termination by either 
side. 
While some questioned the continued usefulness of the Japan-US Security Treaty, 
a former Japanese prime minister expressed his belief that the Treaty, which was 
originally motivated as an anti-Soviet treaty, must seek to playa new post-Cold War 
role: as the linchpin in the Japan-China-US security 'trialogue'. A US government 
security adviser agreed that the US-Japan pact was the keystone to stablity in East 
Asia and must be adapted to new missions. 
A US-Japan joint security declaration was scheduled to be signed during a summit 
in November 1995. The declaration would mark the culmination of 13 months of 
diplomatic work which was seriously ~haken by the public furore in early September 
when three US servicemen raped a 12-year old girl in Okinawa. Because of the US 
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president's absence at the APEC summit in Osaka (see supra: APEC), the signing of 
the US-Japan declaration was postponed.(FEER 23-11-95 pp.16-22; 30-11-95 p.16)] 
The "US-Japan Joint Declaration on Security - Alliance for the 21st Century" of 
17 April 1996 provides, inter alia: 
"1. . . . The two leaders agreed that the future security and prosperity of both the 
United States and Japan are tied inextricably to the future of the Asia-Pacific re-
gion. 
2. For more than a year, the two governments conducted an intensive review of the 
evolving political and security environment of the Asia-Pacific and of various as-
pects of the US-Japan security relationship. On the basis of this review, the 
President [of the US] and the Prime Minister [of Japan] reaffirmed their com-
mitment to the profound common values that guide our national policies: the 
maintenance of freedom, the pursuit of democracy, and respect for human rights. 
THE REGIONAL OUTLOOK 
3 .... [1]nstability and uncertainty persist in the region. Tensions continue on the 
Korean Peninsula. There are still heavy concentrations of military force, includ-
ing nuclear arsenals. Unresolved territorial disputes, potential regional conflicts, 
and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery 
all constitute sources of instability. 
THE US-JAPAN ALLIANCE AND THE TREATY OF MUTUAL CO-
OPERATION AND SECURITY 
4 .... [T]he President and the Prime Minister ... reaffirmed that the US-Japan se-
curity relationship, based on the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security be-
tween the United States and Japan, remains the cornerstone for achieving com-
mon security objectives, and for maintaining a stable and prosperous environ-
ment for the Asia-Pacific region as we enter the twenty-first century. 
(a) The Prime Minister confirmed Japan's fundamental defense policy as articu-
lated in its new "National Defense Program Outline" adopted in Novem-
ber,1995, which underscored that the Japanese defense capabilities should 
play appropriate roles in the security environment after the Cold War. 
The leaders again confirmed that US deterrence under the Treaty of Mutual 
Co-operation and Security remains the guarantee for Japan's security. 
(b) The President and the Prime Minister agreed that continued US military pres-
ence is also essential for preserving peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific re-
gion. The leaders shared the common recognition that the US-Japan security 
relationship forms an essential pillar which supports the positive regional en-
gagement of the US. 
On the basis of a thorough assessment, the US reaffirmed that meeting its 
commitments in the prevailing security environment requires the maintenance 
of its current force structure of about 100,000 forward deployed military per-
sonnel in the region, including about the current level in Japan. 
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(c) The Prime Minister welcomed the US determination to remain a stable and 
steadfast presence in the region. He reconfirmed that Japan would continue 
appropriate contributions for the maintenance of US forces in Japan, such as 
through the provision of facilities and areas in accordance with the Treaty of 
Mutual Cooperation and Security and Host Nation Support. 
BILATERAL CO-OPERATION UNDER THE US-JAPAN SECURITY 
RELATIONSHIP 
5. The President and the Prime Minister, with the objective of enhancing the credi-
bility of this vital security relationship, agreed to undertake efforts to advance co-
operation in the following areas: 
(a) Recognizing that close bilateral defense co-operation is a central element of 
the US-Japan Alliance, both governments agreed that continued close con-
sultation is essential. 
(b) The President and the Prime Minister agreed to initiate a review of the 1978 
Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation to build upon the close work-
ing relationship already established between the US and Japan. 
The two leaders agreed on the necessity to promote bilateral policy coordi-
nation, including studies on bilateral co-operation in dealing with situations 
that may emerge in the areas surrounding Japan and which will have an im-
portant influence on the peace and security of Japan. 
(c) The President and the Prime Minister welcomed the April 15, 1996 signature 
of the Agreement . . . Concerning Reciprocal Provision of Logistic Support, 
Supplies and Services Between the Armed Forces of the United States of 
America and the Self-Defense Forces of Japan, and expressed their hope that 
this Agreement will further promote the bilateral cooperative relationship. 
(d) Noting the importance of interoperability in all facets of co-operation between 
the US forces and the Self-Defense Forces of Japan, the two governments 
will enhance mutual exchange in the areas of technology and equipment, in-
cluding bilateral cooperative research and development of equipment such as 
the support fighter (F-2). 
(e) The two governments recognized that the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction and their means of delivery has important implications for their 
common security. They will work together to prevent proliferation and will 
continue to cooperate in the ongoing study on ballistic missile defense. 
6 .... In particular, with respect to Okinawa, where US facilities and areas are 
highly concentrated, the President and the Prime Minister reconfirmed their de-
termination to carry out steps to consolidate, realign, and reduce US facilities 
and areas consistent with the objectives of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and 
Security .... 
REGIONAL CO-OPERATION 
7. The President and the Prime Minister agreed that the two governments will 
jointly and individually strive to achieve a more peaceful and stable security en-
vironment in the Asia-Pacific region. In this regard, the two leaders recognized 
that the engagement of the United States in the region, supported by the US-
Japan security relationship, constitutes the foundation for such efforts. 
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The two leaders stressed the importance of peaceful resolution of problems in 
the region. They emphasized that it is extremely important for the stability and 
prosperity of the region that China playa positive and constructive role, and, in 
this context, stressed the interest of both countries in furthering co-operation with 
China. Russia's ongoing process of reform contributes to regional and global sta-
bility, and merits continued encouragement and co-operation. The leaders also 
stated that full normalization of Japan-Russia relations based on the Tokyo Dec-
laration is important to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. They noted 
also that stability on the Korean Peninsula is vitally important to the United 
States and Japan and reaffirmed that both countries will continue to make every 
effort in this regard, in close co-operation with the Republic of Korea. 
GLOBAL CO-OPERA nON 
8. The President and the Prime Minister recognized that the Treaty of Mutual Co-
operation and Security is the core of the US-Japan Alliance, and underlies the 
mutual confidence that constitutes the foundation for bilateral co-operation on 
global issues .... " 
(Courtesy US Department of State) 
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The commander of US forces in Japan said in May 1996 that the review of guide-
lines would take up to two years, and would include Japan's potential role in a mili-
tary conflict in Korea and in mine-sweeping operations in regional waters. In the dis-
cussions on this review between the Japanese prime minister and his coalition partners 
the former referred to the formal Japanese position ruling out arrangements on collec-
tive self-defence as being against the constitution. The review would consider topics 
such as rescuing Japanese nationals overseas and accepting refugees.(IHT 14-05-96; 
FEER 06-06-96 p.21) Other concrete issues were: the use of civilian airports by US 
planes in a war, the use of Japanese military planes or warships to pick up refugees 
from elsewhere, the right of Japanese ships or planes to fire in international waters if 
they were about to be fired on, the assistance by Japan to an American warship which 
was being anacked.(IHT 29-05-96) 
China's position vis-a-vis the Japan-US security arrangements 
The spokesman of the Chinese foreign ministry gave a reaction in early November 
1995 to security talks which were to be held between Japan and the US later in the 
month, saying that "when drafting or amending their national defence policies, these 
countries should do so to maintain regional peace and stability instead of undermining 
it".(IHT 08-11-95) 
The issue was raised again in April 1996 in connection with the impending visit by 
the US president to Japan and both countries' review of their security treaty. During 
his visit to Japan the Chinese foreign minister expressed the hope that the US visit 
would not cause 'new problems', and warned Japan not to use its alliance with the US 
to try to contain China. The Japanese prime minister assured that Japan-US security 
agreements were not directed against China. 
It was generally believed that the triangle relationship between China, Japan and 
the US was the main issue in maintaining stability in Asia.(IHT 02-04,04-04-96) 
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With regard to the Japan-US arrangements, China warned Japan against a military 
build-up as it would be bound to cause concern and vigilance among Asian nations. 
Yet the Chinese foreign ministry said it did not believe that the US-Japan security 
agreement was targeted at China.(IHT 19-04-96) 
It was reported that the US went out of its way to reassure China that it was not a 
target of the security pact. The Chinese embassy in Washington was briefed in ad-
vance on the US-Japan announcements. (FEER 02-05-96 p.40) Japan decided on 19 
April 1996 to send special envoys to China and South Korea to calm fears that it 
would expand its military role in Asia as a result of the agreements reached at the US-
Japan summit.(IHT 20121-04-96) 
MILITARY CO-OPERATION 
Status of forces agreements 
(see: Jurisdiction) 
Philippine - US 
The Philippine and US navies held special-warfare trammg exercises near the 
contested Spratly islands in July 1995. The Philippine defense department and military 
said that these exercises were 'normal' and were conducted every year, and had 
nothing to do with the tensions over the Spratly islands.(IHT 25-07-95) 
Yet according to a US official, Philippine-US defence relations had been boosted 
as a result of the Chinese occupation of Mischief Reef (5 AsYIL 495). It was reported 
that the two countries had been working closely together to determine Philippine de-
fence needs and possible US aid. Thus the late July 1995 training of Philippine troops 
by US navy commandos and reports about the Philippines considering buying some of 
the F-16 fighter planes which were not delivered by the US to Pakistan (5 AsYIL 486 
and supra p.338). 
The two sides were also completing negotiations on a status-of-forces agreement 
that would govern visits to the Philippines by US servicemen. In addition, it was re-
ported that the two countries were close to agreeing upon a deal to refit and resupply 
US vessels in the Philippines. Lastly, along with neighbouring countries, discussions 
had been held on the possibility of holding multilateral naval exercises. The US-
Philippine Mutual Defense Board held a meeting at the end of June. (FEER 03-08-95 
pp.22-23) 
Sino-US military ties 
China on 31 October 1995 called for the resumption and improvement of Chinese-
American military ties, as such co-operation was essential to securing global peace 
and stability. Earlier China had suspended military exchanges in retaliation for the US 
decision to allow a visit to the US by the Taiwanese president. Senior military ex-
changes were scheduled to resume in November 1995.(IHT 01-11-95) 
A US naval ship sailed into the port of Shanghai on 31 January 1996 for a friendly 
port call, the first after 1989.(IHT 01-02-96) 
A delegation from the National Defence University in Washington was due to go 
to Beijing in late April 1996 under a long-term agreement with counterparts in China 
to exchange ideas, faculty members, and students. But the Chinese side postponed the 
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visit indefinitely in response to the US decision to call off a visit by the Chinese de-
fence minister to the US in March.(FEER 09-05-96 p.12) 
China pledge to stop military assistance to Myanmar 
The defence minister of Thailand said China had reassured Thailand that it would 
stop helping to build up the Myanmar military. (FEER 09-11-95 p.15) 
Indonesia - Australia military co-operation 
(See: Regional security, infra p. 445.) 
Stationing of Singapore air force planes in Australia 
The two countries were preparing an arrangement under which much of the Singa-
pore air force might be stationed in Australia over the next few years. In 1994 Singa-
pore moved its air force flying training school to Western Australia.(IHT 17-01-96) 
Chinese aid to Cambodian forces 
China agreed to provide military training and $1 million in aid to the Cambodian 
armed forces. It had provided uniforms, boots and medicine since 1992. The Cambo-
dian secretary of national defence said that "co-operation between the two armies and 
countries is becoming stronger and stronger". 
Assistance to the Khmer Rouge ceased after China signed the 1991 Paris peace 
accord.(IHT 24-04-96; FEER 09-05-96 p.28) 
MINORITIES 
Muslims in Thailand 
Instead of struggling for a separate state centered on the muslim province of Pattani 
in Southern Thailand, local muslim politicians decided to exploit Thailand's democracy 
to build up a muslim presence in parliament and to lobby for cabinet positions. The mus-
lim MP for Pattani said: "Before, we played separatists; now we're playing politics". At 
the same time, a new generation of religious teachers were working hard to strengthen 
Islam in their community, saying they sought by peaceful means to foster better relations 
with the Thai government. On the economic development of the Thai muslim region, it 
was reported that many Muslims were hopeful about the planned 'growth triangle', en-
compassing southern Thailand, northern Malaysia, and the adjacent province of North 
Sumatra in Indonesia.(FEER 11-04-96 p.29) 
MISSILE TECHNOLOGY 
Chinese missile tests 
(see: Divided states: China, supra p. 362). 
Chinese missile exports to Pakistan 
On 12 and 13 June 1996, Washington-based newspapers disclosed US intelligence 
reports that Pakistan had deployed Chinese-made M-ll ballistic missiles, and that the 
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country had probably completed the development of nuclear warheads for the missiles. 
A spokesman from the Chinese foreign ministry dismissed the Washington press re-
ports as 'totally groundless.' 
Under the 1978 Missile Technology Control Regime, 28 countries agreed not to 
export missiles capable of carrying a 500-kilogram warhead with a range of more than 
290 kms (see 1 AsYIL 270). The M-11 has a range of 290 kms but can carry a pay-
load of 800 kgs. China is not a signatory to the MTCR but a 1990 US law requires the 
US government to impose sanctions on a country that violates the accord regardless of 
whether that country is a party to the MTCR.(FEER 27-06-96 p.14) 
Indian tests and Pakistani response 
India announced that it successfully tested a longer-range version of the surface-to-
surface Prithvi missile on 27 January 1996. It was the 15th test of the indigenously 
developed, liquid-fueled missile since 22 February 1988, but the first to boost a range 
beyond 100 miles.(IHT 29-01-96) A few days later the Pakistani president warned that 
Pakistan might be forced to build its own missiles if India continues its program. He 
emphasized that the Indian missile is capable of carrying nuclear warheads, which was 
the reason for Pakistan's proposal for a zero-missile regime in South Asia. Pakistani 
military officials said that India was planning to deploy the missiles along the western 
Indo-Pakistan border.(IHT 01-02-96; FEER 22-02-96 p.14) 
Iranian test 
Iran tested a Chinese anti-ship missile in the Arabian Sea outside the Gulf on 6 
January 1996. The missile had a range of up to 100 kilometres.(IHT 31-01-96) 
Russian sale of SS-18 missile technology to China 
The US urged Russia and Ukraine not to sell China the technology for the inter-
continental SS-18 missile which has a range of 11,000 kilometres. The US defense 
secretary said such sales could violate both the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 
(START) and the Missile Technology Control Regime. Under START parties to the 
treaty may not transfer strategic offensive weapons to non-treaty states, and the 
MTCR put further constraints to the technology that may be transferred to non-
parties, like China. 
It was reported that China had asked Russia to supply SS-18 rocket boosters for 
commercial space launching. The Treaty allows launching from the territory of a non-
party state as long as the party to the treaty retains 'possession and control' of the 
launcher.(IHT 22-05-96) 
MONETARY MATTERS 
IMF assistance to Myanmar 
(see: Economic co-operation and assistance, supra p.369) 
Mutual currency support 
In the wake of the Mexican peso crisis, the central bankers from Hong Kong, 
China, Japan, Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, South Korea, New 
Zealand and Australia gathered in a historic meeting in Hongkong on 20 November 
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1995. In a series of bilateral agreements, to none of which Japan was a party, many of 
the central banks agreed to help each other if their currencies come under fire from 
global speculators. They put in place a system in which they would fend off attacks on 
their currencies by translating their reserves quickly into cash. The agreements would 
allow the banks to borrow cash (US dollars) from each other by pledging their securi-
ties as collateral. The dollars could then be used to buy their own currency in the 
market. 
There were doubts, however, that it would really be possible to manage the ex-
change rates in view of the extremely vast amounts involved in the foreign-exchange 
market. It was conceded that the mutual support would be as much moral as finan-
cial.(IHT 18/19-11-95; FEER 07-12-95 p.70) 
Three months later, an agreement was reached between Hong Kong, Singapore 
and Japan to coordinate central-bank interventions in currency markets. The accord 
WOUld, inter alia, allow the Bank of Japan to ask its counterparts to intervene in dol-
lar-yen trading to prevent Japan's fragile economic recovery from being derailed by 
the strong yen.(FEER 29-02-96 p.55) Japanese financial authorities had called for a 
regional system aimed at stabilizing currencies, which would be some kind of Asian 
repurchase pact. The point would be to support regional currencies if they were being 
sold off suddenly, in case of a crisis like that in Mexico. The issue would be discussed 
at an APEC meeting in March 1996.(IHT 22-02-96) 
In April 1996 it was reported that the Japanese finance ministry and the Bank of 
Japan had signed bilateral securities-repurchase agreements with their counterparts of 
Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Hongkong. 
Under the agreements, central banks needing US dollars would be able to borrow for-
eign reserves or dollars from each other against collateral in the form of US govern-
ment securities. Formally the securities are being bought for an amount of cash under 
an agreement to sell them back at a specified date for a specified amount.(IHT 26-04-
96) 
IMF loan to Pakistan 
The IMF agreed to extend a $600 million emergency stabilization loan to Pakistan 
provided the government trimmed its expenditures, reduced its budget deficit, restrict 
its domestic borrowing and shore up its foreign currency reserves. On 13 Dec 1995, 
the IMF agreed to release the first tranche of $200 million, with the rest to be released 
over 15 months provided the government met IMF targets. 
In June 1995, a $1.5 billion loan agreement of 1993 was cancelled because Paki-
stan failed to meet IMF conditions.(FEER 11-01-96 p.76) 
Partial convertibility of Chinese currency 
The governor of China's central bank announced that current account convertibil-
ity of the yuan would be introduced by the end of 1996, making it easier for foreign 
companies to do normal, commercially related currency business with local banks and 
to repatriate profits. As conditions enabling such convertibility the governor men-
tioned political and economic stability, a balanced sheet for international payments, a 
stable exchange rate of the currency and abundant exchange resources. [The current 
account convertibility was to be distinguished from full convertibility, involving a free 
flow of capital in and out of Chinese stock and bond markets.] 
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The new system would replace the current one which requires companies to find 
individual counterparties with whom to exchange money in a series of designated 
swap centres. It would enable those in need of foreign exchange to access, via banks, 
a national foreign exchange market centred in Shanghai.(IHT 21-06-96) 
NATIONALITY 
See: Asylum, Hongkong, Refugees 
NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT 
Eleventh summit meeting 
The 11th summit meeting of the Movement was held in Colombia in October 
1995. Fifty-two heads of state and government attended from the 113 member states. 
The admission of Turkmenistan and Eritrea as new members was on the agenda. 
The communique issued at the end of the meeting called for more representation 
for Africa, Asia and Latin America in the UN Security Council.(IHT 19-10 and 
21122-10-95) 
NUCLEAR CAPACITY 
See also: Sanctions 
Sino-Japanese talks 
More than two months after Japan announced on 15 May 1995 it would reduce aid 
to China because of the Chinese nuclear test on that day, Japan proposed to hold dis-
cussions on nuclear matters, such as nuclear testing, disarmament and the Compre-
hensive Test Ban Treaty. The discussions were held on 25 July 1995.(IHT 19-07,26-
07-95) 
Reactions to French nuclear testing 
The Japanese prime minister on 19 July 1995 accused France of 'betraying' non-
nuclear countries by planning to resume nuclear tests. He announced that Japan would 
sponsor a draft resolution in the UN calling for a halt to such testing, and summoned 
the French ambassador in order to lodge .a formal protest. He refrained, however, 
from a call to boycott French goods, as proposed by several Japanese politicians. 
Japan thus did not use its economic clout as it did toward China where it cut economic 
aid.(IHT 20-07,21-07-95) After the second French nuclear weapon test on 2 October 
1995 the French ambassador was told by the Japanese foreign minister that he 
'strongly regretted' that France did 'not understand Japan's consistent position' on the 
matter. (IHT 03-10-95) 
The Philippine foreign minister said at the ASEAN Regional Forum meeting in 
early August 1995 that the members of ASEAN felt 'betrayed' by France, which 
agreed in May 1995 to an indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty 
and yet proceeded with nuclear tests. 
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It was reported that when members of the ASEAN Regional Forum called for an 
immediate end to nuclear testing, the EU, represented by Spain, objected to the 
call.{FEER 10-08-95 pp.14-16,17-08-95 p.14-15) 
In August 1995 the Maldives High Commission in Sri Lanka issued a statement, 
saying: "The Maldives is alarmed about the ecological outcomes of nuclear testing in 
view of the fragile ecosystem with which it is endowed" .(IHT 10-08-95) 
Taiwan's nuclear weapon capability 
As tensions heightened between the mainland and Taiwan, the Taiwanese presi-
dent answered to a question from a member of the National Assembly on Taiwan's 
future stance on nuclear weapons: "Everyone knows we had the plan before, but this 
issue drew international attention and affected the whole country's image .... 
Whether we need the protection of nuclear weapons - we should re-study the question 
from a long-term point of view". 
According to the Asia-Pacific editor of Jane's Defense Weekly, "[t]hey had a 
nascent program with basic technological capabilities in both weapons and a delivery 
platform". The efforts were halted under pressure from the US and Japan in the 
1980s.{IHT 29/30-07-95;FEER 10-08-95 p.21) 
Implementation of North Korea light-water reactor accord 
By way of implementation of the accord to provide North Korea with light-water 
reactors (see 5 As YIL 545) a team of US, Japanese and South Korean officials left for 
North Korea on 15 August 1995 to inspect the possible site for one of the power sta-
tions.{IHT 16-08-95) 
In the same context a ship carrying the first batch of the 100,000 tons of fuel oil 
for North Korea left for North Korea on 17 August 1995. Another 20,000-ton ship-
ment would depart later in the month. The oil deliveries were being carried out under 
contract by a South Korean refinery and transported on Chinese ships. In November 
1995 North Korea confirmed the shipping of the oil that had to be delivered. A second 
contract for the delivery of 11.8 million gallon would be carried out in late March 
1996.(IHT 18-08,22-11-95,18-03-96) 
In early September 1995 a team of US nuclear experts went to North Korea to 
discuss the treatment of spent nuclear fuel.{see 5 AsYIL 471) 
Talks to work out details of the implementation of the agreement to provide North 
Korea with two nuclear reactors started in Kuala Lumpur on 11 September 1995 and 
continued in New York later in the month. The supply agreement (see 5 AsYIL 554) 
was finally signed on 15 December 1995.{IHT 15-12 and 16/17-12-95; Korea Herald 
30-09-95) The consortium would provide North Korea with a 20-year, interest-free lo-
an. (FEER 28-12-95/04-01-96 p.123) 
In January 1996, the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization deliv-
ered 43,000 tons of oil to North Korea's power stations. 457,000 tons were left to be 
delivered overdue in 1996 because KEDO lacked the necessary funds. 
KEDO needs $50-55 million a year. The US contribution for 1996 was meant to 
be $22 million but was not paid up. As a result South Korea and Japan were bearing 
all expenses, and it was hoped that other countries would contribute for the oil.{FEER 
18-01-96 p.12) 
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Chinese nuclear tests 
China conducted an underground nuclear test on 17 August 1995, but sought to 
defuse international criticism by reiterating that it was ready to stop such testing under 
a global ban. The previous Chinese test was on 15 May 1995. It was expected that 
China would conduct two tests in 1996 in addition to its 43 tests in the past years. 
Japan made a strongly worded protest and threatened a further cut in its grant aid 
(see: Economic co-operation and assistance).(IHT 18-08-95,09-02-96; FEER 07-09-95 
p.13) 
On 8 June 1996 China conducted another nuclear weapon test in its underground 
Lop Nor test site in Xinjiang province, and said it would carry out one more test in 
September before joining an international moratorium on further tests.(IHT 10-06-96; 
FEER 20-06-96 p.13) 
Russian nuclear fuel for Iran 
Russia and Iran signed an agreement for the supply of nuclear fuel by Russia to 
Iran for ten years to be used in a nuclear power plant in southern Iran. The accord 
was supplementary to a contract to complete building the plant in Bushehr.(see 5 
AsYIL 477)(IHT 25-08-95) 
It was reported on 27 August 1995 that Russia would supply two 400-megawatt 
nuclear reactors to Iran. They were to be installed at the Neka nuclear research com-
plex in northern Iran. (IHT 28-08-95) 
Japanese breeder-reactor 
(see 3 As YIL 428) 
Japan's breeder-reactor at Monju (Fukui Prefecture, north of Kyoto), the world's 
second largest, would start operations in late August 1995.(IHT 28-08-95) On 8 De-
cember 1995 an accident occurred, in which two to three tons of sodium leaked from 
the reactor's secondary cooling system because of corrosion, but no radioactive mate-
rials were discharged. As a result the reactor would be shut for at least six months. 
Plans for such breeder reactors, using plutonium, once supported by many experts, 
had been dropped by most countries. The head of the Japanese Nuclear Safety Com-
mission said that unless the cause of the accident could be sufficiently determined and 
appropriate steps taken, fast-breeder reactors would not be used commercially. (IHT 
11 and 18-12-95,26-02-96) 
Cancellation of Sino-Iranian nuclear reactor deal 
China had concluded an agreement with Iran in 1994 for the supply of two nuclear 
power reactors. (see 5 AsYIL 478) In September 1995 the Chinese foreign minister 
was reported to have told the US that China would cancel the contract. However, the 
Iranian foreign ministry denied these reports.{IHT 29-09-95) 
South Korean nuclear weapons project in the 1970s 
A South Korean member of parliament confirmed earlier reports according to 
which South Korea in the 1970s actively pursued a nuclear weapons project to estab-
lish a more independent military relationship with the US. The project was later 
dropped under US pressure in the early 1980s.(IHT 06-10-95) 
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Alleged Indian and Pakistani plans for nuclear tests 
There had been rumours in US newspapers of Indian preparations for a second 
nuclear test, after its first one in 1974. According to reports India was excavating an 
underground shaft at its nuclear test side in the Rajistan desert. India dismissed the re-
ports. It affirmed its nuclear capability but denied that it was preparing to conduct a 
nuclear test.(IHT 16/17-12,18- and 20-12-95,07-03-96) 
It was later reported that the US government had quietly warned India that in case 
of an Indian nuclear test the US would, under the 1994 GLENN Amendment, cut off 
virtually all the economic benefits it offered. This law requires the US to cut off all 
economic aid, credits, bank loans and export licenses to any country, other than the 
five acknowledged nuclear powers, that tests a nuclear weapon. The law also dictates 
that the US oppose World Bank loans and all other international lending. Exception-
ally the GLENN Amendment prescribes mandatory sanctions instead of entitling the 
president to grant a waiver.(IHT 17-01-96) 
In early March 1996 US newspapers mentioned intelligence reports alleging that 
Pakistan planned its first nuclear explosion if India conducted such test. The Pakistani 
ambassador to the Geneva Disarmament Conference said in February 1996 that Paki-
stan "will be obliged to take the appropriate counter-measures to safeguard its secu-
rity" in case of an Indian test. But a foreign ministry spokesman said that Pakistan had 
decided not to use its nuclear know-how for non-peaceful purposes.(IHT 07 and 08-
03-96; FEER 11-04-96 p.28) 
Nuclear energy projects in Asia 
According to IAEA figures, of the 48 nuclear power plants under construction in 
the world, 17 were in Asia. China, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, India, Indonesia, 
Pakistan, Vietnam and Bangladesh were among the countries which planned to expand 
their nuclear power programs or launch new ones. 
The countries may allow international inspection of their nuclear power plants, but 
excluding their research reactors. India and Pakistan do not allow outside inspection 
of either. Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, Vietnam and Bangladesh have 
agreed to all inspections. As is the case with other declared nuclear weapon powers, 
China has signed the non-proliferation treaty but excludes military reactors used to 
make plutonium for weapons production.(IHT 12-01-96) 
Indonesian plans for nuclear power 
Indonesia was reported to be considering an offer from Canada to help building its 
first nuclear power plant, estimated to cost $2.1 billion. Canada was said to seek tax 
exemption for the first 10 years on the revenue earned from the electricity generated 
by the plant. 
The site of the plant would be at Mount Muria in Central Java. According to In-
donesian forecast Java would need a generating capacity of 27,000 megawatts by 
2015, with 7,000 megawatts expected to come from nuclear-powered generators.(lHT 
01-02-96) 
Alleged Chinese exports for Pakistan's nuclear facilities 
(see also: Sanctions, infra p. 447) 
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It was reported in early February 1996 that, according to the US CIA, China had 
exported to Pakistan in 1995 about 5,000 magnet assemblies for use in centrifuge 
machines that enrich bomb-grade uranium in a Pakistani nuclear facility. China and 
Pakistan initially denied the reports.(FEER 22-02-96 p.14, 07-03-96 p.32) 
China reaffirmed its commitment to nuclear non-proliferation following a US deci-
sion on 10 May 1996 not to impose sanctions on it for the sale of the ring magnets to 
Pakistan. The Chinese foreign ministry said China would not transfer nuclear techno-
logy to 'unsafeguarded facilities' in the future.(FEER 23-05-96 p.15) 
Resistance against expanded power of the IAEA 
Germany and Japan resisted US efforts to expand the powers of the IAEA. The 
new powers would require nuclear installations to provide more detailed reports about 
domestic nuclear activity and about the imports and exports of material that can be 
used to make nuclear weapons. Besides, IAEA inspectors would acquire more 
sweeping search authority. Germany and Japan are of the opinion that the proposals 
would place unfair economic and financial burdens on the owners of nuclear power 
plants.(IHT 05-06-96) 
Prospects for a comprehensive test-ban treaty 
In 1995 the five declared nuclear powers had agreed on a commitment to com-
plete a comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT) in 1996, as a condition for the indefinite 
extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty by the international community. 
China and France indicated that their current tests would be their last.(FEER 01-02-96 
p.29) 
In the Geneva negotiations on the CTBT in early 1996 China said it wanted a 
treaty that would allow for 'peaceful nuclear exlosions', but the US proposed to have 
all nuclear test explosions banned. It offered China computer software to simulate the 
effects of a nuclear explosion in return for China agreeing to a nuclear test ban.(FEER 
28-03-96 p.20) China announced on 6 June 1996 that while it held to its demand that a 
comprehensive test-ban treaty should exempt 'peaceful explosions' needed for scienti-
fic and economic development, it was prepared to put off a decision on the issue until 
the treaty would come up for a future review, possibly in ten years. (IHT 07-06-96) 
The negotiations in Geneva on the CTBT entered into difficulties also because 
Pakistan said it would not sign the treay unless India does so; and India insisted that it 
would not join unless a ban on all testing was explicity linked to a timetable for nu-
clear disarmament - something the five declared nuclear powers were not prepared to 
agree to.(FEER 15-02-96 p.l2, 11-04-96 p.28) 
India said at the Geneva conference on 20 June 1996 that it would not sign a test-
ban treaty unless there was agreement on the destruction of existing nuclear weapons 
within a specified period of time. Meanwhile four of the five declared nuclear weap-
ons states, with subsequent US support, agreed that the treaty would not enter into 
force unless ratified by the five nuclear powers and India, Pakistan and Israel. This 
requirement was rejected by India.(IHT 21-06-96) 
Pakistan warned on 21 June 1996 that the treaty would be worthless unless ad-
hered to by the five nuclear powers and the three 'threshold nuclear states'. It also 
held that the draft put control over verification too much in the hands of the declared 
nuclear powers.(IHT 22/23-06-96) 
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The eighteen-month conference ended on 28 June 1996 with no agreement on a 
draft treaty, but would reconvene on 29 July.(IHT 28 and 29/30-06-96) 
OIL AND GAS 
See also: Foreign investment 
Indonesian supply to South Korea 
Indonesia's oil company, Pertamina, signed a $3.3 billion contract to supply an 
additional 1 million tons of liquefied natural gas to Korea annually. The 20-year 
agreement takes effect in 1998. Pertamina, the world's largest LNG exporter, supplies 
4.3 million tons of LNG annually to South Korea.(FEER 24-08-95 p.59) 
Indonesian and Malaysian supply of gas to China 
It was reported that officials of the Indonesian and Malaysian state-owned oil 
companies, Pertamina and Petronas, held discussions with Chinese officials and com-
panies about possible sales of liquefied natural gas. 
Petronas had entered into an agreement with subsidiaries of foreign oil companies 
to supply gas from the Central Luconia area in the South China Sea off the Malaysian 
state of Sarawak, to a new LNG plant in Bintulu. Pertamina would get the gas from 
the Natuna gas field, 225 kilometres northeast of the Natuna Islands, Indonesia's 
northernmost territory in the South China Sea. (IHT 7/8-10-95) 
Pertamina would supply 1.8 million tonnes of LNG annually to Chinese Petroleum 
Corp. for 20 years in a deal worth $6 billion. Shipments from East Kalimantan start-
ing in 1998 would bring Pertamina's Bontang plant to a total capacity of 21 million 
tons per year. The company had earlier signed contracts with Japan and South Ko-
rea.(FEER 09-11-95 p.87) 
Natural gas from Turkmenistan 
(see 4 As YIL 500) 
Bridas Corp., a Virgin Islands-based petroleum explorer, announced in October 
1995 that it had discovered a huge natural gas field in Turkmenistan, in the centre of 
the Amu-Daria basin, with estimated reserves of 27 trillion cubic feet of gas and 165 
million barrels of condensate, a high quality grade of crude oil. 
Meanwhile, Unocal Corp. of the US had begun a study on an $18 billion project to 
transport gas and oil from Turkmenistan across Afghanistan to Pakistan. (IHT 23-10-
95) 
PASSPORTS AND VISAS 
See also: Hongkong 
Indonesian reaction to Australian visa policy 
The Indonesian foreign minister dismissed as groundless a decision by the Austra-
lian government to grant 'bridging visas' to a number of asylum seekers from East 
Timor, saying "Our position is that these people are not being persecuted".(IHT 
22/23-07-95) 
440 ASIAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Abolition of French visa requirement for some Southeast Asian countries 
Starting late August 1995 Malaysian citizens would no longer need a visa for 
France for a visit of less than 3 months. That made Malaysia the third member state 
of ASEAN, next to Singapore and Brunei, whose citizens are exempted from the visa 
requirement.{IHT 12/13-08-95) 
PIRACY 
See also: Fisheries 
Increase in Asian waters 
The Regional Piracy Center of the International Maritime Bureau stated in an 
official report that there was a surge in piracy, with nearly a third (seventeen) of the 
world's sea robberies taking place in Indonesian waters during the first five months of 
1995. There were 25 piracy cases in the first nine months of 1995 compared with 12 
in the previous year. (IHT 11-07-95, 16-11-95) 
Of the 87 cases worldwide reported in 1994, sixty-eight took place in East Asian 
waters. In the first five months of 1995, thirty-four incidents of piracy in East Asian 
waters were reported to the International Maritime Bureau.{FEER 13-07-95 p.25) The 
biggest increase of cases of piracy in the first 9 months of 1995 compared with the 
same period in 1994 was in the China-Hongkong-Macau region, where piracy in-
creased from 3 to 18.{FEER 30-11-95 p.13) 
Suspected piracy in the South China Sea 
There was hightened anxiety about the safety of Asian shipping routes after the 
experience of two cargo vessels. The first ship, the Hye Prosperity, carrying a cargo 
of cigarettes from Singapore to Cambodia, was intercepted in March 1995 in interna-
tional waters in the Gulf of Thailand. The ship with its cargo was then diverted to the 
Chinese port of Shanwei, 60 kilometers north of Hongkong, where the crew were 
apparently made to sign documents stating that they had been smuggling cigarettes 
into China. The cargo was confiscated but the ship released three weeks later. In a 
second incident, another vessel owned by the same company, the Hye Mieko, lost 
radio contact while in the Gulf of Thailand on 23 June. It was spotted two days after-
wards off Vietnam's coast and eventually also found its way to Shanwei. Shanwei port 
officials later confirmed that the Hye Mieko was under their custody, having "veered 
off course and entered our territorial waters". It was not clear whether the two ships 
were actually engaged in smuggling, or whether Chinese officials were sponsoring 
piracy - or unable to control rogue naval personnel or customs and port officials. 
China denied involvement of its government agencies in pirate attacks. It did admit 
that its patrol boats sometimes approached other vessels in an attempt to stop smug-
gling. According to the official People's Daily China had ordered harsh punishments 
against those who "pretend to be naval vessels and commit piracy" . (FEER 13-07-95 
p.25) 
Piracy in China 
China reported 209 cases of coastal piracy in 1994.{FEER 13-07-95 p.25) It was 
reported in mid-1995 that police in the southern Chinese province of Guangdong had 
arrested nine pirates accused of robbing ships at the mouth of the Zhu River, one of 
CHRONICLE 441 
China's most important waterways. Local police had received more than 20 reports of 
piracy in the area since February 1995. (FEER 20-07-95 p.13) 
RAIL TRAFFIC AND TRANSPORT 
Vietnam-China 
The rail links between the two countries which were severed during the border 
war of 1979, would be officially reopened on 12 February 1996.(lHT 26-01-96) 
Thailand-Laos 
Construction had begun on a railroad between the northeastern Thai town of Nong 
Khai and the Laotian capital Vientiane. It is to be the first phase of a planned rail 
network that will eventually link Southeast Asia and southern China. (IHT 29-01-96) 
Asia-Europe 
The Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) appointed Malaysia to oversee building of an 
electric-rail system linking Singapore to Europe via China. The privatized rail link 
would pass through Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam, and China before connecting with 
the trans-European rail track.(FEER 14-03-96 p.63) 
Iran-Turkmenistan 
A 295-kilometre railroad from Mashhad in Iran to Tejen in Turkmenistan was 
opened on 13 May 1996 as part of the Istanbul-Beijing railroad. It will also become 
the shortest way from the Central Asian republics to the Gulf.(IHT 13-05-96) 
RECOGNITION 
Sri Lankan proposed recognition of Israel protested 
News that Sri Lanka was planning to renew diplomatic ties with Isreal drew pro-
tests from the government's muslim allies in parliament, who threatened to quit the 
government. The reported 'recognition-for-arms deal' between the two countries was 
clarified by Sri Lanka's foreign minister in Parliament on 20 June 1995. He stated that 
no decision had yet been taken and that the matter was still under consideration. He 
noted, however, that renewed ties with Israel would allow Sri Lanka to tap Israeli 
military expertise.(FEER 06-07-95 p.27) 
Switching recognition of Chinese governments 
Senegal announced in January 1996 that it broke off relations with the Chinese 
government in Beijing and established relations with the government in Taipei. If 
Senegal was enticed by financial offerings by Taiwan, it would have followed other 
African countries like Gambia and Niger.(IHT 25-01-96) 
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RED CROSS 
See also: Specific territories within a state: Kashmir 
The ICRC in Sri Lanka 
The influential Buddhist clergy demanded the expulsion of the International Com-
mittee of the Red Cross for its alleged support of Tamil rebels. Since the negotiations 
between the government and the Tamil insurgents collapsed on 19 April 1995, and 
fighting resumed, tension had been mounting between the Red Cross and the authori-
ties. Matters came to a head when the government expressed displeasure over the Red 
Cross's decision to release a statement on civilian casualties during a military offen-
sive against the rebels. The foreign minister said the agency had violated protocol by 
issuing the press sta!ement without first informing the government. The head of the 
Red Cross delegation thereupon apologized to the president. 
The Red Cross operated the main hospital in the rebel-controlled Jaffna Peninsula, 
and had consistently maintained its neutrality and concern for the protection of civil-
ians in the combat zone.(IHT 27-07-95) 
REFUGEES 
Vietnamese refugees successfully integrated in Israel 
It was reported that Vietnamese refugees have successfully integrated into Israeli 
society. Most of the original refugees who were resettled in Israel and granted citizen-
ship had set themselves up in the restaurant business. Despite their success, it was 
reported that religion remained an outstanding problem. Most Israeli-Vietnamese are 
Confucians or Buddhists but Israeli law requires that all matters relating to marriage, 
divorce, and death must be handled by respective Jewish, Muslim, or Christian relig-
ious authorities. (FEER 02-11-95 p.22) 
Mon refugees in Thailand 
The UNHCR was involved in delicate negotiations with Myanmar officials over 
the return of some 20,000 Mon refugees from Thailand. The Mon, an ethnic minority 
in Myanmar, were in refugee camps along the Thai-Myanmar border. In previous 
years they had crossed the border, often as rebels of the New Mon State Party, a rebel 
party that had signed a ceasefire with the government in Yangon. The Mon wanted the 
UNHCR to monitor the repatriation exercise to ensure that the refugees were not 
punished on their return. (FEER 23-11-95 p.14) 
Bhutanese refugees in Nepal 
Talks between the two countries ended on 8 April 1996 with no progress over the 
status of thousands of people who had fled Bhutan since 1990.(see 2 AsYIL 349) 
Bhutan refused to take the refugees back, arguing that they had forfeited Bhutan-
ese citizenship because of their voluntary departure. Nepal wanted Bhutan to receive 
them back as they were in possession of documents proving citizenship or land owner-
ship. 
About 100,000 Bhutanese of ethnic Nepalese origin had fled Bhutan in the past six 
years. (IHT 09-04-96) 
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Repatriation of Vietnamese refugees 
Vietnam agreed on 9 April 1996 to speed up repatriation of the nearly 19,000 boat 
refugees still held in the camps in Hongkong.(IHT 10-04-96) 
On 20 April 1996, some 317 Vietnamese illegal immigrants in Malaysia who had 
not signed up for voluntary repatriation were sent back to Vietnam. A total of 252,400 
Vietnamese refugees had fled to Malaysia since 1975; 248,000 have since resettled in 
other countries.(FEER 02-05-96 p.13) 
New possibility of asylum for Vietnamese refugees 
It was reported that the passage in the US House of Representatives of a bill which 
called for all boat people in camps around the Asian region to go through another 
round of screening to determine who were genuine political refugees, had brought to a 
halt a carefully worked-out plan to clear all the camps by the end of 1995. The plan 
was drafted in March 1995 by the international community, including the US.(FEER 
28-09-95 p.42) 
Notwithstanding a decision taken in the context of the Comprehensive Plan of 
Action aimed at having the Indo-Chinese refugee camps closed by the end of 1995 (5 
AsYIL 482), there were at that time still camps in Hongkong, Indonesia, Thailand, 
Japan, and the Philippines housing a total of 37,000 refugees. After having been 
screened out, these refugees were intended to be voluntarily sent back to Vietnam. 
It was reported that the lack of progress in the repatriation of these refugees was 
caused by a US plan to hasten repatriation, known as 'Track II'. Under Track II, the 
refugees might after all be eligible, under a new screening process, for resettlement in 
the US if they returned home first and momentarily settle in a transit centre some-
where in Vietnam while they undergo a new screening process. After six months of 
negotiations Vietnam and the US agreed on implementation of the plan.(IHT 16-05-
96; FEER 11-01-96 p.19) 
Possibility of Philippine asylum 
In the Philippines, holding to the principle of voluntary repatriation as its official 
policy, fdrced repatriation was suspended and the 2,700 remaining Vietnamese refu-
gees were allowed to apply for permanent residence, although there was no certainty 
yet about the final numbers that would be admitted. It was reported that the govern-
ment had tacitly agreed to allow hundreds of Vietnamese to remain in the coun-
try. (IHT 18/19-05-96) 
REGIONAL SECURITY 
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) 
The ARF met formally for the second time (cf.5 AsYIL 484) in Brunei Darus-
salam on 1 August 1995. In preparation of that gathering the ASEAN foreign minis-
ters began their annual meeting on 28 July 1995. The ARF was launched in 1994 by 
ASEAN and their dialogue partners. As of 1995, there were 19 ARF participants: 
Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, The Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Aus-
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tralia, Cambodia, Canada, China, EU, Japan, South Korea, Laos, New Zealand, 
Papua New Guinea, Russia, US and Vietnam. At least 10 other countries had applied 
to join. 
A 'concept paper', which ASEAN officials had threshed out in May, was pre-
sented to the August meeting. The paper sought to ensure that ASEAN would remain 
the security forum's centre of gravity, or 'primary driving force'. The concept paper 
set out broad guidelines for future meetings of the security forum: the meetings would 
have no formal agenda and would approach sensitive security issues in an oblique and 
non-confrontational manner. The paper outlined a gradual three-step process begin-
ning with confidence-building measures, moving to preventive diplomacy and finally 
conflict resolution. It was thought that the ARF is an acknowledgement by ASEAN 
governments that ASEAN is not competent to cope with the wider problems of regi-
onal security linking Southeast to East Asia.{FEER 03-08-95 pp.16-20, 30-11-95 
p.34) 
The meeting reaffirmed that the ASEAN concept paper indicated a pace for mov-
ing the ARF process forward comfortably to all participants, and stressed the impor-
tance of building confidence among ARF participants so as to develop a more predict-
able and constructive pattern of behaviour. They re-emphasized that the ARF is inten-
ded to be a high-level consultative forum to facilitate open dialogue and discussions on 
political and security issues of common interest and concern in the Asia-Pacific re-
gion.{UNdoc. A/49/953-S/1995/652) The meeting included dicussions on tensions on 
the divided Korean peninsula, French and Chinese nuclear weapons testing, political 
developments in Myanmar, and the Spratly Islands.{FEER 10-08-95 pp.15-16) 
It was reported that the US opposed India's membership in the ARF on the 
grounds that it should not be ASEAN alone that made the decision. India was invited 
to the ARF after it became a full dialogue partner of ASEAN in December 1995 at the 
Bangkok Summit. The US expressed concern about ASEAN's core role in the ARF, 
but the ASEAN responded that if it were not the driving force, China would be reluc-
tant to join. {FEER 14-03-96 p.12) 
Australia's defence minister told ASEAN officials that his country does not want 
to see the ARF become a venue for discussion of contentious issues on the Indian 
subcontinent, such as Kashmir. During discussions with Thai officials in Bangkok on 
20-22 April 1996, however, the minister agreed that India had a claim to membership 
in the ARF because of its common boundary with ASEAN states in the Indian 
Ocean.{FEER 02-05-96 p.12) 
At meetings of officials at Jakarta and Tokyo during the first half of 1996 a num-
ber of confidence-building agreements were reached. Among other things, the 19 
countries of the ARF signed a confidence-building agreement in Tokyo on 8 May 
1996 requiring advance notice and an exchange of observers during military exerci-
ses. (IHT 09-05-96; FEER 23-05-96 p.15) 
Exchange of defence data 
At the meeting of the ARF on 1 August 1995 China agreed for the first time to 
give its Asian and Pacific neighbours more information about its defence program. 
Countries like the US, Japan, Australia, New Zealand and Thailand publish regular 
defence policy statements, presenting details about military numbers, structure, 
spending, doctrine and planning, without revealing secrets that could compromise 
national security. But many other ARF members did not provide such information. 
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China also agreed to increase high-level contacts and exchanges between its mili-
tary training institutions and those of the other states in the region. (lHT 04-08-95) 
Indonesia-Australia Security Agreement 
The Australian prime minister first raised the idea of security co-operation in June 
1994, but only halting progress was made until the Australian and Indonesian leaders 
met at Bali in September 1995, when the Indonesian president expressed renewed 
interest. As a result the two countries signed an agreement "on the maintaining of 
security" on 18 December 1995. The aim was defined as contributing to regional 
security and stability because this would be most conducive to the economic develop-
ment and prosperity of both parties and of the region. Under the four-article agree-
ment the parties undertake to consult each other regularly on their common security 
and to develop co-operation beneficial to their and the region's security, and in case of 
adverse challenges to either party or to their common security interests, to consult 
each other and, if appropriate, to consider either individual or joint measures. The 
parties also pledged to promote mutually beneficial cooperative activities in the secu-
rity field.(Text of agreement courtesy Australian Embassy, The Hague) 
The Australian prime minister said that the long-term strategic interests of the two 
countries coincide. As to the term 'adverse challenges' he said that this applied only to 
external challenges. The accord had "treaty status, but it is not a defence pact, which 
implies a military response" .(lHT 15-12-95) The treaty terms were similar to those in 
the security agreements between Australia and Papua-New Guinea, and between Aus-
tralia, New Zealand, the UK, Singapore and Malaysia. On the other side, Australia 
and the US are allies under the ANZUS mutual defence pact. It was the first time that 
Indonesia entered into a formal security arrangement with another state.(IHT 18-12-
95; FEER 28-12-95/04-01-96 p.18) 
Philippines - Indonesia 
It was reported that Indonesia and the Philippines discussed the framework of a 
security agreement similar in nature to that which was signed by Indonesia and Aus-
tralia in December 1995 (supra). (FEER 22-02-96 p.12) 
US ships near Korea 
A US naval group led by the aircraft carrier Independence and two nuclear subma-
rines was stationed and would stay near the Korean Peninsula in January 1996 to deter 
'any kind of provocations' by North Korea.(lHT 18-12-95) 
Peace and military power in Asia 
At a conference in Tokyo on the future of Asia the Malaysian prime minister on 
17 May 1996 rejected the notion of basing regional peace on a balance of military 
power, recalling that the region had not enjoyed the present stability for the past 150 
years.(lHT 18/19-05-96) 
RIVERS 
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India - Bangladesh water sharing talks 
Talks on water-sharing between the foreign ministers of India and Bangladesh took 
place in late June 1995. The meeting achieved three things. First, both sides agreed to 
come to an understanding on permanent sharing of river waters without setting any con-
ditions. Secondly, the officials decided to de-link the water-sharing talks from other 
disputed issues. And third, it was decided to revive the Joint Rivers Commission which 
was established since Bangladesh's independence to monitor the flow of water, but had 
remained dormant since 1988.(see infra p.516)(FEER 20-07-95 p.29) 
Laos policy on the Mekong 
The foreign minister of Laos expressed the Laotian desire to play a central role in the 
Mekong River Commission, an organization of riparian states. The minister said that a 
third of the river flows through Laos and 40 percent of its tributaries come from Laos. 
Because Vientienne is located at the centre of the region, Vientiane had been bidding for 
the Commission's Secretariat to be transferred from Bangkok to the Laotian capital. He 
also said that China and Myanmar should be full members of the Commission. 
The idea of uniting countries along the lower reaches of the Mekong was first con-
ceived by a retired US general in the 1950s. In 1957, the UN, under US auspices, set up 
the Committee for Coordination of Investigations of the Lower Mekong Basin, with 
headquarters in Bangkok, as part of a strategy to unite the pro-Western regimes in the 
region against China and Vietnam. The issue of navigation and water allocation led 
Thailand, Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia to agree in April 1995 to the revitalization of the 
Mekong Basin concept (5 AsYIL 591).(FEER 10-08-95 p.30) 
ASEAN Mekong River Development project 
At the ASEAN Bangkok summit in December 1995 Southeast Asian leaders en-
dorsed a plan to invite China, Japan and South Korea to join ASEAN in the development 
of the Mekong River basin. (FEER 28-12-95/04-01-96 p.17) 
Nepal-India water agreement 
On 29 January 1996, the Indian foreign minister and the Nepalese water resources 
minister reached agreement on scrapping a 1991 water agreement between the two 
countries and substituting it with a new one which gave Nepal a better deal. Under the 
agreement (infra p.5U) Nepal will get seventy megawatts of energy from the Tanakpur 
barrage, which India had built on the Mahakali River that straddles the India-Nepal bor-
der. Nepal also obtains 1,000 cusecs (cubic feet per second) of water. In addition, the 
ministers initialed details on a 6,000-megawatt project on the same river that would take 
eight years and $4 billion to build. (FEER 15-02-96 pp.53-54) 
SANCTIONS 
See also: Air traffic and transport, Environment 
US drive for tighter sanctions against Iran 
(see also: Foreign investment) 
The US government expressed willingness to tighten existing US trade sanctions in 
co-operation with the US Congress. At the same time, however, it was against a pro-
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posal to create a covert intelligence program aimed at destabilizing the Iranian gov-
ernment. (see supra p.4lO) 
A bill sponsored by the senator ALPHONSE M.D' AMATO would impose a variety of 
penalties against foreign companies that cooperate with Iran in the field of oil and gas. 
It would also force the government to bar the chief executives of these foreign compa-
nies from entering the US, ban US government purchases from such companies and 
bar exports by their US subsidiaries. It would also give the president discretion to bar 
loans to such companies and refuse their imports.(IHT 11112-11-95) The bill was later 
amended in order to win the government's support, by dropping some tough sanctions 
like a ban on imports of all products made by companies that do business with Iran. It 
would still empower the president to impose a range of sanctions against foreign com-
panies that aid the development of Iranian energy programs, including stripping them 
of the right to obtain big loans from US banks or to deal in US securities. The US 
Federal Reserve would be barred from allowing any financial institution to become a 
primary dealer in bonds of US origin.(IHT 14-12-95) 
It was later reported that the bill was aimed at both Iran and Libya and that it 
called for sanctions against foreign companies that invest more than $40 million per 
year in either of the two countries. Violation of the bill would be punished with a ban 
on imports to the US, a ban on loans of more than $10 million from US credit mar-
kets, a ban on participation in US procurement contracts, a ban of export licences to 
products manufactured in the US by the sanctioned company. The bill was adopted by 
the US House of Representatives on 19 June 1996. 
One of the main companies concerned was Total SA of France, which took over 
two Iranian oil fields in July 1995 from Conoco of the US after the latter was prohib-
ited from doing business with Iran.(lHT 03-06,20-06-96) 
US sanctions on missile-delivery to Iran 
A US law, dating from the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War, required economic penalties 
against states that supply Iran or Iraq with "destabilizing numbers and types of ad-
vanced conventional weapons". Alleged Chinese exports of anti-ship missiles to Iran 
in 1995 might qualify for such sanctions to be applied and the US was considering the 
application of sanctions.(IHT 08-02,08-03-96) 
US sanctions against Chinese deliveries to Pakistan 
(see also: Nuclear capacity) 
According to US intelligence reports China sold nuclear weapons-related equip-
ment to Pakistan in 1995, involving specialized magnets allegedly meant to be in-
stalled in high-speed centrifuges that enrich uranium. The Chinese deputy foreign 
minister who was on a visit to the US did not deny the sale but argued that it 
amounted only to legitimate 'peaceful nuclear co-operation'. China also argued that 
the magnets in question were allowed to be exported because they did not appear on 
an agreed list of items subject to control under the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. 
Specialist experts conceded that this might be technically correct while legalistic in 
nature. 
The 1994 Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act 1994 required that if the reports 
were considered to be true, the president either would have to apply sanctions bloc-
king loan guarantees by the US Export-Import Bank or formally waive them for rea-
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sons of being vital to US national interests or to US national security interests. In a 
previous alleged sale of missiles to Pakistan sanctions were avoided by concluding 
that the evidence was not strong enough. If the government of the state in question is 
considered not to be involved, the company might be barred from conducting further 
business with the US. 
According to later reports the US intended to apply selective sanctions meant to 
hurt China without disrupting US business. That would require the formal imposition 
of broad sanctions, then waive them on grounds of national interest and immediately 
order the narrower measures. The US asked China to limit future deliveries of nu-
clear-related technology to Pakistan, and suggested that in return it could waive some 
of the economic sanctions currently being considered. Meanwhile the US government 
had asked the (US) Export-Import Bank to hold off financing for 30 days. China re-
jected the US demand.{IHT 08,09,22 and 29-02,25-03,28-03-96) It became clear later 
that the US government had decided that no sanctions across-the-board would be im-
posed. On 16 April 1996 the Eximbank approved a $160 million guarantee of a loan 
for the purchase of civilian aircraft (IHT 18-04-96) but it was later reported that after 
a request from the state department the bank deferred a $35.9 million guarantee for 
the financing of the sale of subway-system components for the Guangzhou Metro 
project. (IHT 27/28-04-96) 
The US announced on 10 May 1996 that it had decided not to impose sanctions on 
China for the alleged export of nuclear weapons-related technology because China had 
agreed not to make such sales in the future. It was reported that China had refused to 
make public pledges to that effect, and that, instead, the US would say what it thought 
were the Chinese intentions while the absence of Chinese denial would be taken as its 
assent. The US secretary of state had "concluded there is not a sufficient basis to 
warrant a determination that sanctionable activity has occurred". China announced 
that it "pursues the policy of not endorsing, encouraging or engaging in the proli-
feration of nuclear weapons, or assisting other countries in developing such weapons. 
The nuclear co-operation between China and the countries concerned is exclusively 
for peaceful purposes". (IHT 11/12-05,13-05,15-05-96) It was reported later that 
China considered new law to control exports of sensitive technology.{IHT 27-05-96) 
In June 1996 it was reported that the US government was to approve a sale of 
advanced US technology by Westinghouse Electric to China Nuclear Energy Industry, 
the company that was accused by the US to have sold the nuclear equipment to Paki-
stan and to have concluded contracts with Iran. The deal was to receive support from 
the US Exim Bank and, therefore, needed a presidential decision as being "in the 
national interest". The agreement was signed in 1995, aquired preliminary approval 
from the Exim Bank in November 1995 and Congressional approval in January 1996, 
before the issue of the alleged Chinese deliveries to Pakistan. (IHT 21-06-96) 
Delay of US arms delivery to Pakistan 
(see also: Arms sales and supplies) 
In late 1995 the US Congress authorized the transfer of $368 million worth of 
arms under a one-time exemption (BROWN Amendment) from a US law (PRESSLER 
Amendment) that bars military co-operation with Pakistan because of its alleged de-
velopment of nuclear weapons. 
The US in February 1996 considered delaying the shipment of the arms because of 
an alleged (but denied) new acquisition of sensitive nuclear equipment from 
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China.(IHT 16-02-96) In March, however, the US government notified the Senate that 
it intended to proceed with the deliveries, ruling out immediate sanctions on the al-
leged acquisition by Pakistan of nuclear-related equipment. The law prescribing sanc-
tions was not applicable because the arms were a substitute for original orders already 
paid for much earlier.(IHT 21-03-96) The US government said the decision to proceed 
with the delivery was "based on Pakistan's current restraint in its nuclear and missile 
activities" .(IHT 18-04-96) 
It was reported in June 1996 that a three-way deal was being prepared under 
which part of the undelivered F-16s ordered by Pakistan would be sold to Indonesia 
and the proceeds returned to Pakistan (supra p.339). Pakistan paid $658 million in the 
early 1990s for the planes, along with another $350 million for other military equip-
ment which was not delivered either.(see above).(IHT 06-06-96) 
SEA AND SEA TRAFFIC 
Iranian-Russian Statement on the Caspian Sea 
The two countries reached a mutual understanding on the legal status of the Cas-
pian Sea on 30 October 1995, the essence of it being that any issues relating to regu-
lation of the uses of the Caspian Sea and its resources shall be decided jointly by all 
Caspian coastal states alone, and that the Caspian Sea shall be used exclusively for 
peaceful purposes. Undoc. A/51/59 Annex) 
Marine scientific research in Indonesia's EEZ 
Foreign oceanographic research in Indonesia's EEZ, meant to probe into the EI 
Nino phenomenon, was refused approval by Indonesia's military. Military officials 
denied security clearance in May and again in September 1995 to research cruises for 
the Tasmania-based Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organization 
and the California-based Scripps Institute of Oceanography. The research cruises were 
supposedly conducted within the framework of the World Ocean Circulation Experi-
ment. 
An Indonesian naval officer said that the security concerns were linked to fears 
that the scientific intelligence about sea conditions and water temperatures off South 
Java could be used by foreign submarines to dodge Indonesia's ship-born sonar 
equipment. 
In an apparent retaliation, Australia and the United States abandoned joint-
mapping projects going back 20 to 25 years.(FEER 30-11-95 pp.29-30) 
Thai contiguous zone 
The Thai government decided to amend the Customs Act and the Navigation in 
Thai Waters Act in order to implement the proclamation of a contiguous zone (supra 
p.228). This proclamation was made with a view to suppressing and preventing oil 
smuggling at sea. 
Japanese 'general policy guidelines' regarding disputed islands 
It was reported that in view of its intention to ratify the UN Convention on the 
Law of the Sea and the existing disputes with China and Korea over some islands, the 
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Japanese government had adopted 'general policy guidelines' for the implementation 
of the Convention. It was said that the guidelines might include 'reservations' about an 
EEZ around the islands and might provide for separate fishing agreements for the 
islands.(IHT 20-02-96) 
Indonesian-US talks on right of transit 
(see also: Disarmament and arms control) 
It was reported that the US has been trying to persuade the Indonesian navy to 
back off from its plan to demarcate three north-south archipelagic sealanes. Under the 
plan lateral movement of ships through the archipelago would be under the right of 
'innocent passage' (instead of 'archipelagic sealane passage'), which would require 
submarines to surface and warships to turn off weapon radars. In December 1995, 
Indonesian officials were invited aboard a US carrier to see the problems that batt-
legroups would encounter in operating under such conditions.(FEER 25-01-96 p.12) 
The designation of three archipelagic sealanes by Indonesia was supposedly un-
dertaken to control access to the Java Sea. In opposing the designation, a US diplomat 
said that Jakarta "was trying to claim that all the sea between the islands is really 
land". The US wanted Indonesia to refer the matter to the IMO but Indonesia, al-
though it recognizes IMOts role on matters related to navigational aides and safety of 
shipping, did not agree that IMO had any competence over the matter of delineation of 
sealanes.(FEER 29-02-96 p.30) 
Up to 28 March 1996 the two countries had had four rounds of negotiations on the 
US demand of having unlimited right to send warships, submarines and military air-
craft through and beyond Indonesian archipelagic waters. Indonesia wanted to restrict 
free movement of foreign ships in its waters (archipelagic transit passage) to three 
designated north-south sealanes, while the US and some other western powers urged 
Indonesia to agree on an east-west sealane as well. 
The three north-south sealanes proposed by Indonesia are: through the Sunda and 
Karimata straits to the South China Sea, through the Lombok and Makassar straits to 
the South China Sea, and from the Indian Ocean and Arafura Sea north of Australia to 
the Pacific Ocean via the Moluccan Sea. Indonesia is of the opinion that many of the 
proposed additional sea lanes were too shallow or had become too crowded with local 
vessels and oil and gas rigs for safe passage by foreign naval vessels, especially sub-
merged submarines. Apart from the three proposed sea lanes foreign ships could use 
other routes on the basis of innocent passage. 
US-Indonesian negotiations would resume on 17 May 1996, and those between 
Indonesia and Australia in June. Indonesia had already ratified the UN Convention of 
the Law of the Sea, but the US had not.(IHT 29-03,16-05-96; FEER 02-05-96 p.12» 
SHIPPING 
See also: Emergency aid 
Downturn in container shipping business 
Because of the price war in the container shipping business, freight rates from 
Asia to the US saw their biggest dive in a decade. Industry executives estimated that 
since 1995, freight rates from Asian ports outside Japan to America had dropped 
15%-20%. The three factors which had pushed rates lower were identified as the 
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addition of capacity at an unprecedented rate, lower American consumption of-Asian 
products, and undercutting of prices set through a shipping conference by competitors 
from South Korea, Taiwan and China.{FEER 11-04-95 p.76) 
SOUTH ASIAN ASSOCIATION FOR REGIONAL CO-OPERATION (SAARC) 
South Asian Preferential Trading Arrangement 
Bangladesh ratified the South Asian Preferential Trading Arrangement, designed to 
minimize trade gaps among the seven SAARC countries. The accord, already signed by 
the other six members, took effect on 8 December 1995.{FEER 16-11-95 p.15) 
India-Pakistan trade under SAARC 
India and Pakistan, which had both committed themselves to extend MFN status on 
each other under the WTO, the GATT and the SAARC, inched their way to closer trade 
ties. Pakistan was reluctant to take any quick decisions because of concern that a flood of 
cheap Indian goods would drive Pakistani out of business. Pakistan also complained that 
India's import duties were quite high and that non-tariff barriers existed. On its part, 
India argued that it had already granted MFN status to Pakistan. It expected Pakistan to 
approve reciprocal rights during a SAARC meeting scheduled to take place in Colombo 
in March 1996.{FEER 08-02-96 p.52) 
SPACE ACTIVITIES 
South Korean launch 
South Korea sent its first telecommunications satellite, Koreasat-1, into space but 
fell short of its intended orbit. The satellite had to give up some of its fuel - and there-
fore a bit of its lifespan - to climb the rest of the way.{FEER 17-08-96 p.71) 
Apstar-2 mishap explained 
The China Great Wall Industry and America's Hughes Space and Communication 
released a joint statement on 25 July 1995 saying that the 26 January 1995 mishap 
involving the blow-up of a Chinese rocket and its payload satellite, Apstar-2 (5 AsYIL 
490), was caused by adverse winds. It was reported, however, that the underlying 
cause for the launch failure was still the subject of continuing disagreement between 
the two companies. The January explosion was the second failure in the two firms' 
collaboration. The first, which involved the same models of rocket and satellite, oc-
curred in December 1992 (3 AsYIL 445-446). {FEER 10-08-95 pp.70-71) 
AsiaSat-2 
It was reported that the launching of the AsiaSat-2 satellite, due for spring 1995 
(see 5 AsYIL 490), was delayed as the Chinese launcher company had to modify the 
launching rocket's fairing (i.e. the nose cone that encases the satellite). This was con-
sidered necessary since an investigation into the causes of the failed launching of the 
Apstar-2 satellite in January 1995 (see ibid.) had shown that wind shear had either led 
to structural damage to the satellite, or had damaged the fairing of the rocket. The 
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satellites were made by Hughes Space & Communications International Inc. and the 
launcher company was China Great Wall Industry Corp.(IHT 27-07,29/30-07-95) 
The launch later took place successfully on 28 November 1995 from a site in Si-
chuan province. The satellite will enable StarTV to deliver local language pro-
grammes to countries within the region.(IHT 29-11-95; FEER 07-12-95 p.83) 
APT - AsiaSat talks 
On 5 December 1995, APT Satellite representatives began a meeting with their 
counterparts from the rival Asia Satellite Telecommunications in Beijing to resolve 
their competing claims for a space in orbit (5 AsYIL 489-490). APT planned to 
launch its Apstar-IA in February 1996 into a position that is close to the spot booked 
for AsiaSat-3, set for launch in 1997.(FEER 14-12-95 p.12) 
The two Hongkong-based rival satellite operators would be launching satellites in 
1997. APT satellite, majority-owned by several Chinese ministries, planned to have 
Apstar-2R in orbit in early 1997, while Asia Satellite Telecommunications planned to 
launch AsiaSat-3 later the same year. APT had still to coordinate a slot for its Apstar-
2R as required by the ITU for any spacecraft that may be close enough to others to 
disrupt signals.(FEER 16-05-96 p.73) 
Malaysian satellite 
Malaysia launched a satellite of its own, the Measat-l, owned by the Telecom 
company Binariang. 
When Measat-l would be ready for test transmissions in April 1996, Binariang's 
sister company Measat Broadcast Network Systems would be poised to beam at least 
10 channels to an estimated 30 million homes in the region.(FEER 23-11-95 p.66) 
Measat-l was launched by Arianespace in January 1996.(FEER 25-01-96 p.57) 
Launch of Japanese satellites 
A telecommunication satellite of the Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corp. 
(NTT) was launched by Arianespace on 29 August 1995.(IHT 30-08-95) In early 
September 1995, it was reported that Japan Satellite Systems successfully launched its 
third satellite into space aboard a Lockheed Martin rocket. The satellite's reach ex-
tends from India to Hawaii and as far as Austalia and New Zealand.(FEER 07-09-95 
p.67) 
Launch of Indonesian satellite 
On 1 February 1996, Indonesia launched a new-generation Palapa-C satellite atop 
a Lockheed-Martin rocket. The satellite's footprint has the capacity to cover most of 
Asia and Oceania.(FEER 15-02-96 p.55) 
Launch of Indian satellite 
A new communication satellite, the ISAT 2C, was launched on 7 December 1995 




It was reported that China Aerospace Corp. would launch three foreign-owned 
satellites in late December 1995 and in February and March 1996, following the suc-
cessful launching of AsiaSat-2. The first satellite to be launched would be the 
Echostar-1 of the US.(IHT 21-12-95) 
On 16 February 1996 a new type of rocket (Long March 3B) launching the three-
ton 'Intelsat 708' satellite exploded and disintegrated, destroying the satellite. Conse-
quently China suspended other satellite-launchings which were already planned.(IHT 
17/18-02-96) Intelsat later cancelled two other launch contracts with the Chinese 
launcher, China Great Wall Industry Corp. (IHT 28-03-96) 
US satellites for China 
The US president, evoking American national interest, on 6 February 1996 an-
nounced the lifting of sanctions blocking the sale of telecommunication satellites to 
China. These sanctions were imposed after the Tiananmen incident in 1989. 
The announcement referred to three Chinese projects: COSAT, which featured 
two Lockheed satellites, ChinaSat, which would purchase a Hughes satellite, and 
Mabuhey, which was to have a Loral satellite for communications in the Philippines 
and neighbouring countries. (IHT 08-02-96) 
SPECIFIC TERRITORIES WITHIN A STATE: EAST TIMOR 
Portugal vs. Australia before the International Court 
In the case Portugal had claimed that the Australian-Indonesian treaty of December 
1989 on exploitation of the continental shelf of the so-called 'Timor Gap' was invalid 
because Indonesia was not entitled to act on behalf of East Timor. 
The International Court of Justice decided on 30 June 1995 that it could not in the 
present case exercise the jurisdiction conferred upon it, because Australia's behaviour 
.:ould not be assessed without first entering the question whether Indonesia could or 
could not lawfully have concluded the 1989 Treaty with Australia, while the Court could 
not make such a determination in the absence of Indonesian consent.(lHT 112-07-95; ICJ 
Communique No.95/19bis) 
Indonesian-Portuguese talks 
Since the resumption of the talks in 1992 the UN Secretary General had held six 
rounds of discussions with the foreign ministers of the two countries (the fifth round took 
place in January 1995, the sixth in July 1995). The seventh round would be held in Janu-
ary 1996. (Undoc. A/50/436 of 19-09-95) 
In March 1996 Portugal offered partial restoration of diplomatic relations by setting 
up 'interests sections' in friendly embassies in the two countries, in exchange for the 
release of a convicted East Timorese leader and a guarantee of human rights in East 
Timor. The foreign minister of Indonesia said that there was no hope for a settlement so 
long as Portugal insisted on self-determination for East Timor. He also said, "I can't 
foresee any development in the way of a framework for a possible solution". (lHT 2/3-
03-96; FEER 14-03-96 p.17, 21-03-96 p.21) 
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Intra-East Timorese Dialogue 
The UN Secretary General took the initiative to facilitate the convening of an All-
Inclusive Intra-East-Timorese Dialogue, the first meeting of which, with 30 participants, 
took place in Austria in June 1995 and resulted in the adoption of the "Burg Schlaining 
Declaration". The Ministers of Portugal and Indonesia welcomed the convening of a 
further meeting or meetings. 
The above Declaration, inter alia, 
- reaffirmed the need to implement the necessary measures in the field of human rights 
and other areas with a view to promoting peace, stability, justice and social harmony, 
- reaffirmed the necessity for the social and cultural development of East Timor on the 
basis of the preservation of the cultural identity of the people, including tradition, religi-
on, history and language, as well as the teaching of Tetun and Portuguese. (Undoc. AI 
50/436 of 19-09-95;IHT 11-07-95) 
The Indonesian ambasador-at-large issued a clarifying statement on the declaration, 
noting, inter alia, that the reference to UNGA resolution 37/30 violated the statement of 
the UN Secretary-General issued after the fifth UN-sponsored Jakarta-Lisbon meeting in 
January 1995, according to which the intra-Timorese dialogue would not discuss the 
political status of the province. (FEER 20-07-95 p.21) 
On 19-20 March 1996, Timorese delegates from the pro- and anti-Indonesia factions 
gathered again in Austria for a second All-Inclusive Intra-Timorese Dialogue. It was 
reported that the Vatican instructed the bishop of Dili, East Timor to stay away from the 
dialogue.(FEER 21-03-96 p.21) 
Government talks with East Timorese leaders 
The chairman of the Indonesian Supreme Advisory Council held talks with some 50 
East Timorese leaders in October 1995.(IHT 18-10-95) 
Asylum-seekers 
(see also: Asylum, Diplomatic and consular inviolability) 
Five Timorese activists sought asylum in the British ~mbassy in Jakarta. Portugal 
afterwards offered them permanent asylum. (FEER 05-10-95 p.15) 
Eight East Timorese sought asylum at the Dutch embassy on 7 November 1995. At 
the request of the latter and with the consent of the Indonesian authorities, the Interna-
tional Committee of the Red Cross facilitated the entry of the persons into Portugal. 
They left Indonesia for Portugal the following day. (IHT 08 and 09-11-95) 
On 14 November 199521 East Timorese climbed a fence into the Japanese embassy 
compound in Jakarta, seeking political asylum. On 16 November 1995 five East Timore-
se entered the French embassy in Jakarta to seek asylum. Both groups later left for Por-
tugal.(IHT 15-11,17-11,18/19-11-95) 
On 20 November 1995 another four East Timorese sought refuge in the French em-
bassy, while other youths staged a pro-government demonstration in front of the em-
bassy. The four also later left for Portugal after intervention of the International Com-
mittee of the Red Cross.(IHT 21-11,22-11-95) 
With five more East Timorese leaving for Portugal on 15 January 1996 after having 
entered the New Zealand embassy, there had been 50 of them who had been brought to 
Portugal.(IHT 16-01-96) 
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Nine East Timorese who sought refuge in the Australian embassy in February 1996 
were not granted asylum for lack of evidence.{lHT 12-02-96) 
On 18 March 1996 there were again reports of East Timorese entering the French 
and Polish embassies at Jakarta.{IHT 19-03-96) 
SPECIFIC TERRITORIES WITHIN A STATE: KASHMIR 
See also: Broadcasting 
ICRC allowed in Kashmir 
The Indian government decided to allow neutral observers into its detention 
camps. Under an agreement signed in New Delhi on 2 June 1995, the Geneva-based 
International Committee of the Red Cross would be allowed access to anyone detained 
in connection with the Kashmir insurgency. Since the ICRC would not be allowed a 
permanent office in Kashmir, it would have to send monitors from New Delhi. Fol-
lowing the ICRC standard practice, the reports of the monitors would not be made 
public but sent to the Indian authorities concerned. {FEER 06-07-95 p.29) 
Indo-Pakistani military skirmishes 
A rocket attack on a mosque in the Kashmiri town of Forward Kahuta, controlled 
by Pakistan, led to skirmishes between troops of both countries on the border of 
Kashmir on 28 January 1996. India denied that the projectile was part of an Indian 
missile-test on 27 January, that took place from a test site on the Orissa coast, 150 
miles into the Bay of Bengal. India claimed that Pakistani rockets meant to disrupt 
Indian Republic Day (26 January) went awry and hit the small town of Forward Kahu-
tao The head of the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan visited the 
place and confirmed craters made by two rockets. He also said that two other rockets 
had landed on the Indian-held side of the cease-fire line on 26 January.{IHT 29-01-96; 
8-02-96, p.13) 
There was renewed firing along the Kashmir border on 10 February 1996 with 
mutual accusations.(IHT 12-02-96) 
Indian-Kashmiri talks and policies 
The Indian home minister met with a delegation of Kashrniri Muslim separatists 
for the first time since the insurgency in Kashmir began in 1989.{IHT 16/17-03-96) 
The first parliamentary elections in Kashmir since 1989 were held on 23 May 1996, 
amid calls for a boycott from separatist political leaders. (IHT 24-05-96) On 6 June 
1996 Pakistan rejected a new Indian plan to give greater autonomy to the Indian-ruled 
part of Kashmir. (IHT 07-06-96) 
SPECIFIC TERRITORIES WITHIN A STATE: TIBET 
See also: Broadcasting 
Visit of the Dalai Lama to the US 
On the occasion of his visit to the US in September 1995 the Dalai Lama urged the 
US president to press the Chinese government to start negotiations with him on 
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granting Tibet "genuine self-rule in association with China". He took pains to say that 
he was not asking for negotiations on full independence.(IHT 13-09-95) 
The US president met the Dalai Lama on 13 September 1995, being the fourth 
encounter since 1991 between a US president and the Tibetan spiritual leader. The 
following day the US charge d'affaires in Beijing was summoned to the Chinese for-
eign office to receive a protest against the meeting which was qualified as a gross 
interference in the internal affairs of China. The meeting represented "a connivance at 
and support for the Dalai Lama's clamour for the independence of Tibet and his po-
litical activities aimed at splitting the motherland" .(IHT 15-09-95) 
The selection of the reincarnation of the Panchen Lama 
The Chinese government decided not to recognize the selection by the Dalai Lama 
of a young boy as the reincarnation of the Panchen Lama. The selection was made on 
14 May 1995, probably on the basis of a list of finalists clandestinely recommended 
by the search committee. 
The Chinese authorities directed a meeting of 75 Tibetan leaders to prepare to 
select a new Panchen Lama from a list of three boys who had been among 28 finalists. 
An approved reincarnation was later chosen on 29 November 1995.(lHT 14-11,30-11-
95) The enthronement ceremony took place on 8 December 1995.(IHT 09/10-12-95) 
German parliamentary resolution 
The German parliament on 20 June 1996 adopted a resolution condemning "Chi-
na's continued policy of repression in Tibet", a text which the German foreign minis-
ter said essentially reflected the government's view. China classified the action as "an 
open violation of the principle of the international norm and a gross interference in the 
internal affairs of China" . (IHT 22/23-06-96) 
TELECOMMUNICATION 
See also: World Trade Organization 
Regulating the Internet 
At a 27-30 June 1995 meeting of the Internet Society in Hawaii, a representative 
of the Chinese ministry of posts and telecommunications announced that China 
planned to block access to objectionable information on the internet. In April 1995 the 
ministry launched ChinaNet, China's first commercial provider of Internet access. 
Underway is CERNET, the Chinese Education and Research Network, managed by 
the Chinese State Education Commission, which aims to link all of China's universi-
ties to the internet. 
In Singapore, the prime minister affirmed that the goverment retains the right to 
define the limits of what is acceptable in cyberspace. The minister for information 
added that "laws against theft of libel still apply to cyberspace" . (FEER 27-07-95 
p.71) 
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TERRITORIAL CLAIMS AND DISPUTES 
See also: Divided states: China, Fisheries, Foreign investment, Military co-operation, 
Sea and sea traffic 
Territorial disputes relating to the South China Sea 
Even while reiterating that it had 'indisputable sovereignty' over the disputed Spratly 
Islands and adjacent waters, the Chinese foreign minister said at a meeting with the for-
eign ministers of ASEAN in Brunei, 30 July 1995, that China was ready to negotiate 
differences according to 'recognized international law', including the 1982 Convention 
on the Law of the Sea. Until recently China seemed to have based its claim to control 
much of the South China Sea on historical evidence and its own national laws. 
The Chinese minister also said that China would discuss the issue on the South China 
Sea with all seven ASEAN members. Previously, China had insisted that disputes over 
the Spratlys should be negotiated in bilateral forums. Nonetheless, China indicated that it 
did not want outside powers such as the US involved in any negotiations on the South 
China Sea, preferring to discuss the conflict 'the oriental way'. 
The Chinese minister also assured his interlocutors that China was committed to 
settling disputes peacefully. 
Noting that the South China Sea was located "at a strategic point for international 
navigation and aviation", he said that China had always attached great importance to the 
safety and freedom of navigation through the international sea and air lanes in the region. 
The Philippine foreign affairs secretary stated that the Chinese gesture was not a 
concession, although "China is having a position now of opening the door to possible 
political compromise". The Indonesian foreign minister welcomed Chinese willingness 
to use the UN Law of the Sea Convention as a basis for resolving the disputes. A US 
official said that "the tone of China referrring to international law and the law of the sea 
gives greater possibility for trying to find a diplomatic solution, even though China has-
n't changed its fundamental position on its sovereignty claims". A US state department 
statement had said that "[m]aintaining freedom of navigation is a fundamental interest of 
the US". (IHT 31-07-95; FEER 10-08-95 pp.15-16) 
The ASEAN foreign ministers in their Ministerial Meeting on 30 July 1995 
"expressed their concern over recent events in the South China Sea. They encouraged all 
parties concerned to reaffirm their commitment to the principles contained in the 1992 
ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea . . . They also called on them to refrain 
from taking actions that could destabilise the region, including possibly undermining the 
freedom of navigation and aviation . . . [T]hey reiterated the significance of promoting 
confidence-building measures (CBMs) and mutually beneficial cooperative ventures in 
the ongoing Informal Workshop Series on Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea 
initiated by Indonesia" . (Joint Communique; Undoc.A149/953-S/1995/652) 
After two days of talks in Manila the Philippines and China on 10 August 1995 
agreed on a 'code of conduct' that rejects the use of force to settle their dispute over the 
Spratly Islands. The code consisted of eight prescripts and was contained in a Joint 
Statement. Details of the code were to be worked out later.(IHT 11-08-95; FEER 24-08-
95 p.15) Prescript 4 reads: "The two sides agree to settle their bilateral disputes in ac-
cordance with the recognized principles of international law, including the UN Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea". 
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The sixth workshop in the series of informal "Workshop(s) on Potential Conflicts in 
the South China Sea" was to be held on 10-14 October 1995 at Balikpapan, Indone-
sia. (IHT 26-09-95) 
[The series of workshops under the above name is convened by the Research and Devel-
opment Agency of the Indonesian department of foreign affairs and sponsored by various 
Indonesian and Canadian corporations and institutions. The first Workshop was held at 
Bali in 1990, followed by subsequent Workshops at Bandung (1991), Yogyakarta (1992), 
Surabaya (1993), Bukittinggi (1994), Balikpapan (1995), Batam (1996) and Pacet (1997.] 
Vietnam and the Philippines held talks on 6 and 7 November 1995, resulting in an 
agreement to resolve their dispute about the Spratly Islands "through peaceful negotia-
tioons in a spirit of , friendship and equality, and in accordance with the UN 1982 Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea" . (IHT 09-11-95) 
At a workshop in Manila in November 1995, attended by experts from the ASEAN 
countries, the US, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, New Zealand and Canada but snubbed 
by China, there was a consensus that China would not risk an armed confrontation in the 
Sprady archipelago because of the economic and political costs that would ensue. But the 
experts said in a summary of their positions, that "conflicts of various sorts and extent" 
were possible either by reason of accident, provocation and competition in oil-drilling 
rights.(IHT 15-11-95) 
Overlapping oil concessions from Vietnam and China 
Referring to the area of the South China Sea where the American Crestone company 
explored under a Chinese license, known in Chinese as Wan 'an Bei, China declared on 
30 August 1995 that it lay within its national waters. 
Thereupon the Vietnamese foreign ministry accused China of illegally exploring in 
the area that the Vietnamese call Tu Chinh. Vietnam had granted drilling rights to several 
foreign companies just to the west of Tu Chinh, and the state-owned Vietnam Oil and 
Gas Corp. had drilled at least one exploratory well in the same area as Crestone. (IHT 
01-09-95) 
In April 1996, PetroVietnam leased two offshore exploration blocks located about 
400 kms from Ho Chi Minh City to the American company Conoco. The area covers 
more than half of the zone which China had leased to Crestone. (see: Joint develop-
ment). 
A Chinese foreign ministry spokesman reacted to the announcement of the Vietnam-
ese lease by saying that China "will never accept any exploration by any country in this 
area. China has indisputable sovereignty over the N ansha [Spratly] islands". A Vietna-
mese foreign ministry statement replied that the areas awarded to Conoco "are on Viet-
nam's continental shelf and fall totally under the sovereignty of Vietnam". It was re-
ported that Conoco was specifically warned by China months before the Petro Vietnam 
deal was signed that China would protect Creston's right to the concession and recom-
mended that Conoco cease its negotiations with Vietnam. 
Crestone's president said that "both Conoco and Crestone anticipate eventually 
working together" as "the Chinese military won't let Conoco drill by themselves". 
While Conoco did not comment on the prospect of joint development, Petro Vietnam, 
however, said that "[ w]e have never discussed joint development . . . The area is under 
our jurisdiction and we can do whatever we want with it" . (FEER 25-04-96 p.65) 
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Chinese reef-building in the Spratlys 
It was reported that a Chinese reef-building expedition, tasked to pour 1,000 tonnes 
of cement and stone onto a submerged reef in the disputed Spratlys in early November 
1995, went badly wrong after hurricane force winds and frigid temperatures wrought 
havoc with the naval personnel. (FEER 21-12-95 p.14) 
US position on Spratlys 
The initial response of the US admistration to deve10ments in the Spratlys was a 
reiteration of long-standing policy according to which the US "strongly opposes the 
threat or use of military force to assert any nation's claim. The US takes no position on 
the legal merits of the competing claims and is willing to assist in the peaceful resolution 
of the dispute". On 10 May 1995, the state department issued a statement which added 
that the US would "view with serious concern any maritime claim, or restriction on 
maritime activity, in the South China Sea that was not consistent with international law" . 
On 16 June 1995, the assistant secretary of defense for international security said that if 
military action occurred in the Spratlys and this interfered "with freedom of the seas, 
then we would be prepared to escort and make sure that free navigation contin-
ues" . (FEER 03-08-95 p.22) 
Impact of China I s ratifcation of the Law of the Sea Convention on its South 
China Sea claim 
On 15 May 1996, China's National People's Congress ratified the UN Convention 
on the Law of the Sea (CLOS) [see 5AsYiL 211]. China asked all parties to the Conven-
tion to respect its new territorial sovereignty and maintained its claim to the Paracel and 
Spratly Islands.(FEER 30-05-96 p.13) 
As a consequence of China's ratification of the Convention, it was suggested that it 
was now possible to agree on a comprehensive interim solution to the Spratly Islands 
dispute. A scholar at the East-West Centre in Hawaii said that a shared area surrounding 
the Spratlys could be governed by a Spratly Management Authority, its costs being cov-
ered by member states on the basis of each state's length of coastline bordering the South 
China Sea. Formal sovereignty would not be surrendered as the Authority would serve 
only to facilitate exploration and management of the resources of the shared area. (FEER 
06-06-96 p.32) 
Meanwhile, the Indonesian foreign minister questioned China's claim to a 200 nauti-
cal mile-EEZ around the Paracels after China ratified the CLOS. The minister asserted 
that according to the CLOS, only archipelagic states could make such clairns.(FEER 20-
06-96 p.12) 
Malaysian military exercises in the Spratlys 
Malaysian armed forces ended a series of exercises on one of the disputed islands in 
the Spradys on 24 May 1996. Eighteen ships, six helicopters, and four jet fighters took 
part in the drills off the island called Layang-Layang.(FEER 06-06-96 p.13) 
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Abu Mussa Island 
(AsYIL Vol.2 p.379, Vol.3 p.450, Vol.5 p.5OO) 
Iranian and UAE officials held negotiations on the three disputed islands in the Per-
sian Gulf, the first time since 1992. The discussions were to set an agenda for a meeting 
between the foreign ministers. Abu Dhabi demanded a comprehensive negotiation on all 
three islands, but Iran was ready only to discuss Abu Mussa island. Iran contended that 
its sovereignty over all three islands was not negotiable, but it had called for talks to 
remove misunderstandings. (IHT 21-11-95) 
Takeshima/Tokdo Islands 
The islands (Takeshima in Japanese, Tokdo in Korean) have a total area of 250 
square metres and are located about 700 kilometres northwest of Tokyo and about 450 
kilometres east of Seoul in the Sea of Japan. They are traditionally inhabited only by 
birds, but are surrounded by rich fishing grounds and the sea bed is believed to contain 
extensive mineral deposits. Currently 34 South Korean maritime police and two civilians 
lived on the islands. 
Japan says it has had sovereignty over the islands since 1905, when it annexed the 
islands during the Russo-Japanese War. It regularly sends coast guard cutters to patrol 
areas around the islands. South Korea had claimed them since the 6th century (512) and 
has reasserted its sovereignty after the Second World War in 1945. It has deployed bor-
der guards on them since 1954. 
The Korean-Japanese dispute over the islands erupted anew on 9 February 1996 
when the Japanese foreign minister protested about Korean plans to improve a pier on 
one of the islands. He said that the islands were "historically, and in the view of interna-
tionallaw, an integral part of Japan". The South Korean president said that the Japanese 
claim to the islands was 'intolerable', and demonstrations were being held in Seoul. On 
14 February 1996 South Korea ordered air and sea exercises around the islands after the 
presence of a Japanese fishing patrol boat in the area. On 22 February 1996 South Korea 
announced it would install a water treatment plant on the islands but denied that it had 
anything to do with the dispute. 
South Korea said it would declare an EEZ only if Japan acts first. On 20 February 
1996 both countries in fact established overlapping EEZs without mentioning the islands 
which lie within 200 miles of both shores. At their closest point, Japan and South Korea 
are about 50 kilometres apart. 
After the two countries declared their EEZs, it was reported that they would enter 
into separate discussions on the issues of fishing areas and overlapping maritime zones. 
Regarding the disputed islands South Korea's ambassador to Japan said: "This is our 
territory and we'll defend it no matter who says what".(IHT 12,13,14,15,16,19,21 and 
23-02-96; FEER 29-02-96 p.13, 07-03-96 p.16) 
Sipadan and Ligitan 
(AsYIL Vol.1 p.348, Vol.2 p.379, Vol.3 p.451, Vol.5 p.515) 
The Indonesian foreign minister said on 19 June 1996 that Indonesia would be pre-
pared to have the International Court of Justice resolve the dispute over the two islands if 
talks fail. Indonesia preferred to resolve it amicably, but "We are ready to solve it le-
gally and we are ready to solve it politically" .(IHT 20-06-96) 
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Japanese-Russian islands dispute 
Japan reacted angrily to remarks by the Russian foreign minister that negotiations on 
the disputed islands should be postponed, repeating similar remarks in January 1996. 
The Japanese foreign ministry said that "We strongly feel that this is an issue which must 
be addressed by our generation and not deferred to the next generation". A Japanese 
protest was lodged with the Russian foreign ministry.(IHT 22123-06-96) 
TERRORISM 
Anti-terrorism co-operation 
The Philippine president stated that the Philippines would join Egypt, Jordan, 
Pakistan and the US to form an effective network to fight terrorism.(IHT 26-10-95) A 
coordination network to combat terrorism was finally formed in February 1996 at a 
conference of 19 countries, among which Japan, Pakistan and the Philippines.(IHT 
22-02-96) 
Muslim foreigners in the Philippines 
Philippine security forces arrested a group of Muslim foreigners accused of plot-
ting to kill the president, bringing the number of suspected foreign extremists detained 
in the past month to twenty-four. One of the suspects was linked to the man who was 
arrested and deported to the US some time ago to face trial in connection with the 
1993 bombing of the World Trade Center in New York. The group was also suspected 
of being involved in a December 1994 bomb attack on a Philippine Airlines plane that 
killed a Japanese national.(IHT 03-01-96) 
UNITED NATIONS 
Malaysian campaign to oust UN Secretary General 
It was reported that Malaysia was holding consultations with members of the Or-
ganization of the Islamic Conference about efforts to remove Mr.BouTRoS GHALI 
from his post. The latter was blamed for the continuing war in the former Yugoslavia. 
Malaysia had repeatedly condemned the UN arms embargo on the Bosnian Mus-
lims.(IHT 15-08-95) 
Korea to join UN peacekeeping mission 
It was reported that South Korea would send 200 army engineers to Angola in 
September 1995 as part of a UN peacekeeping mission to build roads and bridges. 
This would be the second such South Korean mission to Africa, the first being in July 
1993 when an army engineering team was sent to Somalia. (FEER 20-08-95 p.13) 
Proposal of Singapore for the reform of the Security Council 
In addition to the replies of early 1994 to questions on the matter submitted by the 
UN (4 AsYIL 516 et seq.) the suggestions of Singapore were later reformulated in 
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September 1995 for the benefit of the Open-ended Working Group. They read, inter 
alia: 
2. There are two basic problems. The first is simply to decide what is the current 
configuration of international power that should be reflected in the distribution of 
permanent seats .... 
3. When the Charter was being drafted, the end of the Second World War was in 
sight and prepared for, with easily discernible winners and losers. The intention was 
for the winners to have primary responsibility for guiding the new international or-
der. The end of the cold war took everyone by surprise and was far from clear-cut 
in its resolution. Economic, political and military power no longer necessarily co-
here in a single locus. 
4. The second problem is even more vexing. If the new Security Council is really to 
reflect the current international distribution of power, it should logically entail the 
relegation of some from the elite as well as the appointment of others. Even if some 
were to be so elevated without necessarily displacing others, the expansion of the 
small group of the select would imply the relative diminution of the status of the 
current permanent members. This reality compels us to confront the difficult ques-
tion of the veto. 
6. At this stage, it would be most useful to try to identify and build consensus on 
objective general criteria that all permanent members, present or aspiring, must ful-
fil. This is a more clinical and constructive approach than attempting to identify and 
promote one specific Member State or another. ... 
7. Singapore suggests the following criteria that could be used for selecting new 
permanent members of the Security Council: 
(a) a permanent member must have a long-established tradition of good conduct in 
keeping with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and in 
particular in the maintenance of international peace and security; 
(b) The Charter confers upon the Security Council the primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security. A permanent member must there-
fore first of all have the capacity and will to wield military force in support of the 
United Nations to maintain international peace and security. All permanent members 
should be prepared to give effect to Article 43 of the Charter and be ready to place 
their military forces at the disposal of the United Nations; 
(c) A permanent member must also have the capacity and will to contribute civilian 
and humanitarian resources, which are increasingly needed in the growing multidi-
mensional nature of United Nations peace-keeping operations; 
(d) Privilege must be paid for. A permanent member should not shirk its financial 
commitments to the United Nations and must be prepared to carry a larger portion 
of the financial burden of the United Nations. In particular, a permanent member 
must bear special financial responsibilities for peace-keeping; 
(e) A permanent member must be a major contributor to other aspects of the United 
Nations besides peace-keeping. These include international economic, financial and 
social co-operation, which are major elements in bringing about international peace 
and security; 
(f) A permanent member should have the widest possible if not consensual support 
of all the members of the United Nations" . (UNdoc.A/49/965) 
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Indonesian position on UN reform 
Similarly the Indonesian position was reformulated under the heading "Criteria for 
permanent membership in the Security Council". It read, inter alia: 
"1. . . . [I]t is essential to ensure that the question of an increase in the permanent 
membership reflects the current configuration of membership of the United Nations 
and to ensure a more representative and effective Security Council. It is undeniable 
that the present arrangements do not reflect the profound changes and transition that 
have taken place in the global arena. The international community continues to face 
an untenable anomaly where three States from Europe are among the five permanent 
members. At the same time Asia is underrepresented, while Africa and Latin 
America are not represented, an arrangement that in geopolitical terms is unaccept-
able. 
2. Objective criteria should therefore guide the selection process . . . While the 
principle of equitable geographic representation is a valid basis, it should not con-
stitute the sole criterion . . . 
3. Far from paying mere lip service and perfunctory exhortations, States must have 
supported the United Nations as the principal multilateral organization through 
which Governments can and should resolve conflicts . . . 
4. Furthermore, the willingness of Member States to assume the onerous responsi-
bilities inherent in permanent membership of the Security Council . . . must be 
deemed to be essential. These should have been convincingly demonstrated by their 
contribution to the promotion of regional peace and global security through success-
ful diplomatic initiatives . . . Equally important is participation in peace-keeping ac-
tivities over a period of time, as well as contributions to the civil, military, financial 
and other resources of the United Nations. Proven capacity for constructive global 
influence and for undertaking global responsibilities, especially in guiding a coali-
tion of the largest number of States in history comprising all continents and regions, 
would constitute yet another criterion. 
5. Moreover, a country's standing within the new realities of regional and subre-
gional dynamism and in building the edifice of confidence and concordance should 
be fully considered. It is also pertinent to take into account the legitimate aspirations 
of the largest States . . . Of no less importance is a prominent and constructive role 
in resolving issues of global concern, particularly through compromise, co-operation 
and consensus. 
6. Additionally, economic power - both current and potential - and social stability, 
as well as the capacity and Willingness to contribute significantly to socio-economic 
development, are other factors. Another central criterion ... is a record of strong 
and sustained economic growth . . . that would make it one of the largest and vi-
brant economies in the world .... Likewise, sustained economic performance and 
resilience even in the face of adverse global economic conditions such as recession 
should also be given due weight. Stable macroeconomic performance, substantial 
domestic and foreign investment flows and demographic strength . . . are also es-
sential attributes. It is from such strength that a country's capacity to contribute to-
wards development co-operation under multilateral auspices is derived. 
8 .... [T]he exclusion of developing countries through a process of predetermined 
selection should be unacceptable. Enlargement [of the permanent membership] 
should be accomplished through a process of open-ended negotiations on the basis of 
consensus and as a comprehensive package .... "(UNdoc.A/49/965) 
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The foreign minister of Indonesia said in an interview that the United Nations 
must be the central instrument of a new world order. He agreed that Japan and Ger-
many should become permanent members of the security council, but only as part of a 
package that would give council membership to an appreciable number of developing 
countries. The suitability of countries should be evaluated by using objective criteria. 
He expressed himself against the formula of admitting a security member each from 
Asia, Africa and Latin America as this would, in the case of Asia, automatically point 
to India as the country with the largest population. Instead he proposed criteria in-
cluding a country's track record, such as its contribution to peace-keeping missions, 
as well as its capacity for discharging council functions. This would include its size, 
the state of its economy, and its political influence. 
Echoing the position of the Non-aligned Movement, he said that the reforms must 
include the World Bank and the IMF.(FEER 13-06-96 p.38) 
Japanese participation in peace-keeping 
(see: Japan's military role) 
UNRECOGNIZED ENTITIES 
See also: Diplomatic and consular relations 
Russian relations with Taiwan 
The Taiwanese foreign ministry said that Russia was to open a representative 
bureau in Taipei by the end of 1996 to promote trade and technological co-operation. 
Both countries agreed to exchange aviation rights, while direct shipping services 
would be discussed eventually. (FEER 23-05-96 p.15) 
VIETNAM WAR 
American MIAs 
The US president notified the US Congress on 31 May 1996 that Hanoi was cooper-
ating in full faith in the search for remains of American soldiers missing from the Viet-
nam War. The president was required to notify the US Congress before additional funds 
could be spent in expanding diplomatic ties with Vietnam.(FEER 13-06-96 p.13) 
WEAPONS 
US accusations on illegal weapons research 
A US government report released on 14 July 1995 alleged that China and Russia 
had carried out research in the 1980s in violation of the 1972 Biological and Toxin 
Weapons Convention. China on 18 July condemned the report and qualified the alle-
gations as "groundless and utterly irresponsible" .(lHT 19-07-95) 
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WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 
See also: International economic relations and trade 
Institutional functions 
Singapore was appointed Chairman of the General Council, and Thailand Chairman 
of the Committee of Agriculture. (Undoc.A/49/953-S/1995/652) 
Singapore - Malaysia 
The Singapore Ministry of Trade and Industry withdrew a complaint to the WTO 
about Malaysia's restrictions on polypropylene imports (5 AsYIL 506).(FEER 03-08-
95 p.57) 
Terms for Chinese participation 
With the support of almost half of the WTO members but against US objection China 
obtained observer status pending its acceptance as a full member. As a result, although it 
cannot vote, China would have a say in key issues, including foreign-labour rules, the 
environment, financial services and telecommunications.(FEER 20-07-95 p.79) The US 
assisant secretary of state said later that "we just can't let them in on political 
grounds" . (FEER 10-08-95 pp .14-17) 
The so-called Quadrilateral Grouping, consisting of Canada, the EU, Japan and the 
US, decided in October 1995 that the terms proposed by China for its membership were 
unacceptable.(IHT 23-10-95) On the other hand, China rejected the conditions set by the 
US and other countries for China's entry. According to a foreign ministry spokesman, 
"their demands exceed the level of China's economy and are against the basic principles 
of WTO". Neither China nor the Quadrilateral group disclosed details of their respective 
bargaining positions. (IHT 25-10-95) 
At a meeting with the EU trade commissioner, China's foreign trade minister de-
nounced as 'unrealistic' American demands for too-rapid economic and trade liberaliza-
tion in China as a condition for WTO entry. The Chinese minister insisted that when it 
joins the WTO, China should be treated like any other developing country, specifically 
be given three to seven years to bring down tariffs, open the service sector, and take on 
the other WTO trade-opening requirements. EU officials said that they were ready to 
give China more time than developed countries to implement the world rules on free 
trade. In addition, EU wanted China to phase out its system of industrial subsidies and to 
step up its protection of intellectual property rights.(FEER 26-10-95 p.74) 
The objections against China's entry into the WTO were questioned by a senior Chi-
nese official as double standards. As to the argument that the trading regime of China 
was less in conformity with the WTO, it was countered that the WTO had a regime of 
exceptions which could be applied to China as it was applied to members that are devel-
oping or are in transition. The export potential of China, it was argued, should also be 
beyond doubt. Lastly, the interest of a multilateral trading system based on rigorous 
requirements and rules was best met with China inside, rather than out, of the WTO. 
The willingness of China to join the WTO was shown by the announcement in Osaka 
during the APEC meeting of the biggest liberalization package since the country opened 
up in 1979. (FEER 07-12-95 p.44) 
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The Chinese foreign ministry said in March 1996 that the condition made by the US 
that China be classified as a developed nation was unreasonable as it exceeded China's 
level of development. Classification as developed nation would entail more stringent 
standards for market opening which cannot even be fulfilled by current WTO members. 
The same would apply to the demand to comply with the EU free investment treaty as 
even current WTO members had not yet agreed to it. (lHT 04-03-96) 
Failing efforts to conclude new agreements to liberalize trade 
Bilateral negotiations among 50 participating countries that should lead to a multilat-
eral global telecommunication trade pact started on 10 April 1996 in Geneva. Asian 
policy makers had been generally hesitant to open national markets because of perceived 
needs to protect strategic national sectors and because some Asian national telecommuni-
cations were not strong enough to face full-blown foreign competition. The Philippines, 
for example, had set a 40% ceiling for foreign investments in telecommunications, and 
Singapore's offer would limit foreign investment to 49% in any local telecommunications 
provider; besides it would also not open its monopolized market until 2007.(FEER 11-
04-96p.75) 
After having failed to reach agreement before 1 May 1996 it was thereupon decided 
to postpone the deadline for agreement until 15 February 1997. The breakdown high-
lighted the trade tensions between the major industrial countries and the developing 
countries. The US blamed the latter countries for blocking a deal by failing to match a 
US offer of full access to foreign telephone companies; the US said it could not agree to 
a deal unless Asian nations improved market-opening measures. EU officials blamed 
'election year politics' in the US, rather than Asian inaction, for the failure of the talks. 
(FEER 16-05-96 p.83) 
The postponement was expected to influence the parallel WTO negotiations aimed at 
opening up trade in maritime services which had 30 June 1996 as a deadline and which 
were deadlocked by the US refusal to remove long-standing preferences for American 
vessels and shipyards.(IHT 02-05-96) 
WORLD WAR II 
Korean and Chinese reaction to Japanese remark on the war 
The Japanese education minister said in August 1995 that it was only a matter of 
opinion whether Japan's war and colonization in Asia and the Pacific could be char-
acterized as 'aggressive'. The South Korean and Chinese governments swiftly respon-
ded with expressions of regret and protests. After being prodded by the prime minister 
the education minister apologized for causing 'misunderstanding': "My intended 
meaning was that instead of repeating apologies, as has been done by successive prime 
ministers, it is more important to take actions to compensate based on that re-
morse" . (IHT 11-08-95) 
Japanese apology for the war 
On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the end of the Second World War the 
Japanese prime minister on 15 August 1995 delivered a statement which read, inter 
alia: 
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"During a certain period in the not too distant past Japan, following a mistaken 
national policy, advanced along the road to war, only to ensnare the Japanese people 
in a fateful crisis, and through its colonial rule and aggression caused tremendous 
damage and suffering to the people of many countries, particularly to those of Asian 
nations. 
In the hope that no such mistake be made in the future, I regard, in a spirit of 
humility, these irrefutable facts of history, and express here once again my feelings of 
deep remorse and state my heartfelt apology .... " 
The expression of remorse was welcomed by the governments of the Philippines, 
South Korea and China. 
In June 1995 the Japanese parliament had passed a weaker version of an apology. 
It said: "We recognize and express deep remorse for those acts our country carried 
out in the past and for the unbearable pains inflicted upon people abroad, particularly 
those people in Asia". The resolution also refered to "many colonial rules and acts of 
aggression in the modern history of the world" . (see 5 AsYIL 508)(IHT 16-08-95; 
FEER 20-07-95 p.34, 24-08-95 p.18) 
UN report on 'comfort women' 
According to a report by the UN Special Rapporteur on violence against women, 
the system of 'comfort stations' set up by the Japanese Imperial Army during the 
Second World War and involving a network of women forced to provide sexual serv-
ices to soldiers, was a violation of its obligations under internationallaw.(IHT 07-02-
96; UNdoc.E/CN .4/1996/53/ Add. 1 of 04-01-96) 
Korean and Japanese positions on the issue of 'comfort women' 
The above report of the UN Special Rapporteur also contained a presentation of 
the Korean and Japanese positions. 
The Democratic People's Republic of Korea, (para.66 et seq.) first, holds the 
opinion that the forcible recruitment of Korean women as military sexual slaves (the 
term preferred by the Special Rapporteur to the phrase 'comfort women' as the latter 
does not reflect the suffering and severe physical abuse endured by the persons con-
cerned "during their forced prostitution and sexual subjugation and abuse in warti-
me", see para. 10), their severe sexual assault and the killing of most of them in the 
aftermath constitutes a crime against humanity. Furthermore, as the annexation of the 
Korean peninsula by Japan is considered not to have been attained through legal 
means (legal invalidity of the 1905 'Ulsa Five-Point Treaty' and the 1910 'Treaty of 
Annexation') and the Japanese presence on the Korean peninsula is considered to have 
constituted a state of military occupation, the forcible recruitment of the women 
should also be considered a crime under international humanitarian law, since these 
crimes were committed against civilians in an occupied area. Secondly, the DPRK 
contends that the establishment of a 'comfort women' scheme, and in particular the 
forcible recruitment and coercion into prostitution, is contrary to the 1921 Interna-
tional Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women and Children (ratified 
by Japan in 1925). Thirdly, the system of military sexual slavery is inconsistent with 
the 1926 Slavery Convention, which is considered declaratory of customary interna-
tional law at that time. Finally, the act of military sexual slavery is to be considered 
an act of genocide, in accordance with the 1948 Convention which is considered to 
represent generally accepted norms of customary international law even before 1948. 
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None of these issues have been settled between the DPRK and Japan as no diplomatic 
relations have been established between the two countries. The (Japanese) 'Asian 
Peace and Friendship Fund' is considered "a ploy or trick to dodge the issue of state 
compensation" . 
The position of the Republic of Korea (para.77 et seq.) is that under the 1965 
Japan-ROK Treaty diplomatic relations between the two countries have been 
'normalized' and compensation was paid by the Japanese government for property 
damage incurred during the war, but that at that time the issue of military sexual 
slaves has not been addressed. After the first public articles about the issue, the Ko-
rean president has made public assurances that the ROK would not request any mate-
rial compensation from Japan with regard to the issue. Government officials are aware 
of the difficulty of determining whether Japan actually has a legal responsibility to 
compensate for crimes committed 50 years ago and whether or not the treaties conclu-
ded afterwards might have also settled the issue. The Asian Peace and Friendship 
Fund is considered to be a sincere effort to accomodate the wishes of the ROK and the 
victims. 
The Japanese government (para.91 et seq.) feels itself to be under no legal com-
pulsion towards the victims, but only a moral obligation. The 1949 Geneva Conven-
tions and other instruments of international law did not exist during the period of the 
Second World War and Japan was not a signatory of the 1929 Geneva Convention. 
Therefore, Japan is not responsible for violating international humanitarian law. Japan 
ratified the 1910 International Agreement for the Suppression of the White Slave Traf-
fic and the 1921 International Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women 
and Children but it exercised its prerogative under Art.14 of the 1921 Convention to 
declare that Korea was not included in the scope of the Convention. Even if there 
were to exist responsibilities under international law, these were met by the 1951 San 
Francisco Peace Treaty (Art.14) and other bilateral peace treaties and international 
agreements dealing with reparations and/or settlement of claims. The San Francisco 
Peace Treaty states, inter alia, that "the Allied Powers waive all reparation claims of 
the Allied Powers, other claims of the Allied Powers and their nationals arising out of 
actions taken by Japan and its nationals in the course of of the war, and the claims of 
the Allied Powers for direct military costs of occupation". As to the 1965 Japan-ROK 
Agreement on the Settlement of Problems concerning Property and Claims and on 
Economic Cooperation (583 UNTS 258), Art.II deals with the matter. (UNdoc. E/ 
CN.4/1996/53/Add.l; FEER 20-07-95 p.34) 
Japanese chemical weapons in China 
Japanese experts began unearthing and disposing of Japanese chemical weapons 
left behind in China and buried in Jilin Province. Chinese officials estimated that the 
dump holds 1.8 million pieces and that it could take up to nine years and $1 billion to 
clear.(IHT 15-05-96) After the survey the Japanese experts found evidence of only 




International Terrorism by AMRITH ROHAN PERERA, Vikas Publishing House PVT Ltd, New 
Delhi, 1997, ISBN 110007, Price Rs 450. 
This book is an investigation into the development of legal principles in the area of 
international terrorism, already for long a scourge of the international community. In pursuit of 
these legal principles, PERERA considers the various international initiatives which have attempted 
to deal with the problem. 
All work in this area must overcome a definitional hurdle: what precisely is terrorism? While 
taking the simplistic explanation whereby terrorism "involves the systematic threat or use of 
violence calculated to inspire a feeling of fear or dread in the victims of such acts" (p. 1) as a 
starting point, PERERA makes clear that such an elementary exposition is only of limited use in 
creating an international regime to control terrorism. Any such regime must overcome a core 
definitional difficulty, summed up by FREIDLANDER as follows: "For some terrorism exists in the 
mind of the beholder, depending upon one's political views and national origins. For others 
terrorism consists of a criminal act or acts according to the law of any civilized society" (p. 11). 
This "freedom fighter-terrorist" debate is the conundrum lying at the heart of all initiatives to 
combat international terrorism. 
The surprisingly long history of anti-terrorist initiatives, as PERERA suggests, bears 
investigation, given its impact on later efforts such as, for example, the 'extradite or prosecute 
principle' found in the work of the International Conferences for the Unification of Penal Law (held 
in the 1920s and 30s) and in the League of Nations Conventions (the Geneva Convention for the 
Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, and its sister Convention for the Creation of an International 
Criminal Court). While these efforts had limited impact at the time, and the League of Nations Conventions 
even failed to come into force, PERERA sees them as the genesis of legal principles which have since 
developed. 
PERERA's discussion of United Nations initiatives is of particular interest to the reader 
concerned with the freedom fighter-terrorist debate. The dichotomy of views which has dogged all 
efforts to control terrorism has been most apparent in the global arena: while Western states 
condemn all acts of terrorism, the Non-Aligned Movement emphasises the principle of self-
determination and the notion of legitimacy of national liberation struggles. Accordingly, the history 
of United Nations activity in this area is one of stalemate and uneasy compromise. 
Regional organisations (tending to include states with cultural as well as geographical 
similarities) have been more successful in this area, though a definition of terrorism remains 
elusive. PERERA's clear exposition of regional efforts in this area (e.g. within the European Union, 
the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation, the Organization of American States, the 
Non-Aligned Movement, and the non-regional but historically and culturally connected 
Commonwealth of Nations), involving a comparison of the various organisational achievements and 
failures, is of particular interest to the international lawyer considering anti-terrorist initiatives. 
Through this investigation, the author discerns the existence of four legal principles which 
have developed from the various anti-terrorist initiatives: the principle of non-use of the territory of 
a state for terrorist acts against another state, the principle of universality of jurisdiction, the 
extradite or prosecute principle (Aut Dedere Aut Judicare), and the principle of non-extradition of 
political offenders. 
In the conclusion, PERERA looks forward to the future of terrorism control and suggests that 
the end of the Cold War and the growth of international co-operation represent new hope for an 
• Edited by Surya P. Subedi, Book Review Editor. 
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"international order based on respect for the rule of law" (p. 295). This is perhaps a rather 
optimistic view, given that it is traditional divergence of views between the non-aligned states and 
the west, rather than an east-west divide, which has dominated disagreement in this area. PERERA 
also contemplates the possible impact of an International Criminal Court on this area, and suggests 
that it could be positive: "An independent International Criminal Court vested with jurisdiction 
over international crimes of a terrorist character as 'codified' in existing multilateral Conventions 
enjoying general acceptance, would greatly enhance the development of a self-contained legal 
regime to serve as an effective legal response to the threat posed to the international community by 
the phenomenon of international terrorism" (p. 306). 
The book affords a detailed and well organised examination of the various initiatives which 
have emerged in the fight against international terrorism. The historical analysis and investigation 
of the various conventions and initiatives aimed at controlling terrorist activities provide a sound 
base for the international lawyer concerned with international activity in this area. This work is 
perhaps flawed in its limited discussion of the freedom fighter-terrorist debate - an evermore 
important area as the notion of self-determination, and its adjunct the struggle of national liberation 
movements, become increasingly central to international law. While PERERA emphasises the 
importance of this debate, he fails to fully consider its implications. For example, a discussion of 
current initiatives by the Non-Aligned Movement, with its emphasis on the right of self-
determination and the legitimacy of national liberation struggles, only accounts for five pages of the 
book (pp. 146-151) while, according to the author himself, "the Non-Aligned approach ... made 
an impact on International Conventions ... " (p. 147). In addition, the book (perhaps deliberately, 
for this is in itself a massive topic) fails to come to grips with the problem of state terrorism which 
is probably, as the Non-Aligned Movement insists, a greater threat to international peace and 
security than the terrorist activity of individuals. 
KATHRYN BURTON 
University of Hull Law School 
The International Status of Taiwan in the New World Order: Legal and Political Considera-
tions, by JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS (ed.), Kluwer Law International! Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, London/The Hague/Boston, 1996, pp. xviii and 337, ISBN 90-411-0929-3, price 
DFI. 135.OO/US $ 88.00/£ 60.00. 
With the end of the Cold War the time has come to reconceive notions of the international 
system and the world order. One case that will merit increasing attention is that of Taiwan and its 
relationship with China. The increased awareness of fundamental human rights and self 
determination, forces consideration of the question of where Taiwan stands within the international 
order of sovereign states. The International Status of Taiwan in the New World Order seeks to do 
this. It is the result of a conference held in Brussels, organised by the Centre for United Nations 
Law at the University of Brussels on 16 June 1995 to commemorate the golden anniversary of the 
United Nations. This was seen as a good occasion to examine in depth one of the issues that so far 
evaded solution. The book itself is comprehensive in that it takes a politico-legalistic approach to 
the problem and provides a host of relevant documents. It should prove useful to international law 
researchers in the areas of statehood and recognition, as well as self-determination. It could also 
prove useful to politics students examining the concept of the nation state and the politics of 
exclusion. 
The book is divided into five broad sections. Part One sets the stage for what is to follow by 
scrutinising the international legal status of Taiwan. In this section HUNGDAH CHIU summarises the 
events that have shaped the future of the island of Taiwan (formerly Formosa), highlighting the 
ceding of the territory by China to Japan, Japan's renunciation after World War Two and the 
effective control exercised by the government of the so-called Republic of China (ROC). He 
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concludes that the "Peoples Republic of China (PRC) could not acquire title over Taiwan through 
the international law principle of occupation or prescription because it had no physical control over 
the island" (p. 8). HANS KUIJPER, while disagreeing with HUNGDAH that the ROC should be 
recognised as a State and represented in major organisations, examines the issues of statehood under 
the Montevideo Convention. He suggests that the only solution to the problem is to have two 
separate independent countries. MICHAEL DAVIS concludes the first section proposing that for a 
solution to the problem both China and Taiwan need to abandon nineteenth century rhetoric. He 
flags up the issue of modem concepts of sovereignty and statehood, however, which pose the 
question as to whether conferring statehood on Taiwan might be the imposition of outdated 
Westphalian values of statehood. 
The second section of the book relates to the Taiwanese response to diplomatic isolation. 
LiNJUN Wu, in examining the "Limitations and Prospects of Taiwan's Informal Diplomacy" (p. 
35), points out that the economic success of the 1980s was the prime factor in the success of 
'informal diplomacy' employed by the island. He however recognises that this approach has 
limitations and expresses reservations on the extent to which it is likely to succeed. KAY MOLLER 
asks the question: "Does Flexible Diplomacy Improve Taiwan's International Status?" and answers 
that the "new pragmatic foreign policy (of Taiwan) is neither an improvement nor a weakening of 
its international status but rather the logical outcome of a new international and regional setting in 
which China's calls for reunification have been increasingly and effectively orchestrated by 
incentives and pressures" (p. 62). 
Part Three of the book looks at the "Responses to Diplomatic Isolation" and focuses in 
particular on the return of Taiwan to international organisations. It is the longest section of the book 
and includes an article by DENNIS V AN VRANKEN HICKEY who looks at policies, problems and 
prospects of Taiwan's return to International Organisation (p. 65). KO SWAN SIK looks at the 
implication of the meaning of 'Taiwan' to different actors in "Taiwan's "Return" to International 
Organisations" (p. 79). VINCENT WEI-CHENG WANG examines whether Taiwan can join the 
United Nations now that the Cold War has ended. He argues that Taiwan is a state and thereby has 
the right to membership of International Organisations, which also raises the question of the legality 
of Resolution 2758 (replacing the ROC with the PRC in the United Nations). I SHENG-TsUNG 
YANG in "The Republic of China's Right to Participate in the United Nations" claims that the state 
has existed since 1912, while the PRC has only existed since 1949. Therefore participation in 
international organisations is the right of Taiwan - being a peace-loving nation satisfying conditions 
of statehood. Being an original member of the United Nations unfairly dismissed, and showing the 
readiness to provide technical and financial assistance are other factors that weigh strongly in its 
favour. JANET LORD looks at "Taiwan's Right to be Heard Before the Security Council" (p. 133) 
and concludes that as long as the Security Council is discussing the Taiwan Question, the country 
has the right to be represented and heard at Security Council fora. LOUIS SOHN advises that Taiwan 
could perhaps work its way back into the international fold by seeking to first gain status as a 
permanent observer. NERI SYBESMA-KNOL looks at "The UN Framework for the Participation of 
Observers" and builds on the suggestion made by SOHN, comparing different freedom movements 
around the world. Finally, LUNG-CHU CHEN states emphatically that "Taiwan is a sovereign 
independent state in every sense of the word. Taiwan is not a part of China. Taiwan's present and 
future destiny are not an internal affair of China" (p. 190). 
The fourth part focuses on "Relations Across the Taiwan Strait" and contains articles by 
JAMES HSIUNG and CHENG-WEN TSAI. While the former analyses "The Paradox of Taiwan-
Mainland Relations", the latter looks at "The Development of Cross-Strait Policies in China and 
Taiwan". HSIUNG highlights how despite the growth in trade and economic interaction between the 
I For the legality of Resolution 2758 see JOHN BOLTON's testimony in the United States Congress, 
House of Representatives, Committee on International Relations, H. Con. Res 63, relating to the 
Republic of China (Taiwan's) Participation in the United Nations, l04th Congress, 1st session, 
Washington D.C., August 3, 1995. 
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two entities there has been a rise in the level of political tension. TSAI holds the PRC responsible 
for the lack of political headway and claims that "Beijing has always refused to face up to reality 
and has, instead interpreted cross-strait relations from a legalistic and ideological point of view" (p. 
230). The ROC, on the other hand, the author claims, has "in substance ... a real peaceful 
unification formula" (p. 233). In the concluding section of the book, the editor JEAN-MARIE 
HENCKAERTS assimilates the various sections to look into "Self-Determination in Action for the 
people of Taiwan". He explores the use of the self-determination argument from the point of view 
of a separate state of Taiwan. 
One aspect that the study perhaps ignores, is the self-determination of the original Formosans 
of Malay-Polynesian origin. As noted by KUUPER, they were brutally repressed by the occupying 
forces of CHIANG KAI-SHEK (pp. 10 and 12). The study, whilst dealing with the politics of 
exclusion of the 21 million people of Taiwan, strangely excludes these indigenous people. It also 
operates from an area of weakness in that it has not yet been ascertained what the 'people' of 
Taiwan really want. There is a degree of contradiction in this respect, with some claims for the 
maintenance of the status quo (DAVIS, p. 32) while others claim that the ruling KMT government 
speaks for the people. Another weakness that presents itself is the considerable bias in favour of the 
ROC views to the exclusion of the views of the PRC. This demonstrates succinctly the subjectivity 
that is rife in examining issues of international law. It needs to be pointed out, however, that despite 
these weaknesses the book is exciting since it brings together some vital issues surrounding the 
resolution of the problem. The appendices are particularly useful to researchers seeking to enter 
into the area of Taiwan, containing the various documents to be examined. Researchers will find 
the book a useful and comprehensive source of reference material. 
JOSHUA CASTELLINO 
University of Hull Law School 
Sovereignty over Natural Resources: Balancing Rights and Duties in an Interdependent World 
by NICO SCHRIJVER, Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative Law, Cambridge 
University Press, 1997, pp. 452, ISBN 0521562694 hardback, price £55.00. 
The de-colonisation and self-determination processes led to the emergence as independent 
states of many new actors on the world stage. These entities often asserted their independence in 
part through a re-examination of the economic and political status quo. A fundamental perspective 
of the 'new states' has been that one of the most important attributes of statehood is sovereignty. At 
its simplest, the claim to sovereignty is that no other entity can control the actions of a state. In the 
economic context, it is the claim that a state can freely chose with whom it does business and on 
what terms, can change or terminate those relationships or terms, can recover economic assets (or 
their value) taken from it on terms it considers unfair, etc. One of the legal concepts reflective of 
this emphasis on sovereignty, which has grown up over the last 50 years, is that of 'permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources'. 
Professor NICO SCHRUVER of the Institute of Social Studies and the Free University of 
Amsterdam has written an excellent and ground-breaking study of the genesis, development and 
consolidation of this concept. The emphasis on sovereignty which the 'new states' adopted had an at 
least implicitly political dimension, as they sought to distance themselves from their former colonial 
masters and to tangibly demonstrate that they were not to be taken for granted in the changing 
socio-economic-political scene. Sovereignty was therefore aggressively pursued in fact and argued 
in theory. States claimed the widest scope for their powers, to terminate concession agreements, to 
create producer cartels that set prices, to expropriate property, to strictly control the business 
activities of non-nationals, to exclude competition by establishing monopolies in key areas of the 
economy, or to own natural resources located in the state or off its shores. 
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SCHRIJVER clearly sets out the three objectives of this book, a revised doctoral dissertation 
presented at the University of Groningen. They are "to map the evolution of permanent sovereignty 
over natural resources from a political claim to a principle of international law" , "to show that the 
principle of permanent sovereignty has not evolved in isolation but as part and parcel of other 
trends in international law", and "to demonstrate that, apart from rights, duties relating to resource 
management can also be inferred and that under modern international law they are being given 
increasing significance". SCHRIJVER meets these objectives and in doing so provides us with a 
study that illuminates many other aspects of international economic law. 
The first part of the book is devoted to a review of the development of the principle of 
permanent sovereignty primarily at the United Nations. Unlike some other works, this book 
examines the early stirrings of the permanent sovereignty debate. The early link recognised between 
sovereignty over natural resources and the protection of human rights is pointed out, for example. 
Most of this section of the book is taken up with detailed descriptions of the various proposals, 
resolution and reports related to permanent sovereignty over natural resources continuing to the Rio 
Summit on Environment and Development in 1992. The study is notable for looking behind the 
texts adopted to the drafts and comments made by governments. 
This method allows a fuller appreciation of the range of the debate and the areas in which 
compromise was necessary, as well as the bases for compromise. Uniquely, there is a section on 
sovereignty over resources in territories under foreign occupation or administration, in which 
Namibia, the Israeli-Occupied Territories and the Panama Canal and Zone are discussed . 
The middle section deals with developments in three areas of international relations related to 
permanent sovereignty in practice. Here SCHRIJVER examines international investment law, the law 
of the sea and international environmental law. In each area he provides a primer for anyone who 
wishes to understand these areas of law. Indeed, each chapter is a 'mini-textbook' in which the 
background of the issues are reviewed from both a legal and political perspective, developments 
over recent decades are analyzed and future trends are discussed. These are not superficial reviews 
but could be used as the basis for either teaching or further research in each field. 
The most difficult issue which SCHRUVER examines is whether and how the principle of 
permanent sovereignty over natural resources has been transformed from political slogan to legal 
principle. The final part of the book applies the principle to many claims and examines to what 
extent it can actually be applied. Very usefully there is a chapter on the duties of states. This area is 
often neglected in the rhetoric of rights, and would usefully make a study in its own right. The 
author has led the way with an examination of the duties which arise in the context of permanent 
sovereignty. In his final chapter he makes a masterful connection between permanent sovereignty of 
natural resources, the theme of the 1960s and 1970s, to sustainable development, the theme for the 
1990s and the next century. He makes the point that "permanent sovereignty in an interdependent 
world" call serve as "an important corner-stone of rights and duties" . 
Professor SCHRUVER has provided many useful tools for the reader. No review would be 
complete without referring to the very interesting tables and appendices which appear throughout 
the book. One can mention the table reviewing the "drafting history of provisions on permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources in the human rights covenants" and the appendix "survey of 
main cases" as two outstanding examples of highly useful collections. The comparative presentation 
of these materials makes it easy to understand the development of the law. Often authors will use 
specialist words without realising that the reader may not be as familiar as they with these terms of 
art. SCHRIJVER has provided a glossary of Latin phrases. He has also explained the main symbols 
used in United Nations documents, which can be so opaque. Finally, there is a comprehensive 
bibliography and index. 
JAMES J. BUSUTfIL 
British Institute of Human Rights 
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The International Law on Foreign Investment, by M. SORNARAJAH, Grotius Publications, 
Cambridge University Press, 1994, pp. 427 + Index, ISBN 0 521 46528 1 hardback, price 
£60.OO/US$ 100.00. 
The present reviewer cannot agree more with the author of this book when he states that "[i]n 
the second half of the twentieth century, apart from the intemationallaw on the use of armed force, 
no area of international law has generated as much controversy as the law relating to foreign 
investment" (p. 1). Yet, the irony was that no systematic attempt had been made to produce a 
cohesive and comprehensive treatment of the public international law applicable to the protection of 
foreign investment prior to the publication of this book, which nicely fills that gap. 
This thorough, well argued and extremely well written book appears to be a climax of the 
writings of Professor SORNARAJAH of the Faculty of Law of the University of Singapore on the 
subject. This book is a good example of how the wealth of experience and expertise of an author on 
his subject matter can be expressed in a mature and lucid fashion. It is indeed a very welcome 
addition to the existing body of literature in this area of study and will, no doubt, serve as a very 
useful source of reference for both students and teachers alike interested in the public international 
law on foreign investment. 
As stated at the introductory page of the book, "[i]t examines the different techniques that have 
been adopted by States for attracting foreign investment as well as for ensuring that foreign 
investment serves their economic objectives." The author compares foreign investment legislation 
and assesses its legality in the light of international norms, and provides a good survey of the 
development of foreign investment law and a competent critique of the current tendencies that exist 
within both the Bretton Woods institutions and the new GATTIWTO regime. 
The book is divided into nine chapters taking us all the way from the early days of the 
development of foreign investment law (in the first and second chapters), to the state of affairs as 
they stood at the completion of writing (in the eighth and ninth chapters). The author devotes entire 
chapters to some fundamental matters in foreign investment law such as the issues concerning host 
and home country control of transnational corporations. A very useful select bibliography and an 
index are included. The style of organisation of the material presented is sound and the lay-out of 
the book is quite logical. 
In the nine chapters of the book the author touches on more or less every relevant topic or 
issue of foreign investment law, whether it is related to the nature of the risks to foreign investment 
or the ways of avoiding them. He analyses the reasons why, in spite of all the efforts made in the 
past two/three decades, the international community has failed to agree on an internationally 
binding code of conduct for transnational corporations - the main vehicles for foreign investment. 
As warranted by the scope and nature of the study, in this process account is taken not only of the 
law, but also of other disciplines such as economics and political science. The law of foreign 
investment is an illustrative example of the tension that exists in international economic relations 
between the developed and developing states. 
Whilst developing states demonstrate a desire to emulate the success of the industrialised in 
general and the newly industrialised states in particular, they appear apprehensive about the dangers 
that lurk in the wholesale subscription of the Western approach to foreign investment. 
SORNARAJAH alerts the developing countries about the pitfalls of the Western agenda championed 
by the World Bank and the WTO. He is critical of the content of the 1992 Guidelines of the World 
Bank on foreign investment and tells us what are the ideas behind the GATT IWTO agreement on 
trade-related investment measures (TRIMS). 
Since in the name of restructuring and reorganisation the UN bodies working for the 
establishment of a better and fairer international economic system have either been taken out of 
business or denied the resources necessary to carry out their tasks, the world is left with less and 
less inter-governmental 'think tanks' working for a fairer international economic system. This is 
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one reason why studies such as the one presented by Professor SORNARAJAH are of value to those 
prepared to listen to both sides of the argument. 
Indeed, there are quite a few assertions made in this study which some people may find 
difficult to understand. For instance, SORNARAJAH dismisses the idea that private arbitration bodies 
such as the ones constituted by the International Chamber of Commerce can refer to the law of the 
International Convention on Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of 
Other States (ICSID) in settling disputes before them. "As much as it is an error for tribunals not 
created by an international convention to imitate the powers of ICSID, it is an unwelcome 
development in many ICSID arbitrations that an effort is being made to marry ICSID jurisprudence 
with the internationalisation theory" (pp. 352-353). While one can understand the frustration of the 
author with the idea expressed in the second part of the quoted sentence, some people might say 
there is no reason for private tribunals to be barred from using the technique of choice of law 
conferred on a tribunal created by an international convention, if the private tribunals are allowed 
by the parties in the disputes concerned to use that technique and find it to be helpful in resolving 
the dispute before them. 
Another area of difficulty for some people could be with Professor SORNARAJAH's trouble 
expressed regarding the attempts made by "a coterie of scholars of the developed countries", who 
are "totally committed to the protection of the multinational corporation and hostile to the interests 
of the developed countries", to "create investment protection through the formulation of spurious 
doctrines" (p. 335). This is because the type of scholars described by the author have always 
existed and will continue to exist and they would find it difficult to see the points made by the 
author. Not much can be done about the efforts they are making to advance the interests of 
multinationals. One can only hope that their line of argument would continue to be dismissed by the 
developing states as well as those scholars who labour to come up with an unbiased set of research 
findings. Given the current politico-economic climate of the world, it is, however, anticipated that 
the developing states might not hold on to their beliefs. This is because they have abandoned their 
traditional position with regard to many areas of international relations such as the deep sea-bed 
mining regime of the Law of the Sea Convention, 19982. 
There are a couple of minor technical deficiencies in the book. For instance, the author does 
not always give a source of reference or the standard or primary source of reference for 
international instruments where they are mentioned for the first time in the text (e.g. ICSID at p. 
41). Also, it would have been convenient for casual readers, or for those looking for a quick 
reference, had the author given his main research findings or summarising thoughts in a concluding 
chapter at the end of the book. Equally useful would have been tables of cases and of treaties and 
international instruments in a study of this nature. Nevertheless, the book can certainly be regarded 
as the definitive study of the public international law of foreign investment. It is a masterly 
treatment of the subject matter and constitutes a highly recommendable book for anybody interested 
in this area of international law. 
SURY A SUBEDI 
Hull University Law School 
Essays in Honour of Wang Tieya, by RONALD ST. JOHN MACDONALD (gen. ed.), Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, Dordecht/BostoniLondon, 1994, pp. viii and 964, ISBN 0792 324 692, 
price Dfl. 375.OO/US $ 228.00/£ 150.00. 
The book under review is a collection of a wide range of essays in honour of a well known 
and well respected Chinese scholar of international law, Professor WANG TIEY A. It was edited by 
Professor ST. JOHN MACDONALD, and the list of contributors includes established names in the 
field of international law from all parts of the world: a befitting tribute indeed to a scholar of the 
stature of Professor TIEY A. 
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Essays in Honour of Wang Tieya is a skilfully structured book in that the editor has managed 
to include a wide range of topics in the field of international law in a coherent and orderly manner 
without giving a 'cramped' feeling to the reader. The book is one of considerable length, with an 
introduction and 58 chapters. Two of the chapters are written in French while the rest of the 
contributions are in English. Rather than writing a 'conventional' introduction where the main 
issues to be discussed are highlighted, usually by summarising the contents of the book, the editor 
in a poignant manner gives us a flavour of the themes to come through an insight into the multi-
faceted and rich professional life and personal struggles of Professor TIEY A in the promotion and 
development of international law. The themes thus emerging from this chapter sets the scene for the 
diverse aspects and subjects of international law dealt with by contributors to the volume. Thus, we 
find themes ranging from the problems of teaching of international law in law schools, to 
environmental law, law of the sea, governing Antarctica, the UN system, sovereignty, state 
succession, self determination, the European system for the protection of human rights, to Chinese 
concerns in international law and Asian perspectives on international law, to mention but a few. In 
fact one may safely put forward the view that most topical issues effecting current discourse in 
international law have been dealt with. 
The thematic treatment of the book thus reflects the various aspects of the professional 
interests and pursuits of WANG TIEY A in the field of international law. The common thread running 
through the volume is the conviction that even in politically and economically 'unequal' states, 
international law has a decisive and positive role to play. Faith in the efficacy of international law 
and the struggle towards a core of universalism appears as the dominant theme. MANFRED LACHS's 
statement is rather apt: "an important phenomenon of our days is the growing interdependence of 
States, which creates a new environment: the weak become ever more dependent on the strong but 
so do the strong. Thus disparities have to be made less impressive. It is here that the notion of 
equality integrated into contemporary international law can playa decisive role" (p. 488). LEE 
reiterates this importance of international law in his contribution "International Law Reaching Out" 
thus: "International law should now be disseminated as an area of knowledge to the public at large 
rather than as a tool relevant only to certain professions" (p. 509). 
The book is particularly useful in that it is one of the few texts on international law that deals 
at some length with Asian perspectives and concerns regarding international law. The tone of the 
articles is positive and optimistic without failing to portray the very real difficulties of developing 
an effective regime for implementing international law. The excellent contribution of v AN HOOF, 
entitled "Human Rights in a Multi-Cultural World: The Need for Continued Dialogue", is a clear 
example. 
This collection will be of special interest to international law students and researchers who 
usually have little access to works and writings of non-western scholars as well as non-western 
perspectives on the subject. In this regard, one article deserves special mention as it has raised an 
issue one rarely encounters in international law debates. TERESA SCASSA's article entitled "The 
English Language and the Common Law: China and Hong Kong After 1997" deals with the impact 
of linguistic and cultural difference on law and legal systems. She describes the adverse impact of 
'transplanting' the English legal system (in English) into the Chinese society, and how divisive it 
has proved for the people. The sensitivity and perceptiveness with which the author has dealt with 
this subject is indeed laudable. Her inference and conclusions are of almost universal application to 
the post colonial (and particularly) Third World. 
An omission that has detracted slightly from the truly international flavour of this collection 
was the absence of any specific discussion concerning international law issues pertaining to the 
African continent. This omission is perhaps made more pronounced by the presence of 
contributions touching upon international legal issues relating to Europe, Asia, the Middle East and 
America. The predominance of contributions highlighting Asian concerns is understandable bearing 
in mind the aim and purpose of the collection, but one would have welcomed contributions 
reflecting African concerns and interests in international legal discourse. 
In a vast multi-authored collection of this kind, the main aim of which is to honour an 
individual, it is rather difficult to strike a balance in terms of how evenly various topics of 
international law have been spread through the book. One will therefore discern a more detailed 
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treatment of particular subjects. Two such subjects may be mentioned here. Firstly, nine chapters 
have been devoted to Chinese concerns and perspectives on international law which of course is 
quite appropriate and welcome, considering the context and aim of the book. Secondly, ten chapters 
treat various aspects of law of the sea at some length. This 
concentration on the law of the sea probably stems from the fact that it constituted the special area 
of interest of the contributors. A reader looking for a more general text on international law may 
therefore be excused for mistaking the book as a collection focusing on law of the sea. 
In sum, it has to be said that the book under review is an important and useful contribution to 
existing materials on international law and is highly recommended for international law students 
and researchers. 
SHAHEEN SARDAR ALI 
Peshawar University Law School 

BillLIOGRAPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW CONCERNING 
ASIAN AFFAIRS' 
Editorial introduction 
Except for a few minor modifications this bibliography follows our usual format: it 
provides information on books, articles and other materials dealing with Asian topics and, in 
exceptional cases, it includes other publications considered of interest. Only English language 
publications are cited. 
In the preparation of this bibliography good use has been made of book review sections 
in established professional journals of international law, Asian studies and international 
affairs. Special mention should be made of the bibliography on Public International Law 
published by the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law at 
Heidelberg, Germany, and of the regular list of acquisitions of the Peace Palace Library in 
The Hague, The Netherlands. 
The headings used in this year's bibliography are: 
I. General 
2. States and groups of states 
3. Territory and jurisdiction 
4. Sea, rivers and water-resources 
5. Air and Space 
6. Environment 
7. International conflict and disputes. 
8. War, peace and neutrality, armed conflict and peace-keeping 
9. International criminal law 
10. Peaceful settlement of international disputes 
11. Diplomatic and consular relations 
12. Individuals, groups of persons - human rights 
13. Decolonization and self-determination 
14. International economic relations 
15. Development 
16. Information and communication 
17. United Nations and other international/regional organizations 
• Edited by I.I.G. Syatauw, General Editor. 
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3. TERRITORY AND JURISDICTION 
BLAKE, GERALD H. (ed.), World Boundaries Series, Vol. 1: Global Boundaries, CLIVE H. 
SCHOFIELD (ed.), London, Routledge, 1994, 125 pp. 
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(1994). 
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Mass., Harvard Univ. Press, 1992,221 pp. 
KLABBERS, JAN, No More Shifting Lines?, The Report of the Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation 
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SCHOFIELD, RICHARD N. (ed.), Territorial Foundations of the Gulf States, London, UCL Press, 
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SCHOFIELD, RICHARD (ed.), South-West Arabia, 6 vols., [Farnham Common] Archive Editions 
(Arabian Geopolitics), 1993 [vol. 1: Boundaries, Territorial Claims and Disputes (I), 757 pp.; vol. 
2: Boundaries, Territorial Claims and Disputes (II), 566 pp.; vol. 3: The Shaping of State Territory 
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PROTOCOL TO AMEND THE FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT ON 
ENHANCING ASEAN ECONOMIC CO.OPERATION! 
Bangkok, 15 December 1995 
[The Heads of State or of Government of the Member States of ASEAN] 
Recalling the Framework Agreement on Enhancing ASEAN Economic Cooperation (,the 
Agreement') signed on 28 January at the Fourth Summit Meeting held in Singapore; 
Desiring to expedite the implementation of the Common Effective Preferential Tariff 
(CEPT) Scheme for the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA); 
Have agreed as follows: 
Article 1 
Article 2, section A, paragraph 1 of the Agreement shall be amended by deleting the 
expression '15 years' and substituting it with the expression '10 years (beginning 1 January 
1993)'. 
Article 2 
The following shall be inserted after Article 12 as a new Article 12A to the Agree-
ment: 
"Accession of New Members 
New Members of ASEAN shall accede to the Agreement on terms and conditions 
consistent with it and which have been agreed between them and the existing Members of 
ASEAN." 
Article 3 
This Protocol shall enter into force upon the deposit of instruments of ratification or 
acceptance by all signatory governments with the Secretary-General of ASEAN which 
shall be done not later than 1 January 1996. 
This Protocol shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of ASEAN, who shall 
promptly furnish a certified copy thereof to each Member Country. 
Done at Bangkok, ... in a single copy in the English language. 
I Text from: Fifth ASEAN Summit-Meeting of the ASEAN Heads of Government - Bangkok 14-
15 December 1995 p.86. For the Framework Agreement, see Vol. 2, p. 412. 
Asian Yearbook of International Law, Volume 6 (Ko Swan Sik et al., eds. 
C Kluwer Law International; printed in the Netherlands), pp. 501·51& 
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PROTOCOL TO AMEND THE AGREEMENT ON THE COMMON 
EFFECTIVE PREFERENTIAL TARIFF (CEPT) SCHEME FOR THE ASEAN 
FREE TRADE AREA (AFT A)2 
Bangkok, 15 December 1995 
The Governments of . . ., Member States of the Association of South East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN); 
Noting the Agreement on the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) Scheme for 
the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) ('the Agreement') signed in Singapore on 28 
January 1992; 
Recognising the need to amend the Agreement to reflect the latest developments in 
ASEAN; 
Have agreed as follows: 
Article 1 
Article 2, paragraphs 3,5 and 6 of the Agreement be amended to read as follows: 
"3. Exclusions at the HS 8/9 digit level for specific products are permitted for those 
Member States, which are temporarily not ready to include such products in the CEPT 
Scheme. For specific products, which are sensitive to a Member State, pursuant to Article 
1(3) of the Framework Agreement on Enhancing ASEAN Economic Cooperation, a 
Member State may exclude products from the CEPT Scheme, subject to a waiver of any 
concession herein provided for such products. These temporarily excluded products are to 
be gradually included into the CEPT by 1 January 2000. 
5. All manufactured products, including capital goods, and agricultural products shall 
be in the CEPT Scheme. These products shall automatically be subject to the schedule of 
tariff reduction set out in Article 4 of the Agreement as revised in Article 3 of this Proto-
col. In respect of PTA items, the schedule of tariff reduction provided for in the revised 
Article 4(A) set out in Article 3 of this. Protocol shall be applied, taking into account the 
tariff rate after the application of the existing margin of preference (MOP)as at 31 Decem-
ber 1992. 
6. All products under the PTA which are not in the list for tariff reductions of the 
CEPT Scheme shall continue to enjoy the MOPs existing as at 31 December 1992." 
Article 2 
Article 3 of the Agreement be amended to read as follows: 
"This Agreement shall apply to all manufactured products including capital goods, and 
agricultural products. " 
2 Text from op.cit.n.1 p.88. For the Agreement, see Vol. 2, p. 415. 
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Article 3 
Article 4 of the Agreement be substituted with the following: 
"Schedule of Tariff Reduction and Enjoyment of Concessions 
A. Schedule of Tariff Reduction 
1. Member States agree to the following schedule of effective preferential tariff reduc-
tions: 
a. The reduction from existing tariff rates to 20% shall be completed within a time 
frame of 5 years, from 1 January 1993, subject to a programme of reduction to be 
decided by each Member State, which shall be announced at the start of the pro-
gramme. Member States are encouraged to adopt an annual rate of reduction, 
which shall be (X-20)%/5, where X equals the existing tariff rates of individual 
Member States. 
b. The subsequent reduction of tariff rates from 20% or below shall be completed 
within a time frame of 5 years. The rate of reduction shall be at a minimum of 5% 
quantum per reduction. A programme of reduction to be decided by each Member 
State shall be announced at the start of the programme. 
c. For products with existing tariff rates of 20% or below as at 1 January 1993, 
Member States shall decide upon a programme of tariff reductions, and announce 
at the start, the schedule of tariff reductions. 
2. The above schedule of tariff reduction shall not prevent Member States from immedi-
ately reducing their tariffs to 0%-5% or following an accelerated schedule of tariff reduc-
tion. 
B. Enjoyment of Concessions 
Subject to Articles 4(A)(1b) and 4(A)(1c) of the Agreement, products which reach, or 
are at tariff rates of 20% or below, shall automatically enjoy the concessions." 
Article 4 
The following be inserted after Article 9 as a new Article 9A to the Agreement: 
"Accession of New Members 
New Members of ASEAN shall accede to this Agreement on terms and conditions, 
which are consistent with the Framework Agreement on Enhancing ASEAN Economic 
Cooperation (1992) and the Agreement, and which have been agreed between them and the 
existing Members of ASEAN. " 
Article 5 
This Protocol shall enter into force upon the deposit of instruments of ratification or 
acceptance by all signatory governments with the Secretary-General of ASEAN which 
shall be done not later than 1 January 1996. 
This Protocol shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of ASEAN, who shall 
promptly furnish a certified copy thereof to each Member Country. 
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ASEAN FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
CO-OPERA TION3 
Bangkok, 15 December 1995 
The Governments of . . ., Member States of the Association of South East Asian 
Nations (hereinafter refrerred to as 'ASEAN'); 
Recognising the important role of intellectual property rights in the conduct of trade and 
the flow of investment among the Member States of ASEAN and the importance of 
cooperation in intellectual property in the region; 
Have agreed as follows: 
Article 1 : Objectives 
1. Member States shall strengthen their cooperation in the field of intellectual property 
through an open and outward looking attitude with a view to contributing to the promotion 
and growth of regional and global trade liberalisation. 
2. Member States shall promote cooperation in the field of intellectual property among 
government agencies as well as among the private sectors and professional bodies of 
ASEAN. 
3. Member States shall explore appropriate intra-ASEAN cooperation arrangements in the 
field of intellectual property, contributing to the enhancement of ASEAN solidarity as well 
as to the promotion of technological innovation and the transfer and dissemination of 
technology. 
4. Member States shall explore the possibility of setting up and ASEAN patent system, 
including an ASEAN Patent Office, if feasible, to promote the region-wide protection of 
patents bearing in mind developments on regional and international protection of patents. 
5. Member States shall explore the possibility of setting up of an ASEAN trademark 
system, including an ASEAN Trademark Office, if feasible, to promote the region-wide 
protection of trademarks bearing in mind developments on regional and international 
protection of trademarks. 
6. Member States shall have consultations on the development of their intellectual property 
regimes with a view to creating ASEAN standards and practices which are consistent with 
international standards. 
Article 2 : Principles 
1. Member States shall abide by the principle of mutual benefits in the implementation of 
measures or initiatives aimed at enhancing ASEAN intellectual property cooperation. 
2. Member States, being mindful of the international conventions on intellectual property 
rights to which they are parties, and the international obligations assumed under the 
provisions of the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 
shall implement intra-ASEAN intellectual property arrangements in a manner in line with 
3 Text from op.cit.n.l p.105. 
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the objectives, principles, and norms set out in such relevant conventions and the Agree-
ment on TRIPS. 
3. Member States shall strive to implement intra-ASEAN intellectual property coopera-
tion arrangements which are beneficial to creators, producers and users of intellectual 
property and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare. 
4. Member States shall recognise and respect the protection and enforcement of intellec-
tual property rights in each Member State and the adoption of measures necessary for the 
protection of public health and nutrition and the promotion of the public interests in sectors 
of vital importance to the Member States socio-economic and technological development, 
which are consistent with their international obligations. 
5. Member States are conscious of and understand the necessity for each Member State to 
adopt appropriate measures to prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights by right 
holders or the resort to practices which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the 
international transfer of technology. 
Article 3 : Scope of Cooperation 
1. Cooperation shall include, inter alia, the fields of copyright and related rights, patents, 
trademarks, industrial designs, geographical indications, undisclosed information and lay-
out designs of integrated circuits. 
2. Cooperative activities under this Agreement shall aim, among others, to strengthen 
ASEAN intellectual property administration; to enhance ASEAN cooperation in intellec-
tual property enforcement and protection; and to explore the possibility of setting up the 
ASEAN patent and trademark systems. 
3. Cooperative activities under this Agreement shall include, inter alia: 
3.1 Activities to enhance intellectual property enforcement and protection: 
a. Effective protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights; 
b. Cross border measures cooperation; 
c. Networking of judicial authorities and intellectual property enforcement agencies. 
3.2 Activities to strengthen ASEAN intellectual property administration such as: 
a. automation to improve the administration of intellectual property; and 
b. the creation of an ASEAN database on intellectual property registration. 
3.3 Activities to strengthen intellectual property legislation such as: 
a. comparative study of the procedures, practices and administration of ASEAN 
intellectual property offices; and 
b. activities related to the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement and other recog-
nised international intellectual property conventions. 
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3.4 Activities to promote human resources development such as: 
a. Networking of intellectual property training facilities or centres of excellence on 
intellectual property and to explore the possibility of establishing a regional train-
ing institute for intellectual property or other appropriate structures; and 
b. Exchange of intellectual property personnel and experts. 
3.5 Activities to promote public awareness of intellectual property rights. 
3.6 Activities to promote private sector cooperation in intellectual property such as to 
explore the possibility of: 
a. The establishment of an ASEAN Intellectual Property Association; and 
b. Providing arbitration services or other alternative dispute resolution mechanisms 
for the resolution of intellectual property disputes. 
3.7 Information exchange on intellectual property issues. 
3.8 Other cooperative activities as determined by Member States. 
4. Details and the modalities to implement the cooperative activities are to be formulated 
in the form of a program of action on intellectual property under this Framework Agree-
ment. 
Article 4 : Review of Cooperative Activities 
An ASEAN mechanism shall be established, comprising representatives from Member 
States, to review the cooperative activities under this Agreement. It shall meet on a regular 
basis to review the progress of the cooperative activities and any arrangement arising 
therefrom and to submit its findings and recommendations to the ASEAN Senior Economic 
Officials Meeting (SEaM). The ASEAN Secretariat shall give necessary secretariat 
support to the mechanism. 
Article 5 : Consultations 
1. Any differences between the Member States concerning the interpretation or application 
of this Agreement shall, as far as possible, be settled amicably between the parties. 
2. Member States shall accord adequate opportunity for consultations regarding any 
representations made by other Member States in relation to the differences between them. 
If such differences cannot be settled amicably, they shall be dealt with by the SEaM and 
finally by the ASEAN Economic Ministers Meeting. 
Article 6 : General Provisions 
Nothing in this Agreement shall prejudice any existing or future bilateral or multilat-
eral agreement entered into by any Member State or the national laws of each Member 
State relating to the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights. 
Article 7 : Funding 
Activities under this Agreement will be subject to the availability of funds. Expenses 
incurred as a result of any activity undertaken by a Member State to fulfil the objectives of 
this Agreement shall be borne by the Member State concerned unless all Member States 
decide otherwise. 
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Article 8 : Final Provisions 
1. The respective Governments of Member States shall undertake the appropriate measures 
to fulfil the agreed obligations arising from this Agreement. 
2. Any amendment to this Agreement shall be made by consensus and shall become 
effective upon acceptance by all Member States. 
3. No reservation shall be made with respect to any of the provisions of this Agreement. 
4. This Agreement shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of ASEAN who shall 
promptly furnish a certified copy thereof to each Member State. 
5. This Agreement shall enter into force upon the deposit of instruments of ratification or 
acceptance by all signatory governments with the Secretary-General of ASEAN. 
ASEAN FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT ON SERVICES4 
Bangkok, 15 December 1995 
The Governments of ... , Member States of the Association of South East Asian 
Nations (hereinafter referred to as 'ASEAN'); 
Reiterating their commitments to the rules and principles of the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (hereinafter referred to as 'GATS') and noting that Article V of GATS 
permits the liberalising of trade in services between or among the parties to an economic 
integration agreement; 
Affirming that ASEAN Member States shall extend to one another preference in trade in 
services; 
Have agreed as follows: 
Article I : Objectives 
The objectives of the Member States under the ASEAN Framework Agreement on 
Services (hereinafter referred to as 'this Framework Agreement') are: 
(a) to enhance cooperation in services amongst Member States in order to improve the 
efficiency and competitiveness, diversify production capacity and supply and distribution 
of services of their service suppliers within and outside ASEAN; 
4 Text from op.cit.n.l p.1I0. 
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(b) to eliminate substantially restrictions to trade in services amongst Member States; and 
(c) to liberalise trade in services by expanding the depth and scope of liberalisation beyond 
those undertaken by Member States under the GATS with the aim to realising a free trade 
area in services. 
Article II : Areas of Cooperation 
I. All Member States shall participate in the cooperation arrangements under this Frame-
work Agreement. However, taking cognizance of paragraph 3 of Article I of this Frame-
work Agreement on Enhancing ASEAN Economic Cooperation, two or more Member 
States may proceed first if other Member States are not ready to implement these arrange-
ments. 
2. Member States shall strengthen and enhance eXlstmg cooperation efforts in service 
sectors and develop cooperation in sectors that are not covered by existing cooperation 
arrangements, through inter alia: 
(a) establishing or improving infrastructural facilities; 
(b) joint production, marketing and purchasing arrangements; 
(c) research and development; and 
(d) exchange of information. 
3. Member States shall identify sectors for cooperation and formulate Action Plans, 
Programmes and Understandings that shall provide details on the nature and extent of 
cooperation. 
Article III : Liberalisation 
Pursuant to Article 1 (c), Member States shaliliberalise trade in services in a substan-
tial number of sectors within a reasonable time-frame by: 
(a) eliminating substantially all existing discriminatory measures and market access 
limitations amongst Member States; and 
(b) prohibiting new or more discriminatory measures and market access limitations. 
Article IV: Negotiation of Specific Commitments 
1. Member States shall enter into negotiations on measures affecting trade in specific 
service sectors. Such negotiations shall be directed towards achieving commitments which 
are beyond those inscribed in each Member State's schedule of specific commitments 
under the GATS and for which Member States shall accord preferential treatment to one 
another on an MFN basis. 
2. Each Member State shall set out in a schedule, the specific commitments it shall 
undertake under paragraph 1. 
3. The provisions of this Framework Agreement shall not be so construed as to prevent 
any Member State from conferring or according advantages to adjacent countries in order 
to facilitate exchanges limited to contiguous frontier zones of services that are both locally 
produced and consumed. 
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Article V : Mutual Recognition 
1. Each Member State may recognise the education or experience obtained, requirements 
met, or licenses or certifications granted in another Member State, for the purpose of 
licensing or certification of service suppliers. Such recognition may be based upon an 
agreement or arrangement with the Member State concerned or may be accorded autono-
mously. 
2. Nothing in paragraph 1 shall be so construed as to require any Member State to accept 
or to enter into such mutual recognition agreements or arrangements. 
Article VI : Denial of Benefits 
The benefits of this Framework Agreement shall be denied to a service supplier who is 
a natural person of a non-Member State or a juridical person owned or controlled by 
persons of a non-Member State constituted under the laws of a Member State, but not 
engaged in substantive business operations in the territory of Member State(s). 
Article VII : Settlement of Disputes 
1. The Protocol on Dispute Settlement Mechanism for ASEAN shall generally be referred 
to and applied with respect to any disputes arising from, or any differences between 
Member States concerning the interpretation or application of, this Framework Agreement 
or any arrangements arising therefrom. 
2. A specific dispute settlement mechanism may be established for the purposes of this 
Framework Agreement which shall form an integral part of this Framework Agreement. 
Article VIII : Supplementary Agreements or Arrangements 
Schedules of specific commitments and Understandings ansmg from subsequent 
negotiations under this Framework Agreement and any other agreements or arrangements, 
Action Plans and Programmes arising thereunder shall form an integral part of this 
Framework Agreement. 
Article IX : Other Agreements 
1. This Framework Agreement or any action taken under it shall not affect the rights and 
obligations of the Member States under any existing agreements to which they are parties. 
2. Nothing in this Framework Agreement shall affect the rights of the Member States to 
enter into other agreements not contrary to the principles, objectives and terms of this 
Framework Agreement. 
3. Upon the signing of this Framework Agreement, Member States shall promptly notify 
the ASEAN Secretariat of any agreements pertaining to or affecting trade in services to 
which that Member is a signatory. 
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Article X : Modification of Schedules of Specific Commitments 
1. A Member State may modify or withdraw any commitment in its schedule of specific 
commitments, at any time after three years from the date on which that commitment 
entered into force provided: 
(a) that it notifies other Member States and the ASEAN Secretariat of the intent to modify 
or withdraw a commitment three months before the intended date of implementation of the 
modification or withdrawal; and 
(b) that it enters into negotiations with an affected Member State to agree to necessary 
compensatory adjustment. 
2. In achieving a compensatory adjustment, Member States shall ensure that the general 
level of mutually advantageous commitment is not less favourable to trade than that 
provided for in the schedules of specific commitments prior to such negoti.ations. 
3. Compensatory adjustment shall be made on an MFN basis to all other Member States. 
4. The SEOM [Senior Economic Officials Meeting] with the endorsement of the AEM 
[ASEAN Economic Ministers Meeting] may draw up additional procedures to give effect 
to this Article. 
Article XI : Institutional Arrangements 
I. The SEOM shall carry out such functions to facilitate the operation of this Framework 
Agreement and further its objectives, including the organisation of the conduct of negoti-
ations, review and supervision of the implementation of this Framework Agreement. 
2. The ASEAN Secretariat shall assist SEOM in carrying out its functions, including 
providing the support for supervising, coordinating and reviewing the implementation of 
this Framework Agreement. 
Article XII : Amendments 
The provisions of this Framework Agreement may be amended through the consent of 
all the Member States and such amendments shall become effective upon acceptance by all 
Member States. 
Article XIII : Accession of New Members 
New Members of ASEAN shall accede to this Framework Agreement on terms and 
conditions agreed between them and signatories to this Framework Agreement. 
Article XIV : Final Provision 
I. The terms and definitions and other provisions of the GATS shall be referred to and 
applied to matters arising under this Framework Agreement for which no specific provi-
sion has been made under it. 
2. This Framework Agreement shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of ASEAN, 
who shall promptly furnish a certified copy thereof to each Member State. 
3 . This Framework Agreement shall enter into force upon the deposit of instruments of 
ratification or acceptance by all signatory governments with the Secretary-General of 
ASEAN. 
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INDIA - NEPAL TREATY CONCERNING THE INTEGRATED 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE MAHAKALI RIVER INCLUDING SARADA 
BARRAGE, TANAKPUR BARRAGE AND PANCHESWAR PROJECT 
New Delhi, 12 February 1996' 
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Recognizing that the Mahakali River is a boundary river on major stretches between the two 
countries; 
Realizing the desirability to enter into a treaty on the basis of equal partnership to define their 
obligations and corresponding rights and duties thereto in regard to the waters of the Mahakali 
River and its utilization; 
Noting the Exchange of Letters of 1920 through which both the Parties had entered into an 
arrangement for the construction of the Sarada Barrage in the Mahakali River, whereby Nepal 
is to receive some waters from the said Barrage; 
Recalling the decision taken in the Joint Commission dated 4-5 December, 1991 and the Joint 
Communique issued during the visit of the Prime Minister of India to Nepal on 21st October, 
1992 regarding the Tanakpur Barrage which India has constructed in a course of the Mahakali 
River with a part of the eastern afflux bund at Jimuwa and the adjoining pondage area of the 
said Barrage lying in the Nepalese territory; 
Noting that both the parties are jointly preparing a Detailed Project Report of the Panchesh-
war Multipurpose Project to be implemented in the Mahakali River; 
Now, therefore, the Parties hereto hereby have agreed as follows: 
Article 1 
1. Nepal shall have the right to a supply of 28.35 m3/s (1000 cusecs) of water from the 
Sarada Barrage in the wet season (i.e. from 15th May to 15th October) and 4.25 m3/s (150 
cusecs) in the dry season (i.e. from 16th October to 14th May). 
2. India shall maintain a flow of not less than 10 m3/s (350 cusecs) downstream of the Sarada 
Barrage in the Mahakali River to maintain and preserve the river eco-system. 
3. In case the Sarada Barrage becomes non-functional due to any cause: 
• Courtesy of the Minister of Water Resources of Nepal. 
The notes exchanged on the same date between the two prime ministers are not reproduced. The 
notes recall certain items in the Treaty previously regulated on 4-5 Dec. 1991 by the Joint 
Commission and governed by the Prime Ministers' Joint Communique of 21 October 1992. 
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a) Nepal shall have the right to a supply of water as mentioned in Paragraph 10f this 
Article, by using the head regulator(s) mentioned in Paragraph 2 of Article 2 herein. 
Such a supply of water shall be in addition to the water to be supplied to Nepal pursu-
ant to Paragraph 2 of Article 2. 
(b) India shall maintain the river flow pursuant to Paragraph 2 of this Article from the 
tailrace of the Tanakpur Power Station downstream of the Sarada Barrage. 
Article 2 
In continuation of the decisions taken in the Joint Commission dated 4-5 December, 1991 
and the Joint Communique issued during the visit of the Prime Minister of India to Nepal on 
21st October, 1992, both the Parties agree as follows: 
1. For the construction of the eastern afflux bund of the Tanakpur Barrage, at Jimuwa and 
tying it up to the high ground in the Nepalese territory at EL 250 M, Nepal gives its consent 
to use a piece of land of about 577 metres in length (an area of about 2.9 hectares) of the 
Nepalese territory at the Jimuwa Village in Mahendranagar Municipal area and a certain 
portion of the No-Man's Land on either side of the border. The Nepalese land consented to be 
so used and the land lying on the west of the said land (about 9 hectares) upto the Nepal-India 
border which forms a part of the pondage area, including the natural resources endowment 
lying within that area, remains under the continued sovereignty and control of Nepal and 
Nepal is free to exercise all attendant rights thereto. 
2. In lieu of the eastern afflux bund of the Tanakpur Barrage, at Jimuwa thus constructed, 
Nepal shall have the right to: 
(a) a supply of 28.35 m3/s (1000 cusecs) of water in the wet season (i.e. from 15th May to 
15th October) and 8.50 m3/s (300 cusecs) in the dry season (i.e. from 16th October to 
14th May) from the date of the entry into force of this Treaty. For this purpose and for 
the purposes of Article 1 herein, India shall construct the head regulator(s) near the left 
undersluice of the Tanakpur Barrage and also the waterways of the required capacity upto 
the Nepal-India border. Such head regulator(s) and waterways shall be operated jointly. 
(b) a supply of 70 millions kilowatt-hour (unit) of energy on a continuous basis annually, free 
of cost, from the date of the entry into force of this Treaty. For this purpose, India shall 
construct a 132 Kv transmission line upon the Nepal-India border from the Tanakpur 
Power Station (which has, at present, an installed capacity of 120,000 kilowatt generating 
448.4 millions kilowatt-hour of energy annually on 90 percent dependable year flow). 
3. Following arrangements shall be made at the Tanakpur Barrage at the time of development 
of any storage project(s) including Pancheshwar Multi-purpose Project upstream of the 
Tanakpur Barrage: 
(a) Additional head regulator and the necessary waterways, as required, up to the Nepal-India 
border shall be constructed to supply additional water to Nepal. Such head regulator and 
waterways shall be operated jointly. 
(b) Nepal shall have additional energy equal to half of the incremental energy generated from 
the Tanakpur Power Station, on a continuous basis from the date of augmentation of the 
flow of the Mahakali River and shall bear half of the additional operation cost and, if re-
quired, half of the additional capital cost at the Tanakpur Power Station for the generation 
of such incremental energy. 
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Article 3 
Pancheshwar MUltipurpose Project (hereinafter referred to as the 'Project') is to be 
constructed on a stretch of the Mahakali River where it forms the boundary between the two 
countries and hence both the Parties agree that they have equal entitlement in the utilization of 
the waters of the Mahakali River without prejudice to their respective existing consumptive 
uses of the waters of the Mahakali River. Therefore, both the Parties agree to implement the 
Project in the Mahakali River in accordance with the Detailed Project Report (DPR) being 
jointly prepared by them. The Project shall be designed and implemented on the basis of the 
following principles: 
1. The Project shall, as would be agreed between the Parties, be designed to produce the 
maximum total net benefit. All benefits accruing to both the Parties with the development of 
the Project in the forms of power, irrigation, flood control etc., shall be assessed. 
2. The Project shall be implemented or caused to be implemented as an integrated project 
including power stations of equal capacity on each side of the Mahakali River. The two power 
stations shall be operated in an integrated manner and the total energy generated shall be 
shared equally between the Parties. 
3. The cost of the Project shall be borne by the Parties in proportion to the benefits accruing 
to them. Both the Parties shall jointly endeavour to mobilize the finance required for the 
implementation of the Project. 
4. A portion of Nepal's share of energy shall be sold to India. The quantum of such energy 
and its price shall be mutually agreed upon between the Parties. 
Article 4 
India shall supply 10 m3/s (350 cusecs) of water for the irrigation of Dodhara-Chandani 
area of Nepalese Territory. The technical and other details will be mutually worked out. 
Article 5 
1. Water requirements of Nepal shall be given prime consideration in the utilization of the 
waters of the Mahakali River. 
2. Both the Parties shall be entitled to draw their share of waters of the Mahakali River from 
the Tanakpur Barrage and/or other mutually agreed points as provided for in this Treaty and 
any subsequent agreement between the Parties. 
Article 6 
Any project, other than those mentioned herein, to be developed in the Mahakali River, 
where it is a boundary river, shall be designed and implemented by an agreement between the 
Parties on the principles established by this Treaty. 
Article 7 
In order to maintain the flow and level of the waters of the Mahakali River, each Party 
undertakes not to use or obstruct or divert the waters of the Mahakali River adversely 
affecting its natural flow and level except by an agreement between the Parties. Provided, 
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however, this shall not preclude the use of the waters of the Mahakali River by the local 
communities living along both sides of the Mahakali River, not exceeding five (5) percent of 
the average annual flow at Pancheshwar. 
Article 8 
This Treaty shall not preclude planning, survey, development and operation of any work 
on the tributaries of the Mahakali River, to be carried out independently by each Party in its 
own territory without adversely affecting the provision of Article 7 of this Treaty. 
Article 9 
1. There shall be a Mahakali River Commission (hereinafter referred to as the 'Commis-
sion'). The Commission shall be guided by the principles of equality, mutual benefit and no 
harm to either Party. 
2. The Commission shall be composed of an equal number of representatives from both the 
Parties. 
3. The functions of the Commission shall, inter alia, include the following: 
(a) To seek information on and, if necessary, inspect all structures included in the Treaty and 
make recommendations to both the Parties to take steps which shall be necessary to imple-
ment the provisions of this Treaty. 
(b) To make recommendations to both the Parties for the conservation and utilization of the 
Mahakali River as envisaged and provided for in this Treaty. 
(c) To provide expert evaluation of projects and recommendations thereto. 
(d) To co-ordinate and monitor plans of actions arising out of the implementation of this 
Treaty, and 
(e) To examine any differences arising between the Parties concerning the interpretation and 
application of this Treaty. 
4. The expenses of the Commission shall be borne equally by both the Parties. 
5. As soon as the Commission has been constituted pursuant to Paragraphs 1 and 2 of this 
Article, it shall draft its rules of procedure which shall be submitted to both the Parties for 
their concurrence. 
6. Both the Parties shall reserve their rights to deal directly with each other on matters which 
may be in the competence of the Commission. 
Article 10 
Both the Parties may form project specific joint entity/ies for the development, execution 
and operation of new projects including Pancheshwar Multipurpose Project in the Mahakali 
River for their mutual benefit. 
Article 11 
1. If the Commission fails under Article 9 of this Treaty to recommend its opinion after 
examining the differences of the Parties within three (3) months of such reference to the 
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Commission or either Party disagrees with the recommendation of the Commission, then a 
dispute shall be deemed to have been arisen which shall then be submitted to arbitration for 
decision. In so doing either Party shall give three (3) months prior notice to the other Party. 
2. Arbitration shall be conducted by a tribunal composed of three arbitrators. One arbitrator 
shall be nominated by Nepal, one by India, with neither country to nominate its own national 
and the third arbitrator shall be appointed jointly, who, as a member of the tribunal, shall 
preside over such tribunal. In the event that the Parties are unable to agree upon the third 
arbitrator within ninety (90) days after receipt of a proposal, either Party may request the 
Secretary-General of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague to appoint such 
arbitrator who shall not be a national of either country. 
3. The procedures of the arbitration shall be determined by the arbitration tribunal and the 
decision of a majority of the arbitrators shall be the decision of the tribunal. The proceedings 
of the tribunal shall be conducted in English and the decision of such a tribunal shall be in 
writing. Both the Parties shall accept the decision as final, definitive and binding. 
4. Provision for the venue of arbitration, the administrative support of the arbitration 
tribunal and the remuneration and expenses of its arbitrators shall be as agreed in an exchange 
of notes between the Parties. Both the Parties may also agree by such exchange of notes on 
alternative procedures for settling differences arising under this Treaty. 
Article 12 
1. Following the conclusion of this Treaty, the earlier understanding reached between the 
Parties concerning the utilization of the waters of the Mahakali River from the Sarada Barrage 
and the Tanakpur Barrage, which have been incorporated herein, shall be deemed to have 
been replaced by this Treaty. 
2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification and shall enter into force on the date of ex-
change of instruments of ratification. It shall remain valid for a period of seventy five (75) 
years from the date of its entry into force. 
3. This Treaty shall be reviewed by both the Parties at ten (10) years interval or earlier as 
required by either Party and make amendments thereto, if necessary. 
4. Agreements, as required, shall be entered into by the Parties to give effect to the provi-
sions of this Treaty. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned being duly authorised thereto by their respective 
governments have hereto signed this Treaty and affixed thereto their seals in two originals 
each in Hindi, Nepali and English languages, all the texts being equally authentic. In case of 
doubt, the English text shall prevail. 
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TREATY BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDIA 
AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF 
BANGLADESH ON SHARING OF THE GANGA/GANGES WATERS AT 
FARAKKA 
New Delhi, 12 December 1996 
Determined to promote and strengthen their relations of friendship and good neighbourliness, 
Being desirous of sharing by mutual agreement the waters of the international rivers flowing 
through the territories of the two countries and of making the optimum utilisation of the water 
resources of their region in the fields of flood management, irrigation, river basin develop-
ment and generation of hydro-power for the mutual benefit of the peoples of the two coun-
tries, 
Being desirous of finding a fair and just solution without affecting the rights and entitlements 
of either country other than those covered by this Treaty, or establishing any general princi-
ples of law or precedent, 
Have agreed as follows: 
Article 1 
The quantum of waters agreed to be released by India to Bangladesh will be at Farakka. 
Article 2 
(i) The sharing between India and Bangladesh of the Ganga/Ganges waters at Farakka by ten 
day periods from the 1st January to the 31st May every year will be with reference to the 
formula at Annexure I and an indicative schedule giving the implications of the sharing 
arrangement under Annexure I is at Annexure II. 
(ii) The indicative schedule at Annexure II, as referred to in sub para (i) above, is based on 
40 years (1949-1988) lO-day period average availability of water at Farakka. Every effort 
would be made by the upper riparian to protect flows of water at Farakka as in the 40-years 
average availability as mentioned above. 
(iii) In the event flow at Farakka falls below 50,000 cusecs in any lO-day period, the two 
governments will enter into immediate consultations to make adjustments on an emer-
gency basis, in accordance with the principles of equity, fair play and no harm to either 
party. 
Article 3 
The waters released to Bangladesh at Farakka under Article I shall not be reduced below 
Farakka except for reasonable uses of waters, not exceeding 200 cusecs, by India between 
Farakka and the point on the Ganga/Ganges where both its banks are in Bangladesh. 
Article 4 
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A Committee consisting of representatives nominated by the two Govermnents in equal 
numbers (hereinafter called the Joint Committee) shall be constituted following the signing of 
this Treaty. The Joint Committee shall set up suitable teams at Farakka and Hardinge Bridge 
to observe and record at Farakka the daily flows below Farakka Barrage, in the Feeder Canal, 
and at the Navigation Lock, as well as at the Hardinge Bridge. 
Article 5 
The Joint Committee shall decide its own procedure and method of functioning. 
Article 6 
The Joint Committee shall submit to the two Govermnents all data collected by it and 
shall also submit a yearly report to both the Govermnents. Following submission of the 
reports the two Governments will meet at appropriate levels to decide upon such further 
actions as may be needed. 
Article 7 
The Joint Committee shall be responsible for implementing the arrangements contained in 
this Treaty and examining any difficulty arising out of the implementation of the above 
arrangements and of the operation of Farakka Barrage. Any difference or dispute arising in 
this regard, if not resolved by the Joint Committee, shall be referred to the fudo-Bangladesh 
Joint Rivers Commission. If the difference or dispute still remains unresolved, it shall be 
referred to the two Govermnents which shall meet urgently at the appropriate level to resolve 
it by mutual discussion. 
Article 8 
The two Govermnents recognise the need to cooperate with each other in finding a 
solution to the long-term problem of augmenting the flows of the Ganga/Ganges during the 
dry season. 
Article 9 
Guided by the principles of equity, fairness and no harm to either party, both the Gov-
ernments agree to conclude water sharing Treaties/Agreements with regard to other common 
rivers. 
Article 10 
The sharing arrangement under this Treaty shall be reviewed by the two Govermnents at 
five years' interval or earlier, as required by either party and needed adjustments, based on 
principles of equity, fairness, and no harm to either party made thereto, if necessary. It would 
be open to either party to seek the first review after two years to assess the impact and 
working of the sharing arrangements as contained in this Treaty. 
Article 11 
For the period of this Treaty, in the absence of mutual agreement on adjustments follow-
ing reviews as mentioned in Article X, fudia shall release downstream of Farakka Barrage, 
water at a rate not less than 90% (ninety per cent) of Bangladesh's share according to the 
formula referred to in Article n, until such time as mutually agreed flows are decided upon. 
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Article 12 
This Treaty shall enter into force upon signature and shall remain in force for a period of 
thirty years and it shall be renewable on the basis of mutual consent. 
DONE at New Delhi 12th December, 1996 in Hindi, Bangia and English languages. In 
the event of any conflict between the texts, the English text shall prevail. 
ANNEXURE I 
Availability at Share of India Share of 
Farakka Bangladesh 
70,000 cusecs or less 50% 50% 
70,000 - 75,000 cusecs Balance of flow 35,000 cusecs 
75,000 cusecs 40,000 cusecs Balance of flow 
or more 
Subject to the condition that India and Bangladesh each shall receive guaranteed 35,000 cusecs of 
water in alternate three lO-day periods during the period March 1 to May 10. 
[Annexure II is not reproduced] 
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526 
Convention on Psychotropic Sub-
stances, 264 
Convention on the Conflicts of Law 
Relating to the Form of Testamen-
tary Obligations, 244 
Convention on the Control of Trans-
boundary Movements of Hazardous 
Wastes and their Disposal, 242 
Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against 
Women, 247 
Convention on the Law Applicable to 
Maintenance Obligations Towards 
Children, 244 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, 
280 
Convention on the Means of Prohibit-
ing and Preventing the Illicit Import, 
Export and Transfer of Ownership of 
Cultural Property, 236 
Convention on the Nationality of Mar-
ried Women, 246 
Convention on the Political Rights of 
Women, 245 
Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Geno-
cide, 253 
Convention on the Prevention of Ma-
rine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes 
and other matter, 240 
Convention on the Recovery Abroad of 
Maintenance, 243 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, 
248 
Convention on the Settlement of Inter-
national Disputes, 238 
Convention on Wetlands of Interna-
tional Importance especially as Wa-
terfowl Habitat, 239 
Copyright 
conventions, 251-252 
Japan, protection of recordings in, 
393 





Convention on the non- Applica-
bility of Statutory Limitations to 
war Crimes and Crimes against 
Humanity,254 
international, Conventions, 252-256 
proposed establishment of Interna-
tional Criminal Court, 294-298 
Cultural matters 
participation in treaties, 234-235 
Cultural property 
Afghanistan, lotting of treasures, 351 
Myanmar, smuggling from, 350 
participation in treaties, 235-237 
Currency 
Chinese, partial convertibility of, 
433 
mutual support, 432-433 
Debts 




participation in treaties 237 
Diplomatic immunities 
Cambodia, demonstrations at US and 
French embassies, 353 
Chinese regulations, 140-141, 153 
Indonesia, in, 95 
Islamabad, bombing of Egyptian em-
bassy in, 353 
Jakarta, melee in Dutch embassy in, 
354 
Japan, in, 120 
Kabul, attack on Pakistani embassy 
in, 352-353 
Philippines, in, 80 
South Korea, in, 189-190 
Diplomatic protection 






China-France, consulate in 
Guangzhou, 357 
China-Gambia, 356 
Chinese, in Africa, 357 
Hongkong, consulates in, 357 
Indonesia-Australia, 356 
Iran-Jordan, 356 




participation in treaties, 257, 267-
269 




alleged espionage by, 353-354 
Disarmament 
Chinese White Paper, 358 
Dispute settlement 
participation in treaties 238 
Dissidents 
Chinese conviction of, Western con-
demnation of, 389 
Myanmar, 
release in, 360 
visit by Thai ambassador, 410 
Vietnamese-born Americans in 
Cambodia, 360 
East Asia Economic Caucus (EAEC) 
Australian attitude to, 368 
East Timor 
asylum-seekers, 454 
British Embassy, asylum through, 
346 
dialogue, 454 
Indonesian-Portuguese talks, 453 
International Court proceedings, 453 
leaders, talks with, 454 
refugees, Australian attitude to, 345 
Education 
Convention against Discrimination in 
Education, 246 
Elections 
local, right to vote in, 221-223 
Emergency aid 
North Korea, to, 370-371 
Environment 
Arctic. See Arctic 
Biodiversity Treaty, 243 
implementation of, 372 
flora and fauna, 238-243 
527 
Korea, oil spill off coast of, 372 
Malaysian-Indonesian Biodiversity 
Conservation Area, 372 
oil pollution, 238-243 
participation in treaties 238-243 
precautionary principle, 53-55 
Sino-US cooperation, 372 
Taiwan, sanctions for increased 
fauna protection, 372 
UN Conference on Environment and 
Development, follow-up to, 291-
294 
Espionage 
diplomats alleged to have carried 
out, 353-354 
US citizen accused on in China, 334 
US, Japanese protest against, 373 
Evidence 
China, taking in. See China 
Indonesia, taking in, 
Japan, taking in. See Japan 
participation in treaties, 258 
Philippines, taking in. See Philip-
pines 
South Korea, taking in. See South 
Korea 
Extradition 
discretion, exercise of, 224-225 
Thailand, law in, 228-232 
UN draft articles, 299-321 
Family 
participation in treaties, 243-244 
Finance 
participation in treaties, 244-245 
Financial services 
world agreement, 412 
528 
Fisheries 
Japanese-Russian talks, 374 
Myanmar waters, Thai fishing in, 
376 
Philippines, Chinese fishermen con-
victed by, 374 
Thai-Malaysian incidents, 374-375 
Thailand-Vietnam problems, 375 
wild shrimps caught without turtle 





Bangladesh, in, 382 
China, 
Caltex gas storage unit, 380 
China-General Motors coopera-
tion, 380 
expiration of preferential policies, 
380 
natural gas field, 381 
refinery project, withdrawal of Elf 
from, 380 
Three-Gorges Dam project, 381 
European, in Asia, 383 
gas pipeline projects, 379 
German companies, China contracts 
with,378 
India, 
Enron Corp. power plant in, 376-
377 
foreign fast-food chain in, 381 
Indonesia, power plants in, 383 
intra-Asian, 382 
Iranian oil fields, development of, 
378 
Malaysian oil refinery, 379 
Myanmar, in, 377 
Canadian, 382 
North Korea, in, 382 
Pakistan, 
American lobby for, 379 
Southeast Asian investments in, 
382 
Foreign investment, cont'd 
Singapore, by, 378 
South Korea, by, 379 
INDEX 
Subic Bay, Philippine-Taiwanese 
joint venture at, 378 




extradition, UN draft articles, 299-
321 
General Agreement on Trade in Serv-
ices 
ASEAN Framework Agreement, 
507-510 
Health 




export control system, 369 
Hijacking 
Iranian aircraft, of, 383 
Hongkong 
air services agreements, 386 
airport financing, agreement on, 383 
Bill of Rights, review of, 385 
British Dependent Territories Citi-
zenship, 384 
British involvement after hand-over, 
385 
consulates in, 357 
container terminal facilities, 388 
hand-over issues, Sino-British 
agreement on, 384 
Hongkong-Australia air transport 
agreement, 333 
Indians, nationality of, 385 
journalists, expulsion from China, 
335 





preparatory Committee, 387 
residence and nationality questions, 
387 
Taiwan's relations with, 361 
UN Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, and, 386 
US attitude to, 386 
Hostages 
International Convention against the 
taking of Hostages, 255 
Human rights 
China, in, 
conviction of dissident, Western 
condemnation of, 389 
French attitude on, 389 
German attitude on, 388 
no UN action on, 389 
prison facilities, inspection of, 389 
report, 389 
defence, free assistance, 221 
equality before the law, right to, 
207-208 
Indian Constitution, provisions in 
interpretation of, 210 
Myanmar, UN report on, 389 
participation in treaties, 245-249 
refugees, status of, 203-206 
residence, right to, 207-211 
Vietnam attitude to linkage with 
trade, 388 
India 
Act of State, 211-212 
anonymous weapons drop in, 410 
citizenship, claim to, 204 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, 
attitude to, 359 
Constitution, human rights provi-
sions in interpretation of, 210 
Enron Corp. power plant in, 376-377 
ethnicity, relevance of, 373 
foreign broadcasting in, 348 
foreign fast-food chain in, 381 
housing policy, human rights aspects 
of,207-211 
India, cont'd 
India-Bangladesh water sharing 
talks, 446 
529 
India-Myanmar-Thai delimitation of 
trijunction point in Andaman Sea, 
346 
India-Nepal Treaty concerning the 
Integrated Development of the 
Mahakali River Project, 511-515 
India-US air transport agreement, 
333 
International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, ref-
erence to, 208-211 
missile tests, 432 
Nepal-India water agreement, 446 
nuclear tests, alleged plan for, 437 
refugees, status of, 203-206 
satellite, launch of, 452 
Sino-Indian border disagreement, 
347 
Sri Lanka, support for, 395 
state succession, 211-212 
Treaty with Bangladesh on sharing 




foreign awards, enforcement of, 
101-103 
law on, 100 
practice, 101 
Australian visa policy, reaction to, 
439 
China, supply of gas to, 439 
civil law and procedure, 87-88 
civil procedure, sources of, 90 
Country Court, 89 
District Court, 89 
Dutch legal system, influence of, 87 
EEZ, marine scientific research in, 
449 
evidence, taking abroad, 96 
F-36 jets for, 339 
530 
Indonesia, cont'd 
foreign judgments, recognition and 
enforcement, 
declaratory nature, of, 98-99 
discretion of courts, 99 
distinction between, 96-97 
foreign parties to contracts, posi-
tion of, 99 
non-enforceability, 97-98 
proposals for, 97-98 
treaties, absence of, 97 
foreign ships, rights of passage, 
access and communication, 218 
archipelagic sea lanes passage, 217 
innocent passage through, 215-217 
right of transit passage, 217 
High Court, 89 
independence, validity and applica-




archipelagic baseline, 214 
extent of, 213-215 
internal, 214 
sovereignty over, 213 
transitory provisions, 219 
upholding of sovereignty and law 
on,219 
utilization,management, protec-
tion and environmental preser-
vation of, 219 
Indonesian-US talks on right of tran-
sit, 450 
Jakarta, melee in Dutch embassy in, 
354 
judicial system, 89-90 
jurisdiction, 
enjoin or arrest, to, 92-93 
forum actoris, 91-92 
forum non conveniens, 93 
forum selection, 93-94 
immunities, grant of, 
in rem, 93 




notion of, 90 
person, over, 91 
Malaysian-Indonesian Biodiversity 
Conservation Area, 372 
maritime territory, 
archipelagic baseline, 214 
archipelagic waters, legal regime, 
213 
foreign ships, rights of passage, 
215-218 
Indonesian waters, 213-215 
territorial sea, outer limit of, 215 
nuclear power, plans for, 437 




police investigation in Germany de-
nied,421 
power plants in, 383 
preferential tax and tariff treatment, 
416 
satellite, launch of, 452 
separatists, invitation by European 
Parliament, 410 
service of process, 96 
Supreme Court, 89-90 
UN reform, position on, 463 
Insurgents 
communist, Philippine talks with, 
392 
Muslim, in Philippines, 390-391 
Myanmar, in, 392 
Sri Lanka, in, 391 
Intellectual property. See also Copy-
right 
ASEAN Framework Agreement on 
Intellectual Property Co-operation, 
504-507 
Chinese court decision, 393 
participation in treaties, 250-252 
Singapore patents law, 393 
US-China relations, 393-395 
INDEX 
Intellectual property. See also Copy-
right, cont'd 
Vietnam, protection in, 393 
Inter -state relations 






China-North Korea, 404 
China-Russia, 406 
China-Russia-Central Asia, 406 
China-South Korea, 404 
China-Southeast Asia, 408 
China-Sri Lanka, 408 
China-US, 396-400 
China-Vatican, 407 
Chinese policy, restatement of, 404 









Iran-Western powers, 407 
Japan-Korea, 403 




North Korea-Russia, 403 
North Korea-US, 402 
Pakistan-Iran, 405 
Singapore-Australia, 407 
South Korea-Japan, 405 
South Korea-Russia, 403 






International Convention against 
Apartheid in Sports, 248 
International Convention for the Pre-
vention of Pollution of the Sea by 
Oil, 238 
International Convention for the Safety 
of Life at Sea, 273, 276 
International Convention on Civil Li-
ability for Oil Pollution Damage, 
239 
International Convention on the Elimi-
nation of All Forms of Racial Dis-
crimination, 247 
International Convention on the Estab-
lishment of an International Fund for 
Compensation for Oil Pollution 
Damage, 240 
International Convention on the Pro-
tection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of their 
Families, 249 
International Convention Relating to 
Intervention on the High Seas in 
cases of Oil Pollution Casualties, 
238 
International Court of Justice 
arbitral awards, reference to, 
continental shelf, natural prolon-
gation or appurtenance, 14-16 
critical date, notion of, 12-13 
customary law of maritime bound-
ary limitation, as to, 16-17 
effective occupation, principle of, 
10-11 
good faith, negotiation in, 19 
legal status of islands, as to, 18 
tendency of, 9 
uti possidetis, principle of, 13-14 
Chamber, character of, 4 
International Court of Justice 
decisions ex aequo et bono, 
arbitral jurisprudence, and, 22-26 
distributive justice, 22 
equitable results, producing, 21 
increase in, 20 
judicial cases, in, 20-22 
532 
International Court of Justice 
decisions ex aequo et bono, cont'd 
North Seas cases, in, 20 
judges, nationalities of, 6 
judgments, authority of, 9 
Permanent Court of International 
Justice, succeeding, 3 
International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, 246 
Hongkong, in, 386 
International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, 246 
International law 
Asian views, enhancement of pres-
entation of, 62 
International Law Commission 
Rules of Arbitral Procedure, 4, 6 
International Maritime Satellite Or-
ganization Convention, 279 
International Opium Convention, 260 
International trade 
participation in treaties, 257 
Iran 
aircraft, hijacking, 383 
chemical industry, Chinese aid to, 
369 
German investigation of official, 422 
international commercial arbitration 
bill, 337 
Kuwait-Iran, maritime boundaries, 
346 
missile-delivery, sanctions on, 447 
missile tests, 432 
oil fields, development of, 378 
Rushdie death edict, 422 
Russian nuclear fuel for, 436 
sanctions against, 446-447 
US covert actions against, 410 
Islands 
legal status of, 18 
Israel 
proposed recognition by Sri Lanka, 
441 






voting rights, denial of, 336 
annexation of Korea, legality of, 403 
arbitration, 
foreign, recognition of, 133-134 
international, law applicable to, 
132 
procedural law, 133 
validity of agreement, issue of, 
132 
breeder-reactor, 436 
China, trade imbalance with, 414 
citizens, meaning, 221-223 
Code of Civil Procedure, 
amendment, 109 
historical background, 109 
international procedural matters, 
provisions on, 109 
re-appeal system, 108 
summary court proceedings, pro-
visions on, 106 
collective security arrangements, 
constitutional ban on, 418 
copyright protection of recordings, 
393 
disputed islands, policy guideline, 
449 
District Court, 106 
EU, trade with, 415 
evidence, 
foreign law, application of, 123-
124 
foreign states, in, 122 
proceedings abroad, taking for, 
123 
export, Asian share of, 416 
Family Court, 106 
flat glass, Japan-US pact, 411 
foreign judgments, recognition, 
civil judgments, 128-129 
constitutive judgments, 130-131 
effect of, 131 
INDEX 
Japan, cont'd 
foreign judgments, recognition, 
cont'd 
exequatur procedure, 132 
final judgments, 131 
foreign court vested with judicial 
power, rendered by, 131 
jurisdiction of foreign court, 125-
126 
public policy, 127-129 
punitive damages, for, 128-129 
reciprocity, 129-130 
requirements, 125-131 
service and appearance, 126-127 
foreign law, application of, 123-124 
foreign nationals, 
local elections, right to vote in, 
221-223 
trial, costs of, 220-221 
grant-aid to China, suspension of, 
368 
High Court, 107 
insurance market, 415 
international civil procedure, sources 
of, 109 
international treaties, jurisdiction of 
courts, 418 
Japan-US air transport agreement, 
332 
Japan-US security arrangements, re-
vision of, 426-430 
Japan-US Status of Forces Agree-
ment, review of, 421 
judicial system, 105-108 
jurisdiction, 
appearance, on basis of, 115 
corporation, place of business of, 
113 
defendant's domicile, place of, 
112-113 
enjoin and arrest, to, 115 
examination by court, 120-121 
exercise of, 112-117 
forum selection, 117 
immunities, grant of, 119-120 






joinder of claims, 115 
Kankatsu-ken, 110 
lis pendens, 118 
negative declaratory injunction, 
action for, 114 
notion of, 110-112 
performance, place of, 113 
property rights, obligation relating 
to, 114 
quasi in rem, 116 
Saiben-ken, 110 
special circumstance test, 116 
tort, place of, 114 
transboundary cases, in, 111 
Myanmar, aid to, 368 
Okinawa, US bases on, 425-426 
Russia, 
fisheries talks with, 374 
island disputes with, 461 
satellite, launch of, 452 
service of process, 121-122 
summary courts, 105 
Supreme Court, 105, 107-108 
UN peace-keeping, participation in, 
418 
unfair practices, Kodak complaint of, 
411 
unilateral trade sanctions, call for 
end to, 416 
US espionage, protest against, 373 
US military bases, contribution for, 
425 
US semiconductor trade agreement, 
413 
US servicemen, rape incident in 
Okinawa, 421 
Joint development 
China, interest of, 420 
fibre-optic cable system, 419 
gas pipeline projects, 419 
Kazakhstan oil exploitation, 420 
534 
Joint developments, cont'd 
Korean-Russian and Sino-Russian 
energy deals, 420 
Sino-French aircraft development, 
421 
Thai-Malaysia landbridge, 418-419 
Joint ventures 
Sino-Korean commercial airplane 
project, 420 
Vietnamese deals in South China 
Sea, 419 
Judicial assistance 
mutual cooperation in, 299-321 
Judicial cooperation 
participation in treaties, 258 
Judicial settlement 
arbitration distinguished, 
classical differentiations, 5-7 
decisions or reasoning, absence of 
differences in, 26 
functional differences, 3 
recent developments, in light of, 7-
8 
pending cases, 27 
review or improvement, develop-
ments concerning, 4 
tribunal, composition of, 26 
Jurisdiction 
China, in. See China 
Indonesia, in. See Indonesia 
Indonesian police investigation in 
Germany denied, 421 
Japan, in. See Japan 
Japan-US Status of Forces Agree-
ment, review of, 421 
Philippines, in. See Philippines 
South Korea-US Status of Forces 
Agreement, review of, 422 
South Korea, in. See South Korea 
subject-matter, over, 70 
US servicemen, rape incident in 
Okinawa, 421 
Kashmir 
Indian talks and policies, 455 
INDEX 
Kashmir, cont'd 
Indo-Pakistan military skirmishes, 
455 
Red Cross allowed in, 455 
Kazakhstan 




annexation by Japan, legality of, 403 
economic cooperation talks, 367 
oil spill off coast of, 372 
peace talks, 367 
pilot inter-Korean joint venture, 366 
reunification efforts, 367 
rice-aid, 367 
US ships near, 445 
Korean War 
demilitarized zone, repudiation of, 
423 
four-country peace talks, proposal 
for, 423 
North Korean-US talks, 423 
peace accord, proposal for, 423 
Kuwait 






international trade, linkage of stan-
dards with, 423-424 
participation in treaties, 258-260 
Laos 
Mekong, policy on, 446 
Law of the sea 
Asian-African Legal Consultative 
Committee, legal problems 
referred to, 290 




currency, issue by Bank of China, 
385 
nationality issue in, 385 
Malaysia 
Bosnia, arms sales to, 340 
China, supply of gas to, 439 
Malaysian-Indonesian Biodiversity 
Conservation Area, 372 
migrant workers in, 424 
offshore patrol vessels, 340 
oil refinery in, 379 
satellite, launch or; 452 
Thai-Malaysia landbridge, 418-419 
Thailand, fishing incidents, 374-375 
trade preferences, refraining from 
asking for, 412 
Migrant workers 
Asia, in, 425 
Asian-African Legal Consultative 
Committee, legal problems 
referred to, 290 
death of Filipino maid, investigation 
into, 425 
International Convention on the 
Protection of the Rights of All Mi-
grant Workers and Members of 
their Families, 249 
Malaysia, in, 424 
Philippines, phase-out in, 424 
Military alliances 
Japan-US security arrangements, re-
vision of, 426-430 
Okinawa, US bases on, 425-426 
US military bases, Japanese contri-
bution for, 425 
Military cooperation 
Australia, Singapore air force planes 
in, 431 





Asia, balance in, 445 
Minorities 
Thailand, Muslims in, 431 
Missile technology 
535 
Chinese exports to Pakistan, 431 
Indian tests and Pakistani response, 
432 
Iranian missile tests, 432 
Multifibre Arrangement 
phase-out of, 414 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee 
Agency 
Convention establishing, 245 
Myanmar 
Canadian investment in, 382 
China pledge to stop military assis-
tance to, 431 
cultural heritage, smuggling, 350 
dissident, release of, 360 
foreign investment in, 377 
human rights, UN report, 389 
IMF assistance to, 369 
India-Myanmar-Thai delimitation of 
trijunction point in Andaman Sea, 
346 
insurgency in, 392 
Japanese aid to, 368 
Myanmar-Thai border, closure, 346 
Russian helicopter gunships for, 340 
Thailand-Myanmar border wall, 348 
waters, Thai fishing in, 376 
Narcotic drugs 
participation in treaties, 260-264 
Nationality 
participation in treaties, 264-265 
Nepal 
Bhutanese refugees in, 442 
India-Nepal Treaty concerning the 
Integrated Development of the 
Mahakali River Project, 511-515 
Nepal-India water agreement, 446 
New Zealand 
asylum, dispute with South Korea, 
345 
Non-aligned movement 




defectors, asylum, 346 
flood damage, estimates of, 371 
food aid to, 370 
food shortage, 371 
foreign investment in, 382 
foreign workers, consular protection, 
355 
light-water reactor accord, imple-
mentation, 435 
pilot and aircraft, defection of, 368 
rejection of request for aid from 
Thailand, 371 
rice, request for from US, 370 
South Korea, incursion to, 368 
South Korean vessels, arrest of, 367 
UN relief aid, 371 
undercover missionaries in, 337 
Nuclear capacity 
Asia, energy projects in, 437 
Chinese tests, 436 
French nuclear testing, reaction to, 
434 
IAEA, resistance against expanded 
power for, 438 
Indonesian plans, 437 
Iran, Russian nuclear fuel for, 436 
Japanese breeder-reactor, 436 
North Korean light-water reactor ac-
cord, implementation, 435 
Pakistani facilities, alleged Chinese 
exports for, 437-438 
Sino-Iranian reactor deal, cancella-
tion, 436 
Sino-Japanese talks, 434 
Taiwan, of, 435 
Nuclear fusion 
Sino-US laboratory, 350 
Nuclear material 
participation in treaties, 265-266 
Nuclear weapons 
Chinese attitude to, 359 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, 
Indian attitude to, 359 
INDEX 
Nuclear weapons, cont'd 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, 
cont'd 
prospects for, 438 
Indian and Pakistani plans for tests, 
437 
participation in treaties, 281 
South Korean project, 436 
Southeast Asia nuclear weapon-free 
zone, 358-359 
Taiwan, capacity of, 435 
Obscene publications 
suppression of traffic in, Conven-
tions, 277-278 
Oil and gas 
Indonesian supply to South Korea, 
439 
Turkmenistan, natural gas from, 439 
Outer space 
Apstar-2 mishap, explanation of, 451 
APT-AsiaSat talks, 452 
AsiaSat-2, launch of, 451 
Chinese satellite, 453 
Indian satellite, 452 
Indonesian satellite, 452 
Japanese satellite, 452 
Malaysian satellite, 452 
participation in treaties, 266-267 
South Korean launch, 451 
Pakistan 
Afghanistan, alleged interference in, 
409 
American investment lobby for, 379 
Chinese deliveries to, US sanctions, 
447-448 
Chinese missile exports to, 431 
claim against US for money paid for 
planes, 374 
crisis, intervention in, 410 
French warplanes, 339 
German hostage, release of, 334 
IMF loan to, 433 
Indian missile tests, response to, 432 
INDEX 
Pakistan, cont'd 
Islamabad, bombing of Egyptian em-
bassy in, 353 
nuclear facilities, alleged Chinese 
exports for, 437-438 
nuclear tests, alleged plan for, 437 
Southeast Asian investments in, 382 
US arms for, 338 
delivery, delay of, 448 
Passports 
Australian visa policy, Indonesian 
reaction to, 439 
French visa requirements, abolition 
of,440 
Permanent Court of Arbitration 
composition, 5-6 
optional rules, adoption of, 4 
Permanent Court of International 
Justice, and, 3 
permanent observer status, 27 
use, urging, 4 
Permanent Court of International 
Justice 
decisions ex aequo et bono, 20 
defects of arbitration, set up to 
avoid,3 
international law, application of, 7 
judgments, authority of, 9 
Persian Gulf 





asylum in, 443 
Chinese fishermen convicted by, 374 
communist insurgents, talks with, 
392 
Constitution, 67 
Court of Appeals, 64-65 
death of maid, investigation into, 425 
doing business in, meaning, 76-77 
evidence, 





taking in Philippines for litigation 
abroad,83 
foreign judgments, recognition and 
enforcement, 
comity and reciprocity, basis of, 
84 
requisites for, 84-85 
rule on, 83-84 
international civil procedure, sources 
of law, 67-69 
judicial system, 63-67 
jurisdiction, 
concept of, 69-72 
enjoin or arrest, to, 77 
exercise of, 73-78 
forum non conveniens, 71-72 
forum selection, 78-79 
immunities, grant of, 80 
in personam, 73 
in rem, 73 
lis pendens, 79-80 
non-fulfilment of requirements, 
76-77 
person, over, 70-71 
political question doctrine, 72 
quasi in rem, 74 
res, over, 71 
rules ratione materiae, 74-75 
subject-matter, over, 70 
licence for business in, 76-77 
litigation, time taken for, 66 
Marcos accounts, transfer of, 373 
migrant workers, phase-out of, 424 
Muslim foreigners, arrest of, 461 
Muslim insurgents in, 390-391 
Philippines-Indonesia security 
agreement, 445 




service of process, 81-82 
Subic Bay , Philippine-Taiwanese 
joint venture at, 378 
538 
Philippines, cont'd 
Supreme Court, 63-64 
trans-boundary civil disputes, 67 
treaties and conventions, 68-69 
trial courts, 65 
waters, aliens in, 337 
Westinghouse, settlement of claim, 
373 
Piracy 
China, in, 440 
increase of, 440 
South China Sea, in, 440 
Privileges and immunities 
participation in treaties, 267-269 
Racial discrimination 
International Convention on the 







Recognition and enforcement of for-
eign judgments 
China, in. See China 
Indonesia, in. See Indonesia 
Japan, in. See Japan 
Philippines, in. See Philippines 
South Korea, in. See South Korea 
Red Cross 
Kashmir, allowed in, 455 
Sri Lanka, in, 442 
Refugees 
admission, right to decide on, 206 
Asian-African Legal Consultative 
Committee, legal problems re-
ferred to, 289 
asylum, 
East Timorese, sought by, 454 
North Korean defectors, for, 346 
Philippines, in, 443 




Timorese, for, 346 
Vietnamese, for, 443 
Bhutanese, in Nepal, 442 
INDEX 
East Timorese, Australian attitude 
to, 345 
extradition in relation to, 224-225 
India, human rights in, 203-206 
Mon, in Thailand, 442 
participation in treaties, 270 
Vietnamese, 
integration in Israel, 442 
new possibility of asylum for, 443 
Philippines, asylum in, 443 
repatriation of, 443 
Rivers 
ASEAN Mekong River Development 
project, 446 
India-Bangladesh water sharing 
talks, 446 
Mekong, Laos policy on, 446 
Nepal-India water agreement, 446 
Road traffic 




fisheries talks with, 374 
island disputes with, 461 
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Caspian Sea, Iranian-Russian state-
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reform of Security Council, proposal 
for, 461-2 
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 
262 
Sipadan and Ligitan 
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Israel, proposed recognition of, 441 
Red Cross in, 442 
US broadcast, protest against, 348 
State immunity 
China, in, 153 
Indonesia, in, 95 
INDEX 
State immunity, cont'd 
Japan, in, 119-120 
Philippines, in, 80 
South Korea, in, 188-189 
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establishment, 363 
reunification, pledge to, 363 
Russian relations with, 464 
Subic Bay , Philippine-Taiwanese 
joint venture at, 378 
541 
Taiwan, cont'd 
UN seat, rejection of effort to ob-
tain, 365 
Tajikstan 




territorial dispute, 460 
Telecommunications 
Internet, regulation of, 456 
participation in treaties, 279-280 
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PAUL GUGGENHEIM PRIZE 
TO BE A WARDED IN 1999 
The Paul Guggenheim Prize, amounting to Swiss francs 12,000.-, 
will be awarded to a monograph of major importance in the field 
of public international law (except European law). The monograph 
must be of the highest quality and be the work of a young author 
at the beginning of his/her career. Works submitted may be in the 
form of published books or of manuscripts intended for 
publication; they may be written in English, French, German, 
Italian or Spanish. Works which have already been awarded a 
prize of a similar nature will not be considered. 
Applications accompanied by a curriculum vitae, a list of 
publications and five copies of the work submitted must be 
received, no later than 1st February 1999, by: The Paul 
Guggenheim Foundation, The Graduate Institute of International 
Studies, 132, rue de Lausanne, 1211 Geneva 21 (Switzerland). 
Applicants are required to specify whether the work submitted has 
already been awarded a prize. 
The Regulations pertaining to the Prize may be obtained 
at the same address. 
SAT A PRIZE 1999 
In 1997 the Governing Board of the DILA Foundation decided to 
devote part of an annual grant by T okibo Ltd, Tokyo to the 
Foundation, for the award of a prize of US $ 1,500 for an original 
essay of excellent quality written by a young scholar of Asian 
nationality on a topic of public or private international law. The 
prize is named after the President of Tokibo Ltd, Mr.Sata 
Yasuhiko. 
The winning essay will be published in the Asian Year-
book of International Law. The 1999 Sata Prize will be for an 
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and be of a length not less than 8,000 words and not more than 
16,000 words excluding footnotes. 
The Editors of the Yearbook will determine the winning 
essay and notify competitors of the result not later than 31 October 
1999. They may also decide that none of the essays submitted is of 
a quality that would justify award of the prize. The decisions taken 
by the Editors will be final. 
